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The understanding of terrorism has thus far been determined not by some independent 
line of inquiry but instead by a strong interplay between conflicting moral positions. 
Treated sometimes as a method or tactic and at other times as a distinct form of 
violence, the true nature of terrorism remains elusive, while a failure to understand it 
has squarely been blamed on the moral problem. The conceptual and theoretical 
debate in the field of terrorism studies as a result has not progressed in any 
meaningful way. Issues that were associated with terrorism when a formal inquiry 
into the problem was first launched still remain unresolved. Basic questions as to 
whether terrorism generates fear and if it is possible to identify its victim or 
perpetrator continue to plague the terrorism discourse. Meanwhile matters that are 
crucial, such as the widespread tendency to treat terrorism as a tactic, strategy or 
ideology and the essentially contested character of terrorism scholarship are either 
ignored or erroneously taken for granted. This thesis will show that our inability to 
define terrorism is not due to the moral problem as it is made out to be but because of 
our failure to understand the true nature of terrorism. To accomplish this task, it not 
only analyzes issues that are regularly contested but also discusses in detail the ones 
that are trivialized and overlooked. It ultimately concludes that terrorism primarily 
plays only an auxiliary or a facilitatory role and therefore the key to defining it and 
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The question over the definition of terrorism has been raised so many times and in so 
many contexts that even an allusion to it can be off-putting and exasperating. This is 
not necessarily because the discussion is deemed futile and unhelpful but because 
over the years it has not led to anything substantive or conclusive. Following the 
September 11 attacks, this dissatisfaction and frustration grew prodigiously as the 
issue failed to make any serious headway despite drawing in huge amount of financial 
and intellectual resources. The inability to reach a consensus has subsequently led to 
the conclusion that terrorism, whether ultimately definable or not, is an essentially 
contested term. 
Essentially contested concepts are those that ‘inevitably involve endless disputes 
about their proper uses on the part of their users’ as ‘each party continues to defend its 
case with what it claims to be convincing arguments, evidence, and other forms of 
justification’ (Gallie, 1956: 168-169). With terrorism believed to be essentially 
contested, a failure to define it has somewhat acquired the status of orthodoxy in 
terrorism scholarship, prompting many scholars to simply accept the existing 
definitional quagmire as a perpetual and ineluctable status quo. This is not to say that 
the definitional dilemma and the challenges it raises are not deemed problematic, but 
more so to point out that it is a problem that academics feel they can do very little 
about. Resigned thus to a position of despondency, it is perhaps not surprising why 
attempts to define terrorism are viewed with scepticism and incredulity. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the term is essentially contested, questions can and have 
even been raised over the usefulness of defining terrorism. After all, terms like 
democracy and power are also regularly contested, yet a failure to adequately define 
them is not deemed as problematic. More importantly, such failure has not prevented 
scholars from actively, and in many ways, successfully pursuing knowledge about 
these terms. As Richard English points out that ‘Many important phenomenon… 
elude consensual definition, but we do not consequently avoid analyzing them or 
using these terms’ (2016: 9). Given that terrorism is not the only contested term, the 
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amount of criticism and attention it draws certainly appears unfair and excessive. If 
other contested terms can do without a universally accepted or common definition 
then why can terrorism not? 
While it is true that in comparison with other frequently contested terms, the notion of 
terrorism and the ambiguity surrounding its definition draws far more criticism and 
attention, it is important however to acknowledge the extent to which terrorism is 
contested, why it is contested, and the impact that has on both its study and 
policymaking. It is only when these factors are considered that we are able to 
understand why the definitional dilemma of terrorism, as opposed to other contested 
terms, is considered a major stumbling block for not only advancement or research 
undertakings in the field of terrorism studies but also our policy responses to incidents 
of terrorism more generally. 
Now understandably it can be very difficult to explain why certain terms are 
essentially contested, as there is often a multitude of factors at play. And although this 
is generally true for terrorism as well, the contest and division over its precise 
meaning can nevertheless conveniently be expressed in moral terms. As a highly 
politicized and inherently pejorative term, terrorism is first and foremost believed to 
be a moral problem (See e.g. Wardlaw, 1989; Hoffman, 2006). 
Responsible for the popular adage ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom 
fighter’, the moral problem, at base, is simply concerned with the justification of 
terrorist violence. However, this deceptively straightforward conundrum has over the 
years strongly divided opinion. It is the severity and gravity of this division that is 
primarily responsible for the contested nature and in extension the existing 
definitional dilemma of terrorism.1 
Ironically however, it is also the main reason why a definitional pursuit of terrorism 
cannot be abandoned. The opposing moral viewpoints not only produce antithetical 
research agendas but also provide contradictory and therefore unhelpful policy 
recommendations. Clearly if terrorism was given some justificatory space then not 
                                                
1 Although notions of power and democracy can too evoke different moral responses, yet unlike 
terrorism a failure to understand or define them is not exclusively pinned down on their inherent 
morality or immorality. 
	 13 
only will that influence our understanding of the problem but it will also determine 
our policy responses that have wide-ranging societal implications. Conversely, this 
understanding, response and subsequent implications will be very different if 
terrorism was deemed morally reprehensible and completely indefensible. 
Oscillating uncontrollably and somewhat permanently between different moral 
viewpoints, the study of terrorism is often more representative of respective moral 
positions than terrorism itself. 
The inability to define or understand terrorism primarily due to the moral problem 
therefore presents a serious predicament, as a flawed understanding of terrorism could 
easily lead to precarious policies, which could have a detrimental effect on the 
broader society. Admittedly, defining terrorism is an arduous and gruelling 
undertaking and while the prevailing discontent and disillusionment regarding its 
prospects is understandable, it should by no means be excusable. The challenges it 
otherwise poses are far too grave to be ignored. Not only has the credibility and 
validity of the study of terrorism been seriously undermined, but the field as a whole 
has become dangerously fragmented. As exasperating and frustrating as it may be, the 
problem therefore simply cannot be brushed aside. 
Nevertheless, as crucial as it is, it will still be somewhat naïve to think that one can 
come up with a universal definition of terrorism that everyone can agree on. This of 
course does not mean that the entire undertaking is essentially pointless. It is 
important not to forget that due to varying subjective inferences we all intrinsically 
tend to draw, achieving universal consensus on any term or phrase in not a difficult 
but an impossible task. Despite this however, we have been able to achieve a broad 
consensus on the meaning or general understanding of ordinary terms including many 
of the essentially contested ones. This has been made possible by engaging with the 
terms and actively trying to understand their meaning rather than simply conceding 
that they were indefinable. So the fact that a universal consensus on a definition of 
terrorism cannot be achieved should neither come as a surprise nor as a 
disappointment. 
Thus, in spite of its visibly grim prospects of finding something everyone can agree 
on, the definitional quest of terrorism must not be forsaken. For even if it is ultimately 
unsuccessful (which in all likelihood it will be), it can and will significantly contribute 
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towards achieving some form of broad consensus on the meaning of terrorism. This is 
because a pursuit of definition, among other things, allows one to engage with 
important conceptual and theoretical issues that are otherwise unattended or simply 
neglected. This makes it especially indispensible to terrorism, given the dearth of 
theory in its field of study. The definitional quest, in other words, cannot be 
abandoned because it holds the key to unlocking the door to much needed conceptual 
and theoretical development in the field of terrorism studies. 
Unlocking the door to conceptual and theoretical development and subsequently 
laying down the essential groundwork for achieving broad consensus over the 
meaning of terrorism is precisely the objective of this thesis. Although a definition has 
also been proposed at the end, it is more important to see how this definition was 
arrived at and whether that process in any way help us better understand some of the 
most outstanding issues associated with terrorism. 
As the essentially contested nature and the ensuing definitional crisis is primarily 
blamed on the moral problem, the issues and characteristics associated with terrorism 
though often diverse and dissimilar, generally adhere to certain common and 
overarching themes. A rigorous and thorough examination of these themes is clearly 
necessary to not only understand the complexities of the moral problem but also to 
fully appreciate the extent to which terrorism is contested. Accordingly therefore, the 
first four chapters of the thesis identify the broad themes of terror, victim, and actor, 
which as it will be demonstrated, not only encapsulate but also facilitate a discussion 
on virtually all issues and characteristics that are typically attributed to terrorism.2 
While the first four chapters of the thesis discuss popular and constantly recurring 
themes, the last two chapters are concerned with issues that are either overlooked or 
simply taken for granted. Chapter five engages with the extremely undertheorized 
problem of whether terrorism is a tactic, strategy or ideology, as it attempts to 
understand the complex nature of terrorism and resolve our longstanding confusion 
over labelling an actor terrorist. Chapter six on the other hand meticulously examines 
and scrutinizes the discourse on terrorism by looking at how and why the field of 
terrorism studies became deeply fragmented and polarized over time. Both these 
                                                
2 It is important to note that these three themes and all associated variables also represent the most 
frequently highlighted and discussed problems in relation to the definition of terrorism. 
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chapters are crucial contributions as one tries to understand the complex and often 
confusing manifestations of terrorism and the other attempts to make sense of the 
discourse that lays the strongest claim to study terrorism. 
As this thesis relies almost entirely on extensive literature review, its methodology is 
fairly uncomplicated and straightforward. Given that the problem of terrorism, 
especially since 9/11, has attracted interest from various academic quarters, the thesis 
takes a multi-disciplinary approach and engages with a wide range of different 
sources. Its primary focus, however, has been on the mainstream or orthodox 
terrorism scholarship.3 In order to understand and fully appreciate the divergent 
academic viewpoints and criticism of mainstream scholarship, it also actively engages 
with the oppositional self-styled critical studies. To do this effectively and 
methodically, a comprehensive content analysis of leading journals in the field has 
also been conducted. The journals utilized for this purpose are Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism (SCT), Terrorism and Political Violence (TPV), and Critical Studies on 
Terrorism (CST). For SCT and TPV, the content analysis has been carried out for the 
last two decades (1995-2015), and for CST, since its launch in 2008. 
While SCT and TPV are widely regarded as the foremost mainstream journals in 
terrorism scholarship, CST is clearly the leading and perhaps the only terrorism 
specific journal of critical studies. The purpose of conducting a content analysis is 
mainly to see how the term terrorism is differently understood and applied in the 
academic discourse, so that credible and valid inferences can be drawn to make what 
will clearly be very bold claims and assertions. 
Lastly, the notion of terrorism, by virtue of its nature, raises important philosophical 
questions, answers to which are generally not available in terrorism scholarship. This 
is not to say that there has not been any significant contribution from the field of 
philosophy (works by philosophers such as CAJ Coady, Robert Holmes, Virginia 
                                                
3 Critically speaking, it can be difficult, not to mention controversial, to categorize a branch of 
scholarship as mainstream or orthodox. Nevertheless, keeping in line with conventional wisdom, 
orthodox scholarship will be simply be understood in terms of its impact factor and the popular 
perception and representation of it. Paul Wilkinson, Martha Crenshaw, Bruce Hoffman, Walter 
Laqueur, and Alex Schmid are widely regarded as leading orthodox scholars in the field of terrorism 
studies. 
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Held, Jeremy Waldron, Igor Primoratz, and Anne Schwenkenbecher are particularly 
noteworthy) but more so to point out that such work remains largely on the periphery 
and has not been properly integrated in the mainstream terrorism scholarship. This 
thesis therefore not only analyzes all major philosophical contributions to 
understanding terrorism but independently also engages with the wider field of moral 
philosophy.4 This thesis can in fact partly be regarded as a philosophical investigation 
into the problem of terrorism. 
Be it philosophy, mainstream or critical scholarship, the inability to define terrorism is 
unequivocally blamed on the moral problem. As might be expected therefore, the 
moral problem receives significant attention in this thesis. The assertion itself, 
however, is ultimately challenged as it will be argued that the definitional dilemma is 
in fact due to our inability to understand the true nature of terrorism and not because 
of the moral problem as is generally assumed. After disentangling it from its moral 
bondage, the thesis will demonstrate how it is possible to achieve a broad consensus 
over the meaning of terrorism if not a precise definition. 
The goal being set here is not to deliberately disregard and discredit mainstream 
scholarship, nor is there any intention to engage in critical or post-modern 
sophisticacy to reinvent the wheel, but to objectively (as much as possible) understand 
the true nature of terrorism by exposing and opposing the façade of many of our 
conventional wisdoms. 
                                                




Of all the characteristics of terrorism, no other stands out more prominently than 
‘terror’. Given that terror is part of the word terrorism, this distinction is hardly 
surprising. What is surprising however is the debate and contest over whether it is an 
indispensable characteristic of terrorism. Over the years concerns have been raised 
over the importance of terror to understanding terrorism and whether it should be 
made an element of definition. 
Despite the visible centrality of terror to terrorism, the attribute oddly has not been 
subjected to meticulous academic scrutiny. Most of the scholarly work presents only a 
rudimentary view of terror and very few scholars ever venture beyond stating that 
terrorism does/does not generate terror. As a result of this, some very basic yet 
fundamental questions about terror and its relationship with terrorism remain largely 
unanswered. 
Notwithstanding the lack of attention however, almost all scholars will generally 
agree that the notion of terror is unquestionably essential to understanding the 
problem of terrorism. As Ami-Jacques Rapin points out, ‘the root of the problem lies 
in the notion of terror itself, both from a definitional point of view and from the 
perspective of developing a conceptual framework’ (2009: 167). This chapter 
therefore seeks to explore and hopefully answer some of the longstanding questions 
regarding the centrality of terror beginning first by briefly tracing the etymological 








Etymological roots of terror 
The importance of terror is demonstrated by the fact that the term terrorism is 
etymologically derived from it. The word “terror” itself comes from the Latin word 
‘terrere’ that entered the English language through French in the sixteenth century 
(Schmid, 2011: 41). The Merriam-Webster and Oxford English dictionary define 
terror as ‘a very strong feeling of fear’5 and ‘extreme fear’6 respectively. 
The term terrorism was first used during the French revolution for Maximilien 
Robespierre’s government or ‘reign of terror’ from 1793-1794. Robespierre himself 
viewed terror in positive light as ‘the term derives from the Jacobin’s positively 
connoted use of the word terror as a means of justice’ (Rapin, 2009: 165). The term 
terror ‘was first used in a political context by Edmund Burke, who spoke of 
Robespierre’s revolutionary government… as a reign of terror’ (Schinkel, 2009: 183). 
The first use of terror in a political context thus refers to a form of government 
through fear or intimidation. Irrespective of any specific political context and whether 
it was viewed positively or negatively, the use of the term terror signified employment 
or application of fear in some way, which is also in line with the dictionary definitions 
of terror. The etymology of terror thus gestures towards the centrality of fear. 
Similarly, most scholars also typically emphasize fear or some variant of it when 
conceptualizing the terror of terrorism. Clutterbuck points out that terrorism intends to 
‘frighten and coerce a large number of others’ (1977: 11). Lasswell believes that 
terrorism arouses ‘acute anxieties’ (1978: 255). For Laqueur, Wilkinson and 
Hoffman, terrorism intends to create a climate of fear. Claridge believes that terrorism 
aims to alter the behaviour of an audience through generation of fear (1996: 50). 
Crenshaw points out that terrorism intends to ‘shock, frighten, excite, or outrage’ 
(2011: 2). Walter explains the terror of terrorism as ‘the psychic state- extreme fear- 
and on the other hand, the thing that terrifies- the violent event that produces the 
psychic state’ (1969: 5). Simply put, there is generally no academic disagreement on 
terror (of terrorism) being understood in terms of fear. 
                                                
5 Available at: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/terror. Accessed on: 27/03/2015. 
6 Available at: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/terror. Accessed on: 27/03/2015. 
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In light of popular and academic perception, it can therefore safely be inferred that 
terror on its own is almost universally understood in terms of fear. In a sense then the 
term terror appears to refer to a ‘psychological state of mind’ (Schmid, 2011: 41), a 
state that Charles Townshend refers to as ‘collective alarmism’ (2002: 15).  Thus, 
irrespective of our subjective positions on terrorism, we can all at least agree that 
terror corresponds to generation of fear (or some variant of it).7 Whether this 
generation of fear is indispensable to terrorism is a different matter and will be 
discussed later in the chapter. 
Having shown that the term terror on its own is understood in terms of fear, it is 
important now to understand why its relationship with terrorism is deemed 
problematic. 
 
Seven objections to terror 
There is considerable debate in the terrorism discourse regarding the importance of 
terror. At one end, there are scholars who believe that terror is fundamental to the 
understanding of terrorism and therefore necessary for any conceptualization of the 
term. While at the other end, there are those who actively make a case against such 
centrality of terror. Different scholars tend to have different reasons for their 
objections. Despite the wide array of reasons however, seven major objections to the 
centrality of terror can be identified in the terrorism discourse. 
The first major objection concerns the etymological and semantic roots of terrorism. 
As discussed already, the etymological origins of terrorism can be traced back to the 
word terror. Because of this connection, some scholars are weary of severing the 
semantic and etymological connection terrorism has with terror. As Goodin, points 
out, ‘It would be etymologically odd (to say the least) for the analysis of ‘terrorism’ to 
lose track of its roots and fail to analyze terrorism first and foremost in terms of 
‘terror’” (2006: 45). 
As pointed out at the beginning of the chapter, the word terror was first used in a 
positive sense to describe Robespierre’s reign of terror as a mean of justice. However, 
                                                
7 Going forward, I will use the terms terror and fear interchangeably.  
	20 
a historical investigation reveals that soon afterwards semantic changes led to 
neologism and terms like ‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’ with a somewhat negative 
undertone emerged to describe the perpetrators of terrorist violence. These new terms 
were mostly used to describe political opponents in a derogatory and disapproving 
way (Rapin, 2009: 165-166). 
This shows that the term terror, after its semantic makeover, transformed 
significantly- from describing something positively to categorically condemnable. 
Such a shift or reversal of meaning is perhaps not unique or intrinsic to terrorism 
alone given that it is a political terminology, which more than often tend to have a 
polemical meaning. The German philosopher Carl Schmitt observed that ‘all political 
concepts, images, and terms have a polemical meaning. They are focused on a 
specific conflict and are bound to a concrete situation; … they turn into empty and 
ghostlike abstractions when this situation disappears’ (Schmitt quoted in Finlay, 2009: 
751). The term terrorism does appear to bear all characteristics of an archetypal 
polemic concept. Originally intended for the French reign of terror, which lasted only 
a year, the term soon lost its point of reference, becoming thereafter an abstract 
concept that played into the hands of political rivals and lost connection with its 
original usage. 
Given this history, it is not surprising that some academics warn against using 
etymology as a guide. It is argued that although etymology has historical and 
instructive value, it is not always helpful as far as the actual usage of words are 
concerned, as Shanahan notes ‘But whereas etymology can be instructive for 
understanding the origin of a word or concept, it is often a poor guide to current or 
actual usage’ (2010: 181). 
The second objection is regarding the subjective nature of fear. This opposition comes 
mainly from the positivist and the empiricist positions. The objection here is that fear 
is a very subjective phenomenon as we all have varying threshold of fear and 
experience it in different ways. As Wardlaw explains, ‘We all have different 
thresholds of fear and our personal and cultural backgrounds make certain images, 
experiences, or fears more terrifying to each of us than to others’ (1989: 8). In other 
words, what frightens one individual may not necessarily frighten another. This 
subjective character of fear renders it very difficult to make generalizations about 
	 21 
terrorism. It also poses serious challenges for making empirical observations about 
terrorism and studying it scientifically and objectively. 
The cornerstones of the scientific method broadly involve the following steps: 
objective observation, formulation of a hypothesis, testing of the hypothesis, and 
subsequent development of general theories. In the case of terrorism however the 
subjective character of fear would make even the first step of the scientific process 
(objective observation) extremely difficult, if not impossible. Thus ‘Because of the 
complex interplay of the subjective forces… it is very difficult to accurately define 
terror and study it scientifically (Wardlaw, 1989: 8). Owing to these empirical 
challenges many academics either downplay the importance of fear or exclude it from 
the research process altogether. Weinberg et al., in an attempt to define terrorism 
empirically analyzed the usage of the term by the academics in the field. The most 
striking finding of their research was the ‘virtual absence of references to the 
psychological element, heretofore widely thought to be at the heart of the concept’ 
(2004: 777). 
Schmid and Jongman performed a similar research and analyzed 109 academic 
definitions of terrorism (1988: 28) and observed a frequency of 51% for the elements 
of fear and terror and 41.5% for psychological effects (1988: 28). Weinberg et al.’s 
research in comparison only found a frequency of 22% and 5.5% for fear generation 
and the psychological effect respectively (2004: 781). They point out that these 
findings challenge the orthodox assumptions regarding the centrality of fear and 
psychological effect. This, they argue, is actually helpful because ‘By ignoring the 
psychological element, by, in effect, taking the terror out of terrorism, the definition 
facilitates observation of the phenomenon’ (p. 787). Although they concur that their 
‘consensus definition’ is ‘highly general’ and ‘seems too vague’ (Ibid.), the low levels 
of frequencies observed for fear and psychological impact does reflect the academic 
tendency to steer clear of these elements. Their research is also a prime example of 
how some academics believe that taking fear out could facilitate objective observation 
and inquiry into the problem of terrorism. 
The desire to follow strict scientific methods and acquire objective knowledge about 
terrorism has deep roots in the positivist school of thought and is part of its age-old 
tussle with the interpretivist position that accommodates subjective interpretations. 
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Scholars of positivist disposition are therefore always keen to find ways around the 
otherwise different subjective interpretations of terror and terrorism. And since the 
element of fear or terror is one of the most outstanding subjective attributes of 
terrorism, its denouncement is hardly surprising. 
The third objection is less of an objection and more of a criticism of the supposedly 
unfair importance that is given to terror. The main argument is that terrorism is and 
should not be just about terror. This objection draws on the etymological debate and 
posits that the presence of the word terror in terrorism misleadingly suggests that 
terrorism revolves primarily around terror and fear. The disproportionate attention to 
terror that follows causes other important elements of terrorism to be neglected or 
overlooked. Instead, it is argued that terrorism is a heterogeneous phenomenon with 
terror being just one of its facets. As English points out ‘there is far more than just 
terror at the heart of terrorist violence’ and that ‘any serious definition of the concept 
of terrorism will recognize its heterogeneity’ (2006: 6, 22). Teichman also notes that 
it is important to remember that ‘Terrorism is not only terror’ (1989: 511). Schmid 
similarly acknowledges that ‘terrorists create terror- but not only terror’ (2005: 26). 
With its generation of fear and psychological impact, it is believed that the terror 
attribute, could easily outshine terrorism’s equally important other attributes. A focus 
on terror in other words reduces or shifts focus from other essential components of 
terrorism, which could not only prevent an accurate analysis of what the terrorists 
might be trying to communicate but potentially also undermine a broader and more 
accurate understanding of the overall terrorism problem. As Silke points out that 
‘outrage and horror can never be the sole foundation on which to build an accurate 
understanding of the worst terrorist atrocities’ and that we should not be ‘simply 
caught up with the horror of the incident’ (2003: 37, 40). 
The fourth objection concerns the intent of the perpetrator of terrorist violence. This 
objection challenges the view that the primary intention of terrorist violence is to 
evoke fear and terror in the general population. Scholars adhering to this view 
strongly criticize the widespread assumption (popularized by leading scholars like 
Laqueur, Wilkinson, and Hoffman) that terrorism is a form of violence that 
deliberately aims to create a climate of fear. The main objection is that terrorism does 
not always intend as such and can have objectives other than generation of fear. 
	 23 
Waldron for instance argues that terror and intimidation is not always the intention of 
terrorist violence. A terrorist act could be ‘intended as punishment or retaliation’, ‘a 
form of therapy for the perpetrators’, ‘to attract publicity to the cause’ or to ‘send a 
message of some sort to the targeted population’ (2004: 25-28). Coady, in a similar 
vein, also points out that defining terrorism in the spirit of fear and anxiety makes a 
definition ‘too specific about the purposes of terrorist acts’. The purpose of terrorist 
violence, he argues, is not always to terrorize, instead it could be for ‘publicity value, 
for symbolic reasons, or merely to strike the only blow thought to be possible’ (2004: 
6, 9). Hence, if terrorists do not always seek to create terror then it would be wrong to 
suggest that terrorist violence deliberately inflicts fear. 
It must be pointed out here that this objection only contests deliberate generation of 
fear. It does not rule out the likelihood of fear being a by-product. The element of 
deliberate generation of fear will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
The fifth objection is somewhat odd and to an extent fairly contentious as well. The 
objection goes that terrorism does not necessarily generate fear even if it is the 
deliberate intention of the terrorists. There are generally believed to be three ways in 
which people may not be affected by the terror of terrorist violence. 
First, it is argued that terrorist violence over time could become part of the everyday 
life as people grow accustomed to the violence and the horror terrorism creates. This 
argument is usually made for communities that are subject to frequent acts of terrorist 
violence over a considerably lengthy period of time. In a study on the prolonged 
impact of terrorist violence on the Israeli population, Bleich et al. measured the post 
traumatic stress levels in the broader community and concluded that the level of fear 
in the general population decreases if terrorist attacks continue for a long period of 
time (2006: 9). They concluded that if terrorism occurs over an extended period of 
time, it loses much of its shock and awe value and fails to generate fear in the wider 
population. 
Second, it is believed in some academic quarters that when a community is threatened 
with terrorist violence, then instead of spreading fear and horror, terrorism can 
sometimes have the opposite effect. When faced with a common threat, people 
generally put their differences aside and unite against it. A terrorist attack that can 
target anyone of them thus strengthens their resolve, makes them stronger, and brings 
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them together. As Rodin notes ‘It does not seem to be the case that terrorism 
invariably has the effect of causing terror in a population. On the contrary, there have 
been instances in which communities have grown stronger’ (2004: 761). 
Third, and the last reason in this vein is rooted in the way the human mind perceives 
and responds to terrorist actions at a psychological level. It mainly applies to targets 
that are not directly threatened by the terrorist violence but relate in some way with 
the direct victim of it. The main argument is that if people are not direct victims of 
terrorist violence and get to know about it through news media or some other source, 
then they will only be affected by it temporarily. Horgan points out that although we 
may feel some form of anxiety after hearing of a terrorist act but it will be of a limited 
duration and ‘despite our exposure to terrorist events via the printed or television 
media, our memory of terrorist events appears to recede swiftly’ (2005: 14). 
The argument that terrorism fails to generate fear suffers from several inherent 
problems. Firstly, since growing accustomed to terrorist violence is dependent on its 
sustained usage, the argument can only be applied to communities that have long-
drawn-out conflicts or prolonged terrorist movements. Secondly, it is an approach that 
aims to determine the individual state of mind, which is a very complex and delicate 
undertaking. As there is no direct or straightforward way to determine individual 
psychology, certain indirect techniques such as measuring stress levels among 
individuals are utilized in all such studies (See e.g. Horgan, 2005; Avi Bleich et al., 
2006). Clearly however, stress is not the same as terror as Rapin points out ‘we should 
not consider that ‘stress’ is equivalent to ‘terror’ without raising once again the 
problem of accurately defining the terms appropriate for describing the psychological 
impact of violence’ (2000: 173). 
The sixth objection provides perhaps the most important and vital critique on terror. 
The central argument is that terror is not unique to terrorism as it can be observed in 
all other forms of violence as well. As English points out that terror is not a 
distinguishing characteristic of terrorism since it is widely practiced in other forms of 
violence as well (2009: 5-7). Teichman believes that terrorism is not just about terror 
because if it was then ‘almost all forms of warfare would be terrorism, and so would 
be a lot of other human activities’ (1989: 511). In fact many scholars believe that 
other forms of violence such as conventional wars and genocide produce far greater 
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fear and terror than terrorism, as McPherson observes that both terrorism and 
conventional wars produce terror with the latter producing it to far greater effect 
(2007: 529). 
It is important to point out here that even though many scholars raise concerns over 
the exceptionality of terror to terrorism, many still make it a matter of definition 
(English, Teichman, and McPherson), although they may have completely different 
reasons for doing so. Some do it to emphasize the importance of terror to terrorism 
specifically, others to avoid an etymological contradiction, and others still that don’t 
want to uproot the common meaning or understanding of the term. 
On the other hand, there are other scholars who believe that since terror occurs in 
other forms of violence as well, incorporating it into the conceptual and definitional 
framework of terrorism would not only be inaccurate and misleading but also of little 
analytical help. This group does not denounce the importance of terror altogether but 
believe that it should not be made a matter of definition. Coady for instance argues 
that even though terror or spreading fear is a distinctive feature of terrorism but ‘it 
should not be made a matter of definition’ (1985: 54). Shanahan categorically 
excludes the element of terror and fear from his definition and believes that it is not a 
distinguishing characteristic of terrorism (2009: 181). Chadwick also notes that any 
political body that chooses to use violence causes terror and therefore excludes it from 
his definition of terrorism (2009: 443). 
Kaplan belongs to a third group of scholars that broadly agree on other forms of 
violence generating terror but point out that it is particularly exceptional to terrorism 
because terrorist violence always evokes fear. Fear and terror, in other words, are 
deemed more central to terrorism than any other form of violence. Kaplan therefore is 
critical of other scholars that leave out the terror attribute. For him generation of fear 
is the most essential ingredient of terrorist violence (2009: 181). Goodin similarly 
believes that fear, although not the sole province of terrorism, is its most outstanding 
feature and should therefore never be left out of its definition (2006: 37). 
The last and perhaps the most contested objection to terror is rooted in the moral 
problem. Although the moral problem revolves primarily around the victims of 
terrorist violence, generation of fear especially when it is deemed deliberate is an 
important reason why terrorism is regarded as an immoral and illegitimate form of 
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violence. Burke points out that terrorism raises serious normative challenges as it 
targets civilians and generates fear (2008: 39). Several other scholars have also noted 
that part of the moral problem is that terrorism is seen to generate terror. Scheffler, for 
instance, believes that ‘terrorism is morally suggestive precisely because ‘terror’ is its 
linguistic root’ (2006: 16). Chadwick also notes that the word terrorism has a negative 
connotation because it derives from the word terror (2009: 443). 
A form of violence that deliberately targets unarmed seemingly innocent civilians 
with the intention to generate terror, horror, and panic will certainly be viewed as 
dreadful and appalling. Against this backdrop a moral verdict that denounces such 
violence as wrong and unacceptable is certainly not surprising. This moral judgment 
is believed to have reduced the word terrorism to nothing more than a pejorative term 
that is used by different political actors to denounce their enemies. To avoid this 
pejorative undertone and the moral problem altogether, some academics (mostly 
critical scholars) criticize the terror element and often exclude it from their 
conceptualization of the terrorism problem. 
To understand the moral problem in its entirety, it must be discussed in tandem with 
the victim of terrorist violence, a discussion that will be undertaken in the following 
chapter. What is important to note here is that the moral objection has led to a strong 
criticism of the terror attribute and encourages its exclusion from any formal 
conceptualization of the terrorism problem. 
The academic objections highlighted here demonstrate only the extent to which the 
element of terror is contested in the terrorism discourse. And while these objections to 
terror allow us to understand the divergent academic positions on the matter, they do 
not offer any clear solution to the problem. On the contrary, these objections in fact 
reveal a failure or reluctance of terrorism scholarship to engage with deeper 
intellectual and conceptual issues that the terror of terrorism poses. Conveniently 
however, this intellectual void can be filled by the field of philosophy. By shedding 
light on where fear comes from and how it functions in the society, philosophy can 
help us better understand terror and its bearing on terrorism. It is for this reason that it 
is important now to discuss in detail the philosophical roots of terror. 
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The philosophical roots of terror 
I shall begin a philosophical enquiry into terror by engaging with the scholarly work 
of two of the most influential intellectual thinkers of Western political theory, John 
Locke and Thomas Hobbes. 
Locke’s philosophy has had a major impact on the political traditions of the modern 
world and although unlike Hobbes his work is not directly concerned with fear, his 
conceptualization of the state of nature, the rights of individuals, and the civil contract 
theory can help us better understand how fear functions in the society. Despite the 
numerous and often conflicting readings of Locke, ‘few would dispute the claim’, as 
Yolton argues ‘that Locke’s analysis of society rests upon two stock theoretical 
devices: natural law and the state of nature’ (1958: 477). 
Prior to the formation of civil society individuals find themselves in a state of nature 
with each other. According to Locke, a state of nature refers to an absence of formal 
rules and procedures and a consensual governing body. It is a state of nature where 
every individual has equal freedom and liberty, which is governed not by any 
sanctioned authority but by a law of the nature or natural law (Chadwick, 2009: 439).8 
Tully defines this natural law as ‘a set of objective moral principles that express what 
man ought to do and forebear, cross-culturally and trans-historically valid, 
independent of man’s subjective will and discoverable by reason’ (1993: 292). 
Thus, in a Lockean state of nature the individual freedom and liberty is determined 
not by any sanctioned authority but through universal moral principles underscored by 
the natural law. Ashcraft points out that Locke regards this state of nature as ‘both an 
historical and a moral description of human existence’ (1968: 898). Chadwick further 
asserts that by virtue of this law of nature, individuals have two main powers ‘the 
right of self-preservation and the right of punishment’ (2009: 439). The right of self-
preservation empowers an individual to conserve his right to freedom and liberty 
within the premise of the law of nature, whereas the right of punishment grants him 
the power to punish those who transgress on other’s rights and ‘act contrary to the law 
                                                
8 Yolton points out that there is some confusion regarding Locke’s state of nature. As some scholars 
understand it to be nomadic tribes lacking any formal civil structures, while others argue that he meant 
‘some condition of primitive man’ (1958: 492-493). For our discussion, the Lockean state of nature 
simply refers to a society that lacks a government and formal rules and procedures. 
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of nature’ (2009: 439). 
Chadwick believes that this right of punishment raises three major problems of 
impartiality, degree, and effective power. Impartiality refers to observing complete 
neutrality and fairness in punishing the transgressors and to the absence of a guarantee 
that an individual will not be biased in observing his right of punishment. Degree 
corresponds to the problem of fitting punishment that must be proportionate to the 
scale of transgression.9 And lastly the problem of effective power points to the 
absence of common authority required to carryout the desired punishment. Locke 
believes that the solution to these problems would require the individuals to 
voluntarily give up their right of punishment that they have in a state of nature to a 
common and mutually agreed upon authority so that the society can collectively judge 
and justly standardize punishment (p. 440). This is accomplished through forming a 
civil society by consent where security of individual freedom and liberty is ensured 
and fixed standard punishments are set out for any lawbreakers for general common 
good (Ashcraft, 1968: 911). 
Hobbes’s conception of state of nature is fundamentally different from its Lockean 
counterpart. Where the Lockean state of nature is not necessarily lawless and amoral 
(as there is still the law of nature), a Hobbesian state of nature, in Hobbes’s own 
classical account is a ‘war of all against all’, which results in a perpetual condition of 
uncertainty and insecurity. These insecurities in a Hobbesian state of nature can best 
be categorized as ‘material’ and ‘mental’. 
Kronman provides a detailed account of what can otherwise be termed as material 
insecurities. He points out that in a Hobbesian state of nature individuals face two 
different kinds of insecurities. The first insecurity, which Kronman calls ‘vulnerability 
of possession’, is regarding the safety and vulnerability of one’s possession, which in 
a state of nature are ‘subject to attack and expropriation by others’. He terms the 
second insecurity as ‘transactional insecurity’, which corresponds to the absence of 
any procedural guarantees in an exchange between individuals, a transaction in which 
an individual can be ‘denied whatever it was he bargained for in return’ (1985: 6). 
                                                
9 The problem of degrees of punishment has been discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
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The second insecurity ‘mental’ is grounded in human nature and psychology. This 
insecurity underlines the fundamental human fear of mortality and impending death. 
According to Hobbes, what distinguishes man from animals is that the former is 
aware of his ultimate death and ‘the consequence of this awareness is constant 
anxiety’ (Ahrensdorf, 2000: 580). McBride explains this as ‘existential anxiety’, 
essentially a form of psychological fear ‘that comes from recognizing human 
mortality’ (2011: 561). She further explains that this existential anxiety intensifies 
with growing ‘mortality salience’, which is ‘the degree to which an individual is 
aware of his mortality’ (p. 563). The more the mortality salience the greater will be 
the existential anxiety. 
The mental and material insecurities together generate an intense state of fear, which 
is the central theme of Hobbesian philosophy. As Blits points out, ‘More than any 
other philosopher, Thomas Hobbes emphasizes the determining power of fear. Fear, 
according to Hobbes, suffuses and shapes human life’ (1989: 417). A Hobbesian state 
of nature is therefore extremely undesirable and can only be categorized as total 
anarchy. Hobbes’s solution to this total anarchy is the creation of an all powerful 
leviathan or state, to which all individuals must surrender unconditionally, ‘so that 
they might thereby escape once and for all from the natural state of war’ (Ahrensdorf, 
2000: 582). 
Just as with the state of nature, Hobbesian Leviathan is also intrinsically different 
from Lockean civil society. Where consent is at the heart of a Lockean civil society, 
Hobbesian leviathan demands absolute submission. Thus where in a Lockean state of 
nature, law and state, are deemed essential primarily for regulating and 
institutionalizing punishment, in a Hobbesian state they are necessitated by the 
perpetual condition of insecurity. A Lockean civil society rose out of universal moral 
considerations, impartial treatment of all individuals, and a fair and standard judicial 
system for the punishment of any transgressors. Hobbesian leviathan, on the other 
hand, emerged to tame and keep in check the intrinsically bad human nature and 
demands total and unconditional obedience. 
Particularly relevant to our discussion here is the Lockean notion of punishment and 
Hobbesian conception of fear. Lockean punishment, as already discussed, is primarily 
aimed at disciplining all those individuals that transgress the fundamental rights of 
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others. Such outlaws violate a basic right, namely the right of self-preservation that 
each and every individual has been granted by the law of nature. And although a 
Lockean state of nature optimistically posits that there need not be transgressors, the 
idea of a civil society is still advocated to account for any deviations. A Lockean civil 
society in this sense therefore appears to be more precautionary and facilitatory than 
an absolute necessity. Hobbesian fear in a state of nature, on the other hand, is not an 
anomaly but a tangible reality, which in the absence of an overarching authority will 
essentially result in complete chaos and destruction. The Hobbesian leviathan, 
therefore, is not a precautionary measure but an absolute necessity for the survival and 
preservation of humanity. 
Despite this seeming incompatibility between Lockean punishment and Hobbesian 
fear, a link between the two can still be observed. Although Locke is generally 
optimistic of both the state of nature and civil society, harmful and mischievous 
behaviour is not ruled out of hand. In fact, his notion of punishment is primarily 
intended to account for such deviations. Lockean punishment mainly calls for the 
formation of civil society because individuals in their personal capacity are deemed 
incapable of judicially performing their right of punishment. The act of transgression 
(for which the idea of punishment has been advanced) is by its nature a violation of 
other’s fundamental right of self-preservation. This violation of the basic right or even 
the possibility of its violation affects the human psychology and naturally bears the 
potential to trigger concern, apprehension, and anxiety among individuals and the 
society at large. In line with the dictionary and academic descriptions discussed 
earlier, these concerns and apprehensions can also alternatively be understood in 
terms of fear. 
This of course is not to suggest that both Locke and Hobbes equally emphasize the 
power of fear in determining the social order, but merely to point out that both 
conceptualizations accommodate the element of fear. There is a fundamental 
difference between Hobbesian fear and the Lockean framework that grants room to 
fear. Where the Lockean civil society is necessitated by the desire to regulate 
punishment, the Hobbesian leviathan is deemed essential to repudiate the perpetual 
condition of insecurity. The Hobbesian insecurity arises out of material (vulnerability 
of individual possessions and transactions) and mental (existential anxiety) fears, 
whereas in a Lockean framework, fear is not a given but could materialize if an 
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individual steps out of bounds of his own right of self-preservation and infringes those 
of others. 
The point I am trying to make here is that a Lockean conception of society is not 
completely devoid of fear. Irrespective of whether we live in Hobbesian leviathan or 
Lockean civil society, the condition of fear, in one way or another, will always be 
present.  
A Hobbesian state or leviathan is thus necessitated by the material and mental 
insecurities that tower above everything else in a state of nature. And the leviathan 
primarily seeks to tame, control, and manage fear that emerges from these insecurities 
through creating a stable social order. On the other hand, the Lockean civil society is 
a result of pragmatic consent to homogenize the exercise of the right of punishment in 
the event of transgression. This civil society is also intended to create a stable and 
sustainable social order where people free from the fear and anxiety of transgression 
can exercise their right of self-preservation. 
This however does not mean that the establishment of leviathan or civil society will 
rid the world altogether of fear from insecurities and transgression. On the contrary, 
both forms of societies are recommended because they are considered better at 
managing these problems than the state of nature. Furthermore, even though fear will 
be present in both forms of societies, it will be greatly intensified if there is an attempt 
to destabilize the existing social orders. This means that if there is an existential threat 
to either leviathan or civil society, it may signal a return to the state of nature, which 
would consequently amplify the existing fear and anxiety. In other words, any 
challenge to the existing social order will trigger an individual’s pre-existing fear and 
insecurities. 
Samuel Scheffler’s work in this vein is particularly insightful. He utilizes the 
Hobbesian framework to explain how terrorism functions. In agreement with Hobbes, 
Scheffler points out that people form societies because they want to escape from fear 
as ‘it is only within a stable political society that the miserable condition of 
unremitting fear can be kept at bay’ (2006: 5). He argues that the ‘terrorists take these 
Hobbesian insights to heart’ as ‘they engage in violence against some people in order 
to induce fear or terror in others, with the aim of destabilizing or degrading (or 
threatening to destabilize or degrade) an existing social order’ (Ibid). Scheffler refers 
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to this as ‘terrorism of the standard kind’, which is made possible because of the 
‘coercive power of fear’ (p. 6). 
Scheffler believes that his conceptualization of standard terrorism is independent of 
the actor, permitting therefore both state and non-state actors to practice it. And 
although a state actor may use this standard kind against other states (to destabilize 
them and generate fear), it cannot by default use it against its own citizens. This is 
because a state always wants to maintain or retain an existing social order at least 
within its own boundaries. However, Scheffler believes that a state (and also some 
extreme right wing non-state actors) may still use terror and fear to ‘keep people 
afraid as a way of maintaining its grip on power and preserving the established 
system’ although this will not amount to terrorism of the standard kind (p. 13). 
Nevertheless, whether there are attempts to destabilize or stabilize a pre-existing 
social order, the key, according to Scheffler, is the exploitation of the mechanism of 
fear (p. 15). 
In a discussion on terror and fear it is normal for scholars to engage primarily with 
Hobbes since he is regarded by many academics as the most prolific scholar of fear. 
The question that arises here is: do we need to view the world through the Hobbesian 
lens to understand the instrumentality of fear? Or must we live in the Hobbesian 
leviathan or state of nature to experience fear? The discussion above has shown that 
this need not be so. The condition of fear (no matter how vague) can even be 
experienced in a Lockean worldview, which can otherwise be regarded as antithesis 
of Hobbesian work.10 There is no denying that fear is of paramount importance to 
Hobbesian philosophy, but just because Locke challenges Hobbes’s most central 
assumptions does not mean that the element of fear is altogether absent from his own 
conceptualization of society. What can reasonably be argued however is that where 
fear would primarily be deliberate in a Hobbesian state, in a Lockean state it could be 
the unintended consequence of certain actions. It is important to clarify and explain 
this assertion in greater detail. 
                                                
10 ‘Carl Becker and Merle Curti pointed out that the ideas of the two men [Hobbes and Lockes] were 
antithetical’ (quoted in Van Mobley, 1996: 6). 
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‘Deliberate’ generation of fear has been one of the central themes in the terrorism 
discourse for a very long time. In a Hobbesian state an actor willing to affect the 
social life of its individuals in some manner could use the mechanics of fear to his 
advantage. This could be done though exploiting the Hobbesian insecurities, material 
and mental, sketched out earlier in the paper. Through evoking these insecurities, the 
actor will be able to generate a climate of intense fear and anxiety (terror) in the 
desired society. It is not just the mere knowledge but also the centrality of fear in a 
Hobbesian society that permits its deliberate employment. 
On the other hand, in a Lockean state, fear is perhaps best understood not as an 
independent reality but as a byproduct of the rights of self-preservation and 
punishment. Unlike the Hobbesian state, a Lockean framework does not assume a war 
of all against all and its individuals are not subject to a continuous fear of death and 
existential anxiety. Where high levels of mortality salience reinforces the existential 
anxiety in a Hobbesian individual, forcing him to live in a constant state of fear, a 
Lockean individual does not live under the constant shadow of such heightened and 
exaggerated condition of fear and insecurity. However, the Lockean right of 
punishment by its nature does allow a permissibility of transgression, where the rights 
of others could involuntarily be infringed. It is this permissibility or possibility of 
transgression, which may inadvertently generate fear. 
Thus, in a Lockean state, although it may not be a deliberate intention, but when 
rights are infringed and the existing social life is undermined then fear will 
inadvertently be generated. It is important to note here that I have used the term social 
life and not social order that is undermined. The notion of social life is different from 
social order, which not only better explains how fear generation is independent of 
stabilization or destabilization of an existing order but also facilitates a greater 
appreciation of the Hobbesian and Lockean frameworks. 
A ‘social order’ specifically refers to an established authority such as Hobbes’s 
Leviathan or Locke’s civil society, whereas ‘social life’ broadly corresponds to the 
existing society and could therefore refer to both established authority and the state of 
nature. When fear is generated through destabilization of an existing social order, it 
threatens a return to the state of nature through challenging and undermining the 
established authority. Under such circumstances, a Hobbesian and Lockean 
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explanation is quite straightforward, as it would be true for state and especially non-
state actors that challenge the authority of either the leviathan or civil society. The 
notion of social order largely fails to account for state and even non-state actors that 
aim to stabilize or preserve it. This explains why Scheffler sees attempts to generate 
fear through destabilizing an existing system as standard or textbook terrorism (since 
it fits comfortably with his Hobbesian model) and instances of fear generation with 
the intention of preserving an order as what could only be termed as nonstandard 
terrorism. 
At first glance, an attempt to preserve an existing order does not sit well with a 
Hobbesian and Lockean framework. An established order represents stability and 
security so why would its preservation lead to generation of fear? The key here is to 
focus on social life and not social order. The notion of social life, unlike social order, 
corresponds to both state of nature and established authority. Social life will therefore 
be affected and undermined regardless of whether there are attempts to stabilize or 
destabilize an existing order. And since this view also accommodates both state of 
nature and established authority, it is therefore also consistent with both the 
Hobbesian and Lockean frameworks. 
To sum up, this discussion has shown how generation of fear is independent of the 
two most dominant conceptions of society- Hobbesian and Lockean. Admittedly there 
is great difference of degree and emphasis, however, whether an absolute necessity 
(Hobbes) or an outcome of a pragmatic undertaking (Locke), both conceptualizations, 
to varying degrees, accommodate the element of fear. Furthermore, it has also been 
shown that where the Hobbesian model better explains deliberate generation of fear, 
the Lockean model can account for unintentional generation of fear. And lastly, it has 
been argued that it is not necessary to always challenge the existing social order to 
generate fear, a challenge to the social life should suffice. 
By discerning the philosophical roots of fear, this chapter has shown how an act of 
terror can undermine social life and consequently generate fear. Hobbesian and 
Lockean frameworks provide us with the necessary philosophical tools to understand 
how fear is produced in a society. These two frameworks have been utilized not only 
because they are two of the most important philosophical positions in political theory 
	 35 
but also because they broadly correspond to the dominant conceptions of society- 
realist and idealist respectively. 
Fear can be generated irrespective of whether one has a Hobbesian or a Lockean 
conception of society. The question therefore is not whether terror or fear will be 
generated, but whether such generation of fear is deliberate or not. Although judging 
the exact intention of the perpetrator will always remain somewhat problematic, given 
that it is not possible to read the mind of the actor- the Hobbesian and Lockean 
frameworks, however, do provide a sound philosophical explanation for intentional 
and unintentional use of terror respectively. 
According to Hobbesian logic, fear could deliberately be employed to exploit the 
mental and material insecurities for one’s advantage. On the other hand, in a Lockean 
state, fear could be the unintended consequence of exercising the rights of self-
preservation and punishment. Thus, where the Hobbesian conception could account 
for deliberate generation of fear, the Lockean model can adequately explain when it is 
not. 
Whether it is the Hobbesian mental and material insecurities that are undermined or 
Lockean right of self-preservation that is breached, social life will be affected and 
consequently fear will be generated. Since an act of terrorism always effects or 
undermines the prevailing social life, fear will subsequently be generated. Terror, 
therefore, is central to terrorism irrespective of whether it is ultimately deliberate or 





Over the years the category of victim of terrorism has been a matter of intense 
scrutiny, controversy, and fascination. It is the epicentre of the moral problem, which 
many hold to be primarily responsible for the existing definitional and conceptual 
impasse. Terms like innocent, civilian, and non-combatants are commonplace and 
have become somewhat mundane in the terrorism discourse. In spite of the banality of 
these terms, any definitional and conceptual pursuit of terrorism is not only 
incomplete but also positively meaningless without a thorough and formal 
engagement with them. Owing to the extensive interplay between the victim of 
terrorism and the moral debate, it is imperative to first gain greater and deeper insight 
into the moral problem itself. 
 
The Moral Problem 
Grant Wardlaw succinctly asserted over two decades ago that ‘A major stumbling 
block to the serious study of terrorism is that, at base, terrorism is a moral problem’ 
(1989: 4). Similarly, Sproat also asserts that ‘At the heart of any analysis is the fact 
that terrorism is seen primarily as a moral problem’ (1991: 20). The question is what 
do we mean when we say that terrorism is a moral problem? The problem mainly 
concerns the justification of terrorist violence. However, this deceptively 
straightforward conundrum is not only ‘one of the major reasons for the difficulty 
over the definition of terrorism’ (Wardlaw, 1991: 4) but is also primarily responsible 
for the conflicting and opposing academic positions in the terrorism scholarship. 
Wars and basically all forms of violence in general involve some form of harm, 
killing or destruction and are therefore intrinsically bad. Their justification, however, 
and whether they can be right or wrong is a different matter altogether. In other 
words, being bad does not necessarily entail wrongness. Natural disasters such as 
typhoons, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions can also cause great damage and 
destruction and are therefore often regarded as bad. However, in spite of the deaths 
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and destructions such natural disasters may cause, we cannot speak of them as right or 
wrong or just or unjust (Holmes, 1989: 192). Judgment on whether something is right 
or wrong is reserved exclusively for man-made activities. Hence, even though 
everyone will generally agree that all forms of violence are, in one sense or another 
bad, they can still speak of them as being right or justified. It is this practice of 
judging human activities right or wrong that gives birth to the subject of morality. 
And since judgments generally have a tendency to be subjective, we find different and 
often conflicting moral positions. 
Terrorism is a social activity and social activities, by virtue of their nature, are prone 
to different or even opposing subjective interpretations (provided of course one views 
the world through an interpretivist or constructivist lens). The problem with terrorism, 
however, is that these subjective interpretations greatly impede its understanding, as 
each approach tends to pull terrorism in a completely different direction. It is 
important therefore to not only understand the underlying logic of these conflicting 
positions but also contextualize them appositely to not only better understand the 
problem but also to structure and discipline the terrorism discourse. 
All moral positions normally adhere to either utilitarian or deontological normative 
ethical theories. According to the utilitarian logic, the rightness and wrongness of the 
actions are determined on the basis of their outcome. From this viewpoint, violence 
may be regarded unfortunate but necessary if it achieves a certain desirable goal. A 
deontological approach, on the other hand, is not concerned with the consequences 
but with the actions themselves. If the actions are wrong then the outcome 
(irrespective of how noble or just) is irrelevant (Held, 2008: 4-5). Although strict 
adherence is not uncommon in the terrorism discourse, most scholars espouse these 
normative ethical theories to varying degrees. To better understand the overall 
terrorism scholarship, we will do well to imagine a moral continuum along which we 
can place these different moral positions. 
 
The moral continuum 
At one end of our moral continuum, there are scholars who believe that there can 
never be any justification for terrorist violence. Terrorism is believed to be prime 
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facie evil, wrong, and always unjustified. Immorality and wrongness is considered an 
integral part of the term’s vocabulary and any attempt to study and observe terrorism 
differently is largely viewed with scepticism and regarded as an etymological and 
semantic contradiction (See e.g. Walzer, 1977; Rodin, 2004; Scheffler, 2006; Miesels, 
2008). We can call this the amoral position to terrorism. Adherents of this position 
hold that terrorism is bad, wrong, and can never be justified. 
At the other end of the continuum, there are scholars who believe that terrorism, just 
like other forms of violence, can be justified. They are highly critical of the view that 
terrorism by definition should be wrong, evil, and unjustified. They regard the 
practice of treating terrorism immoral as normatively unhelpful and analytically 
obstructive. Although far from exclusive, most of the critical scholars in the terrorism 
scholarship would fall in this camp (See e.g. Burke, 2008; Jackson, 2009; Dexter, 
2011). This position can be called the moral position to terrorism. Advocates of this 
position do not contest that terrorism is bad but argue that it is no worse than other 
forms of violence. What they do contest strongly, however, is the notion that terrorism 
is inherently and egregiously wrong by nature, and make the strongest case for its 
justification.11 
These two positions have long prompted a debate in the discourse regarding whether 
terrorism should be considered wrong and immoral by definition. The issue of 
whether wrongness should be part of the definition of terrorism is an important one. 
When wrongness is not part of the definition of any form of violence, then a case can 
be made for its justification. On the other hand, it will be very difficult to make the 
same case for some form of violence if it was deemed wrong by definition. As 
Holmes notes that one can make a justificatory case for war, killings, and basically 
‘any other type of action whose wrongness is not part of its very definition from the 
outset’ (1989: 212). 
Scholars that adhere strictly to the amoral position believe that terrorism is prime 
facie wrong, evil and immoral and should therefore be defined or at least understood 
                                                
11 The two positions have been categorized as moral and amoral purely because of their respective 
attitudes towards terrorism. Where a moral position is occasionally empathetic to terrorist violence and 
grants it a justificatory space, an amoral position in comparison, shows no such compassion or extends 
no leniency to either terrorism or terrorists. 
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as such. As Caleb Carr notes, ‘terrorism is among mankind’s most outrageously 
unacceptable belligerent practices’ (2007: 48). The charge against terrorism was 
chiefly spearheaded by one of the most influential scholars in the field, Paul 
Wilkinson. He takes a ‘determined moral position against the use of terrorism’ and 
argues that it is ‘morally indefensible’ as he believes there are other less or non-
violent alternatives, such as civil disobedience and political participation (2000: 218). 
Following his footsteps, many other scholars also believe that terrorism is 
fundamentally wrong and the characteristic must therefore be reflected in the 
definition of term. 
Adherents of the amoral position additionally argue that the widespread common 
understanding of terrorism is that it is egregiously bad, wrong and always unjustified. 
Therefore any academic conceptualization of terrorism that does not reflect this 
reality will be disconnected from common and popular understanding of the term. As 
Meisels points out, ‘An adequate definition of terrorism, if it is to have any 
connection with common usage, must describe at least a prime facie wrong and seek 
to further our understanding of this term by bringing out what it is that makes 
terrorism morally repugnant to most of us’ (2008: 19). In similar vein, Rodin also 
notes that reactions to terrorism are ‘undeniably negative’ as ‘most of us regard acts 
of terrorism with abhorrence’ and that ‘There is certainly truth in the thought that 
wrongness is part of the meaning of terrorism’ (2004: 753). To define or 
conceptualize terrorism otherwise is therefore believed to be erroneous and regarded 
as an attempt to uproot the core and commonly understood meaning of the term 
(Rigstad, 2008: 76). 
This approach is challenged by what has earlier been described as the moral position. 
Heralded mainly by critical scholars in the field, this position is strongly against 
defining and conceptualizing terrorism as inherently wrong and immoral. Teichman 
for instance argues that terrorism ought not to be defined as a bad thing, as otherwise 
we risk compromising ‘certain important historical and linguistic facts’ (1989: 507). 
He also rejects attempts to define terrorism in light of ordinary usage of the term 
citing ordinary usage as much too wide and unhelpfully subjective (p. 505-506). 
McPherson calls the amoral view of terrorism as ‘the dominant view’ and criticizes it 
strongly. He suggests that the ‘distinctive wrongness of terrorism is not as obvious as 
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proponents of the dominant view believe’ and goes on to propose what he believes to 
be a morally neutral definition of terrorism (2007: 525). 
This distinction between the moral and amoral position is of course far from 
exclusive. It is merely demonstrative of the two extreme moral viewpoints that can be 
taken with regard to terrorism. There are numerous scholars that take neither of the 
extremes and fall roughly in between the two. Depending on their respective moral 
proclivity, they can either be classed as passive moral or passive amoral. A position 
that tends to lean more towards the amoral position can be categorized as passive 
amoral, whereas a position that appears to be closer to the moral absolute can be 
classified as a passive moral position. 
Igor Primoratz’s approach to terrorism provides a classic example of a passive amoral 
position. He is critical of scholars such as Wilkinson because of their ‘claim that 
terrorism is essentially amoral’ (2004: 23). He puts forward, what he believes to be, a 
morally neutral definition of terrorism as it ‘entails only that terrorism is prime facie 
wrong, and thus does not rule out its justification under certain circumstances’ (p. 24). 
Scheffler’s approach to terrorism provides another case in point. He believes that 
‘terrorism is a prime facie evil’ but at the same time does not rule out the possibility 
of instances where it can be justified (2006: 1-2). Thus, adherents of passive amoral 
position mainly argue that terrorism is bad and also wrong but at the same time can 
also be justified in certain circumstances. 
On the other hand, Coady’s conceptualization of the terrorism problem is typical of 
the passive moral position. He does not believe that terrorism is necessarily prime 
facie evil or wrong and argues that terrorism in fact can sometimes be ‘morally 
permissible’. Coady compares terrorism to the act of lying, which he argues is 
generally considered to be bad but can still be permissible, justified or even 
commendable in certain circumstances (2004: 58). Virginia Held’s position is another 
case in point. Held is particularly critical of scholars that treat terrorism as evil and 
immoral. She argues that terrorism is not necessarily worse than war or other kinds of 
violence. And just as ‘some wars can be justified, so can some forms of terrorism’ 
(2004: 70). She also believes that the question whether terrorism can be justified 
‘should be open [and] not ruled out by definition’ (2008: 80). Advocates of the 
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passive moral position then accept that terrorism is bad, but remain agnostic over the 
question of whether it is fundamentally wrong and unjustified. 
To sum up then, the different academic positions to terrorism can be determined 
primarily by how they approach the issue of morality and justification respectively. 
The absolute amoral position sees a strong causal relationship between morality and 
justification, with both reinforcing each other. The absolute moral position on the 
other hand sees no such relationship between morality and justification and treats the 
two independent of one another. The passive approaches, however, find the line 
between morality and justification somewhat blurry and regard any relationship 
between the two as dependent on different situational and contextual variables.12 
Now the question that arises here is why are there such opposing positions on the 
morality and justification of terrorism? Part of the answer lies in the subjective nature 
of terrorism itself as scholars focusing on different attributes of the phenomenon end 
up supporting different moral standpoints (not to mention the subjectivity of the 
scholars themselves). The other part of the answer lies in the criticism and 
condemnation that the term terrorism typically evokes. 
Just as some natural disasters are worse than others, so are some forms of violence. 
The yardstick for measuring the scale of how bad a natural disaster is usually through 
the death and destruction that results in its wake. The more destructive a natural 
disaster, the more it will be deemed bad. The same, however, cannot be said for 
different forms of violence- even though logic would dictate that the same standards 
be applied to all man-made disasters. Terrorism, particularly, in terms of the 
casualties it causes and the subsequent criticism (or even the praise) it generates has 
been fairly inconsistent. This disproportionate condemnation has in fact become 
somewhat characteristic of terrorism. It is also perhaps the single most important 
reason why so many scholars end up taking different moral positions. Since this 
disproportionate criticism that terrorism evokes is typically insinuated through its 
condemnatory overtone, therefore in order to understand the problem in its entirety, it 
is important to engage directly with terrorism’s pejorative undertone. 
 
                                                
12 These different moral positions will be further developed in Chapter 6. 
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Terrorism’s Pejorative Undertone 
Perhaps the most important facet of the moral problem is the pejorative and negative 
connotation that the term terrorism has acquired over the years. There is a broad 
consensus among scholars that terrorism is a pejorative term as Hoffman notes ‘on 
one point, at least everyone agrees: terrorism is a pejorative term’ (2006: 23). The 
pejorative undertone of terrorism mainly entails that terrorism is an emotionally 
charged value laden term with a strong disapproving undertone, which whenever used 
automatically gives a moral verdict over the act under question. In other words, the 
use of the term terrorism delegitimizes the rationale it serves. This encourages its 
rhetorical use as the word terrorism is used as a linguistic tool to denounce one’s 
opponent, usually for some relative political advantage. The pejorative undertone is 
fairly characteristic of terrorism and has gained significant currency in the discourse. 
Given its importance in the terrorism scholarship and its bearing on the moral 
problem more generally, it is essential therefore to discuss it in detail. 
To do this, it is important first to briefly analyze the relationship between wrongness 
and pejorative undertone. Understandably the two terms are deeply interconnected as 
the word pejorative entails contempt and disapproval, which can only be expressed at 
something that is profoundly wrong and intrinsically bad. Suggesting something 
wrong (or immoral) is generally relational and typically dependent on certain 
observable facts. This means that wrongness should follow after some kind of harm 
has either been inflicted or threatened with. This wrongness, logically speaking, must 
also be directly proportional to the infliction of the actual harm or a credible threat of 
such (the actual harm being more wrong than its threat). Hence, in the event a certain 
harm is inflicted, the incident will first have to be deemed wrong, followed by an 
apposite condemnatory or pejorative description. 
In other words, an incident or a certain occurrence, at least in principle, should only 
be condemned and described with some pejorative word after its wrongness or 
immorality has been established or confirmed. Various forms of violence such as 
genocide appear to follow similar trajectory. Genocide, much like terrorism, is an 
emotionally charged word with a derogatory and pejorative undertone that 
delegitimizes and denounces any actor or action. Unlike terrorism, however, the term 
genocide cannot be employed at discretion. The word genocide is generally not used 
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unless it is evident that a certain number of casualties have either already taken place 
or that there is a credible threat of such. 
Thus the word genocide will only be used to describe the wrongness of a certain harm 
that has either happened or likely to happen very soon. Genocide, by definition, 
demands a large number of casualties (or the credible threat of such) and the 
wrongness explicit in the word corresponds directly to the harm inflicted through such 
casualties. It therefore cannot and is mostly never applied to isolated incidents or 
empty threats. 
In the case of terrorism, however, this is not always the case, as wrongness sometimes 
precedes an actual harm or its threat. Unlike genocide, terrorism is not dependent 
upon a certain number of casualties. The term terrorism can readily be applied to 
isolated incidents such as murders or assassinations of individuals. In fact, it will not 
be an exaggeration to suggest that terrorism’s capacity for limited and restricted 
violence, as opposed to war and genocide for instance, plays to its disadvantage, as 
the term can be applied to various isolated or unrelated incidents or their threats. Such 
a propensity has given rise to the problem of political rhetoric whereby the term 
terrorism (rightly or wrongly) is used as a semantic device to denounce one’s 
opponent. As Gearty points out, ‘the word ‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’ have deteriorated 
into little more than terms of abuse’ (1991: 4). 
Terrorism when deemed inherently evil, deeply wrong, and profoundly immoral, 
concomitantly fails to lend any justificatory space to its practitioners. In other words, 
the word terrorism carries with it a disapproving undertone, an emotive punch, a 
censorious flavor and a negative judgment that renders its practitioner immoral and 
unjustified by definition. Arguably, under such circumstances, if an actor were to be 
labelled a terrorist (or charged with acts of terrorism), there would be little if at all any 
justificatory or moral space granted either to the actor or the actions. As O’Brien says, 
‘Terrorist is of course an emotive term, used to describe people seen as making an 
unjustifiable use of violence’ (1977: 56). 
Adherents of the moral position in particular believe that this pejorative connotation 
has reduced the term terrorism to a mere tool of political rhetoric, a labelling device 
utilized by political rivals against each other. In other words, the term terrorism is 
mainly used as a semantic tool to demonize and denounce one’s opponent or enemy. 
	44 
This to a large extent also explains the adage ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s 
freedom fighter.’ The term freedom fighter as opposed to terrorist is a positive term 
and is therefore naturally the preferred choice of label. The two terms are mostly 
considered to be exclusive of each other with very little in common. A freedom 
fighter is believed to be someone that engages in just, moral, and legitimate violence. 
Practitioners of political violence (whether terrorist or not) therefore, if left to choose 
between the two labels terrorist and freedom fighter, would almost certainly prefer the 
latter. 
Given this predicament, it is not surprising that labelling someone terrorist is deemed 
extremely problematic and often vastly controversial. It appears that the word 
terrorism, understood in this derogatory sense, is used to describe one’s enemies, just 
as one’s enemy reserves the term for its adversaries. This inconsistency prompted 
scholars like Greisman to suggest that terrorism has no objective reality and is 
essentially socially constructed by some social groups that possess greater ability than 
others to construct them. 
Greisman utilizes Kenneth Burke’s concept of ‘identification’ to explain how 
designation of a certain act as terrorism is in fact dependent upon identification with 
either the perpetrators or the victims. ‘Terrorism’, Greisman argues, ‘with the 
potential for exciting negative sanctions, is susceptible to the relativism of situation 
and actors’ (1977: 303). If the audience or the spectators of terrorist acts identify with 
the perpetrators, then such ‘identification with the perpetrator effectively removes the 
terrorist meaning’ (Ibid). Terrorism, according to Greisman, will therefore only be 
present if the wider audience (one that determines the choice of the label) identifies 
with the direct victims of the act and not the perpetrators (p. 303-304). It can be 
further inferred that if the wider audience identifies instead with the perpetrator then 
the actor will either be called a freedom fighter or something else but not terrorist. 
Hoffman, in similar vein, explains that the decision to call someone terrorist can be 
determined by ‘associational logic’. He believes that the criterion for the label 
terrorist is ‘unavoidably subjective, depending largely on whether one sympathizes 
with or opposes the person/group/cause concerned’ (2006: 23). An association with 
the victim would class the act as terrorism and the act would be regarded positive, or 
at worst, ambivalent, if one has some form of association with the perpetrator (Ibid). 
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The logic of both identification and association clearly shows how the term terrorism 
is intrinsically pejorative and unmistakably reserved for an actor or action one 
disapproves of. Kapitan suggests that the theoretical roots of such thinking are mainly 
Hobbesian. In line with the classical Hobbesian philosophy, one forms a political 
society to escape the very conditions that could otherwise be imposed by a terrorist. 
So a Hobbesian objection to terrorism is not about the ‘method employed or the 
human cost as such, but the fact that the strike was against us’. This, Kapitan argues, 
helps explain a crucial semantic feature of the term terrorism, whereby ‘the word 
takes on an indexical character, that is, there is an implicit reference to the speakers 
point of view, so that in general usage, ‘terrorism’ is actually coextensive with the 
phrase terrorism against us’ (2002: 179). ‘The term terrorism’, Kapitan concludes, ‘is 
simply the current vogue for discrediting one’s opponents’ (Ibid). 
If the term indeed possesses this indexical character and is merely a fad to bring one’s 
opponent into disrepute then the word terrorism perhaps is nothing more than a mere 
tool of political rhetoric and name calling that has no real descriptive value. As Gearty 
points out, ‘To call an act of violence a terrorist act is not so much to describe it as 
condemn it, subjugating all questions of context and circumstance to the reality of its 
immorality’ (1997: 11). If this is indeed the case, then any conceptual or definitional 
pursuit of terrorism will be a futile exercise bound to lead to controversy and impasse. 
From a scholarly point of view the issue of political rhetoric therefore raises serious 
problems for scientific inquiry into terrorism. 
In spite of its discouraging premise, the rhetorical use of terrorism should not prevent 
scholars from studying terrorism. The rhetorical use itself can be immensely helpful 
in understanding the divergent political positions, identity politics, role of 
metanarratives and much more. It is, however, of little help when it comes to 
theoretical and definitional development. 
Some scholars may disagree with this position arguing instead that political rhetoric is 
fundamental to terrorism and could therefore greatly contribute to its understanding. 
Rigstad, for instance, suggests that the rhetoric of terrorism could in fact be helpful 
for definitional purposes. He argues that the ‘rhetorical back-and-forth shows the 
expressive flexibility of the concept’ and the ‘reciprocal accusations of terrorist 
violence provide the key to theoretical consensus and conceptual mediation’ (2008: 
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88). Thus, during any conflict, the conflicting parties in question try to invoke similar 
ethical values when condemning each other. This mutual condemnation of each 
other’s actions, Rigstad argues, provides us with the ‘ethical common denominator 
that unifies competing accusations of terrorism’ (p. 89). 
There are, however, some serious problems with what otherwise appears to be a 
straightforward solution to the rhetorical problem of terrorism. First, it is not always a 
given that the conflicting parties will necessarily evoke the same ethical values in 
their mutual condemnation of each other’s actions. One cannot reasonably deny the 
possibility or the probability that the concerned conflicting parties could potentially 
criticize and evoke dissimilar values. 
Second, in asymmetrical conflicts, where one of the parties is always stronger than the 
other, any mutual accusation will always be disproportionate to the scale and scope of 
their relative capacities. A stronger party in a certain conflict, for instance, will have 
greater resources and can therefore cause more harm than its weaker counterpart. Any 
reciprocal criticism of each other thereof could be inequitable or even unjust 
considering that one party could potentially cause greater damage and deserve greater 
criticism than the other. 
Third, all conflicts concurrently also produce a parallel war of rhetoric and narratives. 
This means that a side, which is stronger and better at constructing narratives, will 
have a clear advantage in influencing the wider or outside perception of the conflict. 
The so-called common ethical denominator will therefore be skewed in favor of one 
of the conflicting parties. Hence, if we give into the rhetoric then either the party 
which is better at advertising and projecting its position or the wider audience that 
identifies or approves of certain rhetoric could potentially contaminate our study or 
understanding of terrorism. 
Fourth, in any conflict, it is entirely plausible that one of the parties is completely 
innocent of any wrongdoing. In such a case, the rhetoric of the innocent party is 
perhaps not a rhetoric at all but in fact a genuine outcry against some systematic 
injustice. To treat its outcry rhetorical, and worse still, compare it with the rhetoric of 
its oppressor would not only be downright eccentric but also colossally misleading.  
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Lastly, in the political realm, any criticism of opposition, no matter how justified, will 
often be predisposed to arrive at a prejudicial position. Since, essentially all political 
rhetorics carry a flavor of bias, an examination of reciprocal accusations, far from 
unifying competing accusations, could end up being an analysis of only respective 
biases. 
The importance of political rhetoric to terrorism is certainly undeniable. However, its 
utility for theoretical and definitional development is a different matter altogether. A 
rhetorical use of terrorism reduces the term to a mere name-calling device, which 
conflicting parties may utilize to denounce one another. In a sense, a rhetorical blame 
game is often more reflective of individual political preferences and prejudices than 
anything conceptually substantive. 
Such rhetorical back and forth, in effect, renders all descriptive and analytical pursuit 
of terrorism somewhat pointless. In spite of any contrary claims therefore, any 
definitional pursuit through political rhetoric will be a useless and futile exercise. As 
Kapitan notes, ‘The prevalent rhetoric of ‘terrorism’ has not provided an intelligent 
response to the problem of terrorism’ (2002: 183-184). Hence, any attempt to define 
terrorism in light of its rhetoric will be nothing more than ‘an exercise in political 
classification’ (Brannan et al., 2001: 11) that will subsequently end up being a ‘wider 
contest between various political actors, ideologies and objectives’ (Sproat, 1991: 20). 
It is for this reason that the issue of politicizing and inferences drawn from any 
rhetorical usage of the term will be left out of this thesis. However, before we 
conclude this argument, it is important to make one final distinction between the 
pejorative undertone and the rhetorical use of terrorism. 
Although it is the pejorative undertone of the term that encourages its rhetorical use, it 
is important that the two are not treated as synonyms.  Where the rhetoric it generates 
is a political tool and not important or useful for conceptualizing terrorism, the 
pejorative trait itself is simply indispensible for several obvious reasons. Firstly, it 
helps us understand, outline, and better structure the already discussed different moral 
positions in the discourse and is therefore extremely vital for a fuller appreciation of 
the all important moral problem of terrorism. Secondly, this derogatory use of the 
term is considered by many academics to be a unique characteristic of terrorism that 
helps distinguish terrorism. Terms like guerrilla warfare, insurgency, and riots e.g. are 
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thought to enjoy a somewhat neutral undertone while terrorism’s negative connotation 
in comparison is deemed distinctive (See e.g. Hoffman, 2006; Guelke, 2006). 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, no serious discussion on terrorism is complete 
without a reference to its pejorative undertone. Whether one agrees on it or not, the 
pejorative undertone of terrorism is deeply embedded in our conscience. And for that 
reason, it has had a profound impact on all other characteristics advanced in the 
discourse. Hence, in order to fully understand all these other characteristics, it is 
extremely important to accord due attention to the pejorative undertone. 
Having outlined the moral debate and the pejorative undertone of terrorism, we shall 
now turn our attention to the central problem- the victim of terrorism. 
 
The victim of terrorism 
The victim of terrorism broadly refers to the recipient of terrorist violence or its 
threat. Although the category of recipient generally translates into the victim of 
terrorism, there is a difference between the two. This is because terrorism typically 
addresses not one but multiple audiences (See e.g. Hoffman, 2006; Schmid, 2011). 
These audiences can be categorized as primary, secondary and tertiary.13 The primary 
and secondary audiences have a close proximity with terrorist violence and are the 
two that are actually threatened by it. The tertiary audience translates into a distant 
bystander that is not in anyway threatened by the terrorist violence but is still affected 
by it. 
A tertiary audience is basically one that enjoys a physical separation and is not 
directly part of the conflict involving terrorism.14 Nevertheless, it can inadvertently 
still get affected by it through news media. However, since it is not threatened by 
terrorism in any direct or even indirect sense, it will be left out of our discussion. 
                                                
13 It is important to note here that the terrorism literature generally identifies only two audiences, one 
that is directly targeted and the other that is psychologically affected by it. 
14 It is possible for a tertiary audience to have an indirect (or even direct) involvement in the conflict, 
but the physical distance may make it close to impossible to be a target of any terrorist violence. 
Although in case of any involvement, the threat of terrorism cannot be completely ruled out. 
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Instead, the focus will be on the primary and secondary victims of terrorism that are 
threatened directly or indirectly by terrorist violence. 
Although most academics generally agree that the victim of terrorism are principally 
people, there are some who argue that terrorist violence can also be directed against 
infrastructure. Coady for instance argues that ‘certain types of severe attacks on 
property’ that do not endanger human life, such as destruction of a civil airplane, 
could potentially count as terrorism, although Coady maintains that the property must 
belong to non-combatants (1985: 52). Valls agrees with Coady and believes that 
‘violence can include damage to property as well as harm to people’ and points out 
that ‘Blowing up a power plant’ for instance ‘can surely be an act of terrorism, even if 
no one is injured’ (2000: 67). Schbley notes that attacks on civilian property should 
constitute terrorism (2003: 107). Kaplan, in similar vein, points out that terrorists, 
other than targeting people, can also target property and societal structures that have 
some symbolic significance (2009: 185). 
Many other scholars, however, are somewhat sceptical of this view. Teichman for 
instance argues that destruction of property should not be considered terrorism ‘unless 
it is a precursor of a different kind of action i.e. part of a campaign which includes 
physically harming human beings’ (1989: 512). Primoratz agrees with Teichman and 
believes that an act would only be terrorism if it threatens people’s lives in some way 
and not otherwise (2004: 20). Held is particularly critical of categorizing attacks on 
property as terrorism. She is of the view that property damage should not even be 
considered violence because ‘violence can be defined as actions usually sudden, that 
predictably and coercively inflicts injury upon or damage that harms a person’ (2008: 
127). Held suggests that damage to property should only be considered violence 
‘insofar as it risks injury or harm to people’ (Ibid). 
It is indeed difficult, perhaps even impossible, to categorize (attacks on) property as a 
victim of terrorism for obvious semantic and aesthetic reasons. However semantics 
aside, there are still major problems with categorizing attacks on property as 
terrorism. To start with, clearly there must be some difference between attacks on 
property and people. Most people would agree that there is no moral equivalence 
between the two. An isolated attack on property that poses no visible threat to people 
(such as blowing up an empty civil airplane or a power plant) and is in fact carefully 
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orchestrated to avoid any casualty is clearly very different from an attack that is 
directed towards people or results in human casualty. To call both by the same name 
will not only be confusing but also profoundly unfair. 
It can of course be argued that since terrorism is essentially a psychological form of 
warfare, therefore, it is its psychological impact that should matter, and whether this 
impact is achieved through targeting property or people should be beside the point. 
However, where it is understandably very difficult to discern exact psychological 
impacts and emotional responses, there is an unmistakable and undeniable difference 
between an impact created by attacks on property and attacks on people. The 
emotional and psychological response to human victims will undeniably be far greater 
than any property destruction, especially if that attack poses no threat to human life. 
Furthermore, if an attack on property is deemed terroristic then how is terrorism any 
different from ordinary acts of vandalism? According to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, vandalism is defined as ‘destruction of or damage to public or private 
property’.15 Clearly if terrorism is understood in terms of attacks on both property and 
people, ordinary acts of vandalism could easily be categorized as terrorist acts. This of 
course is not a problem if one believes that acts of vandalism can be terrorism. But 
such a position will be painstakingly difficult to defend, especially because vandalism 
can easily do without what most of us believe to be terrorism’s indispensible 
attributes: psychological impact and political motivation. 
In light of this discussion, it can reasonably be concluded that the victims of terrorism 
must be people and an attack on property could be considered terrorism only if it 
directly threatens human life in some way and not otherwise. 
If it is established that the victims of terrorism are essentially people then is it possible 
to identify and denote a specific class of individuals? It is this question that we shall 
now turn our attention to. 
 
 
                                                
15 Available at: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/vandalism. Accessed on: July 04 
2015. 
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The three categories of victim 
Narrowing down the category of victim to people, though somewhat helpful, hardly 
makes terrorism distinctive in any meaningful way. Since most forms of violence 
involve some kind of harm or injury to people. The question of whether terrorism 
only targets a certain class of individuals has been a source of great concern for 
academics over the years. It is an especially pertinent subject for those who believe 
that the category of victim should be a defining characteristic of terrorism. 
The victim of terrorism as mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, is intrinsically 
tied to the morality of terrorism. The different categories of victim advanced in the 
discourse often reflect a certain moral viewpoint. It is particularly in relation to a 
certain category of victim (in combination with different variables) that we can better 
discern and understand the moral and the amoral positions discussed earlier in the 
chapter. 
There are mainly three categories of victim that are normally put forward in the 
discourse: civilian, non-combatant, and innocent. As both the categories of civilian 
and non-combatant have roots in the just war tradition, it is helpful to discuss the two 
at the same time. 
 
Civilian and non-combatant 
It is perhaps not an overstatement that among all the different categories of victim, the 
one used most frequently and regularly in both academic and non-academic sources is 
the category of civilian. This frequency of usage, however, is not necessarily 
suggestive of the term’s acceptability but possibly more so indicative of a choice of 
convenience.16 Another common practice is to use both the categories of civilian and 
non-combatant, which as this discussion will show, is not only inaccurate but also 
unnecessary. To make sense of the categories of civilian and non-combatant and 
understand how they gained currency, we must appreciate where the terms come from 
and that entails a brief examination of the just war theory. 
                                                
16 As civilian is a convenient label to distinguish ordinary people from military personnel.   
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Although questions can and have been raised over the application of the just war 
criterion to terrorism (See e.g. Goodin, 2006; Held, 2008), the categories of victim 
cannot be adequately explained and contextualized without formal engagement with 
the theory. Some authors believe that it is somewhat misleading to speak of just war 
as a theory and prefer to use the word tradition instead. As Valls points out that just 
war ‘is not a single theory but, rather, a tradition within which there is a range of 
interpretation’ (2000: 68). Schwenkenbecher also believes that ‘it is more accurate to 
speak of the just war tradition instead of just war theory, as the corresponding ideas 
have evolved over many centuries, millenniums in fact’ (2012: 76). It indeed makes 
sense to speak of just war as a tradition so as to lend it the necessary flexibility to be 
applied outside the strict context of war. 
Just war fundamentally concerns the ethics and morality of war, which has been 
developed through the ages to determine and judge the cause and conduct of different 
violent encounters. Following particularly the devastating events of the twentieth 
century (such as carpet bombing of the German cities, the Nazi holocaust, and the use 
of nuclear bombs against Japan) the tradition of just war received significant renewed 
impetuous and attention (Rengger, 2013: 81-82). 
The development of the tradition itself goes back to the early medieval times with 
Western Christianity often credited for formally establishing the practice, as Anthony 
Lang notes, ‘the tradition is fundamentally a Christian one’ (2009: 202). Early 
thinkers such as Augustine, Aquinas, and Grotius are considered to be the founders of 
this tradition. Orend, McMahan, and Walzer in particular are regarded as the ‘most 
salient contemporary philosophers continuing this tradition today’ (Schwenkenbecher, 
2012: 76). In spite of being widely regarded as essentially a Christian tradition, 
questions over the ethics and morality of war have featured extensively in almost all 
other religions and traditions. As Nicholas Rengger succinctly asserts ‘normative 
attitudes on what it is permissible to do in war are features of virtually every culture 
and time period’ (2013: 69). 
Just war has two main tenets: jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Jus ad bellum concerns 
justification regarding the reason to resort to war. It further comprises just cause, 
legitimate authority, right intention, last resort, and the probability of success (Valls, 
2000: 68-74). Jus in bello, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the conduct 
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of war or in Walzer’s words it signifies the observance of ‘positive rules of 
engagement’ (2000: 21). It further encompasses two main elements: proportionality 
and discrimination (Valls, 2000: 75-77). The just war tradition, in the form of jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello provides a combination of deontological and consequentialist 
considerations for assessing the morality of war (Schwenkenbecher, 2012: 76). Both 
these tenets of just war and their respective elements have featured, in form or 
another, in various other cultures and contexts. It is generally believed that for a war 
to be just, it must satisfy all the conditions set forth by both jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello. The same logic is also extended to terrorism. 
Jus ad bellum with its emphasis on legitimacy and probability of success corresponds 
broadly to the consequentialist or utilitarian position. Traditionally terrorism has not 
struggled much at meeting the provisions set forth by jus ad bellum. Even if we were 
to evaluate terrorism at the non-state level, it will probably still not face much qualm 
in satisfying most, if not all, of the conditions. Many terrorist groups, particularly the 
nationalist and certain leftwing groups, have a just cause, the right intention, and 
resort mostly to violence as a last resort. Arguably they do struggle somewhat over 
the issue of legitimacy and chances of success, but these two attributes are fairly 
contested and do not, at least from an academic standpoint, pose an insurmountable 
challenge as far as justification of terrorist violence is concerned.17 
Jus in bello, on the other hand, with its conditions of proportionality and 
discrimination draws mainly from the deontological position and has long been a 
point of concern for the justification of terrorist violence. As a tradition developed out 
of conventional wars, jus in bello, envisages two or more conflicting parties 
confronting each other. The conflicting parties ideally make an explicit declaration of 
war as the designated men that make up the combating force fight it out in open 
pitched battles. The designated combat forces of the conflicting parties are required to 
distinguish themselves with uniforms and emblems of their respective country or 
faction. These distinguished combating forces are called combatants and if the 
standards of just war are to be upheld, then the conflicting parties on all sides must 
only attack and target combatants. 
                                                
17 The issue of legitimate authority and chances of success along with other utilitarian considerations 
will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
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If anyone other than the combatants is targeted then that, at least in principle, breaks 
the just war convention. All other people that are not combatants i.e. not a member of 
the officially designated combating force are categorized as civilians. The jus in bello 
principle of discrimination calls for a clear distinction between what it considers to be 
acceptable (combatants) and unacceptable (civilian) targets. Thus jus in bello, with its 
condition of discrimination, identifies a class of people to which it extends immunity 
from any kind of attack. The notion of immunity is central to the just war doctrine. 
People by virtue of being civilians are, at least in theory, immune from any violent 
and belligerent activity. 
The distinction between combatant and civilian, however, is far from straightforward 
and strewn with problems. A civilian in simple terms is anyone who is formally not 
part of the military establishment. This means that anyone who’s even vaguely 
connected with the military, in principle, does not qualify for the civilian label and 
should therefore be a legitimate target of violence. 
However, it is common knowledge that not everyone associated with the military is 
actively engaged in combat. The military complex employs a range of workforce like 
medical personnel, cleaning and clerical staff, technical workers etc. Then there is of 
course the additional quandary concerning off-duty and ex- servicemen. Lastly, one of 
the pre-conditions of just war is formal declaration of war and active deployment of 
forces, failing which even the active armed personnel cannot be combatants in the 
strict sense of the term. 
It becomes obvious that a failure to qualify for the civilian label does not 
automatically make one combatant. The category of civilian is therefore perhaps too 
vague and indistinct to be of any useful descriptive value. It also appears to embody 
an inconsistent moral virtue, as many non-civilians are no more involved in a conflict 
than ordinary civilians. 
With the term civilian found wanting, the category preferred instead is that of non-
combatant. It not only includes all auxiliary military personnel (both retired and 
serving) but also everyone in the military workforce that are not actively engaged in 
combat. Additionally, as the term makes a distinction between those who are engaged 
in combat (combatants) and all others, it is succinctly able to also incorporate the 
category of civilian. Many academics, when discussing the victim of terrorism, use 
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both the categories of civilian and non-combatant (See e.g. Kapitan, 2002; Barber, 
2007; Weinberg and Eubank, 2008). However, such a practice, at least from a 
commonsensical and definitional point of view is fairly unnecessary. The categories 
of combatant and non-combatant alone should suffice. 
To sum up, jus in bello calls for discrimination in target selection as it permits the 
attacking of combatants and at the same time grants immunity from attack to non-
combatants. Thus, targeting of non-combatants during a conflict will be a violation of 
a fundamental condition of just war. This condition of non-combatant immunity is 
however, far from absolute. The just war tradition has a built-in provision that allows 
exceptions to this rule and permits targeting of non-combatants in certain 
extraordinary circumstances. This mechanism is better known as the doctrine of 
double effect. 
Generally, complete and unconditional prohibition against any kind of non-combatant 
killing is associated with absolute moral theories. Many academics, particularly the 
ones that endorse the just war tradition, are sceptical of such absolutes, as Coady 
points out ‘many contemporary moral philosophers, sympathetic to just war thinking, 
are wary of moral absolutes’ (2004: 58). 
Schwenkenbecher, in similar vein, finds absolute prohibitions unconvincing. She 
believes that ‘no moral theory which does not take consequences of actions into 
account is convincing’ (2012: 69). She makes a distinction between two types of 
deontological accounts ‘moral absolutism’ and ‘moderate deontology’. Rejecting 
absolutism, Schwenkenbecher, makes an argument in favor of moderate deontology 
and concludes that terrorism against non-combatants (or innocents specifically) can be 
justified if employed to avert a greater disaster and if it satisfies the standard just war 
criteria (p. 140). 
Schwenkenbecher’s moderate deontological position helpfully demonstrates the 
intersection between deontological and utilitarian moral positions. In fact, the entire 
edifice of the just war tradition, in spite of being slightly more skewed in favour of 
utilitarian theories, represents a compromise of sorts between the two opposing moral 
extremes. It is this compromise that often tends to pull the just war tradition in 
opposite directions as scholars seek to evoke different principles that match their 
respective moral inclinations. Thus, a focus on the cause, outcome, and probability of 
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success (jus ad bellum) pulls it towards the utilitarian model and an emphasis on 
proportionality and discrimination (jus in bello) pulls it towards deontological 
principles. The pragmatic result of this tug of war is the doctrine of double effect 
(DDE). DDE mainly acquires its rationalization from two of the fundamental features 
of jus ad bellum, the principles of right (or just) reason to go to war and last resort.18 
The doctrine can be explained by two interrelated senses: intentionality and supreme 
emergency. 
There are essentially three strands of DDE intentionality. First, the actor must have a 
good and just intention, typically to redress some unjustness or wrongness that has 
been committed. Second, it must not be a deliberate intention of the actor to target 
non-combatants and any attack on them must either be accidental or incidental. The 
third strand of intentionality is tied to the proportionality principle of jus in bello, that 
the harm inflicted must never be disproportionate. And in the event a disproportionate 
harm is inflicted, it must either be accidental or unintended. 
Walzer, instrumental in developing the modern theoretical framework of just war, 
believes that DDE is defensible if it is a ‘product of a double intention’ that a certain 
‘good be achieved’ and that ‘the foreseeable evil be reduced as far as possible’ (2006: 
262). Rodin fittingly ties DDE to what he calls ‘limited noncombatant immunity 
principle.’ According to this principle, non-combatants are generally immune from 
any deliberate use of force. They are, however, not immune from unintentional use of 
force against them in the due course of just war. In other words, force can in principle 
be used against non-combatants ‘if they are not its intended target’ (2004: 533). 
Supreme emergency, a feature essentially tied to the last resort principle of jus ad 
bellum, was developed formally by Walzer. The notion of supreme emergency is 
different from intentionality in the sense that it grants justificatory space for deliberate 
use of force against non-combatants in certain extraordinary circumstances. The 
intentionality principle holds that an attack against non-combatants must be 
                                                
18 A case can be made that the other two attributes of jus ad bellum, legitimate authority and probability 
of success are also essential for DDE. I, however, find this claim somewhat unconvincing, as the 
legitimate authority precondition will rule out any action by non-state actors. And probability of 
success, essentially a utilitarian argument, will raise deontological moral considerations. 
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unintentional, accidental, or incidental, whereas in supreme emergency, such an 
attack, though extremely regrettable, could well be deliberate and intentional. 
Walzer sets two main criterias: ‘danger’ and ‘imminence’, both of which must always 
apply if a situation is to constitute a supreme emergency (2006: 396). The danger 
posed ‘must be of an unusual and horrifying kind’ (p. 397), and it must also be urgent, 
demanding immediate attention. He provides the example of Nazi threat as 
constituting supreme emergency, ‘Here’ Walzer argues, ‘was a threat to human values 
so radical that its imminence would surely constitute supreme emergency’ (p. 398). 
Even though supreme emergency permits targeting of non-combatants, Walzer 
strongly cautions against excessive use of this provision. He particularly upholds the 
principle of proportionality and believes that if there is a probability that a just attack 
may result in casualties ‘disproportionate to the value of the target; then the attack 
must be called off’ (p. 267). 
The doctrine of double effect, since it grants the minimum justificatory room for 
targeting non-combatants, is perhaps the most important facet of just war as far as the 
question of terrorism’s morality is concerned. However, before we analyze this issue 
in further detail, it is important first to discuss the last of the three categories of 
victim- the innocent. 
 
Innocent 
Innocence is one of the most frequently used phrases in the terrorism discourse to 
describe terrorism’s victims. As opposed to civilian and non-combatant, the term 
innocent is clearly more prone to subjective interpretations. It is nevertheless 
unquestionably the most positive of the three categories, as it is clearly very difficult 
(if not impossible) to justify violence against innocents. 
Some academics find the civilian/non-combatant distinction far too deeply embedded 
in the just war tradition and therefore deem it unsuitable for the complex problem of 
terrorism. The general objection to just war application is that the standard rules of 
war typically do not or may not apply to terrorism. Most of such criticism is grounded 
in the belief that the just war tradition has fundamentally been developed for states 
and since terrorism is more than often a non-state activity, therefore its logic may not 
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necessarily apply to terrorism. Goodin is amongst the strongest critics of just war. He 
rebukes the theories of just war, which he argues have been ‘handed down to us from 
medieval church fathers’ and erroneously ‘assimilated into international law’ (2006: 
6). Goodin suggests that the just war tradition is essentially a framework developed 
for governing wars and state-on-state violence (p. 14) and criticizes Walzer and all 
other academics that follow his lead in applying the just war tradition to terrorism (p. 
7).  
Schwenkenbecher, although not as critical as Goodin, also raises questions over the 
application of just war tradition to terrorism. She believes that the just war criteria 
though ‘not ideally suited for assessing terrorism’ is not entirely irrelevant and needs 
some adjustments and modification ‘in order to be applicable to terrorism’ (2012: 80). 
She mainly objects to the just war combatant/non-combatant discrimination principle, 
which she believes cannot easily be transferred to the context of terrorism. Instead she 
suggests that the term innocent should be preferred (p. 52). 
This position of course is fiercely contested, as many scholars often draw on the logic 
of innocence from within the tradition of just war. Coady, for instance, categorizes 
terrorism as an attack on innocents and considers his classification as an advantage 
that encourages a discussion on morality and connects it with the well established 
tradition of just war (2004: 41). The point being that even though most scholars do not 
necessarily object to combatant/non-combatant distinction, many still frequently 
utilize the innocent category, often conveniently attaching it to the civilian and non-
combatant category (See e.g. Wilkinson, 2000; Walzer, 2006). The category of 
innocence, in other words, is not entirely exclusive as Schwenkenbecher assumes and 
is frequently coupled with other categories, which makes it vital to any discussion on 
terrorism. 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines an innocent simply as someone that is ‘Not 
guilty of a crime or offense’.19 This definition comprehensively captures the popular 
understanding of the term innocent. Categorizing the victims of terrorism as innocent 
would entail that they are not guilty or blameable for any crime or wrongdoing. 
Primoratz explains in detail the sense in which he believes the victims of terrorism are 
                                                
19 Available at: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/innocent. Accessed on 11 July 
2015. 
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innocent. He argues that what makes the victims innocent is that they are not 
attacking or engaged in a war against the terrorists, nor are they responsible in any 
real sense for the perceived injustice, suffering or deprivation that the terrorist is 
allegedly fighting against. In other words, ‘they have not done anything the terrorist 
could adduce as a justification of what he does to them’ (2004: 17-18). Primoratz 
believes that what ‘captures the distinctive obscenity of much terrorism’ is that its 
victims are innocent even from ‘the terrorists own point of view’ (p. 19-20). 
Schwenkenbecher agrees with Primoratz on the usage of the term innocent as ‘relating 
to persons who are in no plausible sense responsible for the problem the terrorists are 
fighting against’ (2012: 52). However, she goes on to make this distinction more 
pronounced by explaining the difference between an innocent and non-innocent. She 
points out that on the innocent account, a non-innocent would simply be a person who 
is in some way responsible for the terrorist’s problem. A non-innocent, particularly 
the ones that have seriously wronged others can justifiably be attacked (p. 53). 
However, Schwenkenbecher also believes that this responsibility for wronging others 
is not straightforward as there are different degrees of responsibilities and some 
individuals can be more responsible than others (p. 60). 
 Understandably it is fairly difficult to determine innocence of people. Non-state 
actors in particular may hold the entire society responsible for their suffering or 
grievances, especially if such a society is a democratic one. A functioning democratic 
government20 is elected by the people and is representative of them. If such a 
government is responsible for some misconduct, then the blame for such wrongdoing 
can conveniently be transferred to the people that elected it in the first place. Owing to 
this logic of deduction, it is hard not to be sceptical of the innocent category. 
Held, among many others, has maintained a firm opposition to the use of the innocent 
label. She particularly challenges the widely prevalent practice of treating all civilians 
as inherently innocent and forcefully asserts that ‘many civilians, the so-called 
‘innocents’, may have demanded of their governments the very policies that 
opponents are resisting, sometimes using terrorism to do so’ (2004: 66). Held believes 
                                                
20 Referring to a liberal democracy (or a free society) according to the Freedom House Index. Available 
at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2012/methodology#.VaOHjYuztW0. Accessed on 
13 July 2015. 
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that in light of these problems the only class of people that can rightly be categorized 
as innocent are small children, ‘but beyond this, there is little moral clarity’ (Ibid). 
Schwenkenbecher further adds people with poor health and mental problems 
(alongside small children) to the category of people who can properly be categorized 
as innocent (2012: 61). 
Given this predicament it is not surprising that the category of innocent is so heatedly 
contested. A general consensus on innocence past the category of small children and 
people with mental health problems will always be extremely hard to achieve. As no 
serious analyst can reasonably contest the innocence of small children and people 
with mental health problems, owing to their complete inability to either comprehend 
or influence the events around them.21 Whereas, on the other hand, liability for a 
certain wrongdoing can always be leveled against civilians and non-combatants (or 
ordinary people generally) that may indirectly be held responsible for it. 
As discussed earlier, the just war tradition has a built in provision, the doctrine of 
double effect, which permits violation of the immunity principle through targeting of 
civilians and non-combatants under certain conditions. Now the question is: can the 
same provision be extended to innocents as well? As pointed out earlier, many view 
the innocent category within the framework of just war and therefore subject it to the 
same rules of double effect. Valls utilizes such a framework and believes that the 
killing of innocents is permissible in certain circumstances ‘for innocents may be 
killed in a just war’ and ‘the basis for this position is the principle of double effect’ 
(2000: 77). 
Even if the category of innocence is to be viewed outside of the strict context of just 
war, attaining unconditional immunity for innocents will be a tall order for three main 
reasons. First, the disagreement over who properly qualifies as an innocent has 
become somewhat of a permanent obstacle. Claiming absolute immunity for a 
decidedly contested category will always be highly improbable. Second, the degrees 
of responsibility accorded to people would entail that seemingly innocent people may 
indirectly be liable for a certain wrongdoing and therefore deserving of some form of 
                                                
21 This is not to suggest that there are no other innocents beyond small children and people with mental 
health problems but merely to point out that these are the two categories that cannot reasonably be 
contested. 
	 61 
retaliation or punishment. Lastly, the term innocent is often attached to the civilian 
and non-combatant category, either under the assumption that the latter two are 
inherently innocent or simply to emphasize that they should be seen as such. This 
would mean that the logic of double effect itself could be easily extended or 
transferred to the innocent category. 
The category of innocent then is not very practical and helpful in any meaningful or 
constructive way. The only two groups that are universally deemed innocent in any 
real sense of the term- small children and people with mental health problems- are 
hardly representative of any society. And as long as terrorism does not target these 
two groups specifically, the assertion that terrorism targets innocents will always be 
intensely contested. 
This of course does not mean that there are no innocents or that terrorism never 
targets innocents. There can clearly be individuals in any society that are completely 
not guilty or responsible in any real sense for some alleged wrongdoing the terrorist 
actors are fighting against. Such individuals can certainly be categorized as innocents. 
The relationship between innocence, guilt, and responsibility however is a complex 
matter and will be discussed at length in the last section of this chapter. 
This section has analyzed the three main categories of victim: civilian, non-
combatant, and innocent. The most commonly used category of civilian is 
problematic and not a very helpful distinguishing criteria. The practice of using both 
the categories of civilian and non-combatant is unnecessary, as the latter, on its own, 
adequately accounts for both. The category of innocent, when treated in isolation, is 
possibly the least helpful (though it too can be incorporated in the non-combatant 
category). Lastly, the provision of civilian, non-combatant, innocent immunity is far 
from absolute as condition for attacking them is provided for by the doctrine of 
double effect. 
The discussion of these three categories of victim so far has been somewhat 
descriptive. This has consciously been done so as to provide a careful explanatory 
account of the three categories. We can now progress to a more analytical 
examination of our problem starting first with an analysis of two very important 
variables: deliberate and indiscriminate. 
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The Variables: Deliberate and Indiscriminate 
In spite of contradictory and conflicting positions regarding terrorism, almost 
everyone will generally agree that terrorism, if anything, is essentially bad. Even 
scholars adhering to the moral position (that seek to identify conditions under which 
terrorism can be justified) also maintain that terrorism is certainly bad, though they 
will often quickly go on to add that it is perhaps just as bad, if not less, than other 
forms of violence (See e.g. Held, 2004). 
The reason why terrorism is bad is because it involves some form of violence, or at 
least its threat, a point hardly anyone will contest. And violence is primarily bad 
because it usually involves a threat of harm or injury. However, if something is bad, it 
does not necessarily mean that it is also unjustified. If this was the case, then not only 
wars and all other forms of violence will be unjustified but also a range of ordinary 
human activities that we normally consider bad such as lying, gossiping, spying etc. 
Consider for example this typical hypothetical example: If a person is under a threat 
of death and the only possible way for him to save his life is through some form of 
violent retaliation that seriously harms or kills his attacker, then such an act although 
probably bad (as it involves violence and harm), but given the circumstances, will 
certainly be considered justified. 
For violence to be considered unjust it must both be bad and wrong.22 Where the word 
bad can be applied to any and all (including natural) occurrences, the expression 
wrong is reserved solely for human activities that we generally disapprove of. 
However, just because something is wrong does not mean that it cannot be justified. 
Therefore even when violence is wrong, there can still be ground for its justification 
(the doctrine of double effect discussed in the previous section provides just such a 
ground), although all such justification will usually be contested. There are of course 
some forms of violence, particularly the ones that are aimed at systematic elimination 
of an entire community such as genocide or ethnocide, that are unequivocally wrong 
and beyond the pale of any justification. Yet, justification for most other forms of 
violence, political violence in particular, will always be a matter of controversy. 
Terrorism happens to be one such activity. 
                                                
22 As something that is wrong must also be bad, the word wrong alone should therefore suffice. 
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The question we must ask now is what is it that makes terrorism specifically wrong 
and consequently unjustified. This question is at the heart of the moral problem and 
the answer to it is far from straightforward. Some point out that terrorism is wrong 
because it generates fear (See e.g. Garrison, 2004; Goodin, 2006; Kaplan, 2009), 
while others insist that it is because terrorism is an unsanctioned and illegitimate form 
of violence (See e.g. McPherson, 2007). In spite of these different assertions, the one 
reason that dwarfs all others concerns the victim of terrorism. 
Arguably, there have been some serious attempts, especially with the rise of critical 
studies, to displace the centrality of victim. However, whether there are attempts to 
endorse the victim category or to redress it is not the point. The crucial factor is that 
all such attempts have significantly elevated the victim category and placed it at the 
forefront of the moral debate of the terrorism problem. 
Now if targeting of innocents, civilians or non-combatants is what makes terrorism 
wrong, unjustified, and consequently immoral then by this logic other forms of 
violence must also be unjustified and immoral- since they all, in one way or another, 
threaten to harm ordinary people- be it innocents, civilians or non-combatants (See 
e.g. English, 2009; Jackson, 2010). However, as we know, this is not always the case. 
Most other forms of violence generally do not struggle with justification the way 
terrorism does, even when they target the same victims. To address this somewhat 
blatant contradiction, the seemingly similar victims of terrorism and other forms of 
violence are further distinguished by two key variables: deliberate and indiscriminate. 




In the context of terrorism, there are mainly three different senses of the deliberate 
characteristic- generation of fear, rational decision, and target selection. From a moral 
standpoint, deliberate selection of a certain target is perhaps the most important of 
these senses. The general idea is that terrorism intentionally chooses to target a certain 
group of people that otherwise enjoy immunity from any kind of violence or harm. In 
comparison, other forms of violence generally do not target groups that have 
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immunity and any harm to such groups is either purely unintended or simply 
unavoidable. A form of violence that deliberately target people with immunity is 
believed to be inherently wrong, unjustified, and immoral. 
The element of deliberate targeting enjoys significant academic patronage, as many 
consider it be an indispensible characteristic that sets terrorism apart. As Richardson 
forcefully asserts that the ‘most important defining characteristic of terrorism is the 
deliberate targeting of civilians. This is what sets terrorism apart from other forms of 
political violence.’ She further notes that striking at civilians or non-combatants is not 
‘an unintended side effect’ but in fact part of a ‘deliberate strategy’ of terrorism 
(2006: 22). Carr also powerfully states that terrorism is essentially a form of warfare 
that is ‘deliberately waged against civilians’ (2007: 48). 
Owing to this importance, many insist that the deliberate element should be made a 
matter of definition. Benjamin Barber, for instance, prefers a definition that ‘identifies 
terrorist acts with the intentional targeting of civilian non-combatants’ (2007: 55). 
Similarly, Ganor also defines terrorism as the ‘intentional use of, or threat to use 
violence against civilians…’ (2002: 292). Coady particularly makes a strong case for 
including intentionality. He argues that if intentionality were to be removed from a 
definition of terrorism, then deaths or injuries that happen accidentally during 
ordinary political rallies or activities would also qualify as terrorism. In his own 
words, ‘It should at least be made clear that the political act intentionally produced the 
death or threat of death to non-combatants, otherwise loud applause at a political rally 
which distracted a passing (civilian) motorist causing him to crash into a pole and die 
would count as an act of terrorism’ (1985: 51-52). 
Despite the fact that deliberate targeting is considered somewhat characteristic of 
terrorism, there are still some scholars that contest this position. Willem Schinkel, for 
instance, notes that the aspect of intentionality, which ‘is present in many if not all 
discussions of terrorism’, represents a definite problem of ‘intrinsic reduction of 
definitions’ (2009: 185). He believes that intentionality is not part of the core of 
terrorism and to treat it otherwise, as majority of the scholars do, is erroneous and 
conceptually unhelpful  (p. 187). 
Criticism of the deliberate element is predominantly found in the moral position. 
There are two main strands of this criticism. Firstly, adherents of the moral position 
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believe that the element of deliberate targeting makes terrorism immoral by definition. 
It is argued that if terrorism is defined as a form of violence that deliberately targets 
people with immunity then there will be little point discussing whether there can be 
any ground for its justification. As Scott Lowe states that by suggesting that terrorism 
is intentional killing of innocent, we inadvertently build immorality into the definition 
of terrorism (2006: 253). Secondly, it is also believed that the aspect of intentionality 
is not unique to terrorism as non-combatants are routinely targeted deliberately in 
other forms of violence as well (English, 2009). Intentionality, it is argued, should 
therefore not be seen as a distinguishing feature of terrorism. 
On the other hand, adherents of the amoral position almost unequivocally advocate 
that deliberate targeting of non-combatants is characteristic of terrorism. However, 
given that the just war tradition (by means of DDE) has a provision for intentional 
targeting, they must for that reason demonstrate that killing of non-combatants in 
other so-called legitimate or justified forms of violence is somehow different from 
terrorism. In this vein, their main contention is that since non-combatant casualties in 
wars and violence is somewhat unavoidable, therefore there must exist some kind of 
justificatory space that permits targeting of non-combatants. This justification usually 
comes in two ways: accidental (which includes negligence and recklessness), and 
incidental (or foreseen). 
The intentionality strand of the double effect doctrine readily provides the necessary 
justificatory ground for any accidental targeting. According to the logic of accidental 
targeting, any non-combatant casualties are unanticipated, unexpected and purely 
accidental. Deaths or injuries to non-combatants thereof, are treated as unforeseen 
routine accidents that may as a rule come to pass in the due course of any event. 
Sometimes, however, such accidents could be the result of some negligent or reckless 
behaviour that could have otherwise been avoided. The accidental provision, though 
over-all critical of negligence and recklessness, still grants them both the same 
justificatory space as purely accidental cases. 
There are some scholars that are critical of granting such justification, especially to 
accidents that are a result of negligence and recklessness. David Rodin, for instance, 
casts doubt over the traditional moral theories that treat accidental casualties in the 
due course of just wars as regrettable but yet permissible (2004: 762). Instead he 
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proposes that any ‘deliberate, negligent, or reckless use of force against non-
combatants’ should be treated as terrorism (p. 755). This, Rodin argues, will 
necessitate reexamining of an essential feature of the moral theories, principally the 
doctrine of double effect, that has long permitted such atrocities (p. 762). Such a 
proposition, however, does not fare well with many others as it is considered overly 
idealistic and too far removed from reality. As Holmes points out that any accidental 
killing during war should not raise concerns over the morality of war itself, because 
‘that would no more show that war is immoral than accidental auto deaths would 
show that highway construction is immoral’ (1989: 190).23 
In incidental targeting, on the other hand, non-combatant casualties are foreseen in the 
sense that they are expected and anticipated. The general idea is that in the due course 
of any just war, some form of harm to non-combatants is simply unavoidable, and in 
some cases it may even be necessary for accomplishing certain crucial objectives. 
Therefore, since any kind of war is clearly not possible without some kind of harm to 
non-combatants, it is argued that instead of prohibiting non-combatant harming 
altogether, provision for it must form part of the rules and regulations of any violent 
engagement. As Coady observes, ‘it seems that modern war (and perhaps any war) 
cannot be conducted unless there is room for some incidental harming of the 
innocent’ (2004: 57). The rules of such violent engagement and subsequent 
justification of incidental harming is provided by the supreme emergency strand of the 
double effect doctrine. 
Thus, those who purposely associate deliberate and intentional targeting of non-
combatants with terrorism choose not to use the same terms for other forms of 
violence, favoring instead words like accidental and incidental. Understandably there 
is clear difference between deliberate and accidental targeting and the two should not 
be treated analogous. Parallels between them, however, can still be drawn if accidents 
are a result of negligence and recklessness. On the other hand, the line between 
deliberate and incidental targeting is a fairly thin one, owing largely to the foreseen 
and anticipatory nature of the latter. It is this thin line that is subject to intense 
scrutiny as moral comparisons between the two are frequently drawn. There are three 
important reasons for such parallel comparisons. 
                                                
23 Holmes, however, does not have similar reservations for incidental or foreseen harming. 
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First, even though incidental targeting is accompanied with claims of last resort, no 
other alternative, and respect for proportionality (the hallmarks of supreme 
emergency), it is still in the end a premeditated choice that consciously targets non-
combatants. In this respect, it is not very different from what the word deliberate 
broadly entails. 
Second, feelings of regret and remorse that an assailant of incidental targeting 
supposedly feels are unimportant, irrelevant and largely fail to distinguish between 
deliberate and incidental targeting. Feelings are inherently fairly subjective and 
practitioners of both deliberate and incidental targeting can share the same emotions. 
And even if they do not, accurately determining their respective feelings is clearly out 
of the question. 
Lastly, treating incidental targeting differently violates the rationality principle of 
consistency, a point that has eloquently been explained by Holmes. Even though he 
applies this principle to wars, his logic can easily be extended to terrorism as well. 
Holmes believes that prohibition against killing can best be ‘understood in ways that 
yield a plurality of principles’ (1989: 195). Referring to incidental killing as 
permissible indirect killing of non-combatants, Holmes argues that this approach 
violates the basic requirement of rationality, ‘namely, that one be consistent’ (p. 196). 
The consistency here demands that we ‘judge similar cases similarly’ as ‘One cannot 
perform virtually identical acts and judge them differently unless they differ in 
morally relevant respects’ (p. 196-197). 
Although a morally relevant case could be made in favour of incidental killing (with 
help from the numerous deontological provisions of the just war tradition), it will still 
manage very little as far as the intention of the perpetrators are concerned, which 
despite being considerate and proportionate is still, at base, deliberate. Incidental 
targeting of non-combatants, therefore, for all intents and purposes is essentially 
deliberate and in spite of any contrary claims should be seen as such. 
 
Indiscriminate 
The term indiscriminate broadly entails that terrorism has no regard for the identity of 
its victims. The logic of terrorism’s indiscriminate characteristic can be better 
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understood if contrasted with the supposedly discriminate nature of other forms of 
violence. 
The term discriminate suggests that there must be a clear distinction between those 
that can and cannot be attacked. Born out of the tradition of just war, the principle of 
discrimination categorizes the people permitted for targeting as combatants and the 
rest as non-combatants. Any actor that claims to be engaged in a just war must 
therefore respect this principle of discrimination. Most of the other forms of violence 
and wars in general are expected to respect this distinction. In comparison, terrorism 
is seen as a form of violence that does not respect the principle of discrimination and 
violates it deliberately. 
The indiscriminate characteristic though essentially tied to the victim is not the only 
way in which terrorism can be indiscriminate. It also happens to have another often 
frequently cited complementary sense. This second sense refers to its unpredictable, 
capricious, and somewhat erratic character, whereby terrorism appears to be random 
and arbitrary. The random attribute is just as frequently used as indiscriminate- in fact 
the two are often treated as synonyms. There is of course a small difference between 
the two as randomness in principle generally refers to only arbitrary and unpredictable 
behavior, while indiscriminate is a much broader term that not only signifies the class 
or classlessness of victims targeted but also effectively incorporates the logic of 
randomness. To use the two terms together, as is commonly done, is therefore 
inaccurate and somewhat unnecessary as the indiscriminate factor adequately 
incorporates randomness. 
The indiscriminate characteristic enjoys significant support especially among scholars 
that adhere to the amoral position. Many leading scholars in the field believe it be an 
indispensible and a defining characteristic of terrorism. Wilkinson, for instance, 
believes that ‘Terrorism is inherently and inevitably a means of struggle involving 
indiscriminate and arbitrary violence against the innocent’ (2000: 218). Walzer 
similarly alludes to the point that no category of people can claim immunity from 
terrorism as the terrorists make no distinction and kill just about anyone they please 
(1977: 203). Terrorism, for Walzer therefore, in a strict sense, is ‘the random murder 
of innocent people’ (p. 198).  
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Among other things, it is perhaps the indiscriminate characteristic in particular that 
prompts scholars like Wilkinson and Walzer to maintain such a determined opposition 
to terrorism. The indiscriminate attribute epitomizes the moral dilemma regarding the 
justification of terrorist violence- because if terrorism is in fact random and arbitrary 
then it will only be a matter of time before it targets people who otherwise enjoy 
immunity- be it innocents, civilians, or non-combatants. As Nick Fotion observes that 
if ‘terrorism is aimed randomly at a general population’ then it ‘will inevitably affect 
many innocent people’ (2004: 48). 
It will indeed be very difficult to make a moral case in favour of a form of violence 
that targets anyone, anywhere and without any constraints. However, the idea of 
terrorism being indiscriminate has over the years attracted intense scrutiny and 
criticism especially in critical circles. This criticism can be said to have three distinct 
strands, which for analytical convenience will be classified here as descriptive, 
empirical, and pragmatic. 
 
Descriptive criticism 
The descriptive criticism of the indiscriminate feature entails that terrorism is not 
necessarily random and can in fact be discriminate in its choice of targets and 
suggesting otherwise would violate its ordinary usage and description. Terrorism is 
primarily considered to be indiscriminate because it supposedly fails to distinguish 
between combatants and non-combatants, innocent and guilty, or civilian and military 
targets. However, many authors challenge this assumption by pointing to carefully 
orchestrated attacks on military or government targets that are routinely referred to as 
acts of terrorism. 
Valls draws attention to this point and suggests that those who maintain that terrorism 
is random or indiscriminate, depart significantly from ordinary usage of the term as 
there are many ‘acts we call terrorist that specifically target military facilities and 
personnel’ (2000: 67). ‘The fact is that terrorists’ Valls asserts ‘or at least those called 
terrorists by everyone, in fact do discriminate’ (p. 76). English also notes that ‘random 
selection of victim has often… been absent from what are clearly terrorist attacks’ 
(2009: 9). 
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The attacks on military and government targets that are frequently regarded as acts of 
terrorism go on to raise serious questions over the category of civilian itself. The 
descriptive criticism therefore, not only challenges the indiscriminate hypothesis, but 
also raises questions over the category of civilians as the only possible victims or 
targets of terrorist violence. This has pithily been observed by Held who also 
acknowledges these obvious ‘descriptive implications’ and points to attacks on non-
civilian targets, such as the ones on the USS Cole in Yemen in October 2000 and the 
Pentagon in September 2001, which are commonly referred to as terrorist attacks 
(2008: 20). 
The terrorist attacks are thus generally not restricted to only civilians, which shows 
that the purely civilian category can be seriously misleading. Nevertheless, attacking 
military personnel does not imply that terrorism cannot or would not target non-
military targets. In fact, the indiscriminate logic discerned above suggests that 
terrorism is indiscriminate precisely because it does not distinguish between military 
and non-military targets and attacks both at random. In light of this observation, the 
descriptive criticism appears fairly inaccurate and somewhat wrong footed. However, 
to fully appreciate the logic of descriptive criticism, we must briefly analyze one final 
sense of the indiscriminate characteristic. 
The word indiscriminate by virtue of its nature tends to suggest that terrorism is 
senseless and pointless violence. This challenges not only any underlying logic of 
terrorism but also the rationality of the actors that practice it. The truth of the matter is 
that terrorism is widely believed to be purposive violence with an underlying logic 
(See e.g. Crenshaw, 1981; Enders and Sandler, 1993). And the terrorists or the actors 
that practice terrorism are largely believed to be perfectly normal, rational, and sane 
(See e.g. Pape, 2006; Taylor and Horgan, 2006). As Wardlaw pithily observes, 
‘Terrorism is not mindless. It is a deliberate mean to an end’ (1989: 17). Since 
terrorism often fails to achieve its long-term goals, some utilitarians understandably 
may question the efficacy and usefulness of terrorist violence. They will still however 
as a rule not question the rationality of the actor. 24 
In view of the fact that terrorism is widely regarded as a rational activity, it is not 
surprising that many commentators in the field are sceptical of what the word 
                                                
24 For a detailed discussion on rationality and utility of terrorism, see chapter 4. 
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indiscriminate entails and are mindful of its descriptive implications. Many scholars 
feel the need to categorically point to terrorist targeting of military personnel to show 
that terrorists can be discriminate in their selection of victims. 
Coady’s position on the matter is clearly demonstrative of this practice. He 
emphasizes that the adjective indiscriminate is ambiguous as ‘it may mean something 
like random or irrational’ and since he believes that terrorists always select their 
victims carefully, he declines to make it a matter of definition (2004: 7). At the same 
time, he also acknowledges that there is a sense in which terrorist violence can be 
indiscriminate, ‘namely, the sense in which it fails to discriminate between combatant 
and non-combatant targets’ (1985: 55). Primoratz, who utilizes the category of 
innocent to classify the victims of terrorism, also argues that terrorism is not 
indiscriminate in the blind and pointless sense but ‘in the sense that it fails to 
distinguish between the guilty and the innocent’ (2004: 17). Because of this double-
edged nature of the indiscriminate feature, both Coady and Primoratz, among many 
others, refuse to make it a matter of definition. 
Given the predicament, the descriptive criticism of the indiscriminate feature is 
reasonably justified. More than anything else perhaps, it represents a strong 
opposition to the view that terrorism is blind, senseless and irrational. However, 
irrespective of how reasonable this opposition may seem, it still falls fairly short of 
comprehensively challenging the indiscriminate characteristic. For a more critical 
appraisal, therefore, we need to turn to the other two strands of the criticism. 
 
Empirical criticism 
The empirical strand of the criticism regards the indiscriminate characteristic as an 
incongruous theoretical supposition that is largely inconsistent with tangible empirical 
facts on ground. Like the descriptive criticism, it upholds the rational, strategic, and 
logical dimension of terrorist violence, but goes one step further in dislodging the 
abstract assumptions by subjecting the indiscriminate hypothesis to rigorous empirical 
tests. 
The work of Lisa Mccartan et al. in this regard is particularly noteworthy. Using 
quantitative data sets from the Chechen conflict, they discern the logic of terrorist 
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choice of targets. They argue that the ‘terrorist acts are not indiscriminate or random 
but rather demonstrate an underlying logic’ and the choice of their targets should be 
seen as strategic or logical (2008: 60). Their findings reveal that civilians were 
primarily targeted in Russia and non-civilian or military personnel were most likely to 
be targeted in Chechnya (p. 72). This led them to conclude that the choice of targets 
reflects the rational decision of the Chechen rebels to maintain public support at home 
while causing serious harm in Russia. The actions of the Chechen rebels therefore 
followed a clear logical pattern and could not be regarded as indiscriminate (p. 73). 
The work of Daphna Nisim et al. provides an even more nuanced criticism of the 
indiscriminate feature. They put to test the ‘randomness hypothesis’, which is 
described as an ‘indiscriminate act of violence in which targeted victims are not 
preselected’ (2006: 468). Utilizing the ‘lifestyle-exposure theory’ from criminal 
victimization studies, they explore the extent to which victims of terrorism are 
targeted at random (p. 486). The lifestyle-exposure theory advances the argument that 
an ‘individual’s social status determines his/her lifestyle or routine activities and these 
in turn determine his/her level of vulnerability’ (p. 487). The findings of their research 
reject the randomness thesis as they conclude that victimization from terrorism is not 
random or arbitrary, but in fact dependent upon certain lifestyle indicators such as 
income, age, and other activities (p. 496). 
The empirical criticism, though helpful in many ways has some obvious 
shortcomings. Firstly, in the absence of an agreed definition of terrorism, different 
data sets end up utilizing different definitions. This means that they could produce 
dissimilar results, making it difficult to compare and contrast findings across different 
quantitative researches. Secondly, given that non-state terrorists are often weak 
relative to their adversaries, the choice of their target could be a matter of 
convenience than preference. Since empirical criticism is largely data driven, it could 
therefore easily be skewed in favor of targets that only reflect terrorist’s choice of 
convenience and not their actual preference. Lastly, although empirical criticism 
effectively challenges the random and irrational facets of terrorist violence, it does not 
adequately explain the reason why terrorism targets certain groups in the first place, 




The pragmatic strand perhaps provides the most balanced and well-rounded criticism. 
Even though it opposes strict adherence, pragmatic criticism does not reject the 
indiscriminate characteristic out of hand. Unlike focusing solely on combatant 
targeting which descriptive criticism does, it not only provides a more complete and 
coherent account of terrorist target selection but also explains the sense in which 
terrorism carries the appearance of being indiscriminate. 
The pragmatic criticism challenges the indiscriminate characteristic primarily on the 
grounds of collective responsibility- the theoretical roots of which can be found in the 
Roman tradition of jus gentium. According to this tradition, a group can be held 
responsible for actions committed by its members (Becker, 2006: 13). Hence, 
terrorists that often seek to redress some grievances may hold an entire group or 
community collectively responsible, even if they are aware that only a few individuals 
are directly responsible for the alleged wrongdoing. Under such circumstances, the 
terrorists may well be within their rights, as far as discrimination in target selection is 
concerned, when they attack any or all segments of a certain society. 
Jeff Goodwin takes on the task of explaining the seemingly indiscriminate logic of 
terrorist violence. He believes that in order to explain terrorism properly we must try 
to understand why they choose to target civilians and non-combatants specifically 
(2006: 2028). He puts forward his ‘theory of categorical terrorism’ and suggests that 
the word ‘indiscriminate’ should be substituted with ‘categorical’. According to his 
theory, terrorism is always directed against some people that belong to a specific 
nationality, ethnicity or religious group. In this sense, terrorism is in fact very 
discriminate, as it is ‘directed against specific categories of people and not others. 
‘For this reason’, Goodwin argues that ‘categorical terrorism is a more accurate label 
than indiscriminate terrorism’ (p. 2031). Goodwin believes that the terrorist groups 
target in this fashion because they hold both civilians and non-combatants complicit 
in some manner. He therefore classifies these people as ‘complicitous civilians’, and 
argues that terrorist violence against them should not be treated as random or 
indiscriminate (p. 2037). 
In similar vein, Schwenkenbecher argues that the issue of collective responsibility is 
very crucial to understanding the moral justification of terrorist target selection. She 
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argues that ‘individuals can be held responsible for an injustice brought about by a 
collective or group of which they are a member’ (p. 59). Schwenkenbecher extends 
this collective logic to not only the direct members of a guilty group but also to all 
others who could have averted this injustice ‘but failed to prevent by either not acting 
out of ignorance or by consciously deciding not to act’ (Ibid). 
This notion of collective responsibility renders the combatant/non-combatant, 
civilian/military and the innocent/guilty distinction somewhat redundant as the 
terrorists may hold everyone in a society responsible for their perceived grievances. 
Since practically just about anyone in the society, in one way or another, can be held 
responsible for some wrongdoing, their targeting therefore should not be treated as 
random or indiscriminate. 
The three strands of criticism discussed above provide not just an assessment of the 
indiscriminate feature, but also represent wider attempts to challenge the immorality 
of terrorism. If we accept that the actors that practice terrorism are normal and 
rational (which scholars on both end of the moral spectrum do) then it is somewhat 
safe to conclude that terrorism can never be indiscriminate in any real sense of the 
term. It may carry the appearance of being indiscriminate, but the targets selected 
should be seen as symbolic rather than random or indiscriminate. 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines a symbol as ‘A mark or character used as a 
conventional representation of an object’.25 In line with the dictionary definition, 
treating terrorist targets symbolic would mean that they are representative or mark of 
an object, a specific and not random or accidental target. Treating a terrorist act as 
symbolic therefore does not denounce the actor or the act as irrational or senseless. A 
symbolic characterization of the object of terror as opposed to indiscriminate not only 
invites far less criticism but also better accounts for the seemingly random appearance 
of terroristic violence. 
As the targets are intended to be symbolic, therefore the terrorists would select those 
individuals that will have the greatest resonance with their target audience. Since 
majority of their target audience is ordinary people, or non-combatants in other words, 
therefore targeting them should at least in principle also achieve the greatest impact. 
                                                
25 Available at: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/symbol. Accessed on 6/6/2015. 
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In this regard, terrorism is in fact very selective even though it carries the appearance 
of being indiscriminate. This is why Lasswell suggests that terrorism is most effective 
when it is ‘indiscriminate in appearance but highly selective in fact’ (1978: 262). 
In the end, it is also important to remember that even if the indiscriminate 
characteristic was important to defining terrorism (which as this discussion has shown 
that it is not), it is still not an analytically or conceptually helpful distinction. For how 
can we study something that is unpredictable, unreasonable, arbitrary, and senseless in 
any constructive and meaningful way? Terrorism, as an object of study, would 
therefore fare much better if it were not treated or categorized as indiscriminate. 
Before we move on to our final discussion, it is important to answer the two important 
questions regarding who the victim of terrorism is and what makes terrorism immoral. 
It has been explained in detail why the category of non-combatant best categorizes the 
victim of terrorism. The non-combatant category not only adequately incorporates the 
two other widely used categories of civilians and innocents but also shows that 
terrorism by default cannot be used against combatants. 
Although some may suggest that terrorism can be committed against combatants, it 
must be pointed out that most of the examples given in such vein are of military 
personnel who are not actively engaged in combat, be it the 1983 bombing of U.S. 
and French barracks or the attack on the USS Cole off the coast of Yemen in 2000. 
Being a combatant does not automatically translate into military personnel, as is often 
assumed, but in fact describes people who are actively engaged in some belligerent 
activity. It will be hard to even imagine terrorism against combatants that are 
otherwise actively engaged in fighting. Furthermore, suggesting that terrorism also 
targets combatants would only entail that terrorism is being used as a tool of political 
rhetoric to denounce one’s opponents in some ongoing conflict. 
Secondly, in light of the above discussion, there also need not be any confusion over 
what potentially makes terrorism immoral. The elements of intentionality and 
indiscriminate violence are not exclusive to terrorism (nor for that matter is generation 
of fear) and because of that they cannot in any reasonable manner explain why 
terrorism is deemed immoral. Moreover, these elements are judged to be morally 
problematic precisely because they are intrinsically tied to the victim of terrorism. It is 
hard to imagine that anyone will have even the slightest of qualms (morally speaking) 
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with these variables if the victim were to be removed. It is somewhat safe to conclude 
therefore that what makes terrorism immoral is its victim (or simply the category of 
non-combatants). 
The most convincing criticism of the non-combatant category is that it is not 
exclusive to terrorism and if it is what makes terrorism immoral, then by that standard 
all forms of violence should be deemed immoral (See e.g. Goodin, 2006). 
Understandably, non-combatants are routinely targeted in other forms of violence as 
well, be it insurgencies, guerilla warfare, or wars in general. This, however, does not 
mean that we should do away with the category of non-combatant altogether. What 
we must not forget is that there is significant overlap between terrorism and other 
forms of violence as terrorism can be employed either as a tactic or a strategy in their 
midst (this issue has been discussed at length in chapter 5). 
 
Discussion 
Support for a certain category of victim in combination with certain variables should, 
at least in principle, also adhere to an analogous moral position. However, this 
curiously is not always the case. Mostly we find scholars that identify similar 
categories of victims and intervening variables and yet somehow end up endorsing 
different and even opposing moral positions. Emphasizing similar attributes of 
terrorism and yet arriving at completely different conclusions is particularly 
demonstrative of the irregularities and inconsistencies that plague the terrorism 
discourse. It has been pointed out in this chapter that among all other characteristics 
of terrorism the one that primarily raises the moral question is the category of victim 
and its closely associated variables (deliberate and indiscriminate). 
Associating a certain class of victims such as innocents, civilians, or non-combatants 
purposely with terrorism tend to make it appear immoral and unjustified. Yet in spite 
of this, it is not uncommon to find academics that identify the victims as such and yet 
curiously enough, still consider their conceptualization to be objective and morally 
neutral. Kapitan, for instance, defines terrorism as a threat directed against innocents, 
civilians, or non-combatants and yet argues that his ‘conception implies nothing 
directly about whether an act of terrorism can be justified or not’ (2002: 173). 
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Primoratz also conceptualizes terrorism as deliberate violence employed against 
innocent people and yet believes his definition is morally neutral as it ‘does not rule 
out its justification under certain circumstances’ (2004: 24). Similarly, Coady also 
defines terrorism as an activity directed against non-combatants and at the same time 
believes that his definition ‘avoids the pitfall of making terrorism immoral by 
definition’ (2004: 8). 
The category of victim, as we know, is not exclusive to terrorism, as civilians, 
innocents, and non-combatants are routinely targeted in other forms of violence as 
well. Those making a moral case against terrorism, therefore, additionally point to 
two key variables (deliberate and indiscriminate) that supposedly make terrorism not 
only distinct but also explain why it is morally repugnant. Interestingly however, 
many scholars on the other end of the moral spectrum (those making a moral 
argument for the justification of terrorist violence) more than often also tend to 
associate the same variables with terrorism under the impression that it is not these 
variables that make terrorism morally questionable. 
Hence, it is fairly common to find scholars that incorporate either the deliberate or the 
indiscriminate feature (or both) in their respective understanding of terrorism and at 
the same time also assert that their conceptualization is morally neutral. For example, 
McPherson, who is extremely critical of the amoral position, defines terrorism as a 
force deliberately employed against non-combatants (2007: 525). In a similar vein, 
Shanahan, who otherwise challenges the notion that terrorism by definition is morally 
wrong, conceptualizes it as ‘strategically indiscriminate’ (2010: 178). This is not to 
suggest that all such positions are necessarily wrong but merely to draw attention to 
the extraordinary level of confusion and uncertainty not to mention the obvious 
contradiction over what it is that makes terrorism immoral. 
In light of this confusion, should we also conclude as English (2009) does- that given 
the heterogeneity of terrorist violence all these categories and distinctions are 
essentially problematic and to an extent also unhelpful? This chapter has argued that 
irrespective of individual moral proclivity, both the deliberate and intentional 
elements are largely unsatisfactory and inadequate criteria for distinguishing 
terrorism. The fact that their usage is contradictory or confusing should therefore be 
beside the point. 
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Terrorism is certainly deliberate in the sense that it is not irrational, a point hardly 
anyone will contest. Beyond this, however, it is perhaps no more deliberate than any 
other form of violence, be it in regard to generation of fear or target selection. It has 
been pointed out earlier that those who espouse to the amoral position and use the 
term ‘deliberate’ solely for terrorism, prefer instead to use terms like accidental or 
incidental for other forms of violence. An accidental harm, as long as it is not due to 
negligence or recklessness, is fundamentally different from deliberate harming. 
Incidental harm, on the other hand, owing to its premeditated and foreseen nature is 
essentially the same as deliberate harm. To treat them differently, as is often done, 
will not change what the terms broadly designate and stand for. 
Although the term accidental is hardly ever used for terrorist violence, it is worth 
remembering that there are instances when terrorism can also be accidental. The 1993 
IRA bombing of the Shankill Road is one such example. The IRA intended to 
assassinate a UDA leader but a premature explosion of the bomb resulted in the 
unintended or accidental death of eight non-combatants and one IRA assailant (Silke, 
2003). Both the terms accidental and incidental do not denote anything that is 
fundamentally opposed to terrorism. Terrorism, just like other forms of violence, can 
be accidental and the word incidental is essentially the same as deliberate. Even 
though some scholars may object to this proposition, they will struggle hard to object 
to the fact that the idea of terrorism being accidental or incidental cannot easily be 
ruled out by definition. 
On the other hand, there is also no denying that there is a sense in which terrorism has 
the appearance of being indiscriminate. However, this has little to do with its failure 
to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants or guilty and innocent or 
military and civilian targets. It is indeed true that one of the reasons why terrorism 
seems indiscriminate is because of its unpredictability in terms of when and where it 
may strike and which specific individuals it will target. In this sense, however, it is 
again not very different from other forms of violence as unpredictability in terms of 
when, where, and who, is never explicitly specified. Unpredictability forms part of 
surprise, secrecy, and trickery, which are essential component of the wars and 
violence generally. Hence, since all forms of violence share the element of 
unpredictability, it seems highly unfair that only terrorism should be categorized as 
indiscriminate. 
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The sense in which terrorism seems or appears indiscriminate has more to do with our 
failure to acknowledge how the terrorists hold their target society responsible for a 
certain wrongdoing. Our failure to recognize that civilians, non-combatants, and even 
innocents can be held accountable for some presumed wrongdoing, contributes to the 
mistaken assumption that terrorism is indiscriminate. 
There will always be individuals in any targeted society that neither play any part in 
an alleged wrongdoing nor are aware of it, but will still be targeted. What we often 
forget though is that they are still a part of the larger society that is accused of a 
wrongdoing, and according to the logic of collective responsibility, the terrorist actors 
can hold them accountable as well. Even if the terrorists are aware of their complete 
non-involvement, they could still be targeted for their ignorance of a wrongdoing that 
is being committed in their name or simply to draw their attention to the problem. 
Moreover, as these targeted people belong to the accused society, targeting anyone (as 
long as they are deemed representative of the target society), irrespective of their level 
of involvement, will send a message to all other members of the community, which is 
the quintessence of terrorist violence. 
Does this mean that there are no innocents involved in terrorist violence? Does 
terrorism always target individuals that are always, in one or another responsible for 
an alleged wrongdoing? Can terrorism therefore not be immoral? 
The basic principles of morality dictate that no harm should come to pass to anyone 
that is innocent of any wrongdoing. This is why a moral alarm is raised when the 
categories of civilian and non-combatant (generally regarded as innocent of any 
wrongdoing) are targeted. However, this chapter has shown that beyond the class of 
small children and people with mental health problems, the category of innocence is 
strewn with disagreement. Liability or responsibility for some alleged wrongdoing 
can generally be levelled against civilians or non-combatants either directly or 
indirectly. 
A direct responsibility entails that someone or some group is individually or 
personally held responsible for an alleged wrongdoing. An indirect responsibility, on 
the other hand, can be conferred in two different ways. It could be extended to people 
that are believed to be related in someway to the individuals directly responsible and 
therefore themselves circuitously contributing towards the wrongdoing, e.g. people 
	80 
belonging to the same ethnic group, sect, or nationality. Responsibility can also be 
extended to people or groups who are in a position to influence the behaviour of the 
directly responsible but are either ambivalent or simply unaware of the terrorist 
grievances. 
If the logic of collective responsibility dictates that the terrorists can deprive people of 
their innocence by extending responsibility (directly or indirectly) for some 
wrongdoing then why do so many people, including a great number of academics, 
associate terrorism with targeting of innocents? Does the doctrine of collective 
responsibility entail that terrorism by default can never target innocents? The issue of 
responsibility and how it can be extended is at the heart of the moral debate. It is, 
however, a complex matter that goes well beyond the simple logic of direct/indirect 
and collective responsibility so far discussed in this chapter. In order to fully 
appreciate the complex task of assigning responsibilities, the debate must therefore be 
analyzed outside the strict context of terrorism and in the broader field of moral 
philosophy. 
The idea of awarding or extending responsibility, intrinsically tied to the broader issue 
of morality, is far from straightforward, as there are degrees of responsibility and 
accountability. Some individuals may be more directly associated with a certain 
injustice or wrongdoing and therefore more responsible than others who are only 
remotely connected or vaguely aware of it. The respective level of responsibility in 
principle should also determine the guilt and punishment accorded to the concerned 
parties. 
The work of Holmes in this vein is particularly noteworthy as he discusses the degrees 
of ‘relations of conduct to wrongdoing’. ‘Guilt’, Holmes argues, ‘is a strong notion, 
and we usually reserve it for the actual performance of serious acts of wrongdoing. 
Responsibility or culpability we reserve for those whose conduct is farther removed 
from wrongdoing but not so far removed as to render them innocent’ (1989: 185). 
Holmes makes this distinction to mainly differentiate between innocence and non-
innocence in relation to the conduct of a wrongdoing and to stress that even though 
being responsible in some manner is not as bad as being guilty, it still entails that one 
is not innocent. Where an innocent is someone that is neither guilty nor responsible 
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for some wrongdoing, the expression non-innocent ‘encompasses both guilt and 
responsibility’ (Ibid). 
Holmes’s distinction thus establishes a firm relationship between responsibility and 
non-innocence. According to which, an individual will be considered non-innocent 
even if he is faintly responsible for a wrongdoing. This proposition is also consistent 
with the overall logic of collective responsibility. In the context of terrorism, this 
would mean that the victims would always be non-innocent as long as they are 
responsible, no matter how remotely, for an alleged wrongdoing. I will, however, 
argue that the relationship between responsibility and non-innocence is not as one-
dimensional and definitive as Holmes envisages and those deemed responsible could 
still qualify for the innocent label. This would, among other things, allow terrorism to 
target innocents. I shall explain this with the help of a hypothetical example. 
Imagine a murder motivated by greed for some financial reward involving four 
different individuals: one that authorizes the murder, another that physically commits 
the murder, a third that provides the weapon, and lastly a forth individual who is 
aware of the murder but does nothing to stop it. Clearly, they are all responsible, in 
one way or another, for the murder committed. 
The first and the second person, one that orders (authorizer) and the other that 
physically performs the act of murder (the executor), are directly involved in the 
decision and conduct of the murder in question. They are, therefore, clearly the most 
responsible and guilty. The third and the fourth person’s involvement are indirect, 
with the third person- one that provides the weapon (facilitator)- more responsible 
than the fourth. The first two individuals made a deliberate decision to commit the 
murder and the third was used more as an accessory. The punishment that must be 
accorded to all three, should in principle, correspond to their respective level of 
involvement. The first two deserve more punishment than the third person, who may 
have provided the weapon but could not have known what it was going to be used for 
and is therefore not as directly involved with the murder as the first two. 
It is the responsibility of the fourth person that is particularly intriguing and deserves 
special attention here. The fourth person as opposed to the authorizer, executor, and 
facilitator, can perhaps best be described as a bystander. If this bystander knew of the 
murder and decided to do nothing because of some financial reward then he is 
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culpable and deserves punishment as well (though markedly less than the other three, 
owing to the indirect nature of his involvement). If, however, he did nothing because 
of feeling threatened or intimidated and out of fear for his own life (or someone else’s 
life) then he should not get any punishment at all. This still does not mean that he is 
no longer responsible for the murder. The fact that he knew of the murder and could 
have prevented it (by reporting it to authorities or taking some action himself), but 
chose not to, means that he is still responsible. Although what has changed now is that 
his responsibility is so far removed that it is simply unpunishable.26 
Responsibility and punishment mostly enjoy a directly proportional relationship, the 
more the responsibility the greater the punishment and vice versa. In case of our 
hypothetical example, the first two share the greatest responsibility and therefore 
deserve the greatest share of punishment as well. The responsibility of the facilitator 
and the bystander (provided the bystander too was motivated by some financial 
reward), on the other hand, is far removed, but not so far removed as to render them 
entirely innocent. They should therefore get punishment as well, although their 
punishment should be markedly less than the others. 
If we accept that the last actor cooperated not out of free will or some financial reward 
but instead out of fear, then from a moral standpoint, he is innocent of the murder and 
should not be punished at all. Although most scholars would almost unequivocally 
agree that under such circumstances the actor should not be punished, some may 
however find the innocent categorization objectionable on grounds that the murder 
would not have taken place if the fourth actor had not cooperated. However, this 
discussion has shown that if the intention of the actor was some financial reward then 
he is certainly not innocent and must also be punished. On the other hand, if he 
cooperated because of a credible threat to his own or someone else’s life then he must 
                                                
26 It is important to acknowledge here that responsibility has a strong relationship with intention. The 
murder itself was the intention of the first two actors and not the latter two (even if the third person 
knew of the murder, it was not his individual intention) and they therefore deserve greater punishment. 
Establishing intent is perhaps one of the most difficult things and although in the current legal system it 
is normally established with evidence, knowing the exact intentions of the actors entails unraveling the 
inner psychological processes of individuals, which is simply not possible. In our example, we will 
therefore assume that the intentions of the first three actors were motivated by some financial reward. 
The intentions of the fourth actor will be treated as unclear. 
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be considered innocent. We must acknowledge that his or someone else’s life (that he 
is trying to save) is no less important than the life of the person about to be 
murdered.27 
At the same time, however, owing to the fact that his knowledge of the murder could 
have helped prevent it entails that he nonetheless still shares a responsibility for the 
murder. It must be pointed out though that this responsibility was not of his choosing 
and was in fact imposed upon him through perhaps threat or intimidation. In a sense 
then, where the other three actors share ‘voluntary responsibility’ (as they acted out of 
their own choosing and willingly participated in a wrongdoing), the fourth actor was 
an unwilling participant and the responsibility extended to him must therefore be 
regarded as involuntary or imposed responsibility. 
In other words, even though it is entirely possible for an actor to be responsible for a 
wrongdoing, there can still be conditions under which he can be innocent. Innocence, 
therefore, cannot simply be ruled out of hand even if an actor shares responsibility for 
some wrongdoing. It must also be noted that this innocent actor, in spite of being 
responsible, cannot be punished for the wrongdoing. Responsibility, innocence, and 
punishment are hence in a very narrow sense somewhat independent of each other. 
And although the relationship between responsibility and punishment is generally 
directly proportional, there should be no punishment in the event a responsibility is 
imposed. 
The term non-innocence therefore does not automatically encompass both guilt and 
responsibility as Holmes suggests, since there exists room for a person to be 
completely innocent even if he is responsible for a wrongdoing. It will be against our 
fundamental moral values if someone, upon whom responsibility is imposed, is 
regarded as non-innocent. Before judging someone to be non-innocent based on some 
degree of responsibility, it is important therefore to see if the responsibility under 
question is voluntary or imposed. This is where the idea of imposed responsibility is 
fundamentally different from the well-known doctrine of collective responsibility. 
The main problem with collective responsibility is that it blames more or less 
everyone in the same way for a wrongdoing and leaves little to no room for 
                                                
27 Assuming that all the concerned individuals are innocent to begin with. 
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innocence. Even more so, collective responsibility does not take into account the 
degrees of responsibilities, as its underlying assumption is that everyone, in one way 
or another is guilty of the wrongdoing. 
This broad-brush treatment is precisely the problem with the notion of collective 
responsibility. It blames everyone equally and fails to account for degrees of 
responsibility in the society. Its implications as a result are so vague and generic that 
it has no analytical value and its complete failure to account for innocence even 
deprives it of its ethical worth. It is not surprising therefore that the logic of collective 
responsibility, in spite of providing perhaps the most prudent and pragmatic defense 
in favor of terrorist violence is not very well received. 
In any society there will always be some innocents and it is extremely important for 
ethical, practical, and analytical reasons that their innocence is duly accounted for. 
Scholars that attempt to grant justificatory ground to terrorism by means of collective 
responsibility risk depriving ordinary people of their innocence. 
The idea that terrorism targets innocents is so deeply entrenched in our conscience 
that all counter suggestions unsurprisingly have up until now only led to confusion 
and contradiction. This of course does not mean that we should feel compelled to 
describe terrorism’s victims as essentially innocent, as many scholars do. Terrorism 
does target innocents, but not only innocents. In any formal conceptualization of 
terrorism therefore, provision to attack innocents must always be provided and should 
not be ruled out by definition. As collective responsibility largely fails to provide this 
provision, we must substitute it with something that does, and the logic of imposed 
responsibility comfortably fills that gap. Having thus outlined the concept of imposed 
responsibility, we can now finally move to justification of terrorist violence. 
In order to be justified, a punishment must be proportional to the degree of 
responsibility. Thus, if terrorism were to be regarded as a form of punishment that is 
conferred upon those believed to be responsible for some perceived wrongdoing or 
injustice, then by virtue of the logic discerned above, the ones deemed most 
responsible for the wrongdoing should, at least in principle, also receive the highest 
punishment as well. On the other hand, the less responsible should get lesser 
punishment and lastly those upon whom responsibility is imposed should not get any 
punishment at all. To satisfy moral principles and to be justified, terrorism ideally 
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must therefore be employed in degrees, just as degrees of punishments are awarded 
for different crimes in ordinary legal systems. 
The problem, however, is that terrorism, wars, and violence in general are not 
necessarily punishments imposed for a certain wrongdoing, but in a Clausewitzian 
sense, could simply be regarded as continuation of politics by other means. The 
reasons and causes of war and violence are clearly beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Nevertheless, what is important is that even if they do not ascribe to the accepted code 
and degrees of punishment, they are still susceptible to some form of moral norms and 
principles generally. Moreover, the basic logic of degrees of punishment will always 
seep in whenever a form of violence is subjected to standard moral ethics. These 
moral ethics are principally determined by conditions set out in jus ad bellum and jus 
in bello of the just war tradition. 
The just war tradition, inherently mindful of the degrees of punishment, sets out 
conditions of proportionality and discrimination that are ought to be observed in the 
due course of a just war. These two conditions are ideally set out to make sure that the 
punishment does not exceed the responsibility and the ones directly responsible get 
corresponding level of punishment as well. However, owing to the nature of wars and 
violence generally, observing proportionality and discrimination can be a tall order 
and that is where the doctrine of double effect comes into play. With its provision for 
accidental and incidental targeting, it overrides moral principles concerning the 
degrees of responsibility and permits targeting of people, who otherwise deserve no 
punishment. Compelled by the nature of war and violence, it places utilitarian 
considerations over commonly accepted moral values regarding responsibility and 
punishment. Hence, even if wars (or any form of violence for that matter) fail to 
uphold the basic moral code of punishment, they can still be justified on utilitarian or 
consequentialist grounds. 
The doctrine of double effect crucially pushes the deontological provisions of 
proportionality and discrimination in the background as it implicitly allows targeting 
of innocent people with notions of accidental and incidental targeting and the logic of 
supreme emergency. It is due to this utilitarian provision, which permits wars and 
violence to be justified even when innocents are deliberately targeted that many 
academics question the immorality of terrorism. It will perhaps not be an exaggeration 
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to suggest that if the double effect provision did not exist, no one could reasonably 
challenge the immorality of terrorism. 
It is also worth mentioning here that the double effect provision for attacking non-
combatants or innocents is, in a way, perhaps even morally worse than terrorist 
attacking. According to the double effect doctrine, the accidental, incidental and 
supreme emergency strands permit targeting of people that it itself acknowledges as 
innocent of any wrongdoing. On the other hand, the terrorists, as is commonly 
believed, generally target individuals it deems responsible for a wrongdoing, even 
though it is true that this responsibility is mostly imposed and not of the victim’s own 
choosing. The point being that the terrorists at least target those innocents believed to 
be responsible for a wrongdoing, whereas, the logic of double effect deliberately 
allows targeting of those believed to be completely innocent and not responsible for 
any wrongdoing. 
This is not to suggest that wars are morally worse than terrorism but merely to point 
out an important paradox that is usually ignored because of our inability to account 
for the logic of degrees of responsibilities. Terrorism is certainly wrong and one does 
not have to be a moral absolutist to figure that out. It is fundamentally wrong because 
it is a human activity that involves violence and a threat of harm. It is this wrongness 
that is embodied in the term’s pejorative undertone- a characteristic almost 
universally acknowledged by every scholar. Its justification, on the other hand, is a 
matter of controversy that is determined not by some objective moral standard but 
instead by means of the moral continuum discussed earlier in the chapter. The amoral 
position, at one end of this continuum, deems terrorism to be morally repugnant and 
inherently unjustified and consciously bolsters its pejorative undertone. This view is 
forcefully contested by the absolute moral position on the other end of the spectrum 
that seeks to redress and revise the negative connotation of the term. In between these 
two are the passive approaches that (based on their respective moral proclivity) tend 
to lean towards one of the two extremes. 
These conflicting and opposing positions, in spite of contrary claims, are in large part 
due to non-combatants that terrorism distinctly targets. The problem is accentuated 
with the assertion that terrorism specifically targets innocents. This discussion has 
shown that terrorism does indeed target innocents, but not specifically nor deliberately 
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or indiscriminately. Moreover, provision for targeting innocents is also granted in just 
wars through accidental and incidental targeting, so even if terrorism does target 
innocents, it still does not make it distinct or lesser of the two evils. The fact that non-
combatants are targeted in both wars and terrorism however does not mean that we 
should not raise any moral qualms whatsoever. 
Targeting non-combatants is wrong, be it in wars or terrorism. There can, however, 
still be justificatory ground for targeting them as long as the non-combatants bear a 
voluntary responsibility for a wrongdoing, since those bearing such responsibility 
deserve to be punished according to widely held moral beliefs. On the other hand, 
targeting of non-combatants will be unjustified if they bear no responsibility or if a 
responsibility has been imposed on them. In other words, when terrorism targets 
innocents (bear in mind that those upon whom responsibility has been imposed also 
qualify as innocents) it must be deemed unjustified. In all other instances, when the 
victims are not innocent, i.e. when they bear voluntary responsibility for a 
wrongdoing, there will always be strong ground for justification of terrorism. 
This chapter, among other things, has addressed one of the most fundamental 
challenges faced by theoreticians in the field of terrorism studies regarding the 
question of whether or not terrorism specifically targets innocents. The question is 
heatedly contested, given the condemnatory and pejorative nature of the term that 
gestures towards targeting of innocents, on the one hand, and the logic of collective 
responsibility that insists that there are no innocents, on the other. It has been shown 
that terrorism does indeed target people who are innocents, however, being innocent 
does not mean that one cannot be held distantly responsible for a wrongdoing. In the 
case of terrorism a responsibility can and will always be frequently extended to 
people who are not directly responsible and could even be completely unaware of a 
wrongdoing that is being committed in their name. Such responsibility, in a sense, is 
therefore imposed on people that can otherwise only be characterized as innocents and 
the violence or punishment imposed on them will always be unjustified. In other 
words, in the end it is the innocence of the victims that determines the justification of 
terrorist violence. 
The question over terrorism’s morality will persist as long as the double effect 
doctrine with its provision to attack non-combatants exists. Parallels between wars 
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and terrorism will continue to be drawn to challenge terrorism’s immorality. This 
dilemma, however, is far from permanent and can be resolved if we acknowledge the 
heterogeneity of terrorism, as in that it can be utilized as a tactic or a strategy during 
wars, insurgencies, guerrilla warfare and any other type of political violence, a point 




Essentially everything about terrorism and what it entails is fundamentally contested 
except for the unquestionable obvious veracity that it is a social phenomenon and a 
human activity.28 Now if terrorism is a social activity, performed by those who are 
either in power or aspire for it, then clearly it cannot take place in a vacuum; there 
must also be some social actors responsible for it. Logic would then dictate that those 
who perform this activity should also incidentally be called terrorists. However, 
reality is far more complex and such a categorization is not as simple and 
straightforward as it appears at first glance. Given the lack of agreement on what a 
terrorist activity constitutes in the first instance and whether or not such an activity 
should also designate a distinctive class of actors who perform it, identifying the 
perpetrator of terroristic violence is certainly not an easy undertaking. 
In spite of this discouraging premise, there are generally two very broad categories of 
actors, which all students of terrorism and political violence are familiar with, namely 
state and non-state (or sub-state) actors. The academics may agree on both or disagree 
on one but they will normally never disregard the two categories altogether. The 
reason they can never disregard both categories is because there is no third category 
and the two sufficiently account for any and all social actors in-between. However, 
despite being broad, the state and non-state categories are not entirely unhelpful and 
evince some important facts about terrorism, which are hardly ever fully realized. In 
particular, since the notions of state and non-state broadly refer to the existing, 
aspiring or even imagined societal actors in some corresponding social order, they 
draw attention to perhaps one of its most important and distinguishing characteristic, 
namely the political nature of terrorist violence. 
Owing to the significance of the political characteristic in relation to the discussion at 
hand and its bearing on terrorism more generally, it is important first to discuss it in 
greater detail. 
 
                                                
28 Some postmodern and critical scholars may even contest this assertion. 
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The centrality of politics 
Over the years, many leading scholars in the field of terrorism studies have 
emphasized the centrality of politics to terrorism. Wilkinson observes that terrorism 
primarily seeks to ‘influence political behavior in some way’ (1992: 289). Monaghan 
also notes that ‘An act of terrorism is one that has been carried out for a political 
purpose… It is the existence of this political motive that differentiates terrorism from 
‘normal’ crime’ (2000: 256). Hoffman states that ‘terrorism, in the most widely 
accepted contemporary usage of the term, is fundamentally and inherently political’ 
(2006: 2). Weinberg and Eubank point out that the political objective is ‘a widely 
shared element’ of most definitions of terrorism (2008: 187-188). 
There are, however, some scholars who disagree about the centrality of politics, 
although such dissentions are usually fairly uncommon. Scholars that advocate such a 
viewpoint mainly argue that terrorism need not necessarily be politically motivated 
and point to a variety of other motivating factors such as ideology, religion, criminal 
etc. Given the range of diverse motivating factors, any definition or conception of 
terrorism, it is argued, should not be strictly restricted to only political motivation. 
Primoratz, for instance, deliberately makes no reference to motivation in his definition 
of terrorism so that it ‘covers both political and non-political’ aspects of terrorism 
(2004: 24). Shanahan likewise argues that terrorism should not be restricted to just the 
political element and includes ideological, social, religious and military reasons in his 
definition of terrorism (2010: 177). Various other scholars who follow this line of 
reasoning typically choose not to make any reference to the intention of the actor and 
purposely keep their definitions of terrorism broad and inclusive. Kaplan, for 
example, chooses not to include any of the motivational factors in his ‘functionalist’ 
definition of terrorism (2009: 188). 
The rise of Islamic fundamentalism and other religiously inspired non-state actors in 
the latter half of the 20th century prompted many scholars to focus on religious beliefs 
and convictions. As a result, such analyses have frequently been divorced from their 
underlying political context. Extremist Islamic groups such as Al-Qaeda, Hamas, and 
Hezbollah have often predominantly been viewed as religious or ideological 
movements. 
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Giandomenico Picco, for instance, believes that for certain terrorist groups ideology is 
of paramount importance. For all such groups, Picco argues, political objectives are 
important, only insofar as they support or promote the wider ideological goals of the 
group. He classes the Al-Qaeda organization as one such group and believes that its 
‘political objectives shift over time which proves by itself that they do not constitute 
the essence but only the façade of Al-Qaeda’ (2006: 14). Similarly, James Piazza also 
believes that groups like Al-Qaeda are driven primarily by ideology and have little or 
no practical political considerations (2009: 65). 
There are, however, a number of problems associated with approaches that undermine 
or challenge the absolute centrality of politics to terrorism. Firstly, it must be borne in 
mind that all such oppositions are fairly uncommon and are not in any way 
representative of wider academic sentiments. Vast majority of the academic 
community generally agrees that politics and terrorism are inseparable. 
Secondly, all such broad and inclusive approaches that misplace the centrality of 
politics normally do not challenge the underlying political context but typically only 
stress that the terrorist motivations tend to be diverse and should therefore not be 
limited to only political. In doing so, however, such inclusive approaches tend to miss 
out on the important point that highlighting the political context specifically does not 
invalidate, challenge, or even undermine the existence of other factors. Moreover, 
they also fail to realize that with the exception of the political element, all other 
motivational factors are often at times found wanting. The political factor, in other 
words, is present even when all other motivating factors are absent. 
Thirdly, in any discussion on terrorism, it is important to remember that all 
alternatively advanced motivations such as social and religion do not stand-alone and 
are always intertwined with certain political inhibitions. As Coady points out, ‘When 
religion or ideology employs violent means to undermine, reconstitute or maintain 
political structures for the further transcendent ends of religion or ideology, then that 
counts as political purposes’ (2004: 41). 
In a discussion on the importance of religious as opposed to political motivations, 
English pithily notes that it is ‘political, rather than religious, context and convictions 
which are the key variables involved in explaining terrorism; religion is on occasion 
important insofar as it relates to this broader and very complex political process’ 
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(2009: 39). English also challenges the assertion that the political objectives of 
religious extremist groups like Al-Qaeda are insignificant or extraneous and points 
towards the entwined nature of politics and religion. ‘The interwovenness of the 
religious and political dimensions of terrorism can be seen again in bin Ladenism, 
which involves the simultaneous desires to expel the US from the Middle East and to 
construct an Islamic State which would control oil resources in that region’ (p. 40). 
Lastly, the most compelling of all criticisms concerns the intent of the actors. 
Arguably establishing intent is one of the most difficult tasks, however unlike the 
intention to generate terror or target non-combatants, centrality of politics to terrorism 
does not necessarily translate into political objective of the perpetrators but broadly 
also gestures towards the visible wider political impact and implications a terrorist act 
incidentally has. 
Whether this impact is in the form of some political backlash or a result of 
interpreting the actor’s intentions as such is beside the point here. What matters 
essentially is the indispensible political impact that all terroristic violence essentially 
has. Terrorism is a rational activity and its objective, in one way or another, is always 
political in nature. With that being said, since it is not possible to determine the exact 
intent of the actors, what we can reasonably conclude is that there is an unambiguous 
political dimension to terrorism, whether intended or not. Perhaps, a better way to 
emphasize the political dimension of terrorism then would be to say that it is political 
in nature than to suggest that it is a politically motivated form of violence. 
Terrorism thus is fundamentally and inherently political, a verity otherwise clearly 
exhibited by our use of the categories, state and non-state. In other words, the choice 
of our labels for actors practicing terrorism designates a class of social actors that 
represent and characterize subsequent political arrangements and dynamics in the 
society. 
Having thus established that terrorism is, at base, political and that a political activity, 
at any given time, involves either of the two actors (state or non-state) or both, it is 
important now to analyze these two actors in detail. Since politics is essentially about 
power, those who have it and those that aspire for it- the two actors, state and non-
state, are normally distinguished from each other in terms of their relative power 
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position in the society. It is this distinction based on power politics that we shall now 
turn our attention to. 
 
Terrorism and relative power positions 
A full explanation of what the term politics entails is certainly beyond the scope of 
this thesis. For the purpose of our discussion the dictionary definition alone should 
suffice. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines politics as ‘activities that relate to 
influencing the actions and policies of a government or getting and keeping power in 
a government’.29 This definition gestures towards two different functions performed 
in relation to government and power- the act of getting to or staying in power and the 
act of influencing it. These functions subsequently also draw attention to the actors 
who perform them- those who are in power and those who either aspire for it or want 
to influence it in some manner. Traditionally, monopoly over power has been 
associated with the state and any attempts to challenge, influence, or sway this 
monopoly has been linked to non-state activities. Terrorism, in a sense, can then be 
committed for two interrelated reasons by two distinct actors. 
Scholars have long sought to distinguish between state and non-state usage of 
terrorism. This distinction is primarily made on the basis of the existing power 
structures in the society. Before moving on to our analysis, it will be beneficial to 
look at some of these academic attempts to distinguish between state and non-state 
terrorism. This will allow us to see how these distinctions play out for the broader 
understanding of terrorism itself. 
Thomas Thornton can be credited with providing one of the earliest of such 
distinctions. Thornton makes a distinction between what he calls ‘enforcement terror’ 
and ‘agitational terror’. Enforcement terror describes the activities of the state or the 
‘incumbents who wish to suppress a challenge to their authority’ and agitational terror 
refers to the activities of the ‘insurgents who wish to disrupt the existing order and 
achieve power’. Thornton believes that the manner in which terror is utilized is 
dependent on the actor. The state or the ‘incumbent in power’ will utilize terror ‘as an 
extreme mean of enforcing their authority’. On the other hand, the non-state actors or 
                                                
29 Available at: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/politics. Accessed on: 5 November, 2015. 
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‘insurgents out of power’ will employ terror to provoke ‘certain reactions from the 
incumbents or an otherwise apathetic population’  (1964: 72). 
William May also makes a similar distinction between state and non-state terrorism. 
‘Terrorism’, he argues, ‘is of two kinds: the regime of terror and the siege of terror’ 
(terminologies he borrows from Eugene Walter). May points out that in the regime of 
terror, terrorism can be seen as an instrument of the established order, while, in the 
siege of terror, terrorism is used by ‘revolutionary movements that are bent on 
overthrowing a dominant regime’ (1974: 277). The regime and siege of terror 
correspond respectively to state and non-state terrorism. 
Although both these distinctions seem fairly simple and straightforward, they come 
with a host of problems. Thornton’s distinction is helpful insofar as it distinguishes 
between agitational and enforcement terror. However, it is his strict association of 
these characteristics to distinct actors that is somewhat problematic. His 
categorization appears to suggest that state actors cannot engage in acts of agitation 
and non-state actors cannot take part in enforcement terror. This distinction is not 
entirely convincing, as state actors, especially in the contemporary age (mostly due to 
the rise in state sponsored terrorism), routinely engage in acts of agitation and the 
non-state actors often tend to perform actions that will otherwise fall under the rubric 
of enforcement terror (Schwenkenbecher, 2012). 
May’s classification also suffers from similar problems. He identifies regime of terror 
with the state and siege of terror with non-state actors. The regime category denotes 
authority and control over power and therefore to some extent captures the essence of 
state actors. However, the term ‘regime of terror’ tends to designate violence 
committed domestically or within a state’s area of jurisdiction and therefore largely 
fails to account for state sponsored terrorism. May’s ‘siege of terror’ is perhaps even 
more problematic. In common parlance, the term ‘siege’ can be used to describe 
actions of both state and non-state actors. Attribution of siege of terror to only non-
state actors therefore contradicts our common understanding of the term and is for 
that reason highly unlikely to gain currency. May’s association of siege of terror with 
only revolutionary movements also rules out most of the extreme rightwing, sub-
revolutionary, single-issue and basically any non-state actor whose goals fall short of 
total revolution. Lastly, his use of the phrase ‘bent on overthrowing a dominant 
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regime’ is too narrow of a distinction that dismisses, among other things, any attempts 
by revolutionary movements to arrive at a concession or compromise of sorts with the 
established order. 
Thus, strict distinctions based on the relative power positions of the actors indirectly 
compartmentalizes state and non-state terrorism, as both appear to be distinct 
categories with their own set of agendas. Subsequently, a resort to terrorism is 
typically explained either in terms of upholding and stabilizing or undermining and 
destabilizing an existing status quo. 
Terrorism is normally linked to state actors when it is committed for upholding a 
prevailing status quo by those who enjoy monopoly over the power apparatus. States, 
by virtue of their nature enjoy a monopoly over power and it serves their interest to 
preserve the status quo that favors such power arrangements. Therefore, when the 
status quo is challenged and their position as power holders is threatened in some 
way, they may utilize terrorism as a mean to restore or impose the pre-existing status 
quo. On the other hand, terrorism is linked to non-state actors when it confronts or 
undermines the prevailing social and political order. The non-state actors typically do 
not enjoy monopoly over the power apparatus and seek to reverse and overturn their 
inferior status by challenging the existing status quo. 
Scheffler, for instance, points out that non-state terrorism ‘standardly’ aims at 
‘destabilizing or degrading an existing social order’ whereas state terrorism aims at 
‘stabilizing or preserving an existing social order’ (2006: 11). It is perhaps true that 
owing to their relative power positions in the society this is normally how the roles of 
state and non-state actors are respectively played out. A frequent occurrence, 
however, does not justify assigning of definite roles to the concerned actors. A state 
actor can at times undermine, and a non-state actor can equally seek to uphold, an 
existing social or political order. 
In fact, the assertion that non-state actors undermine a prevailing status quo 
essentially applies to only leftwing and nationalist or separatist revolutionary 
movements such as the Red Army faction in Germany and the Tamil Tigers in Sri 
Lanka. It does not apply to many extreme rightwing and various other groups that 
seek to further bolster an existing status quo such the GAL or death squads in Spain 
and the Loyalists in Northern Ireland. As Laqueur notes, ‘The ideology of many 
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terrorist groups encompasses elements of far-left doctrine as well as those of the 
extreme right. Slogans change with intellectual fashions- they should neither be 
ignored nor taken too seriously. The real inspiration underlying terrorism is usually a 
free-floating activism that can with equal ease turn right or left’ (2002: 220). 
Similarly, the assertion that a state actor upholds an existing status quo applies to 
states only domestically. It does not apply to them when they either directly intervene 
in the affairs of other countries to undermine their status quo or try and achieve the 
same effect indirectly through supporting or sponsoring some non-state groups. The 
categorical separation of state and non-state terrorism based on upholding or 
undermining an existing status quo is therefore not an unqualified distinction. 
This analysis clearly shows that the distinction drawn between state and non-state 
terrorism, on the basis of the existing power structures in the society, is far from 
satisfactory. When a state actor engages in terrorism, it often does so to restore some 
previously lost power. It would therefore be somewhat misleading to describe a state 
as an actor in power. On the other hand, a similar case can also be made for non-state 
actors that at times exercise the kind of power we normally associate with states. 
There are numerous examples of such non-state actors that enjoy some degree of 
power,30 such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), The Tamil 
Tigers, and the Basque Nationalist party, ETA. To describe them as actors out of 
power would be equally inaccurate. 
The question of relative power positions is bound to lead to controversy owing to the 
fact that the term power is itself an essentially contested term that is subject to various 
inferences and interpretations (See e.g. Lukes, 2005). It can therefore be difficult, not 
to mention contentious, to distinguish the categories of state and non-state, based 
solely on their relative power positions in the society. However, before we draw any 
conclusion, it is worth remembering that even when a state is looking to preserve a 
status quo and restore some previously lost power, unlike non-state actors, it will 
never be completely out of power. This is because the moment a state loses all power 
it ceases to be a state. Therefore, it will always enjoy some degree of power 
irrespective of how much it may have lost previously. Similarly, a non-state actor, 
regardless of how powerful it gets, will only ever enjoy limited power, especially in 
                                                
30 Mostly insurgencies and guerrilla movements that often control large swathes of territories. 
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relation to a state, because the moment it gets more powerful than the state it 
challenges, it will take over the state apparatus and will cease to be a non-state actor. 
Admittedly state and non-state, due to the fluid nature of power, are not entirely 
exclusive categories, however, it still does not mean that the basic distinction between 
the two is analytically and conceptually unhelpful. This is because even though the 
roles of state and non-state actors cannot always be inferred or predetermined, they 
still designate a certain class of actors that are representative of some power 
arrangement or distribution in the society. Moreover, specifically in the context of 
terrorism, the problem is not necessarily with the notions of state and non-state per se, 
but with pigeonholing the two into some predetermined categories that employ and 
practice terrorism for completely different reasons because of who and what they are. 
Categorizing state and non-state actors in such a way, as many academics often do, 
creates a false and disingenuous distinction. 
As this discussion has shown, referring to state terrorism as enforcement terror or 
regime of terror and non-state terrorism as agitational terror or siege of terror etc. can 
be fairly misleading. State terrorism is not necessarily impositional and non-state 
terrorism is not always insurrectional. Owing to the fluid nature of power, it is 
important that any distinction between the two is flexible enough to grant a provision 
for reversal of roles between the two. 
It is important to point out in the end that in spite of the problems that arise due to the 
fluid nature of power, the relative power position argument in itself is an extremely 
important factor. This is because many other definitional and conceptual issues 
advanced in the discourse, in one way or another, stem from our understanding of the 
relative power positions of the two actors in the society. Therefore, for a fuller 
appreciation of all other issues, it is important to acknowledge and appreciate this 
basic distinction first, even if we ultimately conclude that it is an entirely unhelpful 
distinction. 
Having shown that states and non-state actors defy strict categories and 
compartmentalization in relation to terrorism, we will now turn our attention to the 
central question of whether or not states can practice terrorism. And if so, then are 
there any qualitative differences between state and non-state use of terrorism? To do 
this, it is imperative to examine the reasons why terrorism is generally associated with 
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non-state actors and for that we must first attend to the common inference of the term 
terrorism. 
 
The common inference of the term 
The common inference of the term basically entails that the term terrorism is 
primarily associated with non-state actors. The tendency to see terrorism as a non-
state activity has its roots in the widespread anarchist movements of the late 
19thcentury. Narodnaya Volya, perhaps the most noteworthy of such movements, is a 
case in point. Over the course of the nineteenth and the twentieth century, the word 
terrorism (originally associated with the French reign of terror) gradually acquired a 
wider meaning to account for the increasing non-state violence until it became almost 
synonymous with non-state terrorism. The idea received extraordinary impetuous 
after WWII as wars amongst states steadily declined and there was a considerable 
increase in not only the number of non-state actors but also in the violence undertaken 
by them. Even more so, terrorism as a field of study formally emerged during the later 
half of the 20th century- in a period of rapid decolonization and just when non-state 
violence in the form of insurgencies, guerrilla warfare, and rebellions were on the rise 
globally.31 
Against this backdrop, it is perhaps not surprising that terrorism is seen first and 
foremost as a non-state activity. However, the emergence of terrorism studies in such 
a manner is of course by no means an acceptable reason for such predisposition. The 
academic scholars, whether positivists, post-positivists, or interpretivists, always 
examine and analyze the nature, character, and process of the activity and cannot 
simply be swayed by the prevalence of certain accidental or incidental circumstances 
that may have led to the emergence of a certain field of studies in the first place. 
Hence, when it comes to terrorism studies, the claims that it is essentially a study of 
some non-state activity must also be substantiated by some logical, rational, or 
scientifically valid facts or arguments. Equally so, those who challenge this assertion, 
must provide their own strong arguments in support of their opposition. 
                                                
31 This has been discussed in detail in chapter 6. 
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Treating terrorism as a non-state activity is certainly the most important, not to 
mention, contentious issue when it comes to the question of terrorist identity. It is also 
the essence of the actor-centric approach, which maintains that the terrorist activity is 
not independent of the actor. Strict Adherents of this position hold that there are 
fundamental differences between terrorism as popularly understood and the activities 
of the state that are often wrongly interpreted by some as acts of terrorism. There are 
others still that go on to define terrorism not just as a non-state activity, but also 
necessarily directed against the state apparatus.32 
There are different levels of support for the actor-centric position, ranging from 
absolute to passive. An absolute support entails that states by virtue of their nature 
cannot commit acts of terrorism. A passive support, on the other hand holds that states 
may practice terrorism occasionally, however, terrorism in its purest form is 
essentially a non-state activity. It posits that there are irreconcilable qualitative and 
quantitative differences between the state and non-state use of terrorism and seeing 
the two through the same lens would therefore raise serious analytical and 
methodological challenges. 
Notwithstanding these varied levels of support, the prevalent common inference of the 
word terrorism, especially since the latter half of the 20th century, is that of a non-state 
activity. Put differently, over the course of time, terrorism has largely been associated 
with the confrontational attempts to challenge, influence, or sway the power apparatus 
or the status quo. This means that the term terrorism somewhat comes with the tacit 
assumption that it is a non-state or even an anti-state activity. As Primoratz succinctly 
observes, ‘In common parlance and in the media, terrorism is as a rule assumed to be 
an activity of non-state agents in virtue of the very meaning of the word’ (2004: 113). 
The common inference of the word terrorism has had a profound impact on not only 
the way we think about terrorism but also how we go about studying it. A cursory 
glance at the terrorism scholarship reveals that the use of the term terrorism somewhat 
comes with the implicit assumption that it is a non-state activity. Whether or not 
scholars adhere to the actor-centric approach, when they use the word terrorism it 
almost automatically gestures towards non-state terrorism, unless it has categorically 
                                                
32 For instance, Shaun Gregory in his work uses ‘the term terrorism simply to mean politically 
motivated violence carried out directly or indirectly against the state’ (2003: 144). 
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been stated otherwise. This means that when someone talks about state terrorism, they 
must, out of necessity and convention specify the actor as such or else the general 
inference of the word terrorism would impulsively gesture towards non-state 
terrorism. 
This assertion can easily be verified by briefly reflecting on some of the major themes 
in the terrorism discourse. This of course is not to undermine some of the outstanding 
work that has been done in the field, but merely to draw attention to the common 
inference of the term and the non-state centric nature of the terrorism discourse. 
The historical and chronological accounts of terrorism, for instance, typically engage 
with only non-state terrorism. Historical roots of much of contemporary terrorism is 
customarily traced back to non-state actors like the 1st Century Zealots in Roman 
occupied Jerusalem or the 11th century Assassins in Persia (See e.g. Laqueur, 2001; 
Chaliand and Blin, 2007). Such historical inferences are particularly telling, given not 
only the dearth of non-state actors but also the predominance of autocratic and 
totalitarian state actors in the past. The categorical absence of state terrorism from our 
historical references and analyses is a testament of our non-state centric approach to 
the terrorism problem. 
The rationality of the actors engaged in terrorist violence is another important theme 
in terrorism scholarship. The works of psychologists such as Andrew Silke, Max 
Taylor, John Horgan, are particularly noteworthy in this vein. Although the 
overwhelming consensus among scholars in general is that the actors practicing 
terrorism are rational, however, rational considerations regarding terrorist motivations 
are discussed solely in relation to non-state actors. This is clearly illustrated by not 
only the focus of all such researches but also by the choice of the research subjects, 
who either belong to different non-state terrorist groups or represent the interests of 
such organizations. The rationality of state actors, on the other hand, is hardly ever 
questioned, even though dictatorial and authoritarian countries that are led by single 
personalities could equally raise the rationality argument. 
Similarly, other prominent debates in terrorism scholarship, such as its utility and 
causes, also revolve fundamentally around non-state terrorism. From Robert Pape, 
Barbara Walter, and Alan Dershowitz’s assessment that terrorism works to Max 
Abrahms and John Mueller’s scepticism that it does not, the whole utilitarian debate is 
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deeply non-state centric. Arguably utilitarian arguments normally do not apply to 
states in the manner they do to non-state actors, as a state’s relatively privileged 
power position in the society makes it significantly less susceptible to such practical 
or pragmatic considerations. However, it is also worth remembering that even though 
a state may always achieve its tangible material objectives, the cost or prospects of 
losing the respect, trust and support of not only its subjects but also the international 
community could always raise the utilitarian flag.33 
Lastly, the subject of root causes of terrorism has been in the spotlight since the 
inception of terrorism scholarship. Over the years, many scholars have grappled with 
this very complex problem. The works of Ted Gurr, Tore Bjorgo, Leonard Weinberg, 
and Ami Pedahzur are especially worth mentioning here. Not surprisingly, what is 
common in all such works is their non-state centricity. This assertion can be 
confirmed by looking at some important theories that are advanced to explain the 
causes of terrorism.34 
Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation is perhaps amongst the most well known 
contributions. The theory of relative deprivation, first popularized in Gurr’s classic 
book Why Men Rebel, explains why seemingly ordinary people resort to violence. He 
argues that one of the primary reason for violence stems from a profound sense of 
deprivation that people feel in relation to those they are inferior to. Postulating that 
‘The potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of 
relative deprivation among members of a collectivity’ (1970: 24), Gurr develops a 
framework to explain why ordinary people or non-state actors resort to violence. 
Other lesser-known theories advanced to explain the root causes of terrorism also 
appear to follow a similar pattern. Callaway and Stephen’s theory of human security, 
which links the study of terrorism to ‘threats to human security’ and points out that 
terrorism ‘always occurs in conjunction with the denial of basic human rights’ (2006: 
680), clearly applies to non-state actors only. Similarly, Schwartz et al.’s 
‘conceptually grounded’ identity theory that seeks to explore the three interrelated 
                                                
33 The utilitarian debate is fairly extensive and will be discussed in detail in the following continuing 
chapter. 
34 The objective here is not to assess the validity or reliability of these theories but to show that all such 
dominant frameworks have been developed to explain non-state behavior only. 
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dimensions of identity- ‘Cultural, Social, and Personal’ to explain ‘the likelihood of 
participation in terrorism’ (540: 2009), is also entirely non-state centric. 
It is important to point out here that it is not that the scholars are unaware of their 
research limitations, nor are they necessarily implying that states cannot commit acts 
of terrorism, but the underlying reason for such blatant oversight is often a direct 
result of the inference drawn from the word terrorism that it is a non-state activity- an 
inference, that has in many ways, become characteristic of the word terrorism. 
An analysis of the major themes thus clearly demonstrates the non-state centric nature 
of terrorism scholarship. What is most striking about the foregoing discussion is the 
supposed claim that these theories or paradigms are broadly applicable to all instances 
of terrorism, when they clearly apply to non-state terrorism only. 
Nevertheless, this widespread prevalence of the non-state centric inference is by no 
means indicative of the academic refusal to apply the word terrorism to states. On the 
contrary, it merely alludes to the fact that the term terrorism, on its own, is almost 
instinctively treated as a non-state activity. It is this somewhat intuitive inference of 
the word terrorism that has prompted some scholars in the field to formally 
distinguish state terrorism from terrorism proper. Academics that observe such a 
distinction, perhaps against their wishes, concurrently also extend passive support to 
the actor-centric position. 
The most common way to observe this distinction is through reserving the term 
terrorism proper for non-state terrorism and referring to state terrorism as state terror 
or simply using some other affix with state. This means that the term terrorism on its 
own would only entail non-state terrorism unless explicitly stated otherwise. As 
Wilkinson observes, ‘Normally, in the literature, a state’s use of terror is referred to as 
terror, while substate terror is referred to as terrorism’ (2000: 19). Accordingly, 
Wilkinson employs the same distinction throughout his own work as well. 
Given that Wilkinson is a pioneer in the field of terrorism studies, his position on the 
matter set a precedent that has over the years lent considerable passive support to the 
actor centric approach. Following his footsteps, many scholars have subsequently 
developed their own (often novel) ways to account for the non-state inference of 
terrorism. Schinkel for instance, proposes a ‘top down’ and a ‘bottom up’ approach to 
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account for state and non-state terrorism. ‘Terror’ he believes, ‘refers to actions 
designed to spread fear by states, and hence it works top down’ and ‘Terrorism, by 
contrast, is perpetuated by non-state actors [and] works bottom up’ (2009: 183). 
Scheffler similarly outlines a difference between terrorism and state terror. He argues 
that there is ‘significant difference between terrorism- even terrorism perpetrated by a 
state- and state terror’ (2006: 15). According to Scheffler, there is ‘terrorism of the 
standard type’, which is aimed at ‘destabilizing or degrading an existing social order’ 
(p. 11). And although he believes that states may practice it too, he primarily 
associates the standard type with non-state actors (p. 5). 
Anthony Richards also believes that ‘terrorism and state terror (or more broadly, 
‘political terror’) are different phenomena’ (2015: 51). Defining terrorism as ‘use or 
threat of violence or force with the primary purpose of generating a psychological 
impact beyond the immediate victims for a political motive’ (p. 18), Richards believes 
that state terror entails much more than terrorism (p. 51). And although state terror 
can also have a psychological impact but it is primarily aimed at the ‘physical 
elimination of all perceived enemies’, which he argues makes it both qualitatively and 
quantitatively different from terrorism (p. 51-52). 
Understandably, one of the reasons why state terrorism is often referred to as state 
terror (or by some similar denotation) is because of the etymological roots of the word 
terrorism that can be traced back to the French reign of terror. As Laqueur points out 
that during the French revolution and in its immediate aftermath, the word terrorism 
‘was more or less a synonym for reign of terror’ (1977: 6). With the French reign of 
terror as a precursor to modern day terrorism, it is perhaps not so surprising that many 
academics refer to state terrorism as state terror. What is surprising and perhaps also 
ironic is that the term state terror is now employed to distinguish state terrorism from 
terrorism proper when at one point the two terms were almost synonymous. 
One can of course argue that such semantic shifts are trivial or to an extent even 
irrelevant; after all, most of the academics that observe such distinctions usually grant 
a discretionary space to states, whereby they too can practice standard terrorism. But 
to say that is to miss the point here. Measuring state terrorism against a standard, 
proper or real terrorism is in itself demonstrative of the academic predisposition to 
treat terrorism first and foremost as a non-state activity. Merari’s assertion that ‘when 
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states resort to terrorism they do it in the terrorist way’ (1999: 56) perhaps best 
illustrates this predicament. 
Although all such typologies and approaches are generally critical of the actor centric 
approach and are often accompanied by claims that terrorism should be independent 
of the actor; classifying proper or standard terrorism as a non-state activity conversely 
renders all such claims somewhat superfluous. For how can terrorism be truly 
independent of the actor if one believes that standard or proper terrorism necessarily 
involves a non-state actor? All such practices therefore not only manifest the common 
inference of the term terrorism but also end up lending passive support to the actor 
centric approach. To truly appreciate the problem and understand the actor centric 
approach itself, we will turn our attention to the active or direct support it draws from 
various academic quarters. 
Active support for the actor-centric approach cements and formalizes the non-state 
inference of the word terrorism. The main thrust of the argument is that there are 
fundamental differences between terrorism as popularly understood and the actions of 
the states that are often wrongly judged to be terrorism. Treating the two usages alike 
would therefore be conceptually and analytically unhelpful. 
Bruce Hoffman is amongst the most well known advocates of the actor-centric 
position. Hoffman is critical of the view that terrorism should be defined independent 
of the actor. He argues that it is not a satisfactory solution as a definition of terrorism 
must be able to maintain a clear distinction between state and non-state actors, 
otherwise it runs the risk of playing ‘into the hands of terrorists and their apologists’ 
(2006: 25). Hoffman believes that there are fundamental qualitative differences 
between terrorism and the violence committed by states and any definition or 
conceptualization of terrorism must therefore reflect that distinction. 
Louise Richardson is another prominent supporter of the actor-centric position. While 
outlining her ‘seven crucial characteristics’ of terrorism, she argues that among other 
things, terrorism must be seen as an ‘act of sub-state groups, not states’ (2006: 21). 
Similarly, Conor Gearty believes that a terrorist activity, among other things, mainly 
encompasses two key ingredients- politics and sub-state actors, and therefore ‘it 
should be possible to restrict the meaning of terrorism not only to sub-state groups but 
also solely to the violence in which they engage that has a political end’ (1991: 151). 
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It is important to point out at the outset that an actor centric approach and the active 
support it draws does not necessarily suggest that states have nothing to do with 
terrorism. Admittedly, it vehemently posits that terrorism should essentially be seen 
as a non-state activity but it concurrently leaves sufficient room for state direction and 
support for terrorism. In other words, as opposed to state terrorism, the actor centric 
approach encourages a discourse on state sponsorship of it. Thus, while Richardson 
argues that terrorism in itself is an exclusively non-state activity, she still believes that 
states can use it as an ‘instrument of foreign policy’ and proposes ‘five degrees of 
separation’ between the terrorists and their sponsors, ranging from ‘state direction at 
one end of the spectrum to simple support at the other end’ (1999: 210-212). 
Thomas Badey, who is fairly sceptical of the notion of ‘state terrorism’, categorically 
sets out to distinguish it from ‘state supported terrorism’.  He is of the opinion that the 
expression state terrorism is ‘in most cases taxonomically incorrect, misleading and 
often unnecessary… [as] the term obscures rather than clarifies behaviors and existing 
conditions’ (1998: 99-100). While he finds the notion of state terrorism dubious and 
questionable, he has no qualms in suggesting that ‘state support for terrorism 
undoubtedly exists’ as states routinely support the actions of ‘non-state actors with 
similar interests’ (p. 101). Despite his categorization as such, Badey still believes that 
certain state activities in the past, such as the ones observed during the French 
Revolution, Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, or the Stalinist era, ‘are more effectively 
described by the term state terrorism’ (p. 100). Such historical references coupled 
with a failure to find any contemporary use for the term state terrorism clearly 
demonstrate Badey’s proclivity to treat state terrorism as a thing of the past. 
Thus, as the focus on terrorist identity especially since the later half of the 20th 
century, shifted from state to non-state, terrorism was eventually categorized as a non-
state activity by large sections of the academic community. This, among other things, 
also envisaged a new role for states, whereby they could only lend support to 
terrorism. Through barring states from practicing terrorism, the actor centric approach 
effectively encouraged and promoted a discourse on state sponsorship, treating the 
notion of state terrorism as a thing of the past. In a sense therefore, for actor centric 
adherents, terrorism has made the transition from state terrorism to state sponsorship, 
whereby states do not practice terrorism themselves but support non-state actors that 
	106 
do. As Jackson points out, ‘there is an implicit sense that states do not commit 
terrorism directly, but they may support non-state groups that do’ (2008: 381). 
Although state sponsorship is clearly a key feature of the actor centric approach 
specifically and the terrorism scholarship more generally, it is of little avail to our 
discussion. This is because where the non-state identity is deemed characteristic of 
terrorism, state sponsorship of it (no matter how common or frequent) in comparison, 
is never taken to be a necessary or regular feature of terrorism. Moreover, it is also 
worth noting that state sponsorship only refers to support of some sort and support of 
any kind typically does little more than assist or facilitate an activity. The nature and 
character of any activity is largely independent of the support it receives. 
Hence, other than in its intensity and frequency, the terrorist activity will not be any 
different in its nature and conduct, regardless of the manner and fashion in which it is 
supported. State sponsorship therefore has little to no bearing on conceptualizing and 
defining terrorism and for that reason will not be discussed any further in this thesis. 
It is important to also point out here that an active support for the actor centric 
approach does not necessarily mean that the violence committed by states is morally 
superior or any less condemnable than terrorism. Nor does it entail that such an active 
support is driven by revulsion for terrorist violence or a desire to limit the ‘evil’ to 
non-state actors to reprieve states of such heinous and immoral crimes (See e.g. 
Jackson, 2008; Dexter, 2012). 
For instance, in spite of Gearty’s assertion that terrorism should be seen as ‘violent 
political subversion by sub-state groups’ (1991: 151), he denounces and condemns 
state violence in the strongest possible terms. Gearty believes that state violence, both 
in terms of its scale and brutality, dwarfs terrorism in all its forms and manifestations 
(2011: 50-71). Hoffman also notes that states and armed forces bring about far more 
death and destruction than non-state terrorists (2006: 26). Similarly, Richardson is 
also very critical of the violence committed by states and condemns it unreservedly 
(2006). A support for actor centric approach should therefore not be equated with 
moral approval of state violence, as the distinction is not necessarily made to isolate 
the morally reprehensible (bad) form of violence from the supposedly acceptable and 
legitimate (good) violence (See e.g. Dexter, 2012). 
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From our discussion it becomes evident that active support for the actor centric 
approach is heavily influenced by the common inference of the term. However, it will 
also be wrong to assume that the actor centric approach is driven entirely by the 
common inference of the term terrorism. The distinction in fact is often made because 
many scholars actually believe that there is something intrinsic about the nature of 
terrorist violence that makes it a non-state activity. Alternatively, they may also 
believe that there is something about the nature of non-state or state actors that permit 
or forbid them from practicing terrorism. 
To understand the problem in its entirety, we must therefore discuss in detail the 
reasons that supposedly make terrorism a non-state activity. Starting first with the 
most frequently cited difference regarding legitimacy and legality. 
 
Legitimacy and legality 
‘The relationship between legality and legitimacy is one of the most important themes 
in legal and political philosophy’ (Dyzenhaus, 1997: 1). In theory, legitimacy broadly 
refers to the source and origin of law, and is thought to be rooted in popular consent 
and will of the people. It is the power or authority, willingly surrendered to a select 
body to make and enforce laws in order to primarily provide order and security to the 
consenting subjects (See e.g. Rosenfeld, 2001: 8-9; Jackson et al., 2012: 1-2). In other 
words, a state cannot be considered truly legitimate if it does not enjoy the support of 
majority of its subjects. 
Legality, on the other hand, corresponds only to the official status of some preexisting 
authority, normally a state (Rosenfeld, 2001: 20). Although it gives the impression 
that it too reflects the consent of the people but that is largely due to the strong 
interplay between the words legality and legitimacy, as the two terms are often treated 
as synonyms. The term legality, to an extent, is therefore independent of the 
democratic will of the people and merely refers to the process or observance of law by 
some designated authority. 
Thus, legitimacy, in a sense, refers to the source or origin of some existing law, 
whereas legality refers only to its due process and observance. Normatively speaking, 
legal authority should only come about once legitimacy has duly been acquired. In 
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reality however the relationship between the two is more fluid and not always as 
straightforward as is often thought to be. 
It is not uncommon, for instance, to come across instances where one of the two is 
often found wanting. Dictatorial and totalitarian regimes e.g., normally do not enjoy 
legitimacy yet they can still claim to be legal. On the other hand, some non-state 
actors, particularly nationalist groups, due to their lack of hold or share in the ruling 
power apparatus, clearly lack legality. However, it is still possible for them to enjoy 
wide public support and therefore claim legitimacy on those grounds. Also, since they 
challenge the state apparatus and its legitimacy, they denounce the legality of the state 
as nothing more than mere façade. As Thorup points out that a revolutionary actor 
‘places legitimacy above legality in the claim that their rebellion may be illegal seen 
from the state but that it is legitimate from the viewpoint of the people, history, justice 
freedom, etc., and that it therefore constitutes a true legality in opposition to the sham 
justice of the state’ (2008: 345). 
This distinction, however, corresponds more to our theoretical or normative 
understanding of the two terms. In reality, to stay in power, an actor must possess 
both legitimacy and legality and without power any claim to either of the two (as the 
following discussion shall demonstrate) would be strongly contested. 
In principle, a state is required to secure legitimacy from its willing subjects but in 
reality there are a number of intervening variables that often play a far more 
significant role in determining the outcome. One of the most important of such 
variables is international recognition. Here it is important to acknowledge the 
difference between international sympathy, condemnation and formal recognition. It 
is formal international recognition, which all political actors normally seek in their 
drive for legitimacy. However, in most of instances, they (the non-state actors in 
particular) only manage to secure either sympathy or condemnation, both of which, in 
terms of achieving legality and legitimacy, amount to almost nothing. There are 
numerous examples in the world today of non-state actors that enjoy substantial 
popular support and attract international sympathy for their cause but yet are unable to 
secure the desired legitimacy because of lack of formal international recognition. The 
Kurdish population in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria is a case in point. 
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The other important variable is the relative power position of the state that the group 
seeking legitimacy is confronting. If the group is confronted by a state that is not only 
significantly more powerful but also enjoys some degree of international recognition, 
then no amount of popular or international support for the group’s cause will enable it 
to secure the desired legitimacy. The Palestinians confronting the powerful and 
widely recognized state of Israel provide perhaps the most fitting example. On the 
other hand, powerful dictatorial and totalitarian countries, such as North Korea, may 
not even enjoy any substantial international support or recognition. Yet, due to their 
total control over the power apparatus, they are able to not only effectively 
monopolize both legitimacy and legality but also fend off international condemnation 
directed their way. This is why Thorup notes, ‘legality and legitimacy; the state 
incarnates and monopolizes them both’ (2008: 345). 
Legitimacy is therefore often determined by realistic considerations rather than some 
ideal academic qualification. A large number of non-state actors that at least in theory 
deserve or qualify for legitimacy, often fail in their ambitions. Whereas a substantial 
number of undeserving state actors may carry on enjoying legitimacy in one form or 
another. Thus, a hold or a share in power not only facilitates but at times also 
substantiates an unwarranted claim to legitimacy, while a lack of power could equally 
deprive a justified claim to legitimacy. 
Since legality is essentially concerned with the process, observance or simply the 
practice of law, it therefore cannot exist in a vacuum and would require some form of 
preexisting authority or power structure to function. In other words, legality can only 
be observed by actors that control or share the power apparatus, regardless of how 
flawed or unfounded their ultimate claim to legitimacy may be. So even though in 
principle it is legitimacy that is supposed to facilitate the observance of legality, in 
reality it is actually the hold over power that allows manipulation of legitimacy and 
imposition of legality. 
Thus, legality and legitimacy in a sense reinforce each other as the former could be 
manipulated to impose the latter.35 To state that legitimacy and legality are different is 
                                                
35 This is of course not to suggest that real legitimacy propped up by popular electorate does not exist, 
but instead to demonstrate the successful manipulation of these concepts by powerful stakeholders for 
relative advantage. 
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true to an extent in theory but certainly not in practice. An actor practicing legality 
will always either have, or make a false or unjustified, claim to legitimacy. Whereas 
an actor claiming to be legitimate will never truly be legitimate unless it takes over 
the power apparatus and enforces legality. The interplay between the two is therefore 
a fairly complex affair and attempts to formally distinguish them are far from 
satisfactory.36 
The aforementioned gap between theory and practice of course does not mean that we 
should affix the terms legitimacy and legality unconditionally to just state actors. It is 
true that the terms would normally be associated with states since they typically 
possess monopoly over the power apparatus. However, as it was discussed earlier in 
this chapter, a non-state actor is also capable of holding some form of power in the 
society. It may not enjoy legitimacy and legality in the same way a state does, but 
given that the two terms are flexible and fluid and have no fixed meaning or 
interpretation, it is essentially therefore a matter of degree to which state and non-state 
actors enjoy them. 
Moreover, it is also important that the theoretical and normative considerations 
regarding legitimacy and legality are not ignored altogether. The requirements of 
consent and popular support form the basis of modern civilized society and therefore 
to say that a non-state actor that otherwise clearly reflects the will of the people 
cannot be legitimate and a state actor that suppresses and squashes any form of dissent 
is legitimate, is ethically and morally unacceptable. Further reasons for not affixing 
the terms to only state actors will be discussed later on, but first it is important to see 
how legitimacy and legality relate to terrorism specifically. 
Since terrorism, among other things, is often deemed to be an illegitimate and illegal 
form of violence, therefore a state, by virtue of its nature, is believed to be incapable 
of performing it. And if a state is unable to engage in terrorism then it also cannot be 
labeled terrorist properly. Gearty for instance observes the reasons why states like 
Israel and the U.S. are able to evade the label terrorist: ‘The Americans escaped this 
categorization for the same reason that Israel invariably does: their violence was 
                                                
36 Owing not just to the futility but also the misguided nature of the argument, this discussion will 
therefore not observe a formal distinction between the two and will use the terms somewhat 
interchangeably. 
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authorized by a government and was executed by the official armed forces of a state’ 
(1991: 85-86). 
The question of legality and legitimacy inadvertently takes us to the issue of morality 
that has been discussed at length in the previous chapter. Where the last chapter 
mainly discussed the issue of morality in respect to the victim of terrorism, here we 
will briefly analyze it in relation to the actor responsible for terrorism. 
The question of morality and legitimacy, fundamentally rooted in the jus ad bellum 
tenet of the just war tradition, places significant emphasis on the principles of 
legitimacy and legality. The main contention is that for violence to be morally 
justified it must also be legitimate, or simply that legitimate violence can only be 
sanctioned by a recognizable legal authority. Since under the Westphalian system of 
sovereignty, such authority rests solely with the state, therefore, only the violence 
authorized by a state should really be considered legitimate and justified. The just war 
tradition therefore grants states a monopoly over legitimate use of force. 
Thus, in strict accordance with the principles of jus ad bellum, violence would be 
judged unjustified if it is undertaken by an actor that lacks the necessary legal 
authority. It is the absence of this legal sanction that essentially challenges the 
legitimacy and in effect also the justification of all non-state violence. 
Lionel McPherson, in an intellectually stimulating paper, challenges the conventional 
wisdom regarding the morality of terrorism. He argues that the reason why most 
people find terrorism immoral and objectionable is not because of the commonly 
popularized belief that it deliberately targets innocents or non-combatants, but 
because ‘the terrorists do not have adequate authority to undertake political violence’ 
(2007: 524). In support of his argument, McPherson points out that ‘The principle 
challenge for those who believe that terrorism is distinctively wrong’ because it 
targets non-combatants, ‘lies in morally accounting for non-combatant casualties of 
conventional wars’ (p. 525). 
Those who see terrorism as egregiously immoral and wars as legitimate raise two 
important points. The first and the central point is regarding supreme emergency, a 
provision provided by the doctrine of double effect. The second, and to a degree a 
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lesser important point, concerns the legitimacy of the actor and involves a comparison 
of war and terrorism. 
The legitimacy argument basically suggests that since wars are typically fought 
between states, therefore, they enjoy a legal and official status. States, by virtue of 
their nature and international obligations, are expected to respect the established 
norms and rules of violent engagement. Failing which, their actions would be 
categorized as war crimes and the offending party would subsequently be subjected to 
a due process of law. In comparison, since terrorism is believed to be exercised by 
non-state actors, therefore, it does not have any legal or official standing and the 
actors for that reason are also not expected to respect any of the established rules of 
violent engagement. As Hoffman argues that in wars between states ‘there are rules 
and accepted norms of behavior’ whereas in comparison, the terrorists ‘have violated 
all these rules’ (2006: 25-26). And even though the armed forces do occasionally 
break the rules of wars ‘the term “war crimes” is used to describe these acts and there 
is an international system in place (no matter how flawed) to account for such crimes’ 
(p. 28). 
The distinction drawn between state and non-state use of violence, based on the 
principle of legitimacy and legality, suffers from some serious interrelated 
shortcomings. First, the distinction essentially ends up tying legitimacy with morality 
almost unconditionally by setting forth the condition that for a political actor to be 
moral it must first and foremost be legitimate. Whereas the relationship between 
legitimacy and morality is far from absolute, and setting the former as a prerequisite 
gives the impression that the two essentially reinforce each other and are inseparable. 
The condition of legitimacy in other words gives the false impression that a legitimate 
actor cannot be immoral or that an illegitimate actor can never be moral. 
Numerous actors otherwise deemed to be legitimate have, over the years, committed 
acts that would be considered immoral. The 1972 U.S. bombing of Hanoi in North 
Vietnam that resulted in more than one thousand deaths is a case in point. Similarly, 
some non-state actors that often lack legitimacy and legality, in the conventional 
sense of the terms, often renounce violence and engage in peaceful political process. 
The successful assimilation of the Provisional Irish Republican Army in the political 
process of Northern Ireland is a prominent example. 
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Second, the attribute of legitimacy is not an automatic qualification that can easily be 
bestowed on a state just because of its relative power position in the society. Instead, 
it is a privilege that must only be acquired after satisfying certain necessary 
preconditions, such as representing the interest and will of the people. Moreover, 
acquiring legitimacy is only the first step, retaining and sustaining it in the long run, 
comes with its own sets of challenges and stipulations (such as maintaining and 
providing liberty, order, and security to all its subjects and respecting international 
norms). This, in other words, means that legitimacy is not permanent or simply 
guaranteed to states because of their privileged power position. It must meet some 
prerequisites, otherwise it can either be challenged or revoked. 
Here it is worth mentioning again that the notion of legitimacy, owing to its flexible 
nature, can of course sometimes be manipulated. This is predominantly made possible 
by an actor’s hold or share in the power apparatus. It is of foremost importance to 
acknowledge the difference between forced or manipulated legitimacy as opposed to 
what legitimacy normatively stands for. A manipulated legitimacy is ultimately not 
representative of its subjects and will therefore always be open to contestation 
internally in the form of dissent and popular uprising. Furthermore, even though it 
may succeed in getting some limited international recognition, it will never be able to 
secure universal acknowledgement and recognition from other states. The academic 
community in particular is therefore mostly critical of using the terms legitimacy and 
legality, and a large majority strictly refrains from affixing the terms unconditionally 
to state actors. 
Third, the condition of legitimacy often fails to provide a working provision for the 
cornerstone of the modern state system, namely the cardinal principle of self-
determination. It either presupposes self-determination or simply takes it for granted. 
Even more so, it tends to grant a justificatory space to some state actors that neither 
uphold nor embody the principle of self-determination. Non-state groups looking to 
assert their right of self-determination, more often than not, lack legitimacy or any 
official status. Their subsequent resort to violence, regardless of their circumstances, 
will be considered unjustified. Hence, the prerequisite of legitimacy for determining 
the conduct of violent political activity indirectly violates our most basic fundamental 
right of self-determination. 
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 Lastly, the condition not only sees a strong correlation between a state and legitimacy 
but also gives the impression that the two always go together and complement each 
other. Treating the two as counterparts is to an extent deceptive as the relationship 
between a state and legitimacy is far from straightforward. The notions of legitimacy 
and legality are not carved into stone and cannot simply be attached to specific actors. 
The terms are in fact more fluid, both in their nature and application. This flexibility 
allows all actors, state or non-state, to exercise them. Non-state actors, supposedly 
lacking legitimacy, on occasion can and have successfully challenged the state 
apparatus. Thereby not only changing the status quo in their favor but in the process 
also becoming, in the conventional sense of the term, legitimate actors. The terms 
legitimacy and legality are therefore not rigid terminologies and are transferable from 
one actor to another. The move of the African National Congress (ANC) from a 
disavowed non-state terrorist group to political centre stage in South Africa is a case 
in point. 
Given these shortcomings, it is perhaps not surprising that the academic community is 
widely skeptical of this distinction. Legitimacy, as it has been demonstrated, is not the 
sole province of states. The term itself is far too flexible and fluid to be affixed to any 
specific actor. It can readily be extended to state and non-state actors alike and is 
therefore not an adequate distinguishing criteria. As Held points out, ‘the requirement 
of legitimate authority should not be thought impossible for non-state groups that 
make use of violence (including terrorism) to meet’ (2008: 68). If legitimacy cannot 
be tied down to an actor then it means it also cannot be the reason why non-state 
violence should be deemed unjustified and immoral. The assertion then that terrorism 
is fundamentally wrong because it lacks legitimate authority is therefore largely 
inaccurate. 
Thus, the academic tendency to see terrorism as not only a non-state but also an 
immoral activity purely due to issues related to legitimacy and legality is fairly 
myopic and shortsighted, as it fails to scratch below the surface and engages with the 
issue only superficially. Legitimacy and legality, especially in the context of 
terrorism, should instead be treated as fluid concepts that simply cannot be affixed to 
only state actors. 
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If legitimacy and legality are inadequate criteria, then is it the nature of state and non-
state actors and their respective power positions in the society that determines whether 
or not they would resort to terrorism? Although the question of relative power 
positions was taken up earlier in the chapter, the issue of associating terrorism with 
non-state actors primarily due to their relatively inferior power position in the society 
has not been discussed so far. It is an issue that merits greater attention and will 
therefore be discussed in detail now. 
 
Terrorism inherently a weak actor strategy 
Drawn directly from the relative power positions of actors in the society, the main 
thrust of this argument is that terrorism is a form of violence that can only ever be 
employed by weak actors.37 Since non-state actors are always relatively weaker than 
states, therefore by default only they can practice terrorism. State as a relatively 
powerful actor would subsequently resort to some other form of violence, when 
confronting a non-state actor or its subjects. This is because a state would always be 
relatively more powerful than the dissent it is resisting or the non-state actors it is 
confronting. 
The claim that terrorism is inherently a weak actor strategy is primarily based on the 
idea that weak actors normally lack the necessary material and personnel means to 
engage in conventional forms of warfare. As Brian Jenkins observes, ‘Terrorism 
requires only a small investment, certainly far less than what it costs to wage a 
conventional war’ (1974: 13). Scheffler also notes that ‘Figuratively and often 
literally, terrorism offers the biggest bang for one’s buck’ (2006: 9). Arguably, among 
the various forms of low intensity violence, terrorism, in terms of resources required, 
is perhaps the least demanding. It is therefore deemed customary for a weak actor 
(lacking the necessary resources to engage in other forms of violence) to opt for 
terrorism. 
                                                
37 It is important to point out that terrorism is primarily seen as a weak actor strategy in asymmetrical 
conflicts involving a state (powerful) actor and non-state (weak) actor. 
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By this logic, the choice of opted violence in theory should also correspond to the 
respective strength and ability of the actor. Thus the most powerful actor in a conflict 
should resort to some form of oppression. An equally powerful actor should resort to 
open wars or pitched battles with its adversary. A relatively weaker opponent should 
resort to insurgency and guerrilla warfare. And lastly, the weakest of all actors would 
have no other choice but to resort to terrorism. 
This rather straightforward postulation is promptly endorsed by the theoretical 
assertion that terrorism is normally the first form of violence to emerge when an 
asymmetrical conflict first escalates. This is believed to be due to the limited and 
restricted capacity of the weak actor when it first challenges its stronger opponent 
with violence. William Miller explains these different stages of violence that 
correspond to the ability and relative power of the actor. He points out that ‘rural 
guerilla warfare develops in stages beginning with terrorism, moving to guerrilla war, 
and culminating in a series of pitched battles pitting conventionally organized 
insurgents against remnants of the state’s military’ (2000: 64).38 
Not only is it argued that terrorism is the first form of violence to emerge but it is also 
believed that an actor may resort to terrorism if it suffers substantial setbacks, loses its 
dominant or powerful position and becomes weaker through conventional 
engagement with its adversary. Such failures could prompt a weak actor (previously 
engaged in other forms of violence) to revert back to terrorism. In a way, therefore, 
terrorism provides the last or the only alternative to continue a violent struggle. As 
Crenshaw points out, ‘Terrorism is explained as a result of an organization’s struggle 
for survival’ (1987: 13). In a discussion on the difficulties faced by urban guerillas 
while fighting in enemy heartland, Miller also notes that ‘These limitations restrict 
insurgents to a single method of continuing their struggle against the government, 
namely terrorism’ (2000: 70). 
Furthermore, assuming that the actors are rational, they will only ever be able to 
choose a form of violence that their respective capabilities permit. Therefore, opting 
for the least demanding form of violence by the weakest actor appears to be the most 
obvious and rational thing to do. In other words, terrorism provides the only possible 
                                                
38 Miller later concludes that ‘the progression from terrorism to guerrilla warfare to conventional 
warfare is seldom so smooth. Often there occurs a blending of methods…’ (p. 64). 
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alternative to actors that seek change through violent means but lack the necessary 
resources to do so in a conventional way. A resort to terrorism therefore is often not 
out of choice or preference but is instead a matter of necessity obligated because of an 
actor’s weak position (provided of course that an actor wants to use violence to 
achieve its ends). 
Alternatively, this also goes on to suggest that a stronger actor should not opt for 
terrorism since it possesses the necessary capabilities to choose other forms of 
violence. It can of course be argued here that if terrorism is the cheapest and most 
convenient form of violence available then it would be somewhat counterintuitive to 
not utilize it. It would certainly make little sense if a stronger actor chooses a more 
costly violent option, simply because it can, when cheaper and less demanding 
alternatives are readily available. 
Rationally speaking however, a stronger actor that has the ability to choose from a 
range of violent alternatives will only opt for the cheapest option if it is cost-effective 
and high yielding. If, for some reason, the cheapest violent alternative is deemed to be 
ineffective, in so far as it is judged to be incapable of achieving the desired objectives, 
then it will be rejected in favor of other alternatives (a luxury that weak actors 
normally do not have). Therefore, a strong actor will only ever resort to terrorism, the 
least demanding form of violence, if it is deemed capable of achieving the desired 
goals. Clearly, it would make no rational sense to resort to terrorism if it is completely 
ineffective or counterproductive. 
Thus, opting for terrorism by actors with violent alternatives at their disposal is 
ultimately dependent upon terrorism’s utility, chances of success and overall 
effectiveness. This subsequently necessitates an evaluation of the utilitarian argument, 
which is a frequently debated and an extremely contested issues in the terrorism 
scholarship.  However, before we discuss it in detail, it is essential first to 
acknowledge that ultimately any and all utilitarian considerations regarding terrorism 
depend considerably on how it is defined and understood. For instance, if terrorism 
was simply defined as ‘killing of civilians’ then it would be regarded as a highly 
effective mode of violence. 
However, owing to a lack of consensus on terrorism’s definition, the term 
utilitarianism is used somewhat loosely and normally only refers to success related to 
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the objectives of the actors practicing terrorism. It is for this reason that the following 
analysis also assesses the utilitarian argument solely in terms of success related to the 
objectives of the actors practicing terrorism. Given that there is no common 
understanding or definition of terrorism, this analysis is certainly not without its 
flaws. To determine the utility of an ill-defined activity is always going to be 
treacherous ground. To begin with, assessing an actor’s chances of success when it is 
not clear whether it even practices terrorism is indeed seriously problematic. 
However, this is not a problem that is unique to a utilitarian evaluation of terrorism. 
For as long as the definition of terrorism is contested, its assessment in any form or 
kind will be highly questionable. 
Nevertheless, utilitarian considerations, whether terroristic or not, are generally 
associated with chances of success in relation to the objectives of the concerned 
actors. With regard to terrorism, although scholars generally and perhaps even 
understandably approach the problem through their own subjective lenses, most still 
view it as a low-intensity and least demanding form of political violence. For our 
discussion, it will therefore suffice to adhere to this least common denominator. It is 
important to also remember that any academic utilitarian evaluation of terrorism, as a 
rule, also implicitly gestures towards its most outstanding features like non-combatant 
targeting, generation of fear etc. However, owing to lack of universal consensus, it is 
perhaps best not to specify any feature in particular. Instead, for now it will be more 
helpful to evaluate the academic debate as it is with its embedded allusion to 
terrorism’s distinguishing features. 
The academic debate, therefore, on the face of it mainly concerns the usefulness, 
practicality, and effectiveness of terrorist violence in achieving the objectives of its 
practitioner. A cursory examination of the discourse reveals that the debate is 
primarily between those who believe that terrorism works and others who argue that it 
does not. Those who believe that terrorism works posit that terrorism is low-cost high 
impact violence that regularly delivers the desired results. They consider terrorism as 
a rational activity and those who employ it as rational actors. The fact that terrorism 
duly achieves the objectives of its perpetrator is precisely the reason why it is so 
frequently and routinely employed. Crenshaw, for instance, declares that ‘The reason 
for the frequency of terrorism is that it is an effective strategy; its benefits outweigh 
its costs’ (2011: 24). Alan Dershowitz also notes that ‘Terrorism will persist because 
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it often works, and success breeds repetition’ (2002: 6). Andrew Kydd and Barbara 
Walter similarly point out that ‘Terrorism often works. Extremist organizations such 
as al-Qaeda, Hamas, and the Tamil Tigers engage in terrorism because it frequently 
delivers the desired response’ (2006: 49). 
Such assertions over the years have robustly been challenged and it is instead argued 
that terrorism is an ineffective mode of violence that largely fails to achieve its 
desired objectives. Scholars that adhere to this view, normally point to different non-
state actors and the failure of these actors to achieve their goals through utilization of 
terrorism. In a 1976 article The Futility of Terrorism, Laqueur concluded that 
terrorism is largely an unproductive and a futile enterprise destined to fail (99-105). 
According to Thomas Schelling, ‘terrorism almost never appears to accomplish 
anything politically significant’ (1991: 20). Similarly, Loren Lomasky believes that 
terrorism largely fails to advance the claimed political objectives of its perpetrators 
(1991: 89). David Rapoport, although not entirely dismissive of terrorism’s overall 
effectiveness, also notes that ‘Success is very rare in the history of non-state terror, no 
matter what the form or time examined’ (2008: 186). 
Among other critics of the utilitarian argument, Max Abrahms is perhaps one scholar 
that stands out prominently. Overly sceptical of terrorism’s utility, he has dedicated 
his career to explaining why terrorism does not work. He strongly criticizes scholars 
such as Pape who argue that terrorism is a winning and successful strategy (2008). 
Abrahms makes his point by analyzing the stated objectives of various classified 
terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, the PKK, and the Abu-Sayyaf group. He observes 
that an overwhelming majority of terrorist groups fail to receive any concessions from 
their target governments and largely fall short of achieving anything substantial. This, 
Abrahms concludes, ‘suggests not only that terrorism is an ineffective instrument of 
coercion, but that its poor success rate is inherent to the tactic of terrorism itself’ 
(2006: 76). 
In between these two opposing viewpoints, there still is a third position, which posits 
that even though terrorism tends to fail most of the times or at least in the long run, it 
still manages to achieve some of its short term or limited objectives.39 As Weinberg 
                                                
39 The long-term objectives of terrorism may include change of status quo in one’s favor, complete 
overthrow of the existing social order, control over the power apparatus etc. Short-time objectives on 
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explains, ‘terrorist campaigns very rarely achieve the long-term goals or strategic 
objectives of those groups waging them. On those few occasions when the groups 
succeed it is almost always in the realm of their tactical aims’ (2012: 46). 
Terrorism as we know is a rational activity, to suggest that terrorism is entirely 
ineffective and counter-productive would therefore blatantly contradict one of its most 
fundamental tenets. It is for this reason that even scholars such as Abrahms who argue 
that terrorism is ineffective do not go on to suggest that the actors who practice them 
are irrational too. Instead, they try and analyze the resort to terrorism by means of 
some alternate explanation. This, among other things, often supposes the terrorist 
actions to be wrongly conceived or poorly thought out. Abrahms, for instance, points 
out that in spite of the futility of terrorist violence, many actors still overestimate its 
effectiveness because they tend to ‘draw false analogies from successful guerrilla 
campaigns, which are indeed comparatively profitable’ (2012: 47). 
What Abrahms and others like him are doing essentially is isolating the actor from the 
activity and considering only the former as rational that is somehow wrongly judging 
the latter to be effective. This separation of the seemingly irrational activity from the 
actor however raises serious questions about the logic of rationality itself. The 
problem with this approach is not that rational actors may occasionally make 
irrational decisions (for any rational actor may miscalculate from time to time), but 
more so the advocacy of the consistency and frequency with which such irrational 
decisions are made. If terrorism is an ineffective and irrational activity then the rate of 
its occurrence inadvertently casts doubts over the rationality of its perpetrators. 
Rationally speaking then, the popularity of terrorism as a widespread choice of 
violence and its continual deployment becomes highly questionable. Why would so 
many actors repeatedly misjudge the utility and effectiveness of terrorist violence? 
How many false past analogies could the terrorists possibly draw? 
Separating the supposedly rational actors from their seemingly irrational behavior 
creates an unsustainable and a contradictory façade, vulnerable to easy opposition, 
dissension and contestation. Logically speaking, the two positions are largely 
inconsistent, incoherent, and unsustainable. It is for this reason that the view that 
                                                                                                                                       
the other hand, could range from change of government policy, release of political prisoners, publicity, 
or simply generation of fear. 
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terrorism is completely ineffective does not enjoy much popularity in the terrorism 
discourse. Instead, most of the scholars normally adhere to the third position (that 
terrorism tends to be ineffective in its long-term ambitions but effective in its short-
term pursuits). The seemingly contradictory academic positions that terrorism is 
effective and ineffective, to a large extent, are therefore often merely generalized 
assertions (unless stated otherwise) that correspond to its limited or long-term 
objectives respectively. Viewed in this context, it becomes clear that Crenshaw’s 
assessment that terrorism is effective is perhaps more so a reference to its short-term 
achievements and Rapoport’s observation regarding the rarity of terrorism’s success is 
more of an indication of the failure of the perpetrators to achieve their ultimate or 
long-term objectives. 
On the face of it, it certainly appears that terrorism does not achieve its objectives, at 
least not in the manner other more conventional forms of violence do. This, however, 
should not prompt scholars to deduce that terrorism is an entirely ineffective form of 
violence. As will become clear in this discussion, terrorism, often in its own 
distinctive way, frequently manages to achieve its various objectives. Such 
achievements may not appear substantial or consequential, insofar as an actor’s 
ultimate or final objective is concerned. Conversely still, they seem fairly significant 
in terms of an actor’s short-term objectives. 
The assertion that the terrorist tactic or strategy is foredoomed to fail can therefore be 
grossly misleading. Terrorism, much like other forms of violence, can both be 
successful and unsuccessful. And even though it is mostly effective in its short-term 
pursuits, the possibility that terrorism can sometimes also play a role in achieving 
some long-term goals cannot be ruled out by definition. Various previously proscribed 
terrorist groups have been successful in achieving their long-term or ultimate 
objectives. The National Liberation Front in Algeria and the African National 
Congress in South Africa are notable examples. With such historical precedents, there 
is also no logical or rational basis for suggesting that terrorism can never achieve its 
long-term objectives. 
Seeing terrorism as a weak or essentially a non-state actor strategy, taken up due to 
lack of alternatives and only capable of achieving some limited or insignificant 
objectives, stands strongly in contradiction to both logic and history. The fact that 
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terrorism is mostly effective in its short-term pursuits does not mean that 
generalizations regarding its long-term success should be permissible. 
Given this utility and effectiveness of terrorist violence, the relative strength of the 
actor as a determining factor for taking up terrorism becomes highly questionable. 
Subsequently, whether an actor utilizes terrorism in the beginning of the conflict or 
later on, is to an extent also somewhat irrelevant. What matters essentially is that 
terrorism can be successful and as long as terrorism is an effective mode of violence, 
the probability that it can and will be employed by any rational actor at any time is 
also significantly high. 
It can of course be argued that since the long-term successes of terrorism are far too 
uncommon and infrequent, therefore they have very little, if at all any, analytical, 
explanatory or descriptive value. As a result, they should instead be treated as mere 
anomalies or exceptions that have little to no bearing on the functioning and 
understanding of terrorism. Even if we accept this position and suppose that terrorism 
is only successful in achieving some short-term objectives and any chance of its long-
term successes are exceptionally rare, it can still be seen as a useful tool, especially if 
an actor is looking to secure only some short-term objectives. 
To put it differently, not all actors necessarily have long-term ambitions and some 
could only be pursuing some limited or short-term goals. Given its short-term utility, 
terrorism in such cases can be a very useful and effective tool. Furthermore, if an 
actor has a range of violent alternatives at its disposal then it can simply choose a 
form of violence that best corresponds to its specific needs. This would mean that an 
actor could simply utilize terrorism for its short-term pursuits and choose not to use it 
for its long-term ambitions. 
Now since a state, as opposed to a non-state actor, has a range of violent alternatives 
at its disposal, it would make perfect sense to use a form of violence that would 
correspond to its specific needs. Given that terrorism is a useful tool for pursuing 
some short-term objectives, a state may therefore resort to it for addressing some 
immediate issues. At the same time, a state also possesses the resources to employ 
other forms of violence to achieve its long-term term objectives. In other words, a 
state can employ other forms of violence to achieve certain objectives that terrorism 
alone cannot furnish. In strictly utilitarian language, a state may simply pick and 
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choose from a range of violent alternatives or even use them in combination with each 
other; the choice would subsequently depend upon the kind and nature of the 
objective it is pursuing. 
The same, however, does not necessarily apply to non-state actors. Where a state can 
choose between a range of violent alternatives, a non-state actor in comparison, owing 
to lack of resources, is fairly restricted in its choices. As a result of this, certain non-
state actors may feel somewhat compelled to resort to terrorism, as their weak 
position would not permit them to choose any other mode of violent resistance. In a 
sense therefore, non-state actors often do not have a choice between different forms of 
violence but instead only a choice between violence and non-violence and even 
though terrorism may not be the most effective course of action, it may well be the 
only course of action available. A non-state actor that cannot employ any other form 
of violence other than terrorism runs the risk of never accomplishing its long-term 
objectives. In this respect therefore, it makes more sense for a state to resort to 
terrorism than non-state actors. 
This may seem like an unusual proposition given that utilitarian considerations 
regarding terrorist violence are normally reserved for only non-state actors. To 
suggest that it would be more logical for states to utilize terrorism can understandably 
be puzzling. However, in light of the discussion above, this assertion does not seem 
too farfetched. A non-state actor is fairly restricted in terms of the violent alternatives 
it possesses. For this reason, often at times it may not have any other option but to 
resort to terrorism (provided of course it wants to achieve its goals through violent 
means). And since terrorism has very little chance of achieving long-term objectives, 
the probability that the non-state actor would fail in the long run are also significantly 
high. 
A state, on the other hand, may only utilize terrorism for its immediate or interim 
objectives, employing it sporadically or in combination with other forms of violence 
to achieve the desired effect. Hence, a state is able to get all the short-term benefits 
from terrorism, while ultimately relying on other violent alternatives to realize its 
long-term goals, whereas a resort to terrorism by a weak non-state actor is often a 
resort to terrorism alone. Terrorism can therefore help yield greater result for states 
than non-state actors, as a state has considerably greater chances of overall success 
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when it employs terrorism. This proposition may challenge and contradict the 
conventional wisdom regarding the utility of terrorist violence, but it is nonetheless 
fairly consistent with the rational choice theory. 
To conclude therefore, a state may not only utilize terrorism, but in fact is able to 
utilize it far more successfully and effectively than non-state actors. Hence, where the 
argument that terrorism never works was earlier found wanting, there the academic 
assertion that terrorism is a winning or successful tactic, is clearly more applicable to 
states than non-state actors. The argument that terrorism is essentially a weak actor 
strategy and that states will not practice it because they have other violent alternatives 
is therefore, at least on utilitarian grounds, fundamentally flawed. If anything, as this 
discussion has shown, the states stand to gain significantly more from utilizing 
terrorism than non-state actors. 
All the reasons given in favor of the actor centric position- to show that terrorism is 
essentially a non-state activity- have so far proven to be unsatisfactory. Hence, if the 
legitimacy and legality argument is essentially misplaced and if terrorism has little to 
do with the relative power position of the actor, then is there something intrinsic about 
the nature of terrorist violence itself that makes it a non-state activity? It is this 
question that we will now turn our attention to. However, owing to the lengthy and 




4. The Theatre of Terrorism 
 
 
If the commonly popularized factors of legitimacy and legality and the relative power 
positions of state and non-state actors fall short, then in order to validate the argument 
that terrorism is a non-state activity, there must be something inherent about the 
nature of terrorist violence by virtue of which it is seen or treated as such. It is 
important for that reason to turn to characteristics that are most commonly associated 
with terrorism. 
The various attributes of terrorism discussed so far in the thesis are not suggestive in 
any way that terrorism is a non-state activity. Terror or generation of fear, for 
instance, is not something that is unique to terrorism or non-state actors specifically. 
Large-scale violence, such as ordinary wars, normally involves states and regularly 
generates terror or fear in a target population. Similarly, targeting of innocent civilians 
or non-combatants is again a technique that is neither distinctive of terrorism nor of 
non-state actors. States have routinely been engaged in activities that have resulted in 
civilian or non-combatant casualties. To suggest therefore that terrorism is a non-state 
activity because it generates fear or targets non-combatants (whether deliberately or 
not) would be profoundly inadequate. 
Similar conclusions can also be drawn for almost all other popularized attributes of 
terrorism such as coercion, repetition, indiscriminate targeting and so on. There is, 
however, one attribute of terrorism in particular that has traditionally been associated 
with non-state actors only and therefore deserves greater attention here. In fact, if this 
attribute does turn out to be an indispensible characteristic of terrorism (that also 
happens to be unique to only non-state actors), then a strong case can indeed be made 
for considering terrorism as a non-state activity. 
Typically referred to as theatrical, the attribute was first popularized by Brian Jenkins. 
In his 1974 paper International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare, Jenkins famously 
stated that ‘terrorism is theatre’ (p. 4). Jenkins explains that what makes terrorism 
theatrical is the manner in which terrorist attacks are ‘carefully choreographed to 
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attract the attention of the electronic media and the international press’. ‘Terrorism’, 
therefore, he believes ‘is aimed at the people watching, not at the actual victims’ 
(Ibid). Given its importance in both popular and academic discourses, Jenkins’s 
assertion can considerably benefit from a more detailed and systematic analysis. 
 
*** 
The theatrical attribute is commonly understood in terms of the physical manifestation 
of the terrorist act, which among other things is believed to be dramatic, shocking, 
and above all newsworthy. As George Fletcher’s assertion illustrates, ‘Terrorism 
always has a theatrical aspect. Effective terrorism is always a dramatic event that 
captures headlines for long periods. It is unexpected with great shock value’ (2006: 
909). However, as this discussion shall demonstrate, there is significantly more to the 
theatrical attribute, which is hardly ever fully realized. 
An ordinary theatre comprises of three essential components: a stage, backstage, and a 
live audience. Where a stage is the face of the theatre, it is actually the backstage that 
writes the script, pulls the strings, and runs the show. The third component, the 
audience, is mere spectator that has little to no influence on what happens on the 
stage. Yet at the same time it also happens to be the most important of the three 
constituents. Both the stage and backstage work together to put up a show to mainly 
influence and make an impression on the audience. Without the audience, the theatre 
has no meaning or effect. 
Now what is it about terrorism that makes it theatrical? To begin with, the three 
essential components of theatre can also easily be compared with the three key 
players involved in the terrorism process. With the terrorist activity being treated as 
the drama or show that is being put up, some straightforward comparisons, at the 
outset, can be drawn between a theatrical backstage and those who orchestrate and 
plan the terrorist act. Just as the theatrical backstage is responsible for what happens 
on the stage and how the overall act is played out, similarly a terrorist backstage calls 
all the shots and determines how the drama on stage should unfold. 
The direct victims of the attack can accordingly be compared with the actors or 
performers on the theatrical stage. At the outset, there is, however, one very important 
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difference in this particular comparison. Where the actors on the theatrical stage are 
fully willing collaborators, the performers in the terrorist drama are reluctant 
participants that are forced against their wishes to play out a role predetermined for 
them by the terrorist backstage. Nevertheless, the manner in which the actors behave 
on the two stages is strikingly similar, insofar as their actions are directed by a 
backstage and their performance is meant to influence an audience. Moreover, just as 
the real identity of the actors on the theatrical stage is unimportant or even irrelevant 
and what matters instead is what the actors depict, signify and represent; terrorism 
similarly is also not really concerned with the individual identity of its forced actors 
or performers but with the broader community or identity they represent. 
Lastly, and also most importantly, a direct and obvious comparison can be made 
between a terrorist target audience and a theatrical audience. The show in both cases 
is essentially being put together to influence an audience. Without the audience and 
the attention, the act in both instances becomes somewhat meaningless and 
inconsequential. Moreover, just as most theatrical plays are primarily designed to 
appeal to certain audiences, terrorist activities are also aimed at attracting the attention 
of some specific target audiences. What is different perhaps is that terrorism as 
opposed to theatre does not interact with a live physical audience and instead 
communicates with its audience indirectly, a point that will become clear later in the 
discussion. 
These straightforward similarities between terrorism and theatre in many ways 
resonate almost intuitively with our common perception of terrorist attacks and 
particularly help explain why the theatrical attribute of terrorism has acquired 
somewhat of a proverbial status. This simple comparison however is not entirely 
sufficient for formal academic assessment and qualification. There must be more to 
the theatrical attribute that explains the prevalent scholarly support and interest it 
receives. To put it differently, in order for the theatrical attribute to justify its 
academic patronage, it must also incorporate some key features that are typically 
deemed characteristic of terrorism by the terrorism scholarship. 
The above comparison has clearly shown that a number of parallels can indeed be 
drawn between terrorism and theatre. From the many highlighted similarities, the 
most striking perhaps is the way in which the terrorist attacks are primarily aimed at 
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attracting the attention of some specific audience. In fact, for Jenkins and most other 
academics, the theatrical comparison is largely drawn from terrorism’s propensity to 
attract the attention of some target audience through some spectacular acts of violence 
(See e.g. Wilkinson, 2001; Weimann, 2008). The theatre of terrorism then, at least 
from an academic standpoint, is essentially about communicating a message through 
psychologically influencing an audience. The theatrical attribute therefore effectively 
incorporates two of terrorism’s most noteworthy characteristics: its psychological 
impact and communicative nature.40 
Hence, the theatrical understanding of terrorism can primarily be interpreted in terms 
of its proclivity to (psychologically) influence some target audience beyond its 
immediate or direct victims. This means that the drama of terrorism generally plays 
out with the actors or direct victims carefully chosen to resonate with some broader 
target audience. It is worth remembering here that even though the individual identity 
of the actors or direct victims is somewhat unimportant, their selection for 
communicative or message generation purposes, is never entirely random or 
indiscriminate.41 The direct victims of terrorist violence will always boast certain 
characteristics that the real or the intended target identifies with. It is this 
identification with the direct victims that explains the appeal of the terrorist drama to 
its intended audience. 
Terrorism, in a strictly theatrical sense, is therefore a communicative form of violence 
where the direct victims are merely used to send a message to some intended target 
audience. It is owing to this communicative nature of terrorist violence that Hoffman 
and McCormick ‘define terrorism as a signaling game in which terrorist attacks are 
used to communicate a group’s character and objectives to a set of target audiences’ 
(2004: 243). Similarly, Wilkinson also observes this communicative behavior, which 
he believes is intrinsic to all terroristic violence. He points out that ‘terrorism by its 
nature is a psychological weapon which depends upon communicating a threat to a 
wider society’ (177: 2001). It is in fact this centrality of communication that allows 
terrorism to be represented as theatre, as Michael Stohl notes, ‘Political terrorism as 
                                                
40 The psychological impact is on the audience terrorism seeks to influence and the communication is 
through the stage act, which normally involves some form of violence or its threat. Both these 
characteristics as discussed already enjoy significant popularity in the terrorism discourse. 
41 See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion on the indiscriminate and random nature of terrorist violence. 
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communicatively constituted violence may also be presented as theatre: the world is 
the stage for the dramatic ingredients of violence, death, intimidation and fear (2008: 
8). 42 
Now communication of any kind cannot function without some form of medium or 
channel of interaction with the subject of attention. Terrorism in this respect is also no 
exception. For its communication, terrorism relies almost entirely on tools provided 
by modern means of communication- mass media in particular. Media is a blanket 
term that encompasses all foremost means of communication. As Wilkinson notes, 
‘Media is a generic term meaning all the methods or channels of information and 
entertainment’ (1997: 51). Although an analysis of the relationship between terrorism 
and media is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is still important to acknowledge the 
role that print and electronic media play in setting the stage on which the drama of 
terrorism unfolds. As without this stage, not only will terrorism fail to communicate 
its message to its target audience, but its theatrical credentials will also become highly 
questionable.43 
The relationship between media and terrorism has been a subject of great interest and 
has attracted the attention of leading scholars in the field of political violence and 
terrorism studies (See e.g. Laqueur, 1977; Snyder, 1978; Weimann, 1983; Wilkinson, 
2001). This interest in part can be attributed to the advancement in technology 
particularly in the field of mass communication that has significantly facilitated global 
connectivity through disseminating news and information almost instantaneously to 
just about anywhere in the world, thereby rendering all distances, at least in terms of 
communication, somewhat redundant. With distances no longer an obstacle for 
communication, a message can potentially be generated for any audience at any time. 
Furthermore, the importance of the relationship between media and terrorism also 
owes to the nature of terrorist violence, which due to its communicative character is 
                                                
42 The importance of the communicative nature, however, does not mean that any of the other attributes 
of terrorism, such as generation of fear or non-combatant targeting are in any way compromised. The 
message is generally communicated through generation of fear and targeting of non-combatants. 
43 It is important to also point out here that the relationship between terrorism and media is believed to 
be somewhat symbiotic as the media also benefits from the sensational and eye-catching news that 
terrorist attacks typically generate (See e.g. Wilkinson, 2001). 
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believed to be significantly reliant on tools provided by modern means of 
communication. As Jeffery Ross argues, ‘Terrorists use the media as a tool to gain 
increased coverage and communicate their message’ (2007: 221). Ross further 
suggests that ‘The relationship between terrorists and the news media will not 
subside, and in many respects, that interconnectivity will increase in years to come’ 
(Ibid).44 
Thus, with the communicative nature of terrorism facilitated by advancements in the 
field of mass communication, the importance accorded to media is certainly not 
surprising. As Philip Schlesinger pithily observes, ‘In a perspective which sees 
political violence as unambiguously effective drama it is not surprising that media is 
accorded such importance’ (1981: 86). The ubiquitous presence of media coupled 
with the communicative nature of terrorist violence, for the most part therefore, 
explains not only the importance but also the attention the relationship receives. The 
importance of the communicative nature of terrorism and its subsequent reliance on 
media to achieve this end necessitates a small revision of terrorism’s theatrical 
understanding. 
As pointed out earlier, a theatre comprises of three essential components: a stage, 
backstage, and a live audience. While all these three elements are visibly discernible 
in terrorism as well, what is different perhaps is that terrorism, unlike theatre, does not 
                                                
44 It is important to point out that the relationship between terrorism and media appears somewhat 
problematic when one takes a form of government into consideration. This is because relationship 
between terrorism and media is typically observed only in the context of western liberal democracies or 
to a limited extend in countries that permit some form of freedom of speech and expression. The 
importance given to the relationship between terrorism and media in a democratic country, particularly 
by the academic community, is perhaps most evident in Wilkinson’s assertion that ‘When one says 
“terrorism” in a democratic society, one also says “media”’ (177: 2001). 
The reason why this logic is not extended to undemocratic countries is because various dictatorial and 
authoritarian regimes typically maintain a strict control over media and flow of information, frequently 
censoring and repressing news believed to be problematic for the regime. While it is true that media 
functions somewhat differently in non-democratic countries, especially as it fails to provide a 
communicative platform to various insurrectional or dissenting groups, what is important to understand 
is that it can still provide an effective platform for state terrorism. Moreover, since global media 
transcends all borders, it is also not possible for any state to censor all information. Discussions on 
terrorism and media and especially how the former uses the latter to its advantage should therefore not 
be restricted to only democracies. 
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have a live physical audience with which it can interact directly. Instead, it relies on 
tools provided by media to communicate indirectly. Without media, terrorism will 
have no effective medium to communicate with its target audience, and without 
communication, all terroristic violence essentially runs the risk of not only being 
ineffective but also meaningless. Given this important role that media plays, the 
theatrical understanding of terrorism can be said to incorporates not three but in fact 
four essential elements: the terrorist actor, the terrorist act (or its threat), an audience, 
and a medium to communicate (or simply media). 
Terrorism’s reliance on media as its foremost or perhaps even only communicative 
medium entails that the message it is trying to communicate will be perceived through 
not only the physical act but also through how media represents it. In this respect, 
terrorism happens to be somewhat different from theatre. Where a theatrical backstage 
not only controls the performance of the stage actors but also determines the message 
they are trying to communicate; a terrorist backstage (especially in the case of non-
state actors) only manages the performance of the actors and has little to no control 
over media that represents or transmits this performance and communicates the 
terrorist message. The terrorist backstage is therefore often at the mercy of media 
when it comes to representation and portrayal of not only their actions but also their 
intended message. 
Although it can reasonably be argued that the mere reporting of the act in itself is 
often the intended message of the terrorist backstage, especially when the intention is 
to generate fear and panic. However, the manner in which an attack is reported and 
how much attention it receives and whether or not it even gets reported at all, is 
something that is ultimately at the discretion of the media. Hence, mass media does 
play a very central role in terrorist communication and is, as a result, an integral part 
of its overall theatrical edifice. The question of whether, how often and in what 
manner media represents and frames the message and actions of terrorist backstage is 
open to debate and contestation, and certainly beyond the scope of this thesis. What is 
important, however, is the undeniably significant role of media in the entire terrorist 
communication process. 
As noted earlier in the discussion, the theatrical attribute of terrorism enjoys 
widespread popularity and recognition. So much so that many academics consider it 
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to be one of the most distinguishing characteristics of terrorism. Laqueur, for instance, 
noted the significance of the theatrical attribute of terrorism nearly four decades ago 
by pointing out that the terrorist act on its own amounts to very little and what matters 
instead is the attention it generates. He believes that this realization has especially 
become widespread among terrorist actors in the wake of advancement in the means 
of communications. Laqueur particularly acknowledges the role media plays in this 
terrorist formative thinking. In his own words, ‘Terrorists have learned that the media 
are of paramount importance in their campaigns, that the terrorist act by itself is next 
to nothing, whereas publicity is all’ (1977: 223). Similarly, Gabriel Weimann also 
acknowledges the importance of the theatrical dimension of terrorism and goes on to 
utilize the ‘theatre-of-terror’ approach to ‘examine modern terrorism as an attempt to 
communicate message through the use of orchestrated violence’ (2008: 69). 
Fletcher is among those academics that not only see the theatrical attribute as the most 
outstanding but also the least disputed of terrorism’s characteristics. In his attempt to 
conceptualize terrorism, Fletcher identifies eight different factors that have a bearing 
on terrorism. He concludes that none of these variables particularly help create a 
universal definition or understanding of terrorism, as any proposed definition would 
always produce counter examples. This, he believes is because ‘not all the factors 
apply all the time’ (2006: 910-911). However, he points out that there is one attribute 
that appears to apply every time and therefore comes closest to being an essential 
characteristic of terrorism. This unique factor is the element of theatre and Fletcher 
finds it hard to imagine a terrorist attack without ‘a desire to draw public attention to 
the event’ (p. 911). 
It is perhaps true that Fletcher and many other academics normally tend to have 
somewhat of a narrow understanding of the theatrical attribute, generally believing it 
to be a mere spectacular act of violence that draws public attention. However, what 
becomes clearer on closer inspection is that this perception, in spite of never fully 
realizing the various facets of the attribute, is fairly consistent with the logic discerned 
above. 
Most importantly perhaps, the academic assertion that the theatre of terrorism 
essentially involves- some spectacular act of violence that draws public attention- is 
able to effectively incorporate the four essential components of the theatrical attribute. 
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Whilst it seemingly focuses on only two components: the act and the audience, it 
indirectly also encompasses the other two components of actor and media. This is 
because an act can never occur in a vacuum and will always implicate an actor, 
directly or indirectly. Similarly, the attention of the audience can also only ever be 
drawn through some form of medium of interaction or communication, a role that in 
the modern world is largely performed by media. 
Although it is important that the academic understanding is overall consistent with the 
logic discerned above, which clearly goes on to show that the academic perception of 
the theatrical attribute is not completely devoid of intellectual and analytical rigor, 
what is more important however is to acknowledge the popularity and shared 
understanding of the theatrical attribute in the academic community. 
This is because the prevalent view of the theatrical attribute, unlike other attributes of 
terrorism, has never really been contested and is generally shared by academics of all 
dispositions. Hence, where other attributes of terrorism, like generation of fear, 
categorization of victims, indiscriminate or random, deliberate or accidental etc., are 
all fundamentally contested, the meaning and understanding of what the theatrical 
attribute entails has never really been challenged. This is crucially advantageous as it 
essentially means that the theatrical attribute can be treated as self-explanatory or 
simply taken at face value without any qualms. 
Of course from a strictly empirical and diagnostic standpoint, categorization of the 
theatrical attribute as a mere spectacular act of violence that draws public attention 
does not appear to be a very helpful distinction. As what makes a particular act 
spectacular and how and when it is able to draw public attention is understandably 
very difficult to measure and quantify. Thus, given the nature of such qualification, if 
not the meaning of the attribute itself, its application at least will always be open to 
debate and contestation. Nevertheless, regardless of its subjective application or any 
quantitative considerations, the fact remains that there exists, to a large extent, an 
objective academic consensus on what the theatrical attribute broadly represents. And 
for that reason alone, it is important that any representation or conceptualization of the 
attribute also incorporates its prevalent and dominant perception. 
Ideally any formal understanding or conceptualization of the theatrical attribute 
should incorporate not only its core components but also account for its virtually 
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undisputed inference. Understandably however it is not possible to account for every 
small intricacy and some minor aspects, especially those related to the core 
components, will subsequently have to be overlooked or treated as trivialities. 
Nevertheless, where such subtleties to an extent can or will have to be compromised, 
it is important still to remain particularly sensitive to the overwhelming academic 
consensus regarding the theatrical attribute, so as to not undermine the attribute’s 
remarkable distinctiveness.45 Otherwise, any conception will be of little avail, as any 
meaning discerned thereof would be lost on an audience that understands the attribute 
differently. 
Our understanding of the theatrical attribute, as of necessity, should therefore aim to 
incorporate features that reflect academic patronage. As this discussion has shown, 
the three most outstanding features that epitomize academic sentiments or 
characterize academic understanding of the theatrical attribute are: the communicative 
nature of terrorism, drawing attention of some target audience, and the role of media 
in facilitating the entire process. Conveniently enough, all these three features can 
also effectively be expressed or simply summarized by the term ‘publicity’. 
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines publicity as ‘something that draws the 
attention of the public’.46 The Oxford English dictionary, on the other hand, defines 
publicity as ‘notice or attention given to someone or something by the media’.47 With 
one stressing the importance of drawing attention and the other specifically 
highlighting the role played by media, both the two definitions clearly also gesture 
towards the communicative nature of the term publicity- thus, in the process, 
effectively incorporating all three features that characterize the academic 
understanding of the theatre of terrorism. 
The dictionary definitions therefore clearly demonstrate that the term publicity, as 
commonly understood, can succinctly sum up the most outstanding features of the 
theatrical attribute. In fact, it will not be an exaggeration to suggest that publicity is 
                                                
45 Distinctiveness in the sense that, as opposed to all other attributes of terrorism, the meaning and 
general interpretation of the theatrical attribute has never really been questioned or challenged. 
46 Available at: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/publicity. Accessed on: March 29, 2016. 
47 Available at: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/publicity. Accessed on March 29, 
2016. 
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one word that accurately captures the essence and best articulates and expresses the 
theatre of terrorism. It is for this reason that the theatrical attribute from here on will 
primarily be perceived in terms of publicity. 
 
*** 
Having discussed the theatrical attribute in detail, what it fundamentally entails and 
how it is commonly and popularly perceived, we can now move to the central 
question of whether or not it is exclusive to only non-state actors. The analysis of the 
theatrical attribute hitherto, owing to the common inference of the term terrorism, 
may have come across as entirely non-state centric. On closer inspection it becomes 
evident that the analysis is but largely independent of the actor and does not 
presuppose the actor to be non-state.48 The same however cannot be said of the 
academic treatment of the theatrical attribute, which is typically restricted to only 
non-state actors. The question that arises here is whether publicity is characteristic of 
non-state actors only. If so, then given that it is the essence of the theatrical attribute, 
the logic of theatre can never reasonably be extended to state actors. 
Earlier the theatrical attribute of terrorism was discerned by means of its four key 
components: the terrorist actor, the terrorist act (or its threat), an audience, and a 
medium to communicate (or simply media). While the first two of these core 
components are clearly independent of the actor (provided of course one does not start 
off with the assumption that terrorism is a non-state activity), the latter two however 
are not so easily applicable to states and are generally reserved for only non-state 
actors. 
Arguably, it is often difficult to identify the intended audience when it comes to 
actions committed by states. This is because a state characteristically neither identifies 
its target audience nor vociferously takes responsibility for its actions in the manner a 
non-state actor does. Even though states can be equally vocal about their rivals and 
adversaries and denounce them publicly, but a frequent failure on their part to openly 
                                                
48 There are clearly some unanswered questions about terrorist message communication and role of 
media, which if not restricted at least appear to apply somewhat differently to state and non-state 
actors. This will however become clearer as the discussion progresses. 
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declare hostilities and take responsibility for their violent actions sets them apart and 
renders it significantly difficult to implicate them. As a result of this, determining a 
state’s involvement and identifying its target audience is often a matter of speculation 
and guesswork. 
Similarly, with regard to the medium of communication or simply media, a state 
owing to its privileged power position is able to exert control or influence over the 
media apparatus and can either censor its involvement or simply hold someone else 
responsible for its violent actions. Thus Media, which is otherwise believed to be the 
cornerstone of terrorist communication process, fails to perform its normal or 
expected role as a state tries to conceal or disavow its actions through manipulating, 
controlling, or directing it. 
In comparison, a non-state actor continually and repeatedly not only takes 
responsibility for its actions but also clearly identifies its target audience. With 
regards to media, unlike state actors, non-state actors are normally never in a 
privileged power position to assert any kind of influence or control over it. Moreover, 
what specifically sets them apart is that far from shying away from their involvement 
they customarily not only take direct responsibility for their actions but also want the 
media to attribute the violence to them. There thus appears to be a marked difference 
between state and non-state actors when it comes to the theatrical components of 
audience and media. As Peter Waldmann notes, ‘while terrorism relies strongly on 
large-scale media attention, state terror merely requires a whispering campaign 
(quoted in Schwenkenbecher, 2012: 26). 
It is important to remember here that the components of audience and media, other 
than signifying the communicative nature of terrorism, collectively also give rise to 
the element of publicity, which was earlier described as the essence of the theatrical 
attribute. Now if states typically do not specify their target audience, claim no 
responsibility for their violent actions, and also desire no media attention, then they 
clearly do not invoke the element of publicity, at least not in the manner the term is 
commonly and popularly perceived. 
Thus far it has been shown that where the non-state actors tend to actively pursue 
publicity, state actors largely tend to shy away from it- as an actor clearly cannot be 
said to seek publicity if it fails to categorically identify its target audience and 
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purposely avoids media attention. The argument therefore goes that if states neither 
seek nor evoke publicity then there can be no theatrical dimension to their violence. 
Furthermore, if we hold that the theatrical attribute is fundamental to terrorism then 
this would also go on to suggest that a state, in effect, cannot practice terrorism. 
The question that arises here is why a state does not seek publicity the way a non-state 
actor normally does? Although there is no straightforward answer to this question, 
there are still two interrelated factors that to a large extent explain why states appear 
to behave somewhat differently. The first of these factors is rooted in the utilitarian 
debate and questions the overall efficacy of publicity, especially in relation to states. 
The second factor is tied to the nature of the state itself, which owing to its privileged 
power position in the society, is expected to behave different from non-state actors. 
Having already discussed the utilitarian argument, we know that terrorism is anything 
but a futile activity. Moreover, in strictly utilitarian terms it was also concluded that 
states stand to gain significantly more from terrorism than non-state actors. This is 
because states characteristically have a range of violent alternatives at their disposal 
and can employ a form of violence that best corresponds to their needs. In 
comparison, non-state actors, often due to complete lack of violent alternatives, could 
be forced to resort to terrorism even if it is clearly not in their best interest. Hence, on 
the face of it, the utilitarian argument appears to suggest that states may in fact benefit 
more from utilizing terrorism than non-state actors. 
If the utilitarian argument permits states to practice terrorism as it does, then how can 
it also explain why a state would not seek publicity? As pointed out earlier, utilitarian 
considerations, due to a lack of consensus on the definition of terrorism, are mostly 
restricted to only the chances of success of an actor’s objectives or simply the intent 
of the actors in terms of their stated goals and motives. Moreover, with focus on the 
success or failure of objectives alone, they also tend to be largely actor neutral or can 
at least be treated as such. However, not all utilitarian considerations or objections are 
generic and some are driven specifically by certain features deemed to be 
characteristic of terrorism. 
In relation to terrorism there are therefore two types of utilitarian considerations: 
intent centric and nature centric. Where the former engages with terrorism only 
outwardly (focusing primarily on the chances of success of an actor’s stated 
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objectives) the latter is concerned more with specific aspects of the nature of terrorist 
violence. Since utilitarian considerations regarding terrorism are generally interpreted 
in terms the chances of success of an actor’s stated objectives, most academics engage 
with the problem only outwardly. Having already dismissed the intent centric 
utilitarian objections to state’s use of terrorism, we will now turn our attention to 
nature centric considerations regarding terrorism. 
 
*** 
Nature centric considerations tend to focus on certain characteristics that are deemed 
essential to terrorism’s formal makeup. Although such utilitarian considerations can 
be diverse and wide-ranging (emphasizing one or the other attribute to highlight either 
terrorism’s usefulness or futility), the most prominent perhaps and especially relevant 
to our discussion are considerations regarding the element of publicity. In order to 
understand the function and utility of publicity, we must first briefly revisit the notion 
that terrorism, in terms of resources required, is the least demanding form of violence. 
Earlier it was pointed out that one of the reasons why states are routinely exonerated 
is because of the tendency to see terrorism as essentially a weak actor strategy. This 
position is backed by the assertion that in comparison with other forms of violence 
terrorism requires minimal effort and resources. The low cost of terrorism supposedly 
makes it a particularly attractive choice for actors that lack resources to engage in any 
other form of violence. Where treating this as grounds for state exceptionalism has 
robustly been challenged and shown to be an inadequate qualification, the assertion 
itself that terrorism is the least demanding form of violence has not been contested. 
Despite being least demanding we know that terrorism is still an effective mode of 
violence. This raises a set of two interrelated questions- what is it that makes 
terrorism low cost and more importantly perhaps, how can it still manage to stay 
effective? Conveniently enough, there happens to be just one answer to both these 
questions and it lies squarely with the psychological impact of terrorism. 
Understandably, psychological impact is not the sole province of terrorism, as 
violence of any kind, in one way or another, generally tends to have some form of 
psychological effect. However, where it is possible to imagine other forms of violence 
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without the psychological ingredient, there it is almost impossible to imagine an act of 
terrorism without some kind of psychological effect. It is because of this indispensible 
association that the psychological impact is believed to constitute the raison d'être of 
terrorist violence (See e.g. Merari, 1993; Wilkinson, 2001). 
Having already discussed it earlier in detail, it will suffice to say here that the 
psychological impact of terrorism basically functions through influencing or at least 
affecting the psychology of an audience in some manner. Whether deliberate or not, 
terrorist attacks typically disturb an individual’s sense of security through targeting 
certain mental vulnerabilities, which among other things subsequently lead to the 
generation of fear.49 Due to this inherently mental process, terrorist violence in effect 
possesses the ability to exploit our deepest insecurities. As a result of this, the 
response or the effect terrorism produces is often not always rational or proportionate 
to the actual threat it otherwise poses. It is therefore even possible to trigger a 
disproportionate or irrational psychological response with not terrorist violence but in 
fact its mere threat, provided of course the threat is (or at least appears to be) credible. 
Hence, what makes terrorism a low cost violent alternative is not some inscrutable 
physical prowess but instead its unrestrained and irrepressible psychological impact. 
Given that it is able to achieve this impact with just a credible threat further entails 
that terrorism does not even need the personnel and material strength to impress or 
impose. In other words, due to its psychological dimension the appeal of terrorism 
does not necessarily depend upon a visible show of power and physical strength and 
its success need not be measured in conventional military jargons. As Taylor and 
Horgan note that the success for terrorism is ‘not measured through military 
objectives, but much more diffuse psychological objectives’ (1999: 88). 
Free from such conventional notions of success, terrorism instead need only maintain 
a façade of power and strength- enough just to communicate its credible threat. Some 
scholars, however, would argue here that in order to communicate a credible threat, 
terrorism would need to demonstrate its ability first (See e.g. Wellman, 1979; 
                                                
49 Although due to the psychological nature of terrorist violence the precise manner in which an 
audience is affected will always remain somewhat elusive, we can however still conclude that a 
terrorist attack or its threat will result in an actual or perceived threat to an individual’s social life, 
which subsequently would lead to generation of fear. 
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Crenshaw, 2011). Even if we accept this position, the cost of a single act of terrorist 
violence will still be insignificant when compared with the expenditure of other forms 
of regular and irregular warfare. 
The ability to affect the psychology of individuals with minimum effort and resources 
gives terrorism a distinctive edge over other forms of violence. It is this cost-effective 
relative advantage that makes terrorism an attractive choice for furthering one’s 
objectives. Owing to the influence and affect it is capable of exerting psychologically, 
terrorism is able to muster considerable social and political sway despite appearing 
inconsequential in any material or visible sense. 
It is worth remembering here that the way the psychological impact works is through 
communication of a threat to the intended target audience. Without effective 
communication, terrorism will fail to psychologically influence its audience and will 
subsequently lose its relative advantage. Indeed, it is due to this overriding importance 
of communication that terrorism is largely regarded as a communicative form of 
violence (See e.g. Hoffman and McCormick, 2004). Now communication of any 
form, as pointed out earlier, always requires some medium of interaction. Terrorism 
in this respect is also no exception and for its communication relies almost entirely on 
tools provided by media. 
Now media, whether print or electronic, characteristically charges for providing its 
communicative services, which would mean that if not the terrorist act then at least its 
communication could be a costly affair. However, when it comes to terrorism, the 
media normally never levies any charges against the perpetrators. This is because 
terrorist violence by virtue of its nature is newsworthy, sensational and more than 
capable of grabbing headlines. It helps raise viewership and subsequently offers 
indirect financial incentives to media, prompting the latter to render its 
communicative services free of charge. Such indirect financial rewards are 
particularly characteristic of our modern-day market oriented capitalist states. 
In an age of consumerism, any activity that has the potential to draw public attention 
will be deemed commercially successful. In this vein, one activity in particular that 
never fails to draw attention is violence. Be it real or fictional, violence always 
manages to captivate an audience. And since the least common denominator for any 
terrorist activity is violence or its threat, the commercial value accredited to terrorism 
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as a result is hardly surprising. As Schmid pithily observes, ‘Violence, no matter what 
the cause, always draws the attention of people. The production of violence, whether 
in fictional action series or in terrorist campaigns, creates audiences which can then be 
exposed to sales’ (1992: 22). In a sense therefore, the media, far from charging for the 
services rendered, stands to gain significantly from terrorist violence. It exploits 
terrorism’s commercial faculty in order to foster its own ratings and profits. This is 
why Schmid believes that ‘For the media, terrorist news is good news in that it offers 
live drama and compelling pictures’ (Ibid). 
Hence, what makes terrorism both low cost and effective is not just its ability to 
psychologically influence an audience with nothing more than a mere credible threat 
that undermines or affects an individual’s sense of security, but also the free medium 
of communication provided by media. Terrorism, therefore, is a cost-effective mode 
of violence, in not only its conduct but also its communication. We shall now see how 




At the outset, some noteworthy and interesting parallels can be drawn between 
publicity and the cost-effectiveness of terrorism. Publicity as concluded earlier is the 
art of drawing attention and getting noticed primarily with the help of media. 
Similarly, terrorism’s cost-effectiveness, measured in terms of its psychological 
influence, also manages to draw attention of the affected and the actor responsible 
(particularly in cases where the responsibility has either been taken or attributed to 
some actor) gets widely noticed and recognized.50 Moreover, the dependence of 
terrorist activity on media to not only propagate and disseminate its message but also 
promote and project its actions further affirms the link between publicity and cost-
effectiveness of terrorism. 
These parallels essentially go on to show that publicity in fact can be regarded as the 
tool that allows terrorism to function cost-effectively. With its ability to draw 
                                                
50 Even if the activity has not been attributed to any actor, the issue of responsibility still becomes a 
matter of discussion, intrigue, and speculation. 
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attention and attribute credit through media, publicity provides terrorism not only the 
necessary cost-effective platform but also enables it to inflict its psychological impact, 
which allows terrorism to punch above its material and personnel capacity. 
In utilitarian parlance, the role of publicity therefore is to provide a disproportionate 
social and political leverage to actors looking to bring about or prevent some change 
through violent means. In other words, publicity makes terrorism a valuable asset 
especially for weak actors as it conceals their weaknesses and allows them to exert 
more influence than what their size and strength would otherwise permit. This is 
particularly true for non-state actors that in terms of power in the society are often at a 
disadvantage and as a result turn to terrorism to make up for their shortcomings. 
Now the objectives of any dissenting actor, in light of its cause or grievance, can 
broadly be broken down into awareness regarding the cause and resolution of the 
cause. Getting noticed or attracting the attention of some target audience to a group or 
its cause can be treated as a short-term objective, whereas the resolution of the 
group’s overall cause can be regarded as its long-term or ultimate objective. Due to 
lack of resources, disgruntled and aggrieved non-state actors often struggle to not only 
get their grievances resolved but may even fail to get them noticed at all. However, 
owing to the provision of publicity, terrorism ensures that such grievances are at least 
noticed and brought to the attention of wider public, even if they are not permanently 
resolved. Terrorism, therefore, has a built-in provision to facilitate short-term success 
in terms of recognition and attention. 
As discussed earlier, a large number of academics believe that terrorism mostly 
manages to achieve only some short-term or limited objectives. Since, the most 
common short-term objective of any non-state actor is to gain recognition and create 
awareness regarding its cause, the short-term benefits attributed to terrorism as a 
result are hardly surprising. Non-state actors vying for recognition and attention will 
at any rate opt for terrorism even though it does not guarantee overall success. There 
are three main reasons why non-state actors find this short-term goal particularly 
appealing. 
Firstly, non-state actors, owing to their limited resources and disadvantageous power 
position in the society, are often not widely known and therefore their first and 
foremost objective is to gain recognition and create awareness regarding their plight. 
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Secondly, many non-state actors (given that they are rational) are at least 
presumptively aware of the unlikelihood of achieving their ultimate objectives with 
terrorism alone. Under such circumstances, recognition of some sort and drawing 
attention to an actor’s cause (due to its almost guaranteed plausibility), alternatively 
become the pragmatic objective. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, even if 
terrorism is unable to solve the problem immediately or in the near foreseeable future, 
it is not entirely unreasonable for some non-state actors to expect that the acquired 
recognition and attention from terrorism, in one way or another, would still 
considerably help in laying down the crucial groundwork for the ultimate resolution 
of the problem in the long run. The way they see it, terrorism may not grant complete 
victory but it certainly offers a path to it. 
Terrorism’s inherent propensity to mainly offer only limited success often transforms 
ordinary conflicts into symbolic conflicts where ambitions of total or ultimate victory 
are often substituted with the desire to gain broader attention and recognition. The 
reason why such conflicts can be called symbolic is firstly because of the manner in 
which terrorism selects its direct victims, which as discussed in Chapter 2, can best be 
described as symbolic. Secondly, when an actor loses all prospects of achieving its 
ultimate objective yet still repeatedly targets or threatens to target these symbols that 
resonate with its target audience, the nature of the conflict as a result becomes more 
and more symbolic, incapable of winning anything more than attention and 
recognition. 
This is of course not to say that non-state actors using terrorism inevitably lose all 
hope of accomplishing their ultimate goals, nor does this suggest that these short-term 
goals are trivial or unimportant. Clearly, recognition and attention are the vital first 
steps towards achieving complete victory. Instead, it only suggests that since the road 
to such a victory is long, arduous, and fairly uncertain, the easily attainable short-term 
objectives of recognition and attention either appear or inadvertently become the only 
objective of some non-state actors. As Richmond succinctly observes, ‘If non-state 
and terrorist actors cannot win “real” war, they feel they might be able to win these 
symbolic conflicts’ (2003: 299).51 
                                                
51 It is important to point out here that being mostly successful in its short-term pursuits does not mean 
that terrorism is completely inconsequential in the long run. The social and political sway terrorism is 
	144 
So far it has been shown that with the help of publicity terrorism is able to inflict its 
psychological impact, which enables it to punch well above its weight and exert 
significant influence with minimum effort and resources. This makes terrorism a 
highly cost-effective mode of violence that particularly attracts non-state actors 
looking for a violent alternative that corresponds to their abilities. However, given 
that publicity mainly enables terrorism to achieve the objective of recognition and 
attention means that the effectiveness of terrorism is often restricted to partial or 
limited success. 
In other words, although publicity almost guarantees short-term success, any long-
term or complete victory for terrorism is far less assured. This of course does not 
undermine the overall utility of terrorism, especially for many non-state actors that 
would struggle to even register otherwise. It does, however, mean that a failure to 
achieve long-term goals often reduces terrorist violence to a symbolic conflict 
concerned only with some short-term gains. 
It has been pointed out earlier that there is no reason for states to not opt for terrorism 
simply because they have other violent options at their disposal. If anything, a choice 
of violent alternatives would entail that states, as apposed to non-state actors, could 
simply pick and choose a form of violence that best suits their needs. As long as 
terrorism is a cost-effective mode of violence, its utility and application should be 
independent of the actor, unless of course the advantage terrorism offers is either too 
trivial or insignificant to benefit states or its nature is such that only non-state actors 
could profit from it. As will become clear in the following discussion, both these two 
factors, to varying degrees help explain how the utility of terrorism plays out 
somewhat differently for state actors. 
 
*** 
Assisted by publicity, terrorism as we know mostly offers only short-term benefits in 
the form of recognition and attention. Where these benefits are crucial for non-state 
                                                                                                                                       
able to muster because of its psychological impact can have long-term effects on the society even if it 
fails to achieve its primary objective. The nature of symbolic terrorism will be discussed in detail at the 
end of this chapter. 
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actors and in fact in some cases even prove to be vital for their survival, they appear 
to hold far little significance for states. A state actor typically possesses vast material 
and personnel resources and enjoys a privileged power position in the society, 
normally in the form of control over the government or ruling apparatus. It clearly 
therefore faces no qualms regarding its survival or recognition as the general public is 
fully aware of not only its presence but also its authority. A non-state actor, on the 
other hand, not only lacks such resources but is also customarily on the periphery of 
the prevailing power structures in the society, and as a result of this, the broader 
public may not even be aware of its existence least of all its power and ability. 
In order to be taken seriously, non-state actors must therefore put themselves out there 
and demonstrate significant ability that captures the imagination of an otherwise 
inattentive audience. However, a disadvantaged power position coupled with a lack of 
any real ability means that they may instead have to project an illusion of strength and 
power, convincing enough to sway or at least influence popular perception. Terrorism, 
with its provision of publicity, allows them to accomplish just that. States, in 
comparison, with all their power and resources are always in the public eye and are 
generally taken very seriously. Hence, a state normally has nothing to prove in terms 
of its power and ability. The façade or illusion of power and influence that publicity 
provides is at least ostensibly of little avail to states. 
The element of publicity thus appears to apply somewhat differently to state and non-
state actors primarily due to the relative power positions of the two actors in the 
society.  Where states in general boast a fair amount of publicity simply because they 
are at the centre of an existing power hierarchy, non-state actors due to being on the 
fringes of this prevailing power structure usually enjoy no such privilege. 
It seems therefore that a state does not benefit from the most outstanding advantage 
terrorism offers (at least not in the manner a non-state actor does), as it does not need 
publicity to either exaggerate its ability or to draw attention to its actions out of fear 
that it may otherwise disappear from public consciousness. This is not to say that a 
state does not care for recognition and attention, but to point out that a state, by virtue 
of its nature and advantageous power position, already enjoys these privileges. 
Terrorism, with its fairly uncertain long-term prospects only really guarantees short-
term goals of recognition and attention and if states do not benefit from this because 
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their position in the society already grants these provisions, then there is no rational 
basis for them to opt for terrorism. Nevertheless, this seemingly convincing and 
straightforward assessment suffers from one obvious flaw. A state can only ever 
completely enjoy such provisions if it does not face any formidable challenge to its 
status and there is retention and continuation of uninterrupted status quo in its favor. 
The analysis above therefore does not take into consideration the fact that states may 
run the risk of losing their status or face or suspect such a challenge, in which case the 
privileges they enjoy can be seriously threatened or even undermined. 
It is true that as opposed to non-state actors, a state actor by virtue of being in charge 
of the power apparatus will always enjoy a certain degree of publicity and command 
some level of authority no matter how serious of a threat or challenge it faces. 
However, in the event its authority is challenged, especially in the form of popular 
dissent, the manner in which it normally enjoys its privileges may come under threat, 
prompting it to resort to unconventional means, including but not limited to terrorism, 
as this discussion shall demonstrate. 
When a state resorts to violence to quash a challenge to its authority, the prevailing 
view among many academics is that it would do so secretly and clandestinely, often 
disassociating itself from the violence in question (See e.g. Gibbs, 1989; Smith and 
Roberts, 2008). As discussed earlier, a state normally neither takes responsibility for 
its actions nor identifies its target audience, which gives the impression that states do 
not invoke the element of publicity at least not in the manner non-state actors do. It 
may indeed be the case that a state and non-state actor differ significantly when it 
comes to taking responsibility and categorically identifying their respective target 
audiences, but this does not necessarily mean that a state’s actions are completely 
devoid of publicity. 
It is not uncommon for a state to clearly identify and denounce its rivals, however, its 
failure to frequently declare open hostilities against them and take direct 
responsibility for its violent actions is what makes it particularly difficult to implicate 
states. The question to be asked here is why states would try to conceal their 
involvement and seemingly at least, evade publicity. The reason why states behave 
this way is mainly due to factors related to legality, legitimacy and international 
image, which have been discussed earlier. It will suffice to say here that states often 
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brazenly deny any responsibility because they do not want to provoke a reaction from 
other states in the form of international condemnation, sanctions or armed action. The 
international norms and regulations, in other words, compel states to distance 
themselves from their violence. 
While this may be true, a denial on state’s part does not repudiate its involvement 
entirely. A state may fail to take direct responsibility for its actions but there are ways 
in which it can be incriminated indirectly. For instance, given that a state is fairly 
vocal about its opponents and denounces them publically and if no other actor shares 
its hostile feelings nor takes responsibility for violence towards the target group then 
that leaves little doubt about its involvement. 
Similarly, the scale and nature of the violence especially in terms of the weapons used 
could sometimes also indirectly point towards the state. The 2013 Ghouta chemical 
attacks in Syria is a case in point. Although the Syrian regime actively denied any 
involvement- the nature of weapons, the manner in which they were used, and the 
target attacked, all pointed towards Syrian state’s involvement. Even though there is 
some disagreement, an overwhelming majority of scholars and a strong body of 
evidence, clearly incriminates the Assad regime (Blake and Mahmud, 2013: 248-249). 
What is important to realize here is that a failure to acknowledge does not completely 
absolve a state of its responsibility. Involvement of a state actor, in spite of its refusal 
is generally common knowledge and within the margins of reasonable doubt. 
Since a state’s proclamations due to international pressure often tend to be 
misleading, the various indirect ways in which it can be indicted cannot therefore be 
ignored. Even if a state does not denounce its opponents and also the weapons or 
means employed fail to establish its involvement, it still does not mean that a state is 
necessarily bereft of any responsibility. Other than the reasons discussed already, the 
victims or the intended target of violence offer some vital clues regarding the identity 
of the actor that can be particularly instructive. In fact, the recipients of state violence 
provide perhaps the strongest indication of state’s responsibility. 
Due to the international code of conduct that expects all state actors to behave in a 
certain way, a state’s refusal to take responsibility for its actions is primarily intended 
for the broader international community or outside observers, as it does not want to be 
penalized for any unlawful violation. Nevertheless, it should not face such qualms 
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when it comes to taking responsibility before its target audience, as its target due to an 
inferior power position cannot impose similar penalties on it. In other words, a state 
may not own its actions outwardly due to fear of international repercussions but 
inwardly an absence of such a reaction should at least in principle allow it to be far 
less wary. 
However, in the modern age of mass communication, such disclosure even to a select 
audience can prove to be fairly risky, as information especially such as this cannot be 
contained. For a state actor to divulge its identity to a target audience, it must 
therefore get some benefit that would outweigh the cost it will subsequently incur. 
Now the question is, what does a state stand to gain from revealing its responsibility 
to a select audience? 
Rationally speaking, it makes little sense for any political actor to engage in violence 
anonymously. For if the identity of the perpetrator were in doubt then the violence 
would simply appear pointless and devoid of any content. It is indeed hard to imagine 
that an anonymous message of any kind will be taken seriously let alone communicate 
anything meaningful. In the same way, it will be very difficult to make any sense of 
violence if a target audience does not know who is responsible for it and where it is 
coming from. Violence, if unattributed, would subsequently appear to be inapposite 
and even irrational, capable of accomplishing little beyond fear and confusion. 
It is perhaps fair to say that anonymity in violence can only lead to chaos, fear and 
disillusionment. Although it is true that sometimes the intention could well be to 
spread panic and fear alone, however, even in such cases the perpetrator would still 
want its target to know what or whom they should fear. Otherwise the target audience 
would never know what is expected of them and how and if they should behave any 
differently. 
In the context of violence, anonymity and rationality therefore appear to be somewhat 
incompatible. Given that political violence of any kind is generally believed to be a 
rational activity, we can see how anonymity will be a problem for any political actor. 
In fact, it can reasonably be concluded that since anonymous violence mostly tends to 
be irrational, it can never for that reason be political. In other words, it will be very 
odd to even call violence political if the identity of the actor is not known. 
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If rationality and anonymity are truly incompatible when it comes violence, then 
political violence as of necessity would demand some form of ascription. Driven 
largely by some political motives or ambitions, political violence is never completely 
devoid of content and substance. Short of genocide, political violence typically has 
some message to communicate to its target audience. This message will however be 
lost to an audience if the perpetrator opts for anonymity. Simply put, political 
violence cannot occur in a vacuum and a responsibility whether directly or indirectly 
must be attributed to some actor. 
Violence committed by a state actor to suppress any form of dissent or opposition is 
essentially political in nature. To say therefore that state violence tends to be 
anonymous is to suggest that it is irrational. Prevalent as they are, assertions such as 
these are wrong footed that must therefore be corrected. Admittedly, states frequently 
refuse to publically take responsibility for their actions due to external pressures and 
international norms of conduct. However, a refusal neither absolves a state of its 
responsibility nor does it suggest that a state cannot take credit for its violence in 
some indirect way. As long as states are rational actors and as long as they have some 
message to communicate, the violence they commit can never be completely 
anonymous. 
Hence, where the norms of international conduct would force a state to disavow its 
actions, there the logic of rationality would demand that the target audience is fully 
aware of its involvement. A state would therefore want the responsibility to be 
attributed to it in a manner that allows it to evade international scrutiny on the one 
hand and effectively communicate a message to its target on the other. Although it 
may seem difficult to achieve and maintain a contradictory and conflicting façade 
such as this, however, it is made possible by a state’s advantageous power position 
and the influence it can exercise over the medium of communication. 
With the ability to exert significant influence over mass media, states in effect, can 
control, change, or alter representation of events in their favor. This monopoly over 
means of communication allows states to communicate with multiple audiences 
simultaneously, thereby creating a narrative that serves their dual purpose of 
publically denying and surreptitiously acknowledging their own actions. This is of 
course not to suggest that the international community is incapable of seeing beyond 
	150 
the façade and is constantly fooled by the state’s narrative. After all, a perpetrating 
state’s control over media is usually restricted to its own territory or area of influence, 
whereas the global mass media, as we know, transcends all borders. Therefore, far 
from being deceived, the international community is for the most part aware of a 
state’s involvement. 
This raises the question that if the international community is able to see past the 
deception, then why would a perpetrating state even bother to contrive such elaborate 
narratives? Here it is worth remembering that the international community normally 
recognizes only state actors as the officially designated representative of a country. In 
order to implicate any one of them, the norms of international conduct would typically 
require either first-hand evidence or a formal acknowledgement by the concerned 
actor. Otherwise, an actor’s involvement will become a matter of speculation and 
guesswork, which according to international rules is simply not enough ground to 
implicate a state actor. In other words, whenever the involvement of a state actor is 
even slightly questionable, the international community will be forced to grant it the 
benefit of doubt. 
If speculation and intelligent guesses are not enough to implicate states, then in 
principle, a perpetrating state can get away without any penalty as long as its 
involvement remains ambiguous. This means that a state fearing international 
repercussions does not have to conceal its actions entirely, but instead just create 
reasonable doubt and uncertainty regarding its involvement. A state, therefore, need 
only publically deny any involvement and cover its tracks so as to not leave any direct 
trail of evidence. 
Such public denial and an absence of direct trail ensures that a state is not persecuted 
or penalized for its actions. It does not, however, mean that a state cannot be 
indirectly indicted or held responsible. The ambiguity, in fact, manages to leave 
significant room for a responsibility to be affixed to a state actor indirectly. It is this 
indirect indictment that undercuts not only the façade of anonymity but also shows 
how a target audience is made aware of state’s responsibility. Thus, the narratives 
fashioned by the state are not there to completely absolve it of all responsibility but 
instead to create just enough doubt and suspicion to prevent the international 
community from taking any action against it. Given that a perpetrating state can only 
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communicate a message to its audience if the latter is aware of its involvement, we 
can also see how the ambiguity surrounding a state’s responsibility plays to its 
advantage. 
It is important to point out in the end that where the international system puts limits 
on state’s conduct and expects every state to pay for transgression of its privileges, 
there it is also bound by its principle of non-intervention and every state’s right to use 
violence within its own territory. This provision seriously hampers the ability of any 
outside actor to intervene in the internal affairs of another country. Subsequently, it 
limits the options of international community to mere condemnation or sanctions, 
which the perpetrating state may view as an acceptable price to pay for retaining the 
status quo in its favour. 
Simply put, the international community, more often than not, is incapacitated by its 
own norms and practices. Understandably therefore attributing violence to states at 
the international stage will continue to demand an official and formal 
acknowledgement on part of the perpetrating state, at least for the foreseeable future. 
However, where an official sanction is necessary to satisfy states and other legal 
entities, no such pre-conditions should apply to the academic community. 
Unrestricted by such imperatives, scholars should therefore try to objectively 
determine the involvement of state actors irrespective of their contrary claims. 
It is important to also note that states do not necessarily gainsay violence and their 
involvement is also not necessarily intended to be clandestine. In fact, a state often 
openly declares hostilities against its opponents and takes responsibility for its violent 
actions. It then sets out to legitimize and justify its actions usually through an 
elaborate and extensive publicity campaign. The opponents are mostly made out to be 
irrational and dangerous actors that threaten not only the state but also the very fabric 
of the society. And the state takes it upon itself to eradicate and root out this threat 
entirely. Thus, states do not always pursue their rivals clandestinely and often take 
direct responsibility for their actions, much like non-state actors. 
Hence, the popular belief that state violence against its citizenry mostly tends to be 
clandestine is clearly therefore a superficial assumption that takes a state’s denial at 
face value and fails to account for not only its indirect involvement but also how the 
target audience perceives a threat and the actor responsible for it. To say that states 
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are different from non-state actors because they never take responsibility for their 
actions is therefore a misplaced assumption. It is perhaps true that non-state actors 
claim responsibility for their actions almost without fail, whereas states tend to be far 
more discreet and guarded in accepting responsibility. The difference between the two 
however is of degree not kind. 
 
*** 
We know that terrorism, assisted by publicity, is mostly effective in only its short-
term pursuits. What terrorism promises to deliver through publicity is the object of 
recognition and attention. This means that if an actor is reluctant to claim 
responsibility for its actions then terrorism will fail to perform its most effective 
function. Although it is true that by virtue of its nature violence of any kind is 
generally capable of drawing attention. However, drawing attention alone proves to 
be both ineffective and unsustainable in the long run as violence without attribution 
gradually edges towards irrationality. Moreover, violence that lacks recognition also 
fails to yield any publicity. This is because publicity itself is defined in terms of 
drawing attention of an audience and providing recognition of some sort. 
Attribution of violence is therefore extremely important insofar as publicity is 
concerned. Questions were raised earlier whether state actors can generate publicity 
given that they tend to distance themselves from their violence. However, if 
responsibility, in one way or another, can be attributed to states (as this discussion has 
shown) then in principle their violent actions should also be able to generate publicity. 
Yet being able to generate publicity is not enough reason to resort to it, as a state must 
also stand to benefit from it. We already know that non-state actors benefit 
significantly from the publicity that terrorism offers. The question to be asked is: do 
state actors benefit from terrorist publicity just as non-state actors do? 
As discussed already, a state owing to its privileged power position seemingly does 
not benefit from the advantage terrorism offers through publicity. Where publicity 
often provides a lifeline to various non-state actors in terms of recognition and 
attention, there a state typically enjoys these provisions simply by virtue of its relative 
power position in the society. Moreover, terrorist publicity appears to benefit only 
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weak non-state actors looking for a cost-effective violent alternative that conceals 
their weakness and provides them with a disproportionate social and political 
leverage. Due to their weak position especially in relation to states, non-state actors 
tend to rely on terrorist publicity to greatly exaggerate their ability and potential 
through creating an illusion of strength and power. Since a state actor normally 
possesses vast resources and has a range of violent alternatives at its disposal, 
therefore far from exaggerating, it normally does not even need to prove anything in 
terms of its power or ability. It appears therefore that a state would not benefit from 
employing terrorism. 
With regard to state’s innate ability to exercise publicity, it was concluded earlier that 
a state could only fully enjoy this provision if there is retention of status quo in its 
favor. If the status quo is compromised, then the manner in which a state exercises its 
privileges could be seriously undermined. This of course does not mean that a state 
will lose its privileges altogether, for as long as it is state, it will continue to exercise 
publicity and other provisions in one way or another. Nevertheless, a challenge or a 
threat to the status quo even if it is only perceived could prompt a state to utilize 
terrorism and benefit from it- often surprisingly in the same way as non-state actors. 
It is indeed hard to imagine that a state could ever benefit from terrorism in the same 
manner as non-state actors. A state clearly enjoys an advantage in terms of power 
over both its subjects and any non-state competitors. In addition to this obvious 
advantage, its target audience is largely aware of its ability and potential as its 
capabilities are very real and tangible, which means that a state does not need an 
illusion of power and strength that terrorist publicity provides. While this may be true 
in ordinary circumstances, when faced with a challenge, whether real or imagined, a 
state may need more than just a physical display of its abilities. 
Due to the tangible nature of its capabilities which are clearly visible to any and all 
audiences, it is perhaps reasonable to assume that there is no real need for a state to 
demonstrate its abilities even in times of crisis. However, even though a state’s 
capability is fairly evident, its intent to use it is certainly not. In other words, where 
states may not need to exhibit their capabilities, there they may still be required to 
demonstrate their willingness to use this ability. This is because a multitude of 
reasons, ranging from international norms or pressure to some likely backlash from 
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within, could potentially hold a state back from using its capabilities. Since state’s 
competitors and target audience are aware of these limitations, a credible 
demonstration of intent on part of the state can sometimes therefore be necessary. 
The assumption that non-state actors as of necessity must demonstrate their ability 
while state actors need not, is therefore, somewhat superficial. It only considers the 
visible abilities of the two actors and does not take into account the intangible 
limitations that may prevent a state actor from utilizing its capabilities. Just as non-
state actor’s ability is not evident, a state’s willingness to use its ability is also not 
evident. In order to benefit from terrorist publicity, where a non-state actor must 
demonstrate its ability, there a state must demonstrate its intentions to use its ability. 
The two actors are for that reason not very dissimilar in terms of publicizing their 
respective abilities. Both essentially aim to communicate a credible threat to their 
target audiences usually through a physical demonstration of their respective ability 
and intent. 
Although this comparison goes on to show that state and non-state actors are not very 
different in terms of showing off or displaying their abilities, it does not in anyway 
suggest that a state also needs to exaggerate or overstate its ability. It is indeed true 
that unlike non-state actors, a large number of states do not need to create an illusion 
of power and strength. This does not however mean that they still cannot benefit from 
the exaggeration that terrorist publicity provides. Exaggeration being an important 
facet of publicity52 comes in all shapes and sizes and should therefore not be 
associated with illusion of power and strength alone. 
Since a resort to terrorism is essentially due to its cost-effectiveness, exaggerations as 
opposed to actual costly actions are understandably a logical substitute. As we know, 
the primary reason why terrorism is cost-effective is because it need only create a 
psychological impact through some credible threat. Indeed, if an actor can manage to 
inflict considerable psychological impact with as little as threat, then there is no need 
to employ or risk precious resources even if one has them in abundance. 
Now given that this threat must be convincing enough to be able to replace tangible 
costs, it needs to first and foremost conceal all visible weaknesses of the perpetrating 
                                                
52 Publicity, be it of any kind, typically incorporates some form of exaggeration. 
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actor. Otherwise, the actor will not be taken seriously and the credibility of its threat 
will be seriously compromised. Concealing a weakness or simply lying about one’s 
capability naturally involves a fair amount of overplay and exaggeration and is simply 
not possible without it. 
Substituting resources with credible threats therefore often requires a fair dose of 
exaggeration. Both state and non-state actors have some obvious shortcomings, which 
if unchecked would play to their disadvantage and undermine the intensity and 
efficacy of their otherwise credible threat. It becomes somewhat necessary for them to 
exaggerate some aspects of their capability so as to effectively mask their respective 
weaknesses. Thus where a non-state actor must accentuate its ability, there a state 
actor will have to exaggerate its willingness to use its ability. 
This does not however mean that state and non-state actors come with their own 
respective set of exaggerations. On the contrary, there is in fact significant overlap 
and both actors often tend to exaggerate in the same way. For instance, the frequent 
terrorist exaggerations regarding the consequences that would ensue if a target 
audience fails to comply with the demands of the perpetrator are largely actor neutral 
and can equally be employed by both state and non-state actors. 
It may appear as if most terrorist exaggerations, in one way or another, correspond to 
the respective abilities of the actors, yet however this is not necessarily the case 
always. An important dimension of terrorist publicity is to demonize and discredit 
one’s opponents. It is fairly common for terrorist actors to be overly critical of their 
opponents and exaggerate their actions. Although the list of such exaggerated 
criticisms can be long and tedious, it will suffice to say here that they have little, if at 
all anything, to do with the ability of the criticizing actor. 
Exaggerations are multifaceted that extend beyond the abilities of the actor and cover 
all aspects of terrorist violence. They are actor neutral and cannot be associated with 
non-state actors only. A state’s exaggeration of its material and personnel ability can 
therefore never be ruled out of hand. It could also utilize terrorist publicity to create 




So far throughout this discussion it has been pointed out that a state does not need 
such an illusion as it enjoys a clear and fairly visible control over vast resources. This, 
much like other privileges enjoyed by a state, however only holds true as long as a 
status quo favoring the state is in place. A challenge or a threat to the status quo could 
potentially trigger a significant loss of power and authority, which could seriously 
undermine the trust and confidence in a state’s ability. 
A state’s control over the power apparatus and the privileges it enjoys thereof, are in 
large part due to its abilities that are acknowledged and respected by its subjects. 
Consequently, in the event there is a challenge to a state’s authority, it will be 
required to demonstrate its ability to its subjects to show that it still has the necessary 
power to demand their loyalty and command authority over them. Under such 
circumstances, the notion that a state has nothing to prove in terms of its ability 
becomes highly questionable. 
A demonstration of ability would normally depend upon the severity of the challenge 
to the status quo. This means the greater the challenge the greater will there be a need 
for a state to demonstrate its ability and vice versa. Thus, while small and trivial 
challenges can be ignored, greater and serious challenges will require a corresponding 
level of demonstrative response. This is necessary to not only offset the opposition but 
also to reassert a state’s authority over its subjects, which can become uncertain if 
seriously challenged. 
The problem for some states, however, is that showing off abilities especially in the 
wake of some formidable challenge is not always a straightforward affair, as a state 
simply may not have the necessary ability to do so. This is especially true for states 
that are weak and can be easily offset by a challenge. Faced with the seemingly 
impossible task of demonstrating some non-existent ability, states will be hard-
pressed to look for some inexpensive cover up that bypasses the need for actual or 
physical demonstration of power. 
Terrorism, with all its benefits outlined so far, clearly provide states with just such a 
cover up. Through publicity, terrorism offers a cost-effective substitute that not only 
allows an actor to punch above its weight with minimum effort and resources but also 
manages to conceal its weaknesses. The terrorist publicity, in effect, enables a state to 
compensate its inability with exaggerated rhetoric, propaganda and threats, thereby 
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creating a façade of power and strength. Hence, the illusion of strength and power that 
grants a disproportionate social and political advantage to non-state actors provides 
similar benefits to weak states that lack sufficient resources and struggle to keep the 
status quo in their favor. The dictatorial regime of Gaddafi in Libya is an important 
case in point. 
In early 2011, just as the Arab spring gained momentum in the broader Middle East, 
the Libyan state under Gaddafi faced a formidable challenge in the form of popular 
uprising. With the relatively peaceful fall of the dictatorial regimes in Tunisia and 
Egypt and strong international support for a democratic transition in the Middle East, 
dissent against Gaddafi (both internally and internationally) started growing at a 
phenomenal rate (Chorin, 2012: 191). Denouncing not only the uprising but also the 
international support for it, the Gaddafi regime soon embarked on a brutal crackdown 
of all opposition and dissent. Ultimately, what started as a peaceful revolution soon 
turned into a violent armed struggle with both sides refusing to give in (Cronogue, 
2013: 137). 
Fearing a human catastrophe as the Libyan state’s onslaught against its citizens 
intensified, the international community led by US, Britain and France, responded by 
targeting the military capability of the state (Garwood-Gowers, 594: 2013). With both 
its citizens and the international community in strict opposition, the military and 
personnel ability of the state rapidly declined. Feeling cornered and isolated, the 
Gaddafi regime was soon fighting for survival as it desperately tried to cling on to 
power and keep the status quo in its favor. In the face of serious internal and external 
challenges, the state’s ability to govern the country was becoming increasingly 
questionable. 
In order to regain the respect and confidence of its citizenry and also justify its hold 
over the power apparatus, the regime had little choice but to demonstrate its ability. 
However, crumbling under the weight of international sanctions, air strikes and a 
powerful internal rebellion, the state’s physical ability had largely been compromised. 
Yet defiant and unrelenting, the Libyan state sought alternate means to work around 
its handicap. 
The Gaddafi regime, in spite of all its weaknesses, still maintained de facto control 
over the state and the power apparatus, which not only gave it control over the state 
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media but as its proclamations and edicts carried an official sanction, it also enjoyed 
an easy and direct access to all major media outlets across the globe. This unrestricted 
access to media enabled the state to rebuff all counterclaims that the regime was 
losing the support of general public and had greatly been weakened by the rebellion. 
Instead, the state used media to publicize and propagate its own version of events and 
reality. It presented the uprising as insignificant and peripheral that did not represent 
the popular sentiments and urged both its own populace and the international 
community to reject it completely. During the revolution, Gaddafi infamously referred 
to the rebels as mere rats and cockroaches that presented no real challenge to the state 
and vowed to destroy them all (Cronogue, 2013: 138). 
By downplaying the threat posed by the uprising, the regime at the same time also 
dismissed its ability to challenge the state in any meaningful way. In addition to 
making light of the rebellion, the regime was also careful not to show any weakness 
or wavering in its own ability and resolve to deal with the crisis. It utilized publicity 
to not only trivialize the rebellion but also greatly exaggerate and even lie about its 
own ability and support base. Through use of propaganda, rhetoric, and violence, the 
Gaddafi regime attempted to create an illusion of power and strength to compensate 
for its lost ability and credibility. 
All such undertakings eventually proved to be unsuccessful as the rebels assisted by 
coalition air strikes and weaponry, soon made serious headway right into the heart of 
regime stronghold until the state was eventually defeated and a new status quo 
emerged in its place. Although the state’s use of illusion and exaggeration in this 
particular instance proved to be largely unsuccessful, it does not mean that this is 
always the case necessarily. There are numerous other instances where it actually 
proved to be fairly effective. For instance, amid constant regional and international 
challenges, Saddam Husain’s regime successfully managed to create and project an 
illusion of power and strength to not only its subjects but also the wider global 
audience for several decades. It was not until Saddam was defeated that the façade of 
his propaganda and rhetoric was finally uncovered. 
Ultimately, whether or not terrorism was utilized by the Gaddafi or Saddam regime is 
beside the point here. The purpose of these examples was just to show that a state 
could easily find itself in a position where it could benefit from the illusion of power 
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and strength that terrorist publicity readily provides. And as long as a state can find 
itself in a position where it must exaggerate and overstate its ability to retain a lost or 
challenged status quo, it stands to benefit from terrorist publicity in precisely the same 
manner as non-state actors. 
 
*** 
Over the course of this discussion it has been shown that a state’s violent actions, 
even when it claims otherwise, are never completely devoid of responsibility and that 
a state can benefit significantly from terrorist publicity whenever the status quo in its 
favor is challenged. In light of these observations, the discussion has sought to 
challenge the assertion that only non-state actors have a theatrical dimension to their 
violence. For if states take responsibility for their actions and also stand to benefit 
from the recognition and attention that terrorist publicity provides then the theatrical 
attribute of terrorism is equally applicable to them as well. However, where this 
analysis shows that both state and non-state actors benefit from terrorist publicity and 
subsequently have a theatrical dimension to their violence, there it also gestures 
towards an important difference between the two. 
Terrorism as we know mainly offers only limited or partial success and is far less 
enduring in its long-term pursuits. Sole reliance on terrorism alone can therefore 
inadvertently render some conflicts purely symbolic as an unrealistic desire for total 
victory is slowly replaced with the only realizable objectives of recognition and 
attention. This means that an unrelenting actor with no real prospects of winning is 
gradually consumed by the short-term benefits it is guaranteed through terrorism. 
While it is true that terrorism offers the same incentives to both state and non-state 
actors, it is only the latter’s terrorism that can turn symbolic. There are three factors in 
particular that help establish the accuracy of this claim. 
Firstly, as terrorism is fundamentally political, the ultimate objective of all practicing 
actors therefore ranges from control, share, or some form of sway over the power 
apparatus. It is only when an actor completely fails to achieve any of these substantial 
objectives and loses all its power privileges that it tends to get consumed by the 
superficial short-term benefits that terrorism offers. Given that only non-state actors 
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can completely fail to achieve their objectives and lose all power privileges (if they 
had any), only their violence can therefore potentially turn symbolic. This is not to say 
that a state can never fail entirely or lose all its power privileges. Instead, it merely 
gestures towards the nature of the state, which by definition must enjoy certain basic 
privileges and command some form of control over the power apparatus. For if a state 
fails entirely and loses all its power privileges, then it also ceases to be a state. Iraq 
under Saddam Hussein and Libya under Gaddafi are important examples in this 
regard. 
Secondly, an actor would exclusively rely on terrorism only if it has no other violent 
alternatives available. Since it is the non-state actors that often lack violent 
alternatives, therefore only they can be forced to rely on terrorism alone. Sole reliance 
coupled with a failure to achieve primary objectives, often in the long run transforms 
the nature of the conflict to serve only the ends that terrorism furnishes, which 
subsequently reduces the non-state struggle to a mere symbolic conflict capable of 
accomplishing little more than terrorist violence. 
States on the other hand, never have to rely on terrorism entirely. With a range of 
violent alternatives at their disposal, they can simply choose a form of violence that 
best suits their needs, as alternating between different forms violence optimizes their 
chances of achieving their ultimate objective. In other words, states can employ 
terrorism when it can best take advantage of its benefits and switch to other forms of 
violence when it falls short. The conflict therefore can never turn symbolic, as a state 
will always have other means to resort to. 
Thirdly, from a strictly utilitarian standpoint, many non-state actors (due to being on 
the fringes of power hierarchy) rely on terrorism to provide them with attention and 
recognition, without which they may not even be able to register otherwise. Many of 
them will therefore persist with terrorism even if they ultimately realize the futility of 
such an undertaking in the long run. In fact, for some non-state actors, mere 
recognition and attention for either their cause or group can become their raison d'être 
and something worth fighting for. And as long as terrorism obliges, they have no 
reason to veer off course. This is especially true of some ideologue groups that are 
passionate about their cause. The revolutionary left-wing 17N organization in Greece 
is a case in point. 
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In comparison, a state does not need terrorism to make its presence known and its 
objectives are also never reduced to mere recognition and attention. This is not only 
due to the fact that a state normally enjoys these provisions by virtue of its 
advantageous power position in the society (although it may still utilize terrorism to 
further accentuate these privileges), but because as soon as it loses all its privileges, it 
immediately also ceases to be a state. Thus, having control or share in the power 
apparatus means that a state will always have much broader and wide-ranging 
concerns and irrespective of how much loses it suffers, its objectives will never be 
reduced to just recognition and attention. 
Terrorism can therefore only turn symbolic when an actor with no real stake in the 
power apparatus loses all prospects of achieving its ultimate objective and is gradually 
consumed by the benefits that terrorism offers. This distinction is certainly significant 
as it is in all likelihood the only qualitative difference between state and non-state use 
of terrorism. However, it does not undermine the theatrical attribute or for that matter 
any other essential characteristic of terrorism. And for that reason it is largely 
inconsequential insofar as the conduct and understanding of terrorism as an 
independent activity is concerned. 
In conclusion, this chapter has clearly shown that the theatrical attribute is largely 
independent of the actor and is applicable to both state and non-state actors alike. In 
doing so, it has not only challenged an important basis for treating terrorism as a non-
state activity but has also shed light on some key facets of terrorism that subsequently 
emerged as the theatrical attribute was scrutinized. In particular, it drew attention to 
the benefits terrorism offers through carefully explaining its appeal and utility. 
The analysis therefore has led to an easy and straightforward answer to the question of 
whether the theatrical attribute is indispensible to terrorism. If the theatrical attribute 
is the most outstanding and distinguishing characteristic of terrorism that not only 
embodies its benefits but also explains an actor’s resort to it, then its exclusion from 
any conceptualization and definitional development is simply unacceptable. The 
theatrical attribute (or at least what it entails) is an indispensible characteristic of 
terrorism and it must therefore be incorporated into the formal understanding of the 
term. 
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 5. Terrorism: Tactic, Strategy or ideology? 
 
The declaration of war on terrorism following the September 11 attacks in 2001 has 
raised serious normative and semantic challenges over the years. Stephen Biddle 
argues that terrorism is just a tactic and not the real enemy in the war against terrorism 
(2002: 8). Nora Besahel points out that ‘terrorism cannot be “defeated” because it is a 
tactic and not an enemy’ (2006:35). Pape concludes that terrorism is just a tactic that 
will always exist (2006: 238). Michael Innes criticizes the futility of waging a war on 
a tactic (2008:265). Crenshaw promptly asked how the United States could go to a 
war against a ‘method of violence’ (2011: 2). 
Treating terrorism as a method, tactic, or strategy is certainly not unusual, yet what 
academics mean when they make such claims remains fairly unclear. A tactical 
understanding of terrorism raises questions over its strategic utility, whereas a 
strategic conceptualization of terrorism challenges its ideological understanding and 
vice versa. This chapter will analyze this problem in detail and discern the various 
patterns of such usages in the academic discourse. 
Understandably, scholars with diverse political and cultural backgrounds study 
terrorism across a range of different disciplines and therefore expecting consistency 
regarding terms like tactics and strategy is indeed a far cry. However, given the 
theoretical and conceptual stalemate and the fervent academic insistence that 
terrorism must be treated as a tactic or strategy, inconsistencies in the matter can 
hardly be excused. 
Formal theorizing in this area can also particularly be helpful in resolving another 
fundamentally contentious issue over how to label an actor terrorist. Most academics 
regard the issue of labelling an actor terrorist as nothing more than a mere rhetorical 
façade utilized to delegitimize and demonize a political opponent. The debate over 
classifying someone as a terrorist, therefore, often hinges over political and moral 
considerations prompting many scholars to avoid the label terrorist altogether. 
However, as this chapter will demonstrate this need not be so. Keeping moral and 
political considerations aside, there is a scholarly way to resolve this dilemma. 
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In the academic discourse it is often very difficult to separate these three positions, 
especially because there is significant overlap between the terms ‘tactic’ and 
‘strategy’ with the two often used interchangeably or even as synonyms. For clarity 
and formal theorizing, it is important therefore to first discuss all three separately. 
 
Terrorism as a tactic 
Almost four decades ago Brian Jenkins suggested that terrorism should primarily be 
seen as a tactic (1975). Many other academics since then have made similar 
assertions. Carr cogently stated of terrorism that ‘whatever one thinks of the tactic, it 
is a tactic’ (2007: 47). Weinberg and Eubank argue that terrorism should be treated as 
a tactic that can be employed by anyone (2008: 186). In The End of Terrorism 
Weinberg forcefully asserts that ‘We sometimes forget that terrorism is a tactic that 
may be used by groups of varying sizes and different ambitions’ (2012: 75). Jones and 
Smith likewise believe that terrorism is ‘merely a tactic that can be employed by any 
social actor’ (2009: 300). Alex Schmid in his most recent definition of terrorism notes 
that terrorism is a special form of tactic (2011: 86). 
The question however is, what exactly do we mean when we say that terrorism is a 
tactic? Does it entail a separate and unique set of methods that sets terrorism apart or 
is there more to it than meets the eye? For Jenkins the tactical nature of terrorism can 
best be captured by the ‘nature of the act’ (1980: 2). This nature of the act has varying 
and different understanding in the academic community. 
The Merriam-Webster dictionary53 defines a tactic as ‘an action or method that is 
planned and used to achieve a particular goal’.54 If we were to follow this standard 
dictionary definition then terrorism as a tactic would be understood as a specific 
method or action geared towards achieving a certain goal. In academic understanding, 
this specific goal-oriented action can be said to incorporate two senses- instrument 
and effect. 
                                                
53 I find the dictionary definition a good starting point, given the dearth of understanding on the terms 
under discussion. 
54 Available at: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tactic. Accessed on 16-02-2015. 
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The instrumental understanding of terrorism as a tactic further incorporates two 
elements- method and manner. In terms of practical method utilized, terrorism is said 
to include a range of different activities such as bombing, shooting, hijacking, 
kidnapping, assassination etc. The manner includes the way in which these methods 
are carried out such as concealment, surprise, deception, secrecy, stealth, conspiracy 
and so on (See e.g. Gibbs, 1989; Crenshaw, 2011). Although both the method and 
manner appear to incorporate a range of diverse activities, yet the element of method 
can accurately be captured by the term ‘violence’ or the threat of it. Manner, on the 
other hand, can be encapsulated by the word ‘clandestine’. Given that terrorism is first 
and foremost political, the instrumental view of tactical terrorism can be explained as 
‘clandestine political violence’. 
The radical theorist Carlos Marighella was an advocate of this purely instrumental 
view. For him terrorism can simply be exercised ‘by throwing a bomb which harms 
the enemy’ (Thorup, 2008: 237). Mark Sedgwick describes Rapoport’s  ‘four waves 
of terrorism’ in an instrumental sense by pointing out that ‘the first wave was 
distinguished by assassination, the second wave by military targeting, and the third 
wave by hostage taking. The current, fourth wave is distinguished by suicide 
bombing’ (2004: 796). Although Sedgwick’s deduction is certainly an 
overgeneralization, it does however, convey and capture the essence of a purely 
instrumental view of terrorism. 
Now the question is how useful does the academic community find this instrumental 
approach. Not surprisingly, many academics object to a strictly instrumental view of 
terrorism. English is critical of this view and points out that such methods and the 
manner in which they are conducted can be found in other forms of violence, such as 
guerrilla warfare and insurgency as well, a dilemma he refers to as the problem of 
‘related phenomenon’ (2009: 12). A strictly instrumental view therefore is not very 
helpful in distinguishing terrorism from other forms of violence. 
The second sense of the tactical understanding ‘effect’ aims to address the ‘related 
phenomenon problem’ by focusing on the immediate outcome and consequence of the 
instrumental sense. Hence, instead of focusing on the specific method used and the 
manner in which it is conducted, the second sense of the tactical position looks at the 
effect of terrorist actions. 
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Different academics point to different effects that a terrorist tactic produces. The most 
commonly emphasized among them are fear, shock, and intimidation.55 All these 
effects are drawn from the word ‘terror’ in the term terrorism and are in essence 
psychological. Arthur Garrison, for instance, points out that ‘Terrorism is a tool to 
cause change through the infliction of fear. The use of terrorism as a method to 
achieve results remains constant regardless of the desired result’ (2004: 272). 
Kruglanski and Fishman, likewise, conclude that terrorism is essentially a tool and a 
‘fear-inducing tactic for the advancement of one’s objectives’ (2006: 211). This fear-
inducing element can be regarded as the effect of the terrorist tactic.56 
At a tactical level then it can roughly be concluded that terrorism is an instrument 
with effect: fear-inducing clandestine political violence. Although the manner in 
which tactical terrorism is conducted is usually clandestine, there can be instances 
where it is clearly not (as I shall explain later). For a universally applicable 
classification, it will be better therefore to leave out the clandestine attribute. Thus, a 
terrorist tactic is simply fear inducing political violence. 
There are of course a number of scholars that will contest this tactical categorization 
of terrorism as it is often argued that terrorism does not necessarily induce fear (See 
e.g. Coady, 2004: 6). Nevertheless, such criticism is generally directed not so much at 
terrorism failing to generate fear but more so towards other forms violence doing the 
same. As English, points out that ‘terror’ in itself is not a defining characteristic of 
terrorism as it can also be observed in conventional wars (English, 2009: 6). 
Categorizing a terrorist tactic simply as fear inducing political violence can therefore 
be troublesome as all forms of violence can inflict fear. However, the two senses of 
tactical terrorism, instrument and effect, when taken together, also suggest that 
terrorism is purposeful violence and not violence for violence’s sake. The actors want 
to create an effect for which they rationally and purposefully decide to use the 
instrument of violent intimidation. The effect of this instrumental violence is 
psychological and since it is purposeful, it is intended to alter the behavior of a target 
audience is some way. This instrument with effect in other words is utilized to 
‘coerce’ an opponent. 
                                                
55 See e.g. the definitions proposed by Bruce Hoffman (2006) and Alex Schmid (2011). 
56 For a detailed account of the characteristic of fear, please refer to Chapter 1. 
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The tactic of terrorism can therefore be summed up as fear inducing coercive political 
violence. It must also be pointed out here that this tactical categorization of terrorism 
does not specify the perpetrator and is therefore actor neutral. I will also argue that at 
a tactical level, generating fear is the deliberate intention of the actor, a point that will 
be explained in the discussion at the end. 
 
Terrorism as a strategy 
Like the tactical element, numerous scholars also highlight the strategic dimension of 
terrorism (See e.g. Devine and Rafalko, 1982; Gibbs, 1989; Claridge, 1999; Tilly, 
2004; Silke, 2006). Despite this however, terrorism as a strategy is poorly understood 
and remains largely under-theorized. Although there have been few praiseworthy 
efforts to conceptualize terrorism as such but almost all such efforts have failed to 
distinguish between terrorist tactics and strategy. 
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines strategy as ‘a careful plan or method for 
achieving a particular goal usually over a long period of time’.57 Terrorism as a 
strategy can accordingly be interpreted as a careful long-term design to achieve a 
particular goal. As at the tactical level, it is important to acknowledge any strategic 
understanding of terrorism first and foremost in political terms. In the academic 
language, this careful long-term design can be said to incorporate two elements- 
operation and communication. 
The operational level broadly refers to the conduct of terrorist activity. In the 
operational sense, terrorism can be seen as a long-term asymmetrical form of warfare. 
Silke believes that only those who see terrorism as a form of warfare have a complete 
and comprehensive view of what it really is (1996: 13). English likewise argues that 
that ‘it is perhaps as a subspecies of warfare that terrorism is best understood’ (2009: 
23). Several other leading scholars in the field like Clutterbuck (1977) and Schmid 
(2011) also endorse this position. Everett Wheeler’s work in this vein is particularly 
noteworthy. 
                                                
57 Available at: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/strategy. Accessed on 17/02/2015. 
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Wheeler places terrorism ‘within the larger framework of universal history, in hope of 
shedding new light on terrorism’s conceptual origins and theoretical debts’ (1991: 7). 
She views terrorism as a primitive form of warfare that derives from the ‘Graeco-
Roman military doctrine of stratagem’ (p. 6). This doctrine of Stratagem is describes 
as, ‘Reliance on surprise, ambush, hit-and-run tactics, trickery, and avoidance of open 
pitched battle’ that are ‘the hallmarks of primitive warfare, which some primitives 
continued to use in conflicts against more advanced societies, and which weaker 
forces have often exploited against numerically or technologically superior foes’ (p. 
18). Seen as a form of warfare, terrorism tends to have a close relationship with 
guerrilla warfare. As Wheeler explains that terrorism should be seen as a conceptual 
offshoot of guerrilla warfare, with which it continues to enjoy a fluid relationship (p. 
16-19). 
The relationship observed between terrorism and guerrilla warfare is particularly 
intriguing especially at the operational level of analysis, as both guerrillas and 
terrorists tend not only to share an operational inventory but also draw from an 
overlapping conceptual and theoretical framework. Merari’s work in this regard is of 
significant importance. Although he admits that it is very difficult to completely 
isolate terrorism from guerrilla warfare, his classification and categorization is still 
very helpful in furthering our operational understanding of terrorism. 
Merari treats both terrorism and guerrilla warfare as strategies of insurgency, where 
the insurgents can opt for any of the two depending on their circumstances. The 
insurgents are fully aware of their inferiority to the opposition and view terrorism as a 
form of protracted struggle ‘designed to wear out the adversary’ (1993: 236). 
Merari believes that a terrorist ‘lacks the material element of guerrilla’ and does not 
have physical control of a territory. ‘The need to dominate a territory is a key element 
in insurgent guerrilla strategy… terrorist strategy does not vie for a tangible control of 
territory’ (p. 225). He further points out that guerrillas as opposed to terrorists operate 
in relatively larger groups or platoons. The actions of guerrillas are considered 
somewhat similar to that of a regular army with ‘ordinary military-type arms, such as 
rifles, machine-guns, mortars and even artillery’ whereas the ‘typical terrorist 
weapons include home-made bombs, car bombs and sophisticated barometric 
pressure-operated devices, designed to explode on board airliners in mid-air’ (p. 226). 
Thus the guerrillas because of their greater numbers, material superiority and control 
over territory often freely carry arms and even wear uniforms (See e.g. Guelke, 2009; 
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Hoffman, 2006). The terrorists on the other hand, due to their relatively weaker 
strength, avoid direct military confrontation with the enemy. Instead they usually 
blend in with the civilian population and engage clandestinely in a protracted struggle 
against a much stronger enemy. It is this protracted clandestine nature of their 
operation that underscores their operational strategy. 
Wheeler’s doctrine of stratagem with an operational inventory of surprise, ambush, 
hit-and-run, trickery, avoidance of direct confrontation- in short, a strategy of 
exhaustion (as she eloquently put it) in combination with Merari’s strategy of 
protracted clandestine asymmetrical struggle (numerically inferior, covert mode of 
operation, lack of territory) captures the essence of the operational logic of terrorist 
strategy. 
The other element of the terrorist strategy, ‘communication’, mainly captures the 
consequential dimension of the operational view. The communicative logic of 
terrorism has already been outlined in the previous chapter. It will suffice to say here 
that the terrorist communication strategy operates at a psychological level where it 
primarily intends to generate a message for a certain target audience. The message is 
intended to not only communicate some demands or grievances but also a future 
threat of harm. It is thus primarily intended to alter the behavior of the target audience 
in some manner by influencing them psychologically. 
Both Wheeler and Merari emphasize this psychological ingredient while 
conceptualizing their otherwise operational understanding of terrorism. Wheeler 
believes that terrorism is a ‘strategy of psychological warfare’ and it is this 
psychological component that in combination with other factors leads to a strategy of 
exhaustion (1993: 11). Merari, likewise, points out that although all forms of violence 
have a significant psychological impact- for terrorism, however, it is the most 
essential and distinguishing feature (1993: 233). ‘As a strategy’ Merari argues, 
‘terrorism remains in the domain of psychological influence and lacks the material 
elements of guerrilla’ (p. 225). This psychological impact in combination with its 
clandestine operation is mainly intended to coerce an intended audience. 
The operational view by itself is analytically unsustainable and does not adequately 
explain the terrorist strategy. It is only in combination with the communication factor 
that we get a full picture of the strategy that is terrorism. This operation 
communication design (the essence of terrorist strategy) can also be expressed by a 
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phrase that has been popular within the terrorism discourse since its inception, 
namely, ‘propaganda by deed’. The phrase propaganda by deed has two key words, 
‘propaganda’ and ‘deed’ and I shall explain how this phrase captures the logic of 
terrorist strategy. 
Paul Brousse, a French anarchist is widely credited with first using the phrase 
‘propaganda by deed’ (Jensen, 2004: 124). The idea of propaganda by deed did not 
grow out of vacuum or out of a desire to carry out meaningless violence. It was a 
calculated and well thought out strategy to bring about some desired change through 
systematic use of violence as all other means were either deemed ineffective or 
unavailable. Brousse argued that the traditional tools of propaganda such as pamphlets 
and political rallies were largely ineffective and ‘inherently limited in spreading the 
anarchist message to the masses and that the message had to be supplemented by 
deeds and actions’ (Garrison, 2004: 265). 
Brousse believed that the majority of the masses were illiterate and too busy with their 
lives to pay any attention to the traditional mode of propaganda. Moreover, such a 
medium of communication could be countered or altered by the ruling elite. The 
message of the revolutionaries would therefore never reach its intended audience and 
would be lost forever. What was necessary, therefore, was a practical demonstration, 
which would catch immediate attention of the masses and awaken their conscious 
(Wardlaw, 1989: 21). Through propaganda by deed, the revolutionaries hoped that 
their violent actions would ‘transform them from a small conspiratorial club into 
massive revolutionary movement’ (Chaliand & Blin, 2007: 33). 
The Russian philosopher and famous anarchist Peter Kropotkin further developed 
Brousse’s ideas. Kropotkin discussed the power and effectiveness of the deed. He 
pointed out that ‘actions which compel general attention… make more propaganda 
than thousands of pamphlets’ (Townshend, 2002: 56). His philosophy was put into 
practice by the Russian anarchist movement Narodnaya Volya the will of the people 
(Laqueur, 2002: 34). The revolutionary group had given up on the idea of achieving 
any meaningful change through peaceful means and decided to take direct action 
through adopting the logic of propaganda by deed (p. 11-12). It was a small group that 
operated clandestinely against a much stronger enemy and never had any territory 
under its control. It selected its targets very carefully so that they could have 
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maximum communication effect. Through psychologically influencing the target 
audience it intended to coerce them into conceding to its demands. The group in other 
words adopted a violent communicative operational strategy to achieve its goals. 
As pointed earlier the phrase propaganda by deed has two key words ‘propaganda’ 
and ‘deed’. We can now see that the word deed can be explained comprehensively by 
the operational logic whereas the word propaganda is perhaps best expressed in terms 
of terrorisms’ communicative upshot. 
Thus, a group that deems peaceful means ineffective, is numerically far inferior to its 
opponent (asymmetric) and does not command any territory, decides to operate 
clandestinely through blending in with ordinary citizenry. Its clandestine mode of 
operation is intended to be a protracted struggle that would lead to exhaustion and 
eventual defeat of its enemy. This protracted clandestine asymmetrical operation can 
be regarded as the ‘deed’ of terrorism. The operation (or the deed) is intended to have 
a psychological impact on the group’s intended target audience. This psychological 
impact is achieved through carefully directing the violent operations towards specific 
targets that can resonate with the wider intended audience. The generation of message 
through psychologically influencing an audience is the ‘propaganda’ of terrorism. 
Taken together, the deed and the propaganda are intended to coerce an opponent into 
conceding to certain demands. The strategy of terrorism can thus be summed up as a 
protracted, clandestine, asymmetrical and coercive political violence.58 
 
Terrorism as an ideology 
Unlike the tactical and strategic elements, treatment of terrorism as an ideology does 
not receive any serious academic patronage. This does not however mean that 
scholars make no reference to it or even use it in an implicit sense. 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines ideology as ‘The set of beliefs characteristic 
of a social group or individual.’59 In line with this definition terrorism as an ideology 
                                                
58 Although this strategic understanding of terrorism is clearly non-state centric, it will however be 
shown later in the discussion that the strategy of terrorism is in fact independent of the actor. 
59 Available at: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ideology. Accessed on 19/02/2015. 
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will be understood as a set of distinct and rigid beliefs that terrorists adhere to. In 
academic understanding, terrorism, when referred to as an ideology, generally implies 
that it has a distinct underlying philosophy, which gives it certain dogmatic and 
doctrinal characteristics. In other words, terrorism can be said to have a unitary 
existence that is fundamentally and inherently different from other forms of violence. 
The tendency to tread terrorism as an ideology is rooted in the ‘-ism’ of terrorism 
(Guelke, 2009: 16). As most expressions that end with an ‘-ism’ are words for 
ideologies like communism, socialism, and anarchism, it is perhaps not surprising that 
terrorism too is often treated as an ideology. Now the question is, what exactly is this 
underlying philosophy and ideology of terrorism? This question can be answered by 
first briefly analyzing the ‘ends-means’ and ‘moral’ dimensions of terrorism. 
The ends-means debate mainly entails that every action (mean) taken is generally 
geared towards achieving a certain goal (end). This debate borrows from the rational 
choice theory where actors and the choices they make to achieve certain goals are 
believed to be rational (See e.g. Kruglanski and Fishman, 2006). Following this logic, 
the actions taken by terrorists, assuming that they are rational, must also be for 
achieving certain objectives. The tactical and strategic positions discussed above 
account for both the mean (instrumental and operational) and the end (effect and 
communication).60 Thus, according to these two positions the terrorist means are not 
devoid of any meaningful ends, although it is widely believed that the distance 
between the terrorist’s means and ends is fairly large and that the link is often very 
difficult to establish (Guelke, 2009). However, as long as terrorism is seen as tactic or 
strategy, a relationship, no matter how vague or indirect, will always be observed 
between its means and ends. 
A pure ideological position, on the other hand, downplays the rational choice model 
and does not separate the means and ends of the terrorists. It views the terrorist mean- 
the violent action- as an end in itself. Thus, from an ideological standpoint, the 
terrorist violence does not have any strategic or tactical elements- it is in effect 
violence for violence’s sake. Although some advocates of the ideological position 
may argue that terrorism can have strategic and tactical elements or that the actors can 
                                                
60 By ‘end’ here, I am not implying the ultimate goal of the group. But instead what the violent action 
or its credible threat end up producing in its immediate aftermath. 
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be rational but such a position will indirectly imply that terrorism is purposeful and 
that will be logically unsustainable and contradict the overall ideological edifice. 
The conflation of means and ends also gives rise to the moral problem as Wilkinson 
usefully notes ‘Much confusion occurs in the debate on the morality of terrorism 
because of a failure to distinguish ends and means’ (2000: 218). Failure to distinguish 
between the terrorists’ means and ends gives terrorism the appearance of senseless 
and meaningless violence that should be unequivocally condemned and disapproved. 
This unequivocal condemnation and disapproval leads to terrorism being reduced to a 
pejorative and derogatory term and bolsters the assertion that terrorism must always 
be unjustified. The debate on the moral problem is fairly extensive and has been 
discussed elsewhere in the thesis. However, it is important to note that the derogatory 
connotation of the term terrorism, which designates all terroristic violence as morally 
abhorrent and unacceptable, contributes to it being seen as an irrational and mindless 
activity. Although it is important to point out here that advocates of the ideological 
position may not necessarily denounce all perpetrators as insane or even irrational. 
But they do view them all as immoral and tie them down to their actions in a manner 
that severs any ties with the terrorist goals.61 
To summarize, terrorism when seen purely as an ideology, does not distinguish 
between its means and ends and the perpetrators are not seen independent of their 
actions. The terrorist activity subsequently is regarded as immoral and irrational. The 
essence of this position is captured by Mark Rigstad’s assertion, ‘The concept of 
‘terrorism’ designates the class of phenomenon associated with these acts and the 
agents who perform them, and it is therefore presumptively condemnatory’ (2008: 
76). It is this view that allows scholars like Etzioni and Raufer to use terms such as 
‘distinct species’ (2010: 1) and ‘lifeforms’ (2003: 392) to describe terrorists. 
Furthermore, since the ends of terrorists cannot be discerned, ideological terrorism, 
unlike tactical and strategic, cannot be said to be politically motivated. Thus, 
terrorism, when treated as an ideology, evidently has no political ends, and is an 
irrational and immoral violent activity in which violence acts as an end in itself. 
As pointed out earlier, even though there is a widespread tendency to treat terrorism 
as an ideology the position however does not receive much academic patronage, at 
                                                
61 This issue has been discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
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least not by serious commentators in the field. Instead, what is more prevalent is a 
general academic acknowledgement that such a practice exists and a resounding 
condemnation of it. Many academics are often quick to point out that terrorism (which 
they otherwise see as a tactic or strategy) has erroneously been given the 
characteristics of an ideology. As Coady says ‘There is a strong tendency in the 
scholarly and sub-scholarly literature on terrorism to treat it as something like an 
ideology. There is an equally strong tendency to treat it as always immoral. Both 
tendencies go hand in hand with a considerable degree of uncertainty about the 
meaning of the term terrorism’ (1985: 47). 
Wilkinson and various other leading scholars in the field have also expressed their 
concerns. Wilkinson points out that, ‘Among scholars who have studied political 
violence it is generally accepted that terrorism is a special form of political violence. 
It is not a philosophy or a political movement’ (1992: 289). In similar vein, Charles 
Tilly also notes that social scientists ‘should doubt the existence of a distinct, coherent 
class of actors (terrorists) who specialize in a unitary form of political action (terror) 
and thus should establish a separate variety of politics (terrorism)’ (2004: 5). Michael 
Dartnell believes that it is because of its verbal resemblance with words like 
liberalism, communism, and anarchism, terrorism misleadingly suggests that it is a 
‘unitary phenomenon’ (1999: 2000). 
However, in spite of these academic criticisms there are widespread inconsistencies. 
More than often, scholars that are strongly skeptical of the ideological view, end up 
taking it themselves. David Rapoport, for instance, treats terrorism as a tactic (2008: 
169), yet at the same time also asserts that ‘terrorism is a process, a way of life, a 
dedication’ (1971: 38), which is more in line with an ideological view of terrorism. 
How can terrorism be a way of life if it is just a tactic? For even if an actor focuses 
solely on the terrorist tactic (amid no chance of achieving its goals), its use of 
terrorism can never completely be divorced from the underlying political ideology 
that it adheres to. 
If terrorism is a tactic then the specification of the actor should not matter (Crenshaw, 
2011: 4), yet some scholars view terrorism as a tactic and then tie it to a specific class 
of actors. As Richardson (otherwise a strong advocate of a tactical view of terrorism) 
points out, ‘terrorism is an act of sub-state groups, not states’ (2006: 21). Laqueur also 
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believes that ‘terrorism is not an ideology but an insurrectional strategy’ (2002: 4). 
Richardson and Laqueur’s curious position of seeing terrorism as a tactic yet at the 
same time tying it down to only non-state actors is contradictory and inconsistent. 
Such inconsistencies largely exist because terrorism as an ideology, strategy, and 
tactic has never been properly conceptualized. Before we move on to discussion, it is 




The academic conception of terrorism as a tactic, strategy, or ideology is far from 
consistent. A lack of formal theorizing in the area has not only lead to conflicting and 
opposing positions in the discourse but has also contributed towards a trend of 
generalization and oversimplification of the problem. Most scholars treat the terms as 
self-explanatory and merely just state that terrorism is a tactic or a strategy without 
ever feeling the need to explain what they mean. This however is far from true as 
there is no common understanding of what a terrorist tactic or strategy is. As a result 
of this, what is a tactic for many is strategic or even ideological for others and vice 
versa. Although a misunderstanding between a tactical and strategic conception is 
understandable (given the terminological overlap) but confusion with ideological 
terrorism is extremely puzzling. 
Giandomenico Picco (2005) makes a distinction between tactical and strategic 
terrorism. Picco believes that terrorism is not a ‘one dimensional phenomenon’ and 
that there is a fundamental difference between tactical and strategic terrorism (p. 11). 
Terrorism is tactical if it is used as an instrument to achieve a specific well defined 
end. This tactical terrorism, he believes, is rational, has arguably reasonable demands, 
and can be negotiated with (p.12-13). On the other hand, Picco considers terrorism 
strategic when it does not have any well-defined ends, makes irrational claims, and 
places paramount importance on ideology. He argues that strategic terrorism is used 
only for confrontational sake and is rooted in an ‘insurmountable sense of exclusion, 
on an unbridgeable gap with the ‘other’ ’ (p. 14). 
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Picco uses his tactical understanding for nationalist and separatist groups like IRA and 
Hezbollah and applies his strategic logic to groups like Al-Qaeda. He believes that 
since strategic terrorism is only for confrontational sake, the stated political goals of 
such groups are therefore of no relevance. ‘Strategic terrorism is not interested in the 
veniality of the single political issue. They are tools to be used to make sure that the 
confrontation goes on and the appeal of the confrontation never ends’ (p. 14). 
Similarly, James Piazza, also makes a distinction between strategic and what he calls 
‘universal/abstract groups’ (2009). Strategic groups are the ones that have ‘limited 
and discrete goals’ and are assumed to be rational actors that can be negotiated with. 
Universal/abstract groups, on the other hand, are primarily driven by ideology and 
have no rational considerations (p. 65-66). Piazza uses his distinction to designate Al-
Qaeda as a universal/abstract group. 
Devin Jessee, in comparison, presents a very different understanding of terrorist 
tactics and strategy (2006). He ties the notions of tactic and strategy to the intensity of 
the terrorist act. He believes that when an act of terrorism is conducted on a large 
scale, harms high value targets and results in widespread consequences, then it should 
be viewed as strategic. On the other hand, when the attacks are low profile and carried 
out ‘in a less dramatic fashion’ then they should be considered tactical (p. 368). Using 
this model, Jessee suggests that the 9/11 attacks were on a large-scale, had widespread 
consequences, and were therefore strategic. Whereas a random bomb attack on a 
police station in Iraq is low-key, restrained and less dramatic and is therefore tactical 
(p. 368). 
These examples clearly illustrate that scholars have a very different understanding of 
terrorism as a tactic, strategy, and ideology. Picco’s conceptualization appears to be 
completely at odds with Piazza’s categorization. Where Picco views strategic 
terrorism as ideologically driven, rigid, and uncompromising, Piazza holds it to be 
rational, calculated and accommodating. Piazza’s strategic understanding is more in 
line with what Picco categorizes as tactical terrorism. On the other hand, Piazza’s 
universal/abstract categorization can be explained by Picco’s strategic logic. It 
becomes obvious that one academic’s tactical understanding of terrorism can easily be 
another’s strategic. 
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Jessee’s position discussed above presents a rather novel approach to the problem. He 
links both tactic and strategy directly to the nature of the act. Thus, if an attack is on a 
small-scale and does not result in any grave consequences then it is tactical and if it is 
a large-scale, high impact attack then it is strategic. This rather simplistic 
categorization is clearly not in any way representative of common understanding of 
the problem. Judging terrorism to be tactical or strategic based on just one attack not 
only seems odd but also poses serious analytical problems. On what scale should an 
attack take place to be tactical? Can a very low-scale high consequence attack be 
strategic? How can the consequences of an attack be measured? Would the frequency 
in attacks make any difference? 
Where Picco and Piazza’s conceptualization of the problem demonstrates a 
contradiction in terms, Jessee’s position highlights the dangers of oversimplification. 
Of course these just happen to be random examples that are not in any way 
representative of the entire discourse, yet they are still demonstrative of the prevailing 
practices and are able to draw our attention to the problem. 
It is also worth remembering here that most academics merely just use the terms 
tactic, strategy and ideology- treating the terms as self-explanatory and without 
feeling the need to explain them. This makes it all the more difficult to critically 
analyze the individual positions of most scholars on the matter. It would of course 
make little sense to spell out a usage if there was any common or popular 
understanding of a terrorist tactic, strategy or ideology. However, as the discussion so 
far has shown, no such common understanding exists and all three terms are more 
than often used differently or interchangeably. Hence, to treat the terms as if they are 
self-explanatory, in the context of terrorism, is certainly not helpful. But before we try 
to set this confusion right, it is important to discuss the problem of categorizing that 
results from this prevailing confusion. 
 
The challenge of categorizing 
Generally academics that endorse a tactical or a strategic view of terrorism also posit 
that a range of different actors can employ it. These actors could be insurgents, 
guerrillas, revolutionaries, and for some even states. Critical scholars like Jackson, 
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Dexter, Shanahan, Goodin have repeatedly asserted that terrorism is independent of 
the actor. Although such assertions are widespread, they do raise a number of 
complex issues, which are usually never addressed in any rigorous sense. For 
instance, what happens to the status of an actor when it utilizes terrorist tactics or 
strategy? Does it lose its previous designation and become a terrorist instead or is it 
possible for an actor to retain both labels? Can anyone who utilizes terroristic 
violence be a terrorist? Is there any difference between groups opting for terrorist 
tactics instead of terrorist strategy? 
An academic distinction can generally be observed between terrorism as a 
supplementary or auxiliary tool (i.e. a tactic or a strategy) as opposed to being pure 
and absolute. As Charles Townshend points out ‘Terrorist actions may be auxiliary- 
one element of a larger military or guerrilla strategy… or it may be ‘absolute’- the 
pursuit of political goals through the systematic use of terror alone’ (2002: 13). 
Townshend is not alone in this assertion as other leading scholars in the field also 
make similar assertions. 
Wilkinson makes an important distinction ‘between pure terrorism used in isolation 
and terrorism as an auxiliary weapon in a wider repertoire of violence’ (1992: 290). 
Coady also points out that terrorism generally is used as a tool in the service of wider 
goals, however, ‘with some terrorist operations it may be that the terror itself has 
assumed the status of an end so that terrorism has become a sort of ideology’ (1985: 
48-49). Townshend’s absolute, Wilkinson’s pure, and Coady’s an end in itself, appear 
to designate what I have referred to earlier as an ideological view of terrorism. The 
auxiliary view, on the other hand, corresponds to the tactical and strategic positions. I 
will discuss the implications of the auxiliary view first. 
The auxiliary view of terrorism lends it the flexibility to be employed by various 
actors in a range of different conflicts. This means that actors like guerrillas, rebels, 
and insurgents may utilize terrorism as their mode of resistance or opposition. As 
English pithily notes, ‘terrorism often overlaps with guerilla violence or with 
campaigns that might be termed insurgent’ (2009: 12). Crenshaw also points out that 
‘terrorism occurs in the context of civil war, insurgency, or other manifestations of 
wider violence’ (2011: 3). 
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The question however is, if terrorism is used in this auxiliary sense, should then its 
practitioners be called terrorists? Or are they still guerrilla or insurgent that utilize 
terrorist tactics or strategy? Or can both labels be used to describe them? The problem 
is that using terrorism in an auxiliary capacity is not the same as using vandalism for 
instance. Because when a group uses vandalism, no matter how frequently, it can still 
retain its label. With terrorism, however, it is not as straight forward. To understand 
this, we have to again revisit the term’s pejorative undertone. But first I will explain 
this problem with a hypothetical example. 
If, for instance, some insurgents utilize terrorist tactics (or strategy) to achieve their 
goals then what should they be called? Will they cease to be insurgents or will their 
status change to terrorists? If their status changes to terrorists then this means that 
insurgents in principle cannot use terrorist tactics, because if they do, then they will 
cease to be insurgents and will instead transform into terrorists. The assertion then 
that insurgents can utilize terrorist tactics therefore becomes invalid. If their status 
stays insurgency then this will imply that insurgents may use terrorist tactics without 
being labeled terrorist. 
It appears then, the academics that insist insurgents, guerillas and conventional armies 
may utilize terrorist tactics are essentially arguing that such utilization does not 
necessarily make the practitioners terrorists. There is clearly an academic hesitation, if 
not an outright reluctance, to label organizations such as Irish Republican Army 
(IRA), Hezbollah, Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and many others as terrorist 
organizations, although they are frequently accused of employing terrorist tactics. Is it 
then that for most academics terrorism (and in extension terrorists) is qualitatively 
different from terrorist tactics/strategy? That utilization of a terrorist tactic or strategy 
alone does not make one a terrorist? Is then the auxiliary view of terrorism 
analytically unsustainable? 
As pointed out earlier, the pejorative undertone of the term terrorism generates 
contempt and revulsion and undermines the legitimacy of the actor. It is therefore not 
surprising if some authors choose not to denounce an overall organization/actor as 
terrorist and instead choose to see its certain isolated acts as terroristic. However, this 
creates a contradiction in terms and causes semantic confusion, as it not clear which 
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criteria makes one a terrorist. There are numerous examples of such a practice and I 
will highlight a few here. 
Peter Chalk views the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and Moro Islamic 
Liberation Organization (MILF), nationalist/separatist movements in Philippines, 
primarily as guerrilla groups that periodically use ‘terrorist-type tactics’ (2001: 248). 
Hence he acknowledges that the groups engage in some terroristic activity but does 
not see the over all movements as terrorist. Arquilla and Karasik analyze the Chechen 
resistance against Russia and throughout their discussion use terms like rebels, 
fighters, small-armed bands, and largely abstain from referring to them as terrorists. 
However, at the same time, they point out that these rebels have on occasions 
employed certain terroristic actions (1999). Similarly, in a discussion on Iran and 
Hezbollah, Daniel Byman notes that ‘Hezbollah is now better characterized as a 
guerrilla and political movement that at times uses terrorism rather than as a pure 
terrorist group’ (2008: 173). An analysis of the terrorism literature reveals that such 
considerations are usually reserved for nationalist and separatist movements such as 
the ones going on in Palestine, Chechnya, and Kashmir.  
A parallel view in this discussion that merits attention is the transitionary position, 
which involves seeing terrorism as a stage that most groups generally pass through. 
As opposed to the auxiliary view where terrorism is something that can be utilized at 
any stage, the transitionary position views terrorism as either a first stage an 
organization goes through or something that it evolves into because of its 
circumstances. As Merari points out, ‘Terrorism is the first form of violence that 
appears when conflicts escalate’ (1999: 52). 
This position is based on the assumption that revolutionary groups are weak in the 
beginning and have very limited resources and personnel. Terrorism alternatively 
presents a low-cost high impact alternative. It is, however, deemed essential for the 
group to eventually make a transition to another form of violence if it wants to 
succeed or survive in the long run. As William Miller explains, ‘Without a transition 
to guerrilla warfare, however, terrorism becomes, as its name suggests, the 
meaningless taking of life and spread of fear’ (2000: 72). Miller also points out that an 
organization may revert back to terrorism if it suffers significant loses (p. 64). From 
such a perspective, although terrorism is seen as a choice of necessity, its eventual 
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success and survival is tied to its transition into other forms of violence, as Merari 
notes ‘One might say that all terrorist groups wish to be guerrillas when they grow up’ 
(1993: 245). 
This transitionary explanation, however, appears somewhat naïve and simplistic62 as 
Wilkinson explains ‘there is no universal pattern so far as the decision to use terrorism 
is concerned’ and that there is no ‘discernible evolutionary pattern’ whereby 
organizations start exclusively as terrorist and later acquire the weaponry and 
manpower for a wider insurgency (2002: 15-16). Weinberg also points out that there 
is no particular reason why different actors should follow a standard choreography 
and ‘Some insurgents employ terrorism during the middle and the end of their efforts 
as their opening measures’ (2012: 76). 
Hence, the transitionary position largely fails to explain why so many established 
insurgencies and guerrilla forces are charged with using terrorist tactics or strategy. It 
also challenges the assertion that terrorism is independent of the actor and evades the 
question of when an organization starts or ceases to be a terrorist organization and 
whether and if an organization can simultaneously carry two labels. 
The auxiliary view of terrorism is certainly the more dominant one in the discourse. 
As Wilkinson notes, ‘The mixed form of terrorism is the general rule in all major 
areas of conflict throughout the world’ (1992: 290). This auxiliary view suggests that 
one cannot have a one-dimensional view of terrorism and the actors that practice it. 
As Michael Boyle argues, ‘terrorism is one card among many that can be used by 
actors’ (2012: 529). This means that organizations that utilize terrorism perform 
multiple functions and since each function is radically different from the other, each 
of its roles could pull the organization in a completely different direction. Hence, a 
focus on a certain aspect of the organization may establish it as terrorist, while an 
emphasis on another may reveal it to be guerilla or insurgent. 
The question however is, which of these roles should describe the organization as a 
whole? As Christopher Finlay points out, ‘Would only one proper act in the course of 
an armed campaign stretching over decades be sufficient to justify the terrorist label 
                                                
62 Even Merari (1999) and Miller (2000) who make a case for this position are highly skeptical of it and 
believe that in reality there is a significant mixing and overlapping. 
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or would there have to be more’ (2009: 756). He explains this problem by employing 
the logic of synecdoche ‘where one part of a greater organization… can be used to 
characterize the organization as a whole’ (Ibid). Finlay concludes that this problem is 
unlikely to get any definite answer at least from the field of philosophy. 
Boaz Ganor believes he has a solution to this problem. He optimistically suggests that 
the issue can be resolved through conducting a quantitative analysis to measure the 
frequency of different functions the organization performs. If it chiefly engages with 
terrorist activities then it should be labeled as a terrorist actor and vice versa (2002: 
297). This is an appealing but clearly an impractical proposition. Subjecting the 
actions of an organization to an academically rigorous quantitative analysis is not only 
painstakingly difficult but will have very little practical impact. Furthermore, such an 
approach lumps terrorist tactics and strategy together which, as this chapter shall 
argue, is conceptually unhelpful. 
The auxiliary view of terrorism discussed above rests on the assumption that there is 
an absolute and pure form of terrorism, which is qualitatively and fundamentally 
different from its supplementary variant. Before we go any further it is therefore 
important to address some important questions; what exactly is pure terrorism? Which 
characteristics make an organization a pure terrorist group? And how is it different 
from what could otherwise be described as un-pure or mixed groups? 
Luis de la Calle and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca believe that the term terrorism has two 
senses, actor and action sense (2011: 451). And terrorism is pure when these actors 
(terrorists) carry out the actions (terrorist acts). They identify the actors as 
underground groups without any territorial control and coercive violence as the 
terrorist actions (p. 453). This leads them to conclude that pure terrorism is simply 
coercive violence by non-territorial groups (p. 461). Their categorization, although 
highly questionable, is representative of most actor-centric approaches in the 
discourse. Wilkinson also appears to follow similar logic when he suggests that 
terrorism is typically used as an auxiliary weapon in places like Central America 
where it is accompanied by wider insurgencies ‘but in Western Europe and North 
America terrorism is usually seen in its ‘pure’ form’ (1992: 290). And even though 
Wilkinson does not state it explicitly, it is fairly straightforward that it is mostly non-
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territorial groups that carry out terroristic violence within Western Europe and North 
America. 
Although an understanding of pure terrorism generally ties the actor and the action 
together, it will be unwise to categorically specify the actor as Calle and Cuenca do. 
Because if we follow their logic then terrorism can only be pure when the actor is an 
underground non-territorial group. Owing to this problematic classification, it is 
important to look at alternate understandings of pure terrorism. 
Going back to the earlier basic classification of Townshend, Wilkinson, and Coady, 
pure terrorism is understood to be violence for violence’s sake- an end in itself. No 
distinction is made between terrorism’s means and ends and it is largely regarded as 
an irrational and immoral activity. The essence of this is captured by what I have 
already described as ideological terrorism. In order to further understand this 
ideological/pure terrorism, it is important to look at some examples. 
In spite of different academic assertions, it is hard to find examples of pure terrorism. 
However, using the conceptualization of pure terrorism outlined in this chapter and 
drawing from popular academic understanding of it, it is possible to identify instances 
where terrorism can be seen in this absolute sense. This requires identifying groups 
that are largely viewed as irrational and consider violence as an end in itself. 
Although some scholars like Picco and Piazza categorize groups like Al-Qaeda as a 
pure terrorist group, such categorization, however is not consistent with the 
conceptual understanding of ideological terrorism. Al-Qaeda clearly has political 
objectives, the individuals that make up the organization are generally regarded as 
rational, and their violence, more than often, is intended to send a message to a 
broader audience, which clearly contradicts the fundamentals of pure terrorism, as 
outlined in this chapter. Instead, groups that are generally described as nihilistic, 
millennialist, or apocalyptic appear to be the only fit for pure terrorism. These groups 
have very unusual ends that the broader community largely fails to understand and 
comprehend. The use of violence by such groups is more than often part of the overall 
group ideology and not usually a mean to any practical or rational end. 
The Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan led by Shoko Asahara is a notoriously popular 
apocalyptic group. It is the only known sub-state group that has used biological 
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weapons by attacking a Tokyo subway with sarin gas. The group’s rationale for using 
violence was to trigger an apocalyptic chain of events that would destroy the existing 
social and political order (Muir, 1999). Other millennialist groups such as ‘Heaven’s 
Gate’ and ‘Order of the Solar Temple’ can also be viewed in similar vein. Even 
though the violence by the latter two was directed inward,63 they still shared their 
irrational goals and beliefs with Aum (Whitsel, 2000). 
Apocalyptic groups tend to isolate themselves from the wider society and are 
generally very skeptical of the established social and cultural norms. As a result, they 
have a very different understanding of standard moral and social values. Violence is 
generally arrived at purely because of ideological reasons, usually to fulfill an 
imagined prophecy, and not because of any rational mean/end considerations. As 
Richard Landes explains ‘because apocalyptic believers consider themselves to be 
taking part in the final and ultimate conflict, normal considerations, including future 
consequences do not carry weight. Apocalyptic time, with its sense of urgency and 
threat, conflates means and ends, making unthinkable violence acceptable’ (2002: 
258). 
The apocalyptic groups thus appear to have no regard for standard or accepted 
morality, generally have no message to communicate, and no mean/end 
considerations, which are basically the hallmarks of pure terrorism. Although the 
apocalyptic groups seem to fit perfectly well with the pure understanding of terrorism 
discerned earlier, their analysis raises serious question over the validity of the 
category of pure terrorism itself. If the groups are physically disconnected from the 
society, have no message to communicate to a broader audience, and no tangible 
political goals- should they even be considered terrorist? Certainly harboring 
apocalyptic beliefs is not the same as having political ambitions, which many consider 
a cornerstone of any terrorist violence. 
The auxiliary view is somewhat built around the assumption that there is a 
freestanding absolute form of terrorism but if this pure or absolute terrorism does not 
exist then where does that leave its supplementary variants? Understandably it will be 
very convenient to brand an actor a terrorist if it practices pure terrorism (as apposed 
to when terrorism is adopted as a tactic or a strategy). However, if pure terrorism as 
                                                
63 Both groups committed mass suicide in pursuit of their imagined goals (See Whitsel, 2000). 
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commonly understood does not exist and the auxiliary view is the only game in town 
then terrorism must either be a tactic or a strategy that is independent of the actor. 
And if terrorism is independent of the actor then who should be categorized as a 
terrorist? Does this not make the label terrorist highly questionable? I will now 
address these questions in greater detail. 
 
Discussion 
As the figure below illustrates, the tactical, ideological, and strategic positions 
regarding terrorism can also be understood by analyzing and breaking down the word 
terrorism. A focus on the ‘terror’ of terrorism (fear-generating element) broadly 
corresponds to the tactical utility of terrorism. An excessive emphasis on the ‘ism’ of 
terrorism explains the ideological take on terrorism. And lastly, the word ‘terrorism’, 








Before I address the multitude of questions that have been raised in this chapter, it is 
important first to distinguish between tactical and strategic terrorism and attend to the 
overlap between the two. Terrorism as a tactic has been categorized as an instrument 
with effect- fear inducing coercive political violence. On the other hand, strategic 
terrorism has been described as an operation communication design- protracted, 
clandestine, asymmetrical, coercive political violence, which can also be explained by 






Significant overlap can be observed between the two. Both are first and foremost 
politically motivated. Both through the instrumental and operational logic convey that 
terrorism is in fact purposeful violence and not violence for violence’s sake.64 Both 
are also independent of the actor. And lastly, both are also coercive. 
Moving on to the differences between the two: A terrorist strategy must be protracted 
and incorporate a long-term recurring pattern of terroristic violence, it is in a sense a 
form of warfare. Use of terroristic violence in strategic terrorism is expected and 
predictable. A terrorist strategy is therefore a long-term operational design in which 
terroristic violence is fairly predictable. 
A terrorist tactic on the other hand, usually involves an isolated and individual act of 
violence that does not require a recurring long-term pattern of terroristic violence. 
Although terrorist tactics may be utilized in some protracted conflicts, however, in 
such instances, terroristic violence is infrequent and often far in between. The use of 
terroristic violence at a tactical level is therefore very unpredictable. It is important 
here to distinguish between unpredictability and irrationality. Where irrationality fails 
to understand the logic behind violence and the motives of the actors, unpredictability 
simply implies that such violence is unexpected and unforeseen. 
Another difference between the two is regarding the clandestine nature of their 
activity. Where it is not necessary for tactical terrorism to be clandestine, strategic 
terrorism by its very nature is always clandestine. And although both have a 
psychological dimension to their violence, strategic terrorism need not necessarily 
intend to induce fear. This is a rather unusual and controversial proposition but it is 
also very important for understanding a fundamental difference between the two. 
It has been suggested that both tactical and strategic violence aim to psychologically 
influence their target audience through effect and communication respectively. Now 
where the tactical effect seeks to primarily induce fear, strategic terrorism may not 
necessarily seek to evoke fear. Since strategic terrorism demands a long-term 
                                                
64 Where the word ‘instrument’ would usually be applied to isolated and individual acts of violence, the 
term ‘operation’ would refer only to a long-term recurring pattern of violence. 
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protracted asymmetrical engagement with the adversary, the communication design 
may be utilized to send multiple messages to often multiple audiences. 
Furthermore, since terroristic violence is very frequent and predictable, it may 
eventually lose its shock and awe value. This is not to say that strategic terrorism does 
not generate fear altogether, but merely to suggest that unlike tactical terrorism, 
generating fear is not necessarily its deliberate intention. The fear generated could 
well be a byproduct in strategic terrorism. As concluded in chapter one, generation of 
fear is fundamental to all terroristic violence- the key is to understand when it is 
deliberate and when it is merely a byproduct. When terrorism is employed tactically, 
the element of fear is utilized deliberately. Whereas in strategic terrorism, as 
terroristic violence becomes the primary or the only modus operandi of the actor, fear 
is often a byproduct rather than a deliberate intention. 
It has been pointed out that both the terrorist tactic and strategy are independent of the 
actor, which means that both states and non-state actors can practice it. Although most 
academics view terrorist tactic and strategy in this light, their conceptualization of the 
problem however is almost always non-state centric. Merari’s conceptualization of the 
terrorist strategy and Wilkinson’s analysis of the terrorism problem is almost entirely 
non-state centric. As a result of this, their assertion that terrorism is independent of the 
actor and their subsequent analysis of the problem appear somewhat contradictory. 
This of course is a widespread problem and is not restricted to just these two 
influential scholars. In spite of their otherwise assertions, most academics (due to the 
common inference of the term) conceptualize terrorism almost solely in light of non-
state insurrectional terrorism. Consequently, significant inconsistencies and 
discrepancies can be observed throughout the terrorism discourse. As this chapter 
utilizes some of these academic models, it is important to reflect on them to address 
the inconsistencies and to truly accommodate all actors. 
Firstly, it has been observed that terrorism, especially at the strategic level, operates 
clandestinely. This although generally true for most non-state actors, does not apply to 
states at all times, at least not at the tactical level. States may at times operate 
clandestinely but by virtue of their very nature and their privileged power position, 
they may either choose not to act clandestinely or simply fail to keep their activities as 
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such (as discussed in the previous chapter). It is mainly for this reason that the 
clandestine feature has been excluded from the tactical conceptualization of terrorism. 
Wheeler and Merari’s conceptualization of terrorism, utilized in this chapter, is also 
primarily insurrectional centric. As a result, they focus on a weaker foe that is 
numerically inferior and has no territory. Clearly, a state is not always a weak party in 
an asymmetrical conflict and certainly commands territory. It is for this reason that 
territorial control has also been excluded from the final conceptualization. I will now 
discuss and defend the elements that have been utilized. 
The elements of ‘protracted’, ‘asymmetrical’, and ‘clandestine’ have been used for 
conceptualizing the terrorist strategy. All of these elements are independent of the 
actor and are very important for distinguishing a terrorist strategy from tactic. For a 
state to utilize terrorism strategically, its engagement must be asymmetrical and 
protracted. Since the terrorist strategy, as opposed to tactic, is a protracted long-term 
engagement, efforts are also made by the actors to keep it clandestine. However, the 
state and non-state actors keep their activities clandestine for different reasons and 
with varying degree of success. A non-state or insurrectional actor must keep its 
activities concealed because of its inferior status and for achieving greater 
psychological effect. A state, on the other hand, tries to keep its activities concealed 
largely because of international considerations and also to have greater psychological 
impact. Although unlike non-state actors its forces are physically visible and 
concealing its activities is not always successful. 
The current Syrian regime under Bashar Al Assad provides a good example of the 
strategic use of terrorism. The regime is clearly engaged in a protracted struggle 
against a much weaker rebel force. Terroristic violence is being utilized to serve 
various ends and not just to inflict fear. This violence is largely coercive because it 
aims to influence the behavior of its target audience in some manner. And lastly, the 
regime also tries to conceal its actions to avoid international condemnation. The 
ongoing Syrian crisis is a protracted, clandestine, asymmetrical and coercive political 
violence, which has earlier been categorized as strategic terrorism. 
At the tactical level, however, the element of clandestine is not very important 
(especially if the actor is state) and terrorism is simply used as an instrument to coerce 
the opponent through the infliction of fear. A good example of such a tactical use by 
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states would be the Allied bombing of Dresden and U.S. bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki during WWII. The intention there was to simply inflict fear and coerce the 
opponent (no attempt was made to conceal the act or the actor). 
Thus, the states, like the non-state actors, may choose terrorism as a tactic or strategy. 
A strategic engagement of a state must be asymmetrical, protracted, and clandestine 
whereas a tactical commitment need only require coercion through intimidation. 
Hence, even though the model developed in this chapter borrows from insurrectional 
discourse, it is still able to accommodate any and all actors, provided of course they 
are political and rational. 
After gaining clarity at the tactical and strategic level we can now analyze the third 
variant, ideological terrorism. Ideological (or pure/absolute) terrorism has been 
conceptualized in this chapter as an irrational and immoral violent activity in which 
violence acts as an end in itself. It has been argued that since pure terrorism fails to 
distinguish not only between the means and ends but also between the actors and their 
violence, therefore it is presumptuously irrational and immoral. This propensity to see 
terrorism as an ideology was found rooted in the ‘-ism’ of terrorism. By drawing on 
the conceptualization of pure terrorism sketched in this chapter, it was concluded that 
only apocalyptic/millennialist groups could practice pure terrorism. The analysis of 
these groups, however, raised serious concerns over the validity of category of pure 
terrorism itself. 
Concerns over judging apocalyptic violence terroristic are not new, as many other 
academics have also objected to such categorization. This is mainly because all such 
groups challenge our most fundamental understanding of terrorism itself. As Jean 
Mayer in a discussion on religious cult groups points out, ‘It is important to note that 
many cases of religious violence have nothing to do with terrorism properly said’ 
(2001: 362). Gregory Koblentz challenges the categorization of Aum Shinrikyo as a 
terrorist organization in the Western discourse. He argues that where in the U.S. ‘Aum 
was being seen as representative of the larger class of terrorist groups… The view 
from Japan, however, was different… Instead the Japanese public saw Aum as a 
bizarre religious cult without any clear ideological or political objectives’ (2011: 508). 
Apocalyptic violence has no tangible political objectives, has no message to 
communicate, the goals and even the actors in most cases are not rational in any 
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sense, and the means and ends are mostly conflated.  It becomes obvious that the 
understanding of pure terrorism as popularized, is logically and analytically 
unsustainable with our fundamental understanding of terrorism. 
The question to be asked here is if there is no pure terrorism, then why do so many 
academics make a reference to it? Part of the answer has already been suggested. Pure 
terrorism lacks serious academic patronage65 and most academics only make fleeting 
references to it. This mere acknowledgement of an imagined pure terrorism clearly 
has no analytical value. The reason why it lacks this patronage is because it 
contradicts our fundamental understanding of terrorism itself. Those that do venture to 
formally categorize pure terrorism mostly end up constructing analytically unstable 
edifices. 
Picco and Piazza’s categorization of Al- Qaeda as a pure terrorist group or 
Wilkinson’s assertion that pure terrorism can chiefly be observed in the Western 
world (a reference to organizations like ETA, IRA etc.) is therefore grossly 
misleading. Not only does Al Qaeda and most terrorist groups in Europe have 
irrefutable political objectives, but they are also rational actors that seek to 
communicate through their threat of violence. Their violence is therefore purposive 
and not meaningless and irrational as the category of pure terrorism demands. 
The other reason for the widespread acknowledgement of pure terrorism is rooted in 
the moral problem. This results from wrongly focusing on the ‘-ism’ of terrorism. The 
term’s pejorative undertone misleadingly suggests that the phenomenon in its purest 
form must be abhorrent, irrational, and immoral. It is therefore convenient to isolate 
this imaginary pure form, condemn it unequivocally, and then claim to study its 
somewhat placid auxiliary variants. It must be pointed out here that the problem is not 
with the notion of pure terrorism itself. Of course if terrorism exists, so must real 
terrorism. The problem is with the sham characterization of real terrorism that 
contradicts our most basic and fundamental understanding of terrorism itself. 
                                                
65 It is important to point out here that the lack of academic patronage here refers to serious 
commentators and longstanding traditions in the field of terrorism studies. Many other scholars, 
especially since the end of cold war do support and promote an ideological understanding of terrorism. 
This however is part of wider ‘new terrorism’ debate, which will be discussed in detail in the following 
chapter. 
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Now if there is no real terrorism then it means that terrorism must only exist in the 
auxiliary sense. This purely auxiliary existence of terrorism does not cause a setback 
to our understanding of the problem. In fact as pointed out in the beginning of the 
chapter, most academics view terrorism as a tactic, method or strategy. Although 
there is no clear understanding of what this tactic really is and how it is different from 
a terrorist strategy. What is needed therefore is proper understanding of terrorism as a 
tactic or strategy and that is what this chapter has attempted to do. 
If terrorism exists only in the auxiliary sense and is independent of the actor then what 
does that mean for the actors that utilize it? Can anyone who utilizes terroristic 
violence be a terrorist? Crenshaw believes that ‘the identity of the actor does not 
matter to the specification of the method’ and therefore finds the term ‘terrorist 
organization’ contentious, although she admits to using it herself (2011: 4). However, 
as I shall explain, it need not be contentious or even difficult to label an actor a 
terrorist. 66 The key is to understand the difference between tactical and strategic use 
of terrorism. 
The confusion over labelling an actor terrorist is because most academics generally 
fail to distinguish between tactical and strategic use of terrorism. The tactical use of 
terrorism only entails coercive intimidation through the use or threat of violence. It 
can therefore be sporadically utilized when an actor feels the need to send a message 
and coerce a target audience, or simply to take advantage of the short-term benefits 
terrorism offers. This means that guerrillas and insurgents that are normally restrictive 
and predictive in their use of terroristic violence may tactically utilize it to achieve 
certain goals. State actors in a similar fashion can also utilize terrorism tactically in 
their otherwise conventional engagement with both state and non-state actors. 
Strategic terrorism, on the other hand, is protracted, asymmetric, clandestine, and 
coercive. The use of terroristic violence is frequent, expected, and predictable. And as 
it is also independent of the actor, both states and non-state actors may utilize it. 
                                                
66 Although I agree with Crenshaw that labelling someone terrorist is deeply problematic and should 
ideally be avoided (2011: 4), the practice however is widely pervasive and will continue to persist 
regardless. Given this inevitability and the plethora of problems it creates, it will be more helpful to try 
and resolve it than ignore it. 
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However, since strategic terrorism by nature is essentially asymmetric, actors cannot 
utilize it against opponents that it is at par with. 
Hence, it is postulated here that actors utilizing terrorism tactically cannot and should 
not be called terrorist and only those employing terrorism strategically should be 
labelled terrorist properly. In the academic discourse, the confusion over labelling an 
actor terrorist generally arises because of the tactical use of terrorism. There is usually 
very little confusion or disagreement when an actor utilizes terrorism strategically. 
The model presented here is therefore broadly consistent with the general academic 
classification of different terrorist actors. This will become clearer with a few 
practical examples. 
Conor Gearty in his book Terror asks whether groups like Tupamaros and 
Montoneros should even be considered terrorist ‘in the strict sense of the word’, as 
‘They emerged from an intellectual tradition that borrowed from Lenin, the rural 
guerrilla theories of Mao and the foco ideas of Debray and Guevara, none of whom 
could properly be called terrorist’ (1992: 44). However, Gearty also points out that 
both these two organizations, especially at a later stage, ‘came close to that 
arbitrariness in the application of force which we recognize as terror’ (Ibid). On the 
other hand, Gearty has no such hesitation in labelling the Tamil Tigers as terrorists 
even though he also acknowledges it as a guerrilla force (p. 102). Why is it then that 
Gearty sees guerrilla movements like Tupamaros, Montoneros, and Tamil Tigers in 
different light when all of these organizations utilize terroristic violence? 
Gearty and many other scholars who maintain such a position, may argue that this 
apparent contradiction in terms can be explained by the logic of frequency i.e. the 
more the frequency of terroristic violence, the more likely the actor will be called a 
terrorist. And since the Tamil Tigers used terroristic violence far more frequently than 
Tupamaros and Montoneros, they should therefore be called terrorist. This logic of 
frequency though is of little help or analytical utility. 
A thorough analysis of the three groups shows that where Tupamaros and Montoneros 
utilized terrorism tactically, the Tamil Tigers made strategic use of it. As Weinberg 
notes ‘the LTTE ‘Black Tigers’ carried out terrorist attacks throughout the conflict’ 
(2012: 76). Terroristic violence was in fact the most outstanding characteristic of the 
Tamil movement. The Tamil Tigers should therefore be labeled terrorist properly, 
	192 
whereas Tupamaros and Montoneros can be regarded as guerilla movements that 
utilized terrorism tactically. It can also be observed here that strategic terrorism also 
incorporates the frequency element and therefore does not contradict what many 
scholars already suggest. Instead the tactical and strategic categorization provides a 
richer and more comprehensive tool for labelling an actor terrorist. 
MNLF and MILF in the Philippines are generally treated as insurgent/guerrilla 
groups, though they are often charged with utilizing terrorist tactics. The Abu Sayyaf 
group (ASG), on the other hand, is largely viewed as a terrorist group. Alfredo Filler, 
for instance, views both MILF and MORO as insurgencies and believes that in 
comparison ‘the ASG by its nature and activities is a contemporary terrorist 
organization’ (2002: 142). Chalk also views MILF and MORO as guerrillas and 
insurgents and points out that ‘in terms of revolutionary political violence, virtually 
all of ASG’s activities are terroristic in nature’ (2001: 248). The reason why both 
MNLF and MILF are largely viewed as insurgent or guerrilla movements is because 
they utilize terrorist tactics as opposed to a terrorist strategy. On the other hand, the 
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), also operating in Philippines and for similar political goals 
as MNLF and MORO, utilizes terrorist strategy and is therefore widely regarded as a 
terrorist group. 
The infamous Al-Qaeda organization, which is often treated as a benchmark terrorist 
group, can also be explained by the logic sketched here. Al-Qaeda is a rational actor 
with certain political objectives (no matter how outlandish). The organization is 
clearly locked in a protracted asymmetric struggle and primarily utilizes terroristic 
violence. The group’s use of terroristic violence is frequent and predictable. Hence, 
the group utilizes strategic terrorism and can therefore rightly be categorized as a 
terrorist organization. Similarly, the 17N group in Greece was engaged in a protracted 
clandestine asymmetrical conflict with the state for decades. The actors were clearly 
rational and were trying to communicate their political message through violence 
(Kassimeris, 2013). The group therefore, because of its strategic use of terrorism, can 
easily be categorized as a terrorist group. In comparison, Hezbollah can be seen as a 
guerrilla group that sometimes uses terrorist tactics. Various other non-state groups 
such as the IRA and the PKK will also be viewed as insurgents or rebel groups that 
utilize terrorism tactically and are therefore not terrorists per se. 
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In similar vein, a choice between a tactic and strategy can determine how a state 
should be labelled. As the terrorist strategy demands asymmetry, therefore a state 
cannot practice it during wars with other states though it may still utilize terrorism 
tactically against other states. Since a tactical use of terrorism is not sufficient to label 
an actor terrorist, therefore, it is hardly surprising that the Allies, despite their terrorist 
tactics were not labelled as terrorist during WWII. Although Nazi Germany was 
designated a terrorist state, it was not because of its military engagement with the 
Allies (or its tactical use of terrorism) but because of its strategic use of terrorism in 
asymmetrical conflict areas, which were under its control, such as Greece (Kalyvas, 
2004). During conventional wars, therefore, states normally use terrorism only 
tactically against each other. Hence, a state typically is not labelled terrorist when it is 
fighting another state. 
States can only be labelled terrorist properly when they utilize strategic terrorism 
against non-state actors or their own citizenry. The current Syrian state under Bashar 
Al Assad is an example of a terrorist state. States may also utilize terrorist tactics 
against their own citizenry but because of tactical use will not be labelled terrorist. 
The Egyptian state under President Hosni Mubarak provides a good example of such 
tactical use of terrorism by a state. 
The model suggested here also accounts for ‘lone wolf terrorism’. A lone wolf act of 
terrorism is always clandestine, politically motivated, asymmetrical, and intends to 
send a message to a certain target audience, which is in line with the strategic logic of 
terrorism. The problem is that it appears to be not protracted, as the individuals do not 
belong to any specific organization. However, the individuals who commit these acts 
see themselves as part of a wider political movement and their grievances are more 
than often in line with known terrorist organizations or radical movements (See e.g. 
Spaaij, 2010: 857). 
Hence, although lone wolf terrorism may give the impression that it is not protracted, 
the perpetrators view themselves as part of a wider protracted struggle and the wider 
society or the target audience also views or treats their actions as such. The July 2016 
lone wolf truck attack in Nice, France is a case in point. The attacker that killed 86 
people identified with the radical Islamist group ISIS, which is widely regarded as a 
terrorist group (Gunaratna, 2016). Thus, since the rationale of lone wolf terrorism is in 
	194 
line with strategic terrorism, the perpetrators can in most of the cases comfortably be 
labelled terrorists. 
Terrorism will crop up whenever noncombatants are targets of political violence, be it 
in conventional wars, insurgencies, or rebellions. Terrorism does not have a separate 
or freestanding existence and will always be adopted either as a tactic or a strategy in 
other forms of violence. Owing to its auxiliary existence, debate in the terrorism 
discourse often stalls over who should be labelled terrorist properly. However, as this 
discussion has shown, this need not be so. Understandably academics are generally 
weary of labelling an actor terrorist because of the pejorative undertone of the term 
that misleadingly gestures towards an unqualified pure terrorism. But if this ‘pure 
terrorism’ does not exist then terrorism need not be weighed against an abhorrent, 
irrational, and immoral form of violence. The longstanding auxiliary view of 
terrorism may in fact be the only view of it. And pure terrorism could well be 
reclassified as strategic terrorism (since strategic terrorism corresponds to the 
complete utilization of terrorism). Terrorism is not a way of life, it is a tool 
independent of the actor that can be used either tactically or strategically. And a 
choice between the two can determine how an actor should be labelled. 
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 6. Classic, Extreme, and Critical: The Three Academic Positions 
 
 
Over the course of this work it has become obvious that terrorism is a deeply 
contested term. This however is not to say that the problem of terrorism is beyond 
apprehension. On the contrary, this observation in fact is more a criticism of the 
divided academic scholarship than terrorism itself. Terrorism, indeed is complex, 
multifaceted, and above all defies not only the existing categories and classification 
but also prevailing logic and reason. Even so, its understanding, as a matter of fact, is 
largely incapacitated by the competing, conflicting, contradictory, and often confusing 
academic positions. 
Given this predicament, the concluding task must therefore be to set out a criterion 
whereby these divergent academic positions can be reasonably structured and 
standardized. Amidst the range of problems that beset the scholarship, such an 
undertaking certainly appears impractical and unlikely. However, it is worth 
remembering here that all the major themes and issues discussed so far in this thesis, 
clearly also outline the underlying academic leanings, preferences, and dispositions. It 
should therefore be possible to discern some general pattern in our overall analysis 
and put forth at least a basic model that helps better contextualize the academic 
scholarship. 
In light of our fairly exhaustive analysis of all the major characteristics of terrorism 
(and also keeping broadly in line with the customary understanding of the discourse), 
I shall propose that the terrorism scholarship can be better understood by means of the 
following three academic positions: the classic orthodox, the extreme orthodox, and 
the critical position. The classic and the extreme orthodox positions originate from 
within the orthodox or traditional discourse on terrorism and are therefore named as 
such. The critical position on the other hand (although clearly discernable in both 
early and contemporary orthodox writings as well), came to prominence after the 
launch of the journal Critical Studies on Terrorism in 2008 with a vociferously 
expressed critical agenda and is thus named accordingly. This academic 
categorization primarily embodies the prevailing moral or ethical preferences of 
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scholars studying terrorism and for that reason corresponds directly to the moral 
continuum that was discussed in chapter 2. 
Out of the three categories, the critical and the extreme orthodox positions can be said 
to characterize the two opposing viewpoints on the moral continuum- moral and 
amoral respectively. This means that the extreme orthodox position essentially views 
terrorism as inherently evil and morally unjustifiable, whereas the critical position not 
only argues strongly against the inherent evilness of terrorism but also grants it the 
necessary justificatory space. Uncompromising and unyielding in their respective 
moral stances, both these two extremes have long been at loggerheads with each 
other. The third position, the classic orthodox, on the other hand can be regarded as 
the long-standing foundational position that does not take an extreme moral viewpoint 
and sits roughly in between the two extremes, sharing certain common elements with 
both. This position especially of late is often overshadowed by the more visible and 
dramatic extreme orthodox and critical positions. 
Although these three categories are not divided along any specific timelines, a certain 
position tends to be more dominant than others at any given time. The dominance of a 
certain position does not however mean that other positions simply disappear or have 
little or no relevance. Instead it only suggests that the other positions are either largely 
overshadowed or become somewhat secondary in importance. Additionally and 
perhaps also more importantly, it also entails that a dominant position has the 
potential to seep into and profoundly influence other positions. 
Before we discuss this any further, it must be pointed out at the outset that these three 
categories are not entirely exclusive as there is significant overlap between them. 
Scholars often tend to oscillate between these different positions and are not 
necessarily tied down to one particular approach. Even though some academics do 
strictly hold on to their predispositions (especially critical scholars), many still can be 
swayed otherwise (or at least influenced) by the dominant position. Nevertheless, this 
overlap does not repudiate or invalidate these positions, as a clear divide within the 
terrorism scholarship does in fact exist. Other than the divergent and conflicting 
academic viewpoints that have surfaced over the course of this discussion, the very 
emergence of the critical studies on terrorism with its agenda to challenge the 
dominant discourse is a direct proof of such a divide. 
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In terms of dominance, the classic orthodox, as the long-standing and the oldest of the 
three positions, was clearly dominant up until the early 1980s when the field of 
terrorism studies was still in its infancy. Gradually however, the extreme orthodox 
position gained ground and in due course took over as the dominant position in the 
early 1990s and held that stature for almost two decades. As the extreme orthodox 
position characterizes one of the extreme moral viewpoints, its dominance 
subsequently triggered a sharp critical response from the other end of the moral 
continuum. 
With terrorism being essentially political, the relative support each position draws 
therefore also depends considerably on the corresponding political events of the time. 
The prevailing political circumstances continually not only influence academic ideas 
and beliefs but also tend to dictate their relevance and appeal. This means that the 
dominance of a certain position is often largely determined by the political zeitgeist of 
the time. This strong correlation not only explains the relative sway each position 
commands at any given time, but as this discussion shall demonstrate, also 
significantly helps in outlining their essential features and characteristics. 
 
Classic Orthodox Position 
Soon after the Second World War, the world witnessed a rapid decline in inter-state 
conflicts and a mushroom growth of insurrectional violence in the form of nationalist 
and anti-colonial struggles. This shift encouraged the study of resistance movements 
and intrastate state conflicts, which subsequently led to a discourse on insurgency, 
guerrilla warfare and other similar forms of violent resistances.67 Since this discourse 
primarily viewed violence in the broader context of nationalism, self-determination, 
and anti-colonialism, most of the commentators adopted either a neutral or sometimes 
even a sympathetic moral attitude towards their object of study (although such moral 
considerations were typically reserved for only non-state actors). The insurgents, 
                                                
67 This is of course not to say that the state was no longer an object of study. In fact violence by states 
was deemed equally if not more important (See Walter, 1969). Instead, this is merely to point out that 
the academic focus shifted from state on state violence to intrastate violence that involved both state 
and non-state actors. Taking cue from Stampnitzky (2013), I will call this discourse as insurgency 
discourse. 
	198 
guerrillas, or rebels were largely viewed as rational actors that had well defined 
political objectives. 
In other words, the new insurgency discourse never viewed the actors or their actions 
in complete isolation and most importantly it never doubted the political intent and 
rationality of the actors, as Thornton assertively states, ‘We shall treat terror as a tool 
to be used rationally’ (1964: 71). The actors were thus not defined or confined by 
their identity and a mere allusion to the category of insurgent or rebel would 
concomitantly raise the question of context and perspective. Terrorism was merely 
seen as one of the means utilized to achieve an end. David Galula, Thomas Thornton, 
Brian Crozier, Richard Clutterbuck, Eugene Walter, and Ted Gurr can be regarded as 
the earliest protagonists of the insurgency discourse. It is from this discourse that the 
study of terrorism ultimately emerged. 
During the formative years of the insurgency discourse, references to terrorism were 
often few and far between. Both the act and the activity of terrorism were largely 
treated independent of the actor. The terms terror and terrorism were mostly used to 
describe certain activities that an actor would take up for some tactical advantage. 
This tactic or the method of terrorism was primarily understood in terms of generating 
fear or some psychological impact, which shows that the term terrorism was more 
often used in a literal sense. This partly also explains why the use of the word terror 
was more common than terrorism during this period. Lisa Stampnitzky in her thought 
provoking book Disciplining Terror has also made a similar observation. She points 
out that ‘Although the terms terror (and less often terrorism) did sometimes appear 
within the counterinsurgency literature, these were generally treated as a tactic or tool, 
and not as the defining feature of individual or group identity’ (2013: 52). 
By the 1970s a technological revolution in mass media was underway as satellite 
communication and live broadcasting was beginning to provide an easy and direct 
access to news around the globe. One of the most outstanding effects of terrorism, as 
we know, is publicity and effective newsmaking, as Groom notes, ‘… terrorism is 
news and that is one of its raison d'être’ (1978: 62). Hence, just as television sets 
became everyday household items, terrorism with its potential to generate fear and 
influence psychologically, began to draw attention of audiences on an unprecedented 
scale. This among other things allowed terrorism to capture headlines around the 
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globe and also greatly enhanced the popularity of terrorism as a cost-effective mean to 
an end. 
Since the tactic of terrorism due to its psychological ingredient and dramatic nature 
was deemed highly newsworthy, the media often conveniently focused more (or 
entirely) on the act than the wider conflict it was part of. This disproportionate 
attention subsequently transformed the importance and significance of terrorism both 
in relation to the movement it was part of and in terms of its wider impact on the 
society. 
This attention and impact, despite being disproportionate, demanded immediate 
academic attention, not only due to the growing popularity but also because of the 
inability of the wider society to comprehend the frequently isolated act of terrorism 
that was increasingly becoming more visible than the wider context it was part of. 
Thus, the tactic of terrorism from being on the periphery of the insurgency discourse 
eventually ended up taking the centre stage. And with the launch of the foundational 
core journal Terrorism: An International Journal (later Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism) in the late 1970s, terrorism formally emerged as a discourse in its own 
right. 
The rise of terrorism scholarship therefore can in large part be attributed to the 
revolution in mass media that made the tactic of terrorism more visible and larger than 
the context it existed in. Where this undue attention encouraged independent study of 
terrorism, it also in the process often divorced terrorism from its socio-political 
context. Although this severance was largely unintentional and driven primarily by a 
desire for profits (as will become evident over the course of this discussion), it proved 
to have an enduring and detrimental effect on not only the perception but also the 
study of terrorism in the long run. 
Here one must also acknowledge the role of growing insurgencies and civil wars 
during this period that frequently resorted to terrorism because of the tactical and 
strategic benefits it offered.68 Given that inter-state wars were in decline, the attention 
                                                
68 It is important to remember here that a reference to insurgency and civil wars does not presuppose 
the actor to be non-state, as any reference to insurgency, guerrilla warfare, or civil wars, as a rule also 
involves state actors. 
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accorded to terrorism as the most visible and dramatic feature of intrastate conflict is 
understandable. Even though terrorism was mostly employed sporadically and was 
largely dwarfed by other forms of violence both in terms of its frequency and 
casualties, it still stood out prominently due to its ability to grab headlines and capture 
public imagination. 
As the field of terrorism studies emerged from the study of insurgency and civil wars, 
it carried with it some remnants that were clearly characteristic of the preceding 
discourse. The characteristics that were assigned to terrorism were broadly in line 
with features that had long been associated with insurgents, guerrillas, or even 
repressive states. Thus, just like insurgency or guerrilla warfare, terrorism was first 
and foremost understood to be political and the actors engaged in the activity were 
largely believed to be rational. Both understood terrorism (or terror) primarily as a 
fear generating and psychologically influencing method or tactic that was largely 
independent of the actor. 
Thus, although the terrorism discourse by now had formally emerged as an 
independent field of inquiry, it still continued to study and observe terrorism just as 
the insurgency discourse did. For instance, even though the first few issues of the 
founding journal Terrorism focused on some conceptual and theoretical aspects of the 
term (See e.g. Jenkins, 1978; Lasswell, 1978; Merari, 1978, Knutson, 1980), a large 
number of articles engaged primarily with the ongoing insurgencies, including 
different left and right wing revolutionary struggles that were particularly 
characteristic of this era (See e.g. Whetten, 1978; Pisano, 1979; Anderson, 1980, 
Tugwell, 1981; Gregory, 1981). Thus, other than some very elementary conceptual 
work, little changed in the new scholarship. Terrorism was still very much entangled 
in its socio-political context and its so-called new study was little if at all any 
different. 
This is of course not to say that terrorism was not given any special importance, but 
instead to point out that there was no remarkable shift in the new discourse, which for 
the most part continued to deal with the same post-colonial problems. Terrorism was 
still largely viewed and studied in the broader context of insurgencies and 
revolutionary movements, just as it was in the preceding discourse. Moreover, there 
was also no noticeable change in the general understanding of terrorism. The 
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characteristics that were associated with terrorism in the insurgency discourse 
continued to shape and dominate the conceptual understanding of the nascent field. 
There are a number of factors that can help explain this continuity. Firstly, terrorism 
studies emerged from within the insurgency discourse and therefore it is 
understandable that it would also inherit some of its most fundamental tenets. 
Secondly, the emergence of the field, though somewhat sudden, was neither 
revolutionary nor reactionary, which allowed it to both value and absorb many of the 
preexisting traditions. Thirdly, there was no new breed of scholars that initiated and 
spearheaded the field. Most of its leading protagonists were trained in the preceding 
discourse and had been working on revolutionary and sub-revolutionary cultures or 
movements within the broader field of insurgency and irregular warfare.69 
Lastly, and also most importantly, the transition from insurgency to terrorism 
discourse was more out of terrorism’s growing popularity (because of the 
disproportionate attention it started receiving from media) than any real or perceptible 
change on ground. Hence, when academics set about to isolate and diagnose the 
problem, there was hardly anything new, distinct or unique about terrorism, at least 
not in a manner that demanded or necessitated a separate or new field of inquiry. 
Terrorism, therefore, for a brief period of time continued to be observed and studied 
in virtually the same manner. 
However, in spite of all these similarities between the two discourses, there appears to 
be one small difference. Although the early terrorism discourse strongly advocated 
actor neutrality and saw terrorism as a tactic that could equally be employed by both 
state and non-state actors, the new research agenda happened to be largely non-state 
centric. There are several reasons for this deliberate neglect and most of them have 
already been discussed earlier. Nevertheless, within the specific context of the 
emerging terrorism discourse, it is important to point out a number of additional 
factors. 
It was, as we know, the advent of media and mass communication that changed the 
popular perception about both the importance and uniqueness of terrorism and 
                                                
69 For instance, Martha Crenshaw, one of the earliest and most influential scholars in the field, started 
her academic career as an expert on the Algerian civil war (See Crenshaw, 2011).  
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subsequently also prompted a formal academic inquiry into the matter. Yet it is 
important to note that media’s hype over terrorism was essentially in response to non-
state acts of terrorism (which also includes state sponsored acts of terrorism) and not 
state terrorism. Mass media in fact played a very crucial role in ultimately shaping the 
non-state inference and perception of the term terrorism. 
Due to their control over the media apparatus, states on the other hand were able to 
often censor their involvement to wider audiences and channel it through to their 
select target instead. Non-state actors, in comparison, generally did not hold any sway 
over media and could therefore not control or influence the flow of information the 
way states could. This non-interference gave media outlets the license to report the act 
in a manner that most suited their profit driven interests. As a result, the terrorism 
attributed to non-state actors was not filtered for a select audience and was routinely 
broadcasted to any and all audiences across the globe. This unfiltered global 
transmission, as opposed to censored state terrorism, contributed greatly to the 
popular non-state inference of the term terrorism. 
Moreover, we also know that state actors generally do not take responsibility for their 
actions in the manner non-state actors normally do and a responsibility is generally 
attributed to them indirectly. Although from an academic standpoint an indirect 
responsibility should not be treated any differently from direct responsibility, for 
promotional and newsmaking purposes however, direct responsibility is often 
indispensable. For if the identity of the perpetrator is suspect or if an act is not 
attributed at all, then it could simply disappear from public consciousness and will not 
have the same shock and awe value. Therefore, even if state terrorism is clearly 
visible, it will still never get the same level of media attention as non-state terrorism. 
Wardlaw similarly observes, ‘When terrorism becomes institutionalized as a form of 
government it makes the headlines less often’ (1989: 11). 
Additionally, there were also some serious practical considerations that prevented 
scholars from doing little more than occasionally acknowledging state terrorism. 
Given that states openly denied any responsibility, the growing international norms 
and practices made it exceedingly difficult to implicate them in any meaningful way. 
Raising accusatory fingers at states amid their public denial were routinely shunned as 
acts of political bias. The politicizing of the term terrorism made it increasingly 
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difficult to study state terrorism in an analytically rigorous manner.70 It especially 
made it difficult for academics to implicate any of the existing states. As a result, any 
references to state terrorism were either hypothetical or historical. For instance, in a 
discussion on state terrorism, it became an exceedingly common practice to refer to 
either the Nazi or the Stalin era or both as leading examples of state terrorism (See 
e.g. Wilkinson, 1974; Laqueur, 1977). This was clearly because references such as 
these were deemed safe as they would not invite any criticism or provoke any 
backlash from academic or political circles. 
The problem of state neglect was further aggravated because of the difficulties and 
perils of conducting research on state terrorism. Due to state censorship of its 
activities, it was deemed incredibly hard to collect any data and field research of any 
kind was almost non-existent. As Groom pointed out, ‘… it is dangerous to conduct 
field research in contemporary regimes of terror. It is far easier to conceptualize the 
use of terror as a weapon to achieve a specific goal rather than as a form of regular 
and normal government’ (1978: 62). In the absence of primary research and reliable 
data, it was therefore somewhat convenient to mention state terrorism only in passing 
without actually engaging with the problem. 
Lastly, academic research of any kind often tends to rely heavily on government or 
state funding. Researches funded this way, even if not forced, may still have to take 
into consideration the political leanings and preferences of their respective 
governments. Even if officially funded researches were not completely state directed, 
they could still be heavily influenced. In other words, the political biases held by a 
state were frequently reflected in all such state sponsored researches. While 
explaining why researchers have failed to hold liberal democracies accountable for 
their terrorism, Ruth Blakeley explains, ‘The close links between liberal democratic 
governments and academics undertaking such research have nevertheless impacted on 
the field of terrorism studies, in that they further privilege work on threats by non-
                                                
70 This is not to say that the rhetorical use of the term would apply differently to non-state actors. 
Although clearly there has always been a degree of difference as states due to their privileged power 
position, sway over media, and international norms can both exploit and avoid the rhetoric better than 
non-state actors. However, this observation is in relation to taking active responsibility for one’s 
actions, which state actors regularly do not. 
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state actors against democratic states and their interests, and marginalize work that 
examines the complicity of those states in terrorism’ (2008: 158).71 
All of these problems associated with state terrorism subsequently culminated in an 
unaccredited yet widely pervasive practice of state neglect.72 This practice, though 
undesirable and unintended, over time became somewhat characteristic of the new 
discourse. Admittedly, the discourse consistently advocated actor neutrality and 
remained fairly critical of the notion of state terrorism, yet it failed to actively engage 
with the problem in any rigorous sense. Almost all references and allusions to state 
terrorism were either hypothetical or historical that clearly lacked any meaningful 
content and substance. As a result, it inadvertently promoted a research agenda that 
was almost entirely non-state centric. 
However, before drawing any final conclusions about this, it is important to point out 
that the tendency to focus primarily or almost entirely on non-state actors was not a 
deliberate or conscious decision by the emerging terrorism scholarship. Instead, it was 
part of a broader evolving tradition in the insurgency discourse that was itself 
gradually becoming more and more non-state centric. Leading scholars in the field of 
insurgency, such as Galula, Crozier, Clutterbuck, and Gurr, had principally focused 
on non-state actors in their analysis of insurgencies and irregular warfare. In fact, the 
main difference between their work and the terrorism scholarship was essentially only 
in terms of importance given to the terrorism tactic. 
Reasons for the prevalence of non-state centricity in the insurgency discourse are not 
very different from the ones that have already been discussed in relation to terrorism 
scholarship. What is important to note is that even though mass media and rise of 
intrastate conflicts (the two overarching features responsible for the non-state centric 
shift) certainly broadened and heightened both in importance and scope over time and 
                                                
71 Most of the reasons provided for ‘state neglect’ clearly apply today as well. This is mainly to show 
that the trends that are often observed today, especially in critical scholarship, are not entirely new and 
can be traced back to the time when terrorism scholarship first emerged. 
72 It is important to note that here state neglect is not the same as state exceptionalism. Where state 
exceptionalism reflects the non-state centric position, which argues that states cannot practice terrorism 
by virtue of their nature, state neglect is an active failure to engage with state terrorism especially while 
positing that terrorism is independent of the actor. 
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ultimately paved the way for terrorism scholarship, they were still very much 
characteristic of the post-WWII era when the insurgency discourse first emerged. 
This comparison to an extent seems unjustified as the insurgency discourse focused 
primarily on intrastate conflicts and had very little to say about terrorism. However, 
just as terrorism studies initially claimed to be independent of the actor, the 
insurgency discourse also never downplayed the role or the participation of a state in 
an insurgency. Yet due to reason discussed already, both adopted a somewhat non-
state centric approach to the problem. Moreover, given the close affinity between the 
two fields of study, it was important to understand that the non-state centric approach 
is not unique or new to terrorism scholarship but in fact follows an evolutionary 
trajectory that can be traced back to its predecessor discourse. 
The insurgency discourse thus had an immense impact on the nascent field of 
terrorism studies. Not only was there a visible continuity in content and context, but 
there was also no real change in the overall focus of research. Most importantly, the 
two shared a common understanding of terrorism, as it was believed to be a fear 
generating rational political method or tactic. Terrorism was primarily regarded as a 
mean to an end. And in spite of their shared non-state centricity, both were also very 
strong advocates of observing actor neutrality. 
Treating terrorism as a rational political activity in and of itself suggested that 
terrorism was never divorced from its socio-political context and was never viewed in 
isolation. This outlook subsequently also determined the moral attitude towards 
terrorism. It is important to remember here that this understanding of terrorism 
developed at a time when most of the ongoing intrastate conflicts were viewed 
through the post-WWII lens of nationalism and anti-colonialism. Therefore, not only 
were these conflicts generally viewed in a positive light, but there was also 
widespread sympathy for various non-state actors that were evidently resisting 
subjugation and fighting for their right of self-determination. Since terrorism was 
viewed as a tactic that was often employed by these resistance and revolutionary 
movements, it was not only believed to be rational and political but many 
commentators also granted it the necessary justificatory space. 
Hence, viewing terrorism in the broader socio-political context of nationalism and 
anti-colonialism allowed moral judgments to be contextual rather than predetermined. 
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Academics in particular were not predisposed to arrive at some fated moral 
conclusions. This is of course not to say that the activity of terrorism was not 
condemned. In fact terrorism was routinely and almost unequivocally condemned, its 
justification however, was believed to be circumstantial and therefore a different 
matter altogether. 
Although terrorism was granted this justificatory provision by both the discourses, the 
terrorism scholarship was understandably a touch more conservative than the 
insurgency discourse. This is because the insurgency discourse clearly had a much 
broader research agenda and focused on the wider aspects of conflicts. Terrorism was 
but one small factor among a myriad of others. Due to this lack of attention to 
terrorism specifically, any judgments related to it were highly contextual and 
dependent on various other intervening variables. In comparison, the terrorism 
discourse was terrorism specific (or at least it claimed to be) and for that reason alone 
it tended to be more guarded in its assessment. 
Admittedly, even though the content, context, and focus of the research had not 
changed in any noticeable manner, the claim alone to exclusively study terrorism- an 
unquestionably pejorative term- was always going to be difficult and controversial in 
terms of its moral justification. Thus, where on the one hand the discourse’s terrorism 
specific agenda made moral judgments awkward, there on the other hand its 
association with the insurgency discourse made similar moral justifications 
permissible. The result was a muted and sometimes often confusing moral position. A 
quick survey of the early discourse reveals that moral justifications for terrorism were 
often only theoretical and as a result were mostly restricted to hypothetical and 
historical references (See e.g. Wellman, 1979; Coady, 1985). 
Use of historical or hypothetical references in place of contemporaneous examples 
clearly demonstrate the hesitancy of the field regarding moral judgments. 
Nevertheless, despite this hesitancy, the justificatory provision was still an important 
and in many ways a defining characteristic of the new terrorism discourse. Even 
though the provision was essentially theoretical, it was still a vital constituent of the 
overall conceptual edifice of the new terrorism discourse. Moreover, just like other 
outstanding attributes of terrorism it too demonstrated continuity and progression of 
the preceding insurgency scholarship. 
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The dominant themes during the early years of terrorism scholarship thus continued to 
reflect the fundamental tenets of the preceding discourse. Although there was some 
dissension and opposition right from the start, the infancy stage of terrorism 
scholarship was largely dominated by a position that was shaped and crafted through 
characteristics acquired from the insurgency discourse. This position though dominant 
for only a very brief period of time, is extremely important as it not only manifests the 
foundational understanding of terrorism but also encapsulates the earliest formal 
academic enquiry into the problem. Since the position developed out of a long 
tradition that ultimately culminated in the establishment of terrorism discourse, it will 
be appropriate to refer to it as the classic orthodox position. 
 
The Extreme Orthodox Position 
Terrorism scholarship confronted a range of complex issues at the time of its infancy. 
From finding raison d'être for its emergence and continued existence to asserting itself 
as a new and an independent field of inquiry, the infant discourse was marred with 
difficulties. The problem was further compounded by the different and conflicting 
moral positions that failed to either give or permit a clear direction or path to the field 
of terrorism studies. Unable to gain any suitable direction at the time of its inception, 
the field instead fragmented and fractured along these deeply entrenched moral lines. 
With the political element being the least common denominator for terrorist violence, 
the importance or the dominance of any moral position was largely contingent on the 
political events of the time. 
The political landscape started changing drastically by the mid 1980s. The colonial 
struggles and the cold war confrontation that had defined the post-WWII era were 
now coming to an end. In other words, the events that had brought the phenomenon of 
terrorism to limelight started waning just when a formal enquiry into the subject 
began. The new political developments also brought new frames of references that 
encouraged a dormant moral position in the terrorism scholarship to surface and 
dominate the research agenda. This position challenged many of the conventional 
wisdoms regarding terrorism and pushed for new and often novel approaches to solve 
the problem. Before we analyze the essential characteristics of this position, it is 
important to look at the events that led and contributed to its rise. 
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During the 1980s many of the anti-colonial struggles and other left and right wing 
revolutionary movements, that had been characteristic of the post-WWII era, started 
to run out of steam. Most of these revolutionary movements had either failed (e.g. the 
Baader Meinhof group) or were assimilated in the political process (e.g. Tupamaros). 
And the few that were left were simply beginning to lose their appeal (e.g. 17N). The 
collapse of Soviet Union in particular served a deathblow to various leftwing groups 
around the globe. This was a turning point in recent history not just in terms of end of 
the ideological divide between the East and the West, but also in terms of attitude 
towards revolutionary armed struggles in general.73 
As pointed out earlier, moral attitudes towards popular resistances, immediately after 
the Second World War, were overly positive. This is because all intrastate conflicts 
were generally viewed through an anti-colonial/imperial lens. Revolutionary leaders 
such as Che Guevara and Fidel Castro, who openly advocated violent resistance and 
guerrilla warfare, were revered and glorified all over the world. However, by the time 
the century drew to a close, the attitude and popular perception began to change. 
Colonialism and imperialism, in the conventional sense of the term, were considered 
somewhat dead and a thing of the past. The popularity of revolutionary ideas and the 
romanticism attached to violent resistance and guerrilla warfare slowly began to 
wane. 
The revolutionary struggles along with the cold war had dominated the global 
political agenda for a good part of the second half of the twentieth century. As the 
cold war drew to a close and revolutionary struggles declined steadily, there was no 
outstanding issue that was grand in its scale and far-reaching in its effect to transcend 
borders and dominate global agenda. 
Traditionally, such omnipresent characteristics have only been associated with issues 
that were clearly visible and self-evident. The defining spirit or zeitgeist at any given 
time, in other words, had to be glaringly obvious to take effect (such as the cold war 
or the two World Wars before that). This, however, changed with the advent of mass 
media. Through satellite communication and live broadcasting, media was able to 
                                                
73 Such was the magnitude of this event that Francis Fukuyama in his much-celebrated 1989 essay 
referred to it as ‘the end of history’. Although his remarks were more in reference to the end of Soviet 
Union and the supposed triumph of the Western values. 
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reach audiences all across the globe. This meant that even a small and insignificant 
event could easily become important and well known. Media’s pervasiveness, when 
coupled with an activity that was able to captivate an audience and influence them 
psychologically, provided just the right ingredients to achieve the scale and effect 
necessary for an issue to dominate global agenda. 
Terrorism had already started generating headlines as early as 1970. The true extent of 
its capacity to draw large audiences through media first became evident during the 
1972 Munich Olympic massacre. On September 5, 1972, members of the Black 
September Organization, a Palestinian nationalist group, took several Israeli athletes 
hostage and demanded the release of a number of Palestinian prisoners in Israel. All 
Israeli hostages were subsequently killed after a failed police rescue attempt. The 
drama unfolded at the Olympic stage, which was being broadcasted to a global 
audience. 
This incident is often regarded as the event that ushered the age of modern terrorism. 
As Stampnitzky observes, ‘… it was the massacre at the 1972 Munich Olympics that 
took on central symbolic significance in the history of terrorism. The events at 
Munich have been inscribed in popular and expert histories of the problem alike as the 
spectacular event that inaugurated the era of modern terrorism’ (2013: 21). 
Interestingly, it was neither the scale of violence nor the number of casualties that 
made this incident so significant. Instead it was the manner in which the platform of 
media was utilized to draw attention for a political cause. It was the first time that an 
act of political violence had deliberately sought media attention in front of an 
unprecedented audience. The attention and impact it generated, thereupon inspired 
numerous other disgruntled actors to employ similar tactics to register their political 
grievance or defiance. It especially encouraged weak non-state actors with limited 
capabilities to achieve worldwide recognition and attention. The 1972 Munich attacks 
and the events that followed in its wake, thus paved the way for media incentivized 
political violence. Such violence (then increasingly referred to as terrorism) would 
soon become a defining characteristic of the last quarter of the twentieth century, just 
as the cold war and anti-colonial frames of references were becoming obsolete. 
The turn of the century was therefore a pivotal moment for terrorism as the 
momentous changes during this time had a metamorphic effect on its popular 
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understanding and perception. Firstly, the attitude towards all forms of revolutionary 
and violent resistance movements began to change considerably as they were no 
longer seen as positive signifiers. Secondly, the USSR started to crumble under its 
own weight and with that all the left-wing movements it supported and inspired also 
began to recede. Thirdly, and perhaps also most importantly, the phenomenon of 
terrorism, assisted by media, began to emerge as the most outstanding issue of the 
time.74 
The role of mass media in setting the stage for terrorism to transform from a context 
specific fear-generating tactic to a globally significant phenomenon is unquestionably 
paramount. Even though terrorism was an extremely cost-effective tool, its over-
projection by media ultimately proved to be detrimental to not only its cause and 
perception but also its study. Driven by profits, mass media had always been more 
interested in the shock and awe value of terrorism and conveniently therefore focused 
more on the act than its cause or motive. As the phenomenon of terrorism began to 
replace the cold war and post-colonial frames of reference, this severance of the 
violent act from its wider socio-political context went on to determine the dominant 
research agenda of the terrorism scholarship. 
Terrorism studies, as we know, primarily emerged in response to excessive media 
attention and growing popular sentiments. The importance given to terrorism 
deceptively suggested that there was something unique or enigmatic about it that 
demanded immediate attention. Terrorism thereupon became a matter of academic 
urgency. However, when a formal academic enquiry in the form of terrorism studies 
was launched, many academics failed to find anything new or distinct. As a result, 
instead of departing from past trends and charting its own course, the new discipline 
adopted the same conceptual and theoretical framework as its predecessor discourse. 
Over time as the political zeitgeist began to shift in favor of terrorism, the media 
attention given to the act of terrorism in comparison with its wider context also 
became increasingly disproportionate. Distancing the act from its socio-political 
context reinforced the idea that terrorism was fundamentally unique or different from 
other forms of violence. As the act became increasingly more pronounced than the 
                                                
74 Although this transition did not take place up until the very end of the twentieth century, terrorism 
had steadily been growing in popularity since the early 1970s. 
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underlying context, wider perception of terrorism and the actors engaged in it also 
began to change considerably. Terrorism was now predominantly viewed as immoral, 
evil, irrational, and devoid of any sensitivity or human emotion. Moral attitude 
towards terrorism was thus predetermined and was no longer considered a matter of 
deliberation. As Peter Neumann’s assertion demonstrates, ‘Terrorism had degenerated 
into a form of irrational bloodlust which could burst out anywhere for any reason’ 
(2009: 3). 
As the scholarly communication with respect to terrorism research has always been an 
open one (i.e. the flow of information is primarily from external sources such as 
government documents and media sources) (Gordon, 2011: 116), the growing popular 
resentment along with media’s representation of terrorism, eventually made its way 
into the field of terrorism studies. Since the field was still in its infancy, this injection 
prompted the rise of a new and somewhat extreme position that strictly opposed the 
premise of terrorism scholarship, which it saw as deep-rooted in an outdated and 
foregone discourse. It found the conventional understanding of terrorism too soft and 
archaic to account for any of the existing challenges. 
Interestingly however, in spite of its strong opposition, the new approach did not 
reject the classic orthodoxy entirely. Instead, it argued that the classical approach was 
only applicable to past instances of terrorism. And as the nature of terrorism had since 
evolved significantly, the traditional understanding of terrorism was no longer 
deemed relevant. Thus, where the extreme orthodoxy acknowledged that terrorism in 
the past was rational, calculated, politically motivated, discriminate, and often good 
and legitimate, there on the other hand it posited that contemporary terrorism was 
irrational, evil, indiscriminate, and never justifiable under any circumstances. Swayed 
by popular perception and media projection, it argued that there was something 
fundamentally different about modern-day terrorism. Classic orthodoxy was believed 
to be wrong footed and ill equipped to deal with a problem that had transformed 
completely. 
The view that classic orthodoxy was only historically relevant gained significant 
currency as the new approach became dominant over time. Ironically the charge was 
led by Laqueur, who is regarded by many academics as the leading historian in the 
field of terrorism studies. Laqueur points out that ‘there is no escaping the fact that 
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nineteenth century terrorists acted according to standards very different from those 
prevailing at present… the driving force is hate not love, ethical considerations are a 
matter of indifference to them, and their dreams of freedom, of national and social 
liberation, are suspect precisely because of their personalities ’ (1977: 132). It was 
this merging of the terrorist act and the actor into a distinct terrorist identity that 
would ultimately became a defining characteristic of the new orthodoxy. 
By suggesting that terrorism was rational, political, and often justifiable in the past, 
but irrational, necessarily evil, and unjustifiable in the present, the new orthodoxy not 
only turned the conventional wisdom regarding terrorism on its head, but also 
encouraged a contradictory and paradoxical understanding of it. Even though this 
contradiction was able to thrive because there was no agreed definition or a sound 
conceptual basis of terrorism, it soon became evident that such a confusing and 
contradictory edifice would be analytically unsustainable in the long run. 
Subsequently, the term new terrorism emerged to address this contradiction and 
distinguish modern-day terrorism from its supposedly distant and in many ways, 
irrelevant history. The notion of new terrorism and what it represents epitomizes the 
essential features of the extreme orthodoxy in the discourse. 
A range of different terms and expressions began to emerge as the extreme orthodoxy 
set out to distinguish terrorism in its current manifestation from its somewhat 
misleading past. Laqueur, for instance, famously used the expression ‘post-modern 
terrorism’ (1996) to describe the revolutionary change in terrorism. Glen Scheweitzer 
and Ehud Sprinzak referred to it as ‘superterrorism’ (1998) and ‘hyperterrorism’ 
respectively (2001). Over time however, the term new terrorism gained currency and 
became the most commonly used expression.75 Nevertheless, whether post-modern, 
super, hyper, or new, all these different prefixes in effect demonstrate attempts to 
characterize modern-day terrorism as something distinctly and fundamentally 
different from conventional terrorism. As Kurtulus states ‘In the contemporary 
academic literature, ‘new terrorism’ refers to a qualitative change in the nature of 
terrorism, which has allegedly taken place during the 1990s’ (2011: 477). 
                                                
75 While the terms used to make the new terrorism distinction have continued to vary greatly, the 
difference between them to a large extent has been purely terminological (Kurtulus, 2011: 494). 
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As the notion of new terrorism is essentially a product of strict moral opposition to 
terrorism, it forwarded a range of assumptions that accentuated terrorism’s 
immorality. Indiscriminate, random, mass destruction, civilian and innocent targeting, 
are among its most frequently highlighted features. Interestingly, some of these 
elements have regularly featured in the classic orthodoxy as well. However, where the 
classic orthodoxy would observe caution and allow for exceptions, the new terrorism 
discourse instead inflated these attributes and granted no allowance. Thus despite the 
overlap, there was a visible difference in degree and emphasis. 
The biggest point of departure however was not in terms of some distinct 
characteristic but in the stand out contention that terrorism could no longer be treated 
as a mean to an end. The new terrorism discourse argued that the recent developments 
clearly demonstrate that terrorism had transformed from being a mean, to an end in 
itself. As Mathew Morgan’s assertion clearly demonstrates, ‘For many violent and 
radical organizations, terror has evolved from being a mean to an end, to becoming 
the end in itself’ (2004: 30). Treating terrorism as an end in itself was a significant 
break from the past as it undermined some of its most fundamental and long-standing 
assumptions in the process. 
On the one hand, the suggestion that terrorism was not a mean, effectively ruled out 
any practical or functional utility of terrorism. On the other hand, its treatment as an 
end evinced complete lack of political (or for that matter any other) intent. The new 
terrorism discourse not just encouraged a focus on the act instead of intent and 
context, but in fact suggested that the act was all there is to terrorism. Although it is 
true that even the classic orthodoxy had been swayed by the disproportionate attention 
the act of terrorism received due to its nature, yet it never contested the broader 
context terrorism was part of. Conversely however, through conflating means and 
ends, the new terrorism discourse categorically precluded any underlying socio-
political context. The phenomenon of terrorism, the actor responsible for it, and the 
broader context it was part of, were all effectively reduced to just the act of terrorism. 
Terrorism subsequently was given the characteristics of an ideology (which was 
briefly discussed in the last chapter). This visible departure from the past thereupon 
set the tone for future research to follow. 
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Although new terrorism became popular only in the 1990s, as Mark Juergensmeyer 
says ‘The last decade of the twentieth century was the decade of the new terrorism’ 
(2009: 158), the roots of the phenomenon were actively traced back to the events of 
1960s and 1970s (See e.g. Neumann, 2009). There are two important reasons for 
claiming such lineage. First, the methods that were typically associated with modern-
day terrorism such as hijacking, hostage taking, mass bombings etc. were believed to 
have originally erupted on the world stage during this period. Second, most of the 
terrorist organizations or movements that were deemed characteristic of the new era 
were either seen as continuation of the groups or events that transpired during this 
period or were at least thought to have been inspired by them in some way. 
Drawing lineage from the events that transpired in the 1960s and 1970s should in 
principle also suggest that modern-day terrorism in some ways is a variation or 
continuation of Post-WWII ethno-nationalist and other left and right wing 
revolutionary struggles. However, a quick survey of the discourse reveals that this is 
not the case. Far from being ethno-nationalist or left/right wing, new terrorism is 
believed to be predominantly religious in its motivation and drive (See e.g. Veness, 
1999; Pinto, 1999; Dishman, 1999; Raufer, 1999; Schbley, 2004; Etzioni, 2010). The 
genealogy of new terrorism, traced back to the 1960s and 1970s, is therefore more of 
a specific reference to a movement during that period than the era as a whole. 
As pointed out earlier, the 1972 Munich attack proved to be a watershed event in the 
recent history of terrorism. It not only inspired weak non-state actors to employ 
similar means to punch well above their weight, but also brought the Palestinian cause 
to the wider attention of the world. Although the Palestinian cause was first and 
foremost nationalistic, there was a visible religious side to it as well that in particular 
resonated with Muslims around the world who saw it as a vestige of Western 
Imperialism and a constant reminder of their fall of grace. Downtrodden and 
demoralized by not just their inferior position in the world but also by the constant 
political instability and infighting that plagued the entire Muslim world, the Palestine 
cause in many ways served as an inspiring and unifying factor.76 Even though the 
                                                
76 The religious significance of Jerusalem, the Muslim-Jewish confrontation, and the American support 
of Israel are among some of the most outstanding factors that inspired Muslims around the globe. 
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Palestinian conflict was primarily nationalist, it managed to trigger deep-seated 
grievances that over time became more and more religious in their outlook. 
Hence, in an era where nationalist and left/right wing movements were still dominant, 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was perhaps the most standout conflict with an 
unmistakable religious dimension.77 And since new terrorism is believed to be 
primarily religious, its roots can therefore conveniently be traced back to this most 
significant conflict of the time. Additionally, as the dominant movements of this era 
gradually lost their appeal and many simply vanished over time, the Palestinian 
struggle not only continues to exist to this day but has also inspired several parallel 
and overlapping movements over the years. It is this inspiration both in terms of 
specification of method and ideology that prompts such historical inferences. 
It is important to point out here that this historical reference to the early Palestinian 
liberation movement does not undermine or neglect other factors that are frequently 
credited for the rise of Islamic terrorism. Instead, it merely alludes to the somewhat 
obvious yet often overlooked fact that historical inferences for Islamic terrorism from 
the events of 1960s and 1970s could only be drawn from the Palestinian liberation 
movement. This is not only due to the absence of any other major religious movement 
at that time but also because most of the other factors credited for the rise of Islamic 
terrorism typically refer to events that transpired much later. Rapoport, for instance, 
credits the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, the beginning of a new Islamic century, 
and the unprovoked Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, as the three events that 
were vital for the launch of the fourth wave of terrorism (2001: 61). Although he 
refers to this fourth wave as the ‘religious wave’, he concedes that ‘Islam is at the 
heart of the wave’ (Ibid). Rapoport’s waves of terrorism are particularly crucial for 
proponents of new terrorism thesis as many take cue from it and even though he never 
                                                
77 While there were certainly other notable Islamist movements at the time (such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood under Sayyid Qutb in Egypt), they did not enjoy the same level of media and popular 
attention as the Palestinian conflict. This is because firstly most of them were operating in authoritarian 
Muslim countries where media was often strictly regulated and so they never received the same level of 
attention. Secondly, as an internal challenge, they did not present a threat to the wider international 
community. Thirdly, most of these challenges were homegrown within predominantly Muslim 
countries, for that reason they did not have the same appeal as the Muslim-Jewish confrontation that 
particularly resonated with the entire Muslim world and also had a greater publicity value globally. 
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used the term himself, many still draw comparisons between his fourth wave of 
religious terrorism and the religiously inspired new terrorism (See for e.g. Kurtulus, 
2011). 
Nevertheless, where Rapoport’s fourth wave can be interpreted as new terrorism, his 
third wave can be seen as setting the tone for religiously inspired new terrorism. In his 
analysis of the third wave which he believes began in the early 1970s, Rapoport refers 
to groups like Viet Cong, the American Weather Underground, Red Army Faction, 
the Italian Red Brigades, the Japanese Red Army, the Irish Republican Army, and the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Where his analysis clearly reveals that 
nationalist and left/right wing movements were still visibly dominant at this time, the 
PLO (despite being primarily nationalistic) was the only group that had a pronounced 
religious dimension to its conflict and as other movements subsequently disappeared, 
the Palestinian liberation struggle continued to inspire new movements in its wake 
(2001: 56-61). 
Thus, the Palestinian liberation struggle that began soon after the Second World War 
and came to worldwide attention during the 1972 Munich attack can be regarded as an 
antecedent to modern-day religious or (to be more precise) Islamic inspired 
terrorism.78 On the one hand, it directly inspired local movements specific to the 
Palestinian cause such as Hezbollah and Hamas and on the other hand it served as an 
indirect inspiration for transnational organizations with wide-ranging objectives such 
as Al-Qaeda.79 Where the local groups were often at the centre of terrorism research 
in the early 1980s, the transnational groups became overly dominant in the discourse 
from 1990s onwards. This progression from the locally inspired to transnational 
organizations formally marks the arrival of new terrorism. 
                                                
78 Although new terrorism is described as religiously inspired, its genealogical references to the 1960s 
and 1970s clearly show that it draws its lineage from only Islamic inspired acts of terrorism. Moreover, 
references to religions other than Islam are almost non-existent in the new terrorism discourse. To refer 
to new terrorism as religiously inspired, though not inaccurate, is therefore unnecessarily generic and 
also somewhat misleading. Instead, Islamic inspired terrorism will perhaps be a more accurate 
description of the new terrorism thesis. 
79 Where the inspiration for Hamas and Hezbollah is clearly straightforward, transnational 
organizations like Al-Qaeda have also vocally expressed their support for the Palestinian cause (See 
e.g. Byman, 2003; Mendelsohn, 2009) 
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Although initially inspired by the Palestinian cause, it is believed that many of the 
religiously motivated organizations eventually moved away from it. This shift became 
more pronounced as the local Palestinian groups were superseded by transnational 
Islamic terrorist organizations that had a range of different objectives. As 
Juergensmeyer asserts ‘The new terrorism emerged in the 1980s from more traditional 
forms of political conflict in the Middle East. Gradually, along with pro-Palestinian 
acts of political violence, new strands of strident Muslim terrorism began to appear 
that were unrelated to the Palestinian or any other definable political cause’ (2009: 
158). Similarly, Veness suggests that ‘especially in 1990s, terrorism appears to have 
changed more than it ever has since the contemporary ‘re-birth’ of terrorism in the 
1960s’ (1999: 8). 
It is important to point out here that this historical reference, despite being very 
narrow and specific, is neither commonly treated as a benchmark nor even necessarily 
seen as a precedent. Instead, it is only intended to vaguely explain the evolutionary 
trajectory of new terrorism- in terms of its method and ideological motivation. 
Despite its somewhat lose lineage, new terrorism is believed to be both qualitatively 
and quantitatively different from the terrorism of 1960s and 1970s and not just 
terrorism prior to that (See e.g. Morgan, 2004; Kurtulus, 2011). Thus, even though the 
hijacking, kidnapping, and bombing along with Islamic inspired terrorism was first 
systematically observed in the 1960s and 1970s, there are supposedly two 
fundamental differences that sets it apart from new terrorism. First, despite involving 
similar forms of tactical methods, old terrorism was not entirely indiscriminate, at 
least not in the manner new terrorism was thought out to be. Second, the objectives of 
the groups were mainly nationalistic and only secondarily religious as opposed to new 
groups that were deemed to be first and foremost religiously inspired. 
As discussed in chapter 2, the indiscriminate factor is generally understood in terms of 
terrorism’s unpredictability and failure to distinguish between combatant and 
noncombatant or guilty and innocent. Despite this however, terrorism before the 
advent of new terrorism was expected to abide by some basic guidelines and standard 
rules of engagement. Terrorism in a sense was believed to be somewhat selectively 
indiscriminate. 
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The general idea is that if terrorism is a rational political activity then it will be goal 
driven and careful in its selection of target and method of violence even if it is 
ultimately indiscriminate. This is because targets and methods that would draw 
intense criticism and alienate the intended audience entirely would prove to be 
detrimental to the group and its cause. Jeanne Knutson, while outlining some implicit 
rules of the terrorist game, points out that the terrorists, as rational political actors are 
usually wary of a maximum and minimum threshold of violence that is to be inflicted. 
If the violence is too low then it will fail to gain any attention and if it is too high then 
it will result in an undesirable backlash (1980: 206). 
Thus, certain targets, methods, and thresholds have conventionally been off-limits for 
terrorism. In terms of its direct targets, terrorism was not expected to target places like 
hospitals, schools, retirement homes etc.  With regard to its choice of methods, it was 
presumed that terrorism would not use unconventional weapons, especially weapons 
of mass destruction. Lastly, in respect of threshold, terrorism was expected to observe 
some form of restraint and not cause mass casualties. In other words, terrorism, when 
rational and political, could still be indiscriminate as long as it was conservative in its 
target selection, modus operandi, and level of intensity. 
The advent of new terrorism, however, purportedly altered this longstanding 
perception regarding terrorism. Believed to be neither rational nor political, new 
terrorism was not bound by any conventional guidelines or rules of engagement. In 
fact, it was understood to have categorically broken all erstwhile practices including 
implicit rules regarding selective indiscriminate targeting. Accordingly, new terrorism 
was declared to be rash in its target selection, audacious in choice of method, and 
unrestrained in its intensity. Terrorism was now totally and unreservedly 
indiscriminate. 
The shift from selective to total indiscrimination is usually seen as an ineluctable side 
effect of the move from rational and political terrorism to religiously inspired new 
terrorism. It will, however, be erroneous to make such a putative assumption without 
taking account of the underlying factors and the corresponding events of the time. 
Since terrorism allegedly made the shift to total indiscrimination in the 1990s, it is 
important therefore to look at some of the major events and developments of the time 
that may have prompted such a transition. 
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With the collapse of USSR in early 1990s, the cold war confrontation, which had 
shaped global politics and dominated news agenda for almost half a century came to 
an abrupt end. As wars and direct confrontations between states became increasingly 
uncommon, terrorism propped up by media and its own innate ability to draw large 
audiences, became the most visible form of violence. Since media actively focused on 
the act rather than the context of terrorism, the most visible form of violence also 
became one of the most loathed. This moral opposition was further augmented by the 
change in perceptions regarding all forms of revolutionary and subversive struggles, 
which were no longer seen through anti-colonial/imperial lenses. The change in 
attitude towards revolutionary struggles in particular is an important factor. It is 
important because terrorism by then was increasingly seen as a non-state activity and 
therefore growing disapproval of all subversive violence in general did not bode well 
for it. 
Spurred by this unfavorable backdrop, proponents of new terrorism set out to 
vindicate their moral standpoint by pointing out two important recent developments 
that were not only novel and unprecedented in their nature and scale but also 
reprehensible and inexcusable in their outcome. 
The first of the two developments was the emergence of the phenomenon of suicide 
terrorism, which since the 1980s became increasingly frequent and was regarded as 
the most outstanding hallmark of modern day terrorism. Although suicide violence in 
and of itself was not considered new, its association with religiously inspired 
terrorism however is thought to have transformed its character. It was seen as a tool 
that was exploited for its greater lethality and capacity to cause mass casualties both 
discretely and indiscriminately. Thought to be religiously inspired, the phenomenon is 
believed to have emerged out of the Palestinian and the broader Middle East conflicts 
(See e.g. Pape, 2003). The 1983 suicide attack on the US Marine barracks in Lebanon 
is considered to have ushered the age of mass casualty indiscriminate terrorist 
violence. As Michael Horowitz states, ‘the Lebanon bombing in the early 1980s 
signaled a new era of suicidal military activity… The non-state nature of the act, the 
casualties from the initial demonstrations, and the media coverage make the early 
Lebanon bombings the appropriate point at which the innovation should be 
considered mature’ (2010: 40-41). Suicide bombing from then onwards became one 
of the most prevalent and frequently observed form of terrorism. 
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The second important development was regarding the use of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs) that appeared after the end of cold war. This development was 
primarily in response to the serine gas attack on a Tokyo subway in 1995 by the 
apocalyptic group Aum Shinrikyo. As Christopher Hughes says ‘Events such as the 
Aum Shinrikyo’s sarin gas attack… have placed terrorism at the top of the post-Cold 
War security agenda’ (1998: 39). 
The use and production of WMDs has traditionally been associated with only states. 
Throughout the cold war the greatest threat was regarding a potential nuclear 
showdown between the two superpowers. However, after the fall of USSR (coupled a 
sharp decline in interstate conflicts and a steep rise in violent non-state activity), many 
of these fears were transferred to non-state actors. Although initially there were 
concerns regarding both the capability and willingness of non-state actors to use 
WMDs, the Tokyo subway attack however shattered this longstanding taboo. The 
attacks in other words demonstrated both the willingness and the ability of a non-state 
actor to use unconventional weapons that could potentially cause mass casualties. 
Since both suicide attacks and willingness to use WMDs were seen as part of the 
evolving raison d'être of terrorism (as the new terrorism thesis suggested), the terrorist 
activity was therefore clearly no longer conservative in its target selection, modus 
operandi, and level of intensity. Suicide attacks coupled with the willingness to use 
WMDs thus help explain the shift from selective to total indiscrimination. Where the 
readiness to use WMDs manifested the desire to cause mass casualties, there the 
suicide attacks demonstrated a group’s level of commitment and dedication to achieve 
that very objective. As Dolnik points out, ‘The fact that suicide operations produce a 
large number of casualties and that they are often used indiscriminately seem to make 
organizations using this method primary candidates for escalation to the level of 
CBRN weapons’ (2003: 18). The suicidal act of self-immolation paired with weapons 
intended for total annihilation also generated moral revulsion and undermined the 
political intent and rationality of the actors. 
As the shift from selective to total indiscrimination shaped the moral attitude towards 
terrorism, it subsequently also had a huge impact on the focus and direction of future 
terrorism studies. Since terrorism seemingly was no longer political and the terrorists 
were no longer rational, many academics focused not on the intent or context but on 
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the irrationality and unruliness of the terrorist behavior. Given the novelty of the 
benchmark Tokyo subway attacks, where for the first time a non-state actor used 
biological weapon with the intention of causing widespread destruction, many 
scholars looked for unusual and novel ways in which terrorism could inflict its total 
indiscriminate violence. 
Joseph Foxell for instance believes that there is a potential catastrophic terrorist threat 
to livestock and agricultural infrastructure. Referring to it as ‘agroterrorism’, Foxell 
points out that ‘The relatively indirect and indiscriminate nature of an agroterror 
attack meshes perfectly with the perceived shift in terrorism goals, which have 
ostensibly veered away from attempting to achieve specific political results and 
instead increasingly seek the destruction of ‘enemy’ societies’ (2001: 107). Robert 
Baird likewise postulates that there is a very real and possible threat of terrorists 
igniting massive wildfires. He coined the term ‘pyro-terrorism’ for this novelty and 
argues that it could ‘rival the destructive force of nuclear weapons’ (2006: 415). 
Similarly, Robert Bunker warns about the dangers of laser weapons and believes that 
the clock is ‘literally in countdown mode to terrorist use of laser weapons’ (2007: 
452). Bunker argues that this shift in terrorist modus operandi was due to the rise of 
newly inspired religious terrorists that were increasingly seeking to inflict mass 
destruction. Pointing to Islamist groups, he observes that ‘The newer religious 
terrorists that arose in the late 1980s, specifically Al Qaeda and its affiliates, are 
looking to use weapons of mass destruction to create high levels of deaths and 
overwhelming damage’ (p. 449). 
Such alarmist predictions were propped up by the claim that terrorism was no longer 
local or regional, neither in its operations nor in its aspirations. Instead, terrorism was 
now seen as a transnational activity with global nihilistic ambitions. It was this 
blanket assertion that encouraged and permitted such frightening prognostics to 
flourish. As opposed to being hierarchical and highly centralized in the past, terrorism 
was now believed to be loosely networked and decentralized. This idea was first 
propagated by Arquilla and Ronfeld in 1993. They point out that the modern age was 
‘favoring and strengthening network forms of organizations, while simultaneously 
making life difficult for old hierarchical forms’ (1999: 193). Calling this development 
‘netwar’, they believe that ‘network-based conflict and crime will become major 
phenomenon in the decades ahead’ (p. 195). Although their notion of ‘netwar’ did not 
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catch on but the idea of networks as opposed to hierarchies became one of the most 
recurring themes in the discourse. 
It is important to remember here that new terrorism was first and foremost believed to 
be religiously (Islamic to be precise) inspired. As Daniel Masters says ‘The new 
terrorism is defined by a tendency towards maximum destruction and a pronounced 
religious motivation’ (2008: 396). The decentralized network thesis was therefore 
primarily utilized to account for the pervasive transnational character of religious or 
simply terrorism. 
New terrorism, as we know, traces its roots from the Palestinian conflict that emerged 
on the global stage in the 1960s and 1970s. The conflict initially inspired struggles 
that were primarily regional and local in their ambitions. Over time however, such 
regional aspirations were supposedly overtaken by a desire for global domination. 
This change in ambitions was purportedly due to ideological reorientation as groups 
in the past were primarily nationalist and only secondarily religious, whereas the 
contemporary groups were principally motivated by unwavering religious ideologies 
with adherents willing to sacrifice their lives for their beliefs. 
Religious ideologies as opposed to nationalist or separatist tend to transcend borders 
and can therefore have sympathizers and supporters all across the globe. It was this 
global appeal that supposedly allowed the decentralized networks to thrive and 
flourish. Nevertheless, for a religious ideology to enjoy such cross-border appeal, it is 
important first that it cuts through societal divisions (such as race, culture, ethnicity 
etc) and is unvarying and standardized. Because if it is not (as is often the case with 
religious ideologies), then the internal divisions will seriously restrict both its lure and 
proliferation and will not allow the networks to form in the first place. In other words, 
for the Islamic ideology to have universal appeal, it was necessary that it was uniform 
and homogeneous. 
It is for this reason that the advocates of the new terrorism thesis presented Islamic 
extremism as a monolithic threat that was homogeneous in its composition and 
universal in its appeal. However, in order for this to happen, there had to be a 
transnational organization or movement first that was widely endemic and 
fundamentally religious. Conveniently enough, after the September 11 attacks, that 
organization emerged in the form of Al Qaeda. Thereafter, the academics not only 
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focused on the worldwide pervasiveness of Al Qaeda, but also linked it to various 
regional and local Islamic militant groups. 
David Jones et al. observe pattern of terrorist networks in Southeast Asia and 
conclude that its genealogy demonstrates ‘both the long-term thinking and planning of 
Al Qaeda, and its protean and diffuse character, which enables it to connect to 
Islamist movements as far afield as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Singapore’ (2003: 452). Lawrence Cline in an article titled From Ocalan to Al Qaeda 
tries to link the Islamist militant groups in Turkey with Al Qaeda. His linkage, 
however, appears completely superfluous and largely speculative. In fact, Cline barely 
even mentions Al Qaeda and primarily discusses the ongoing militancy in Turkey 
(2009: 322). 
Some academics were also convinced that Al Qaeda was not only keen but was in fact 
in the process of developing WMDs. For this reason many actively compared Al 
Qaeda with Aum Shinrikyo- the only group that ever used WMDs. As Gavin 
Cameron says ‘Al Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo were intent on acquiring a non-
conventional weapon of mass destruction; whether that weapon was nuclear, 
biological or chemical was of secondary importance’ (1999: 297). Hellmich and 
Redig argue that the rational calculations that prevented the nuclear holocaust during 
the cold war do not apply to Al Qaeda (2007: 392), as it has an explicit ‘desire for 
mass annihilation’ (p. 382). They believe that the only obstacles the group has faced 
up to now are technical and tactical and ‘neither is likely to remain an obstacle for 
long’ (p. 393). 
Jordan and Boix have identified six ‘special characteristics’ of Al Qaeda that aptly 
summarize the prevailing attitude towards the organization at the time. They point out 
that: the ideology of Al Qaeda respects no frontiers, it is decentralized and networked, 
its adherents blend in with the community, it has the tendency to spread, it has a 
willingness to use WMDs and cause mass casualties, and lastly it intends to bring 
about a global cultural clash (2004: 2-5). 
Since the new terrorism thesis presented a monolithic picture of Islamic terrorism, it 
therefore either played down the longstanding ethnic and sectarian tensions in Islam 
or simply chose to ignore them. As is evident in Schbley’s assertion that ‘Since 9/11, 
however, an emerging mode of conflict identified as netwar… is assiduously working 
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on patching these deep wounds between Islamic sects, which are being miraculously 
healed’ (2004: 211). Jones et al. similarly point out that Bin Laden was ‘more than 
willing to overlook his Sunni provenance to collaborate with Shiite Iran to further the 
global jihadist cause’ (2003: 448). Such assertions over time not only proved to be 
grossly exaggerated but also fundamentally wrong (as witnessed during the Shiite-
Sunni sectarian violence that ensued in the aftermath of US invasion of Iraq). 
Understanding of new terrorism as a monolithic Islamic threat that was apocalyptic in 
its beliefs, totally indiscriminate in its conduct, and loosely networked in its 
organization, further strengthened the conviction that terrorism was no longer political 
or rational. Although some new terrorism scholars would still argue that terrorism is 
rational and even distantly political, such assertions however appear out of place as 
they contradict the overall edifice of the new terrorism thesis. Suggesting for instance 
that terrorism is rational but totally indiscriminate or arguing that it is political yet 
also apocalyptic is visibly self-contradictory- as terrorism clearly cannot be a rational 
activity if it intends to destroy the society and it also cannot be political if it harbors 
irrational apocalyptic beliefs. 
Nevertheless, whether religious or not, even the idea of decentralized networks made 
the underlying socio-political context of terrorism somewhat redundant and 
contributed to the body of knowledge that found terrorism’s socio-political goals 
suspect. For if terrorism was loosely networked with no central chain of command, 
and if each cell was largely autonomous in its operations and undertakings, then an 
organization clearly had no discernable ideological or political standpoint. 
Additionally, the transnational character of the organization also suggested that 
terrorist organizations due to their networked nature had no specific headquarters or 
hideouts and could therefore operate anywhere. This element of unpredictability 
further magnified the colossal threat posed by terrorism. Terrorism, in addition to 
being totally indiscriminate could also happen anywhere and at any time. 
Decentralized and amorphous, with an active desire to use weapons of mass 
destruction through an act of self-immolation if necessary, stripped terrorism off its 
morality completely. Such egregious categorization of terrorism ultimately led to the 
dehumanization of terrorists as well. The difference between terrorism and terrorist 
actor eventually evaporated and instead an abhorrent and a very confusing terrorist 
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identity subsequently emerged that could only be condemned and anathemized. 
Raufer’s characterization of terrorists as ‘lifeforms’ is a case in point. He thinks that 
‘we are witnessing an almost biological, uncontrollable, and, thus far, uncontrolled, 
proliferation of dangerous, complex entities that are very hard to identify, understand 
and define’ (1999: 35-36). 
Terrorists were thus cast out as anomalies and aberrations that did not deserve the 
same treatment as ordinary humans. Many academics in fact went on to argue that the 
rights granted to ordinary citizens should not be extended to terrorists (See e.g. 
Turner, 2011). Etzioni believes that terrorists should not be treated as either soldiers 
or criminals because ‘terrorists are a distinct breed that require a distinct treatment’ 
(2010: 5). He insists that ‘terrorists should not be incarcerated for a set period of time’ 
like ordinary criminals, because the purpose of detention is to prevent criminals from 
committing a crime again and terrorists would certainly resort back to their ways as 
long as their misconstrued grievances persist. This prompts him to suggest that the 
Palestinian prisoners in Israel should only be released ‘once the conflict between 
Israel and Palestine is finally settled’ (p. 6-7). Similarly, Pedahzur and Ranstorp 
propose an ‘expanded criminal justice’ model to separately deal with what they 
consider as the exceptional problem of terrorism (2001: 6). 
As the new terrorism thesis took centre stage, there was a strong backlash from the 
classic orthodoxy to challenge and contest its frightening prognostics.80 To begin 
with, classic orthodoxy found the notion of ‘new’ highly questionable. By drawing 
comparisons between the so-called old and contemporary terrorism, it challenged the 
fundamental assertions of the new terrorism thesis. It insisted that the historical 
parallels between the two demonstrate continuity and not change. Merari while 
assessing the past and present trends in terrorism concludes that it ‘has not changed 
much in the course of a century, and virtually not at all during the last 25 years’ 
(1999: 53). Tucker similarly concludes that ‘there is little that is new in the new 
terrorism, and what is new is not necessarily more dangerous or difficult to counter 
than the old’ (2001: 1). Isabelle Duyvesteyn also believes that ‘from a historical 
                                                
80 It is important to note here that many new terrorism scholars often claim to take their cue from 
prominent classic orthodox scholars like Wilkinson, Crenshaw, and Hoffman. Therefore, among other 
things, it was necessary for classic orthodoxy to retaliate firmly and rebuff such distorted patronage. 
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perspective there are several reasons to be hesitant about the application of the label 
new’ (2004: 440). 
Through historical references, the classic orthodoxy not only drew parallels between 
old and contemporary terrorism but was also able to challenge the newness and 
unusualness of the most outstanding attributes of new terrorism. Silke, for instance, 
examines the novelty of suicide bombing which is deemed characteristic of modern-
day terrorism. He believes that ‘Explanation of suicide in terms of madness, 
brainwashing, coercion, and fanaticism rings hollow with many of the historical 
cases’ (2006: 35). He asserts that the spectacle of suicide has historically played a 
very significant role especially in political and military context. Tracing this 
military/political significance to the ancient Roman Republic, he argues that suicide 
makes perfect logical sense when an individual’s death can have a greater socio-
political impact than his/her continued life (p. 37). Silke concludes that ‘The tendency 
to ignore experiences from earlier decades and centuries creates wasteful blind spots. 
The assumption that our contemporary problems are unique, and that history is largely 
irrelevant, is not simply naïve but borders on criminal neglect’ (p. 44). 
Similarly, terrorist use of WMDs and the notion of indiscriminate violence has also 
been heatedly contested. Hoffman argues that in spite of all the prevailing assertions 
terrorists ‘have remained remarkably conservative operationally’ and ‘gun and bomb 
remain the terrorist’s main weapon of choice’ (2001: 417). David Claridge suggests 
that there are two main reasons, strategic and logistic, which help explain why 
terrorists do not use weapons of mass destruction. The strategic reasons relates to 
traditional cost-benefit analysis. At the strategic level, terrorist as rational actors are 
wary of ‘uncertain political consequences’ and ‘unequivocal international 
condemnation’ (1999: 140-142). This strategic logic corresponds to Knutson’s 
implicit rules of terrorist game whereby terrorists are cautious about breaking certain 
thresholds. The logistic factor, on the other hand, relates to obtaining the necessary 
materials, laboratory apparatus, technical skills, cost of the undertaking etc. (p. 139-
140). 
The logistical factor has over the years received considerable attention from adherents 
of the classic orthodox position. Since the 1995 Aum attack was treated as a 
watershed event, many debated and questioned the merit of such a benchmark. 
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William Rosenau, for instance, timely reminds that the Aum attack, despite being the 
first and most dangerous of its kind, was ultimately a failed attack. As a non-state 
actor, Aum was an extremely powerful and influential actor with billions of dollars in 
assets. Its failure therefore ‘suggests that requirements for mass-casualty bioterrorism 
are considerably higher’ (2001: 297). Rosenau provides a detail account of the various 
technological and organizational hurdles the organization confronted while 
developing its biological weapon. Similarly, Brian Jackson discusses the difficulties 
non-state actors generally face when acquiring new technologies and concludes that 
‘chemical and biological weapons are not simple technologies’ and that there are 
‘significant technical obstacles to producing and using WMDs’ (2001: 205). 
There has also been a strong criticism of decentralized networks and transnational 
character of new terrorism. Its critics argue that decentralized transnational networks 
are not a unique characteristic of modern day terrorism and can be traced back to the 
anarchists in the 19th century. Duyvesteyn points out that the anarchist movement of 
the 19th century was networked ‘instead of hierarchically based’ (2004: 444). She also 
points out that more recently many traditional terrorist organizations such as the IRA 
in Great Britain and the Red Army Faction also had similar transnational networks 
(Ibid). In similar vein, Tucker also notes that contemporary terrorism is ‘Neither more 
networked nor ad hoc than earlier versions’ (2001: 5). Additionally it is also pointed 
out that although contemporary organizations tend to be networked, many still have a 
central command in place. Therefore to assume that hierarchies are a thing of the past 
is clearly misleading. As Alexander Spencer notes that ‘there are clear signs of 
hierarchical command structures in new terrorist organizations’ (2006: 23). He 
concludes that hierarchies and networks are found in both old and new terrorism (p. 
25). 
Lastly, there has been a strong backlash against the so-called religious character of 
new terrorism. Scholars have repeatedly drawn historical parallels to show that 
religious terrorism is not a new or novel occurrence and point to various groups in the 
past that had a visible religious dimension to their violence. One of the earliest 
religious groups cited in the literature are the Jewish Zealots in Palestine during the 
first century and the Ismaili Assassins during the Middle Ages (Chaliand and Blin, 
2007: 55-78). In addition to this, critics also challenge the assertion that new terrorism 
is entirely or completely religious in its motivation. Instead they argue that 
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contemporary religious terrorism, just as its predecessor, has a visible political 
dimension. As Duyvesteyn notes, ‘new terrorism can be seen as both religious and 
political at the same time’ (2004: 447). Spencer suggests the same for Islamist 
inspired groups and points out that ‘although the actions of Islamist terrorist groups 
are religiously motivated they still have a certain political agenda’ (2006: 14). 
Insistence on seeing a political dimension to the religiously motivated terrorism is a 
crucial factor for various reasons. In classic orthodoxy (and in the insurgency 
discourse before that) terrorism is first and foremost believed to be political. And even 
though the definitional problem has plagued terrorism scholarship since its inception, 
the political factor has consistently been regarded as the base ingredient. Without the 
political factor therefore the classic orthodoxy especially was at a total loss at what 
was being studied. 
It is important to also note that religious motivations for new terrorism were not being 
understood in any rational or logical sense. Instead, religiously inspired terrorists were 
seen as fanatics and extremists that were determined to destroy the very fabric of the 
society by any means possible. With no rational political considerations to restrain 
them, religiously motivated terrorists were believed to be the greatest threat facing 
mankind. As Alan Dershowitz says ‘The greatest danger facing the world today 
comes from religiously inspired terrorist groups that are seeking to develop weapons 
of mass destruction’ (2002: 2). 
It is worth remembering here that the discourse on mass violence and use of WMDs 
formally emerged after the 1995 Tokyo subway attack, as Merari points out 
‘Following this incident there has been a gush of publications addressing the prospect 
of terrorism by weapons of mass destruction’ (1999: 53). The attack, largely believed 
to be terroristic, was the work of the apocalyptic group Aum Shinrikyo. Aum’s 
objectives, just like any other apocalyptic or cultic group, were purely in the realm of 
fiction and imagination. Led by a delusional yet charismatic leader, Shoko Asahara, 
the group believed in an impending apocalypse, which only its devout followers 
would be able to survive (Lifton, 2004: 65). Disillusioned and misguided and with 
millions of dollars at its disposal, the group hastened to jumpstart this imminent 
apocalypse. By using unconventional weapons, it intended to trigger a chain of 
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cataclysmic events that would destroy the existing society and pave the way for its 
imaginary post-apocalyptic world order. 
The objectives of Aum, though somewhat distantly political, were certainly not 
rational. However, irrationality is not just characteristic of Aum but of all apocalyptic 
and millennial groups or cults in general. Led by prophecies and fantasies, they view 
the wider world with disdain and disgust and conform strictly to their very narrow and 
myopic viewpoint. Their beliefs and objectives appear bizarre and outlandish to 
anyone that is not part of the group. Their violence (or any other action for that 
matter), as a result, is outrightly dismissed as illogical and mindless. 
Aum’s categorization as a terrorist group therefore stands in contradiction to standard 
norms and practices. The group did not have a message to communicate to a broader 
audience nor did it try to create any kind of psychological impact. Moreover, it did 
not have any rational political demands or grievances. And lastly, it did not present 
any future danger from its thousands of adherents, since many were completely 
unaware of what Asahara and his close confidants had been planning. As Daniel 
Metraux says ‘There is no evidence that the rank-and-file members of Aum were 
involved in, or even knew about the criminal activities of their leaders’ (1995: 1154). 
This is evinced by the fact that the group, which survives to this day, has not engaged 
in any violent activity since the Tokyo subway attacks more than two decades ago. 
Here it is important to remember that Aum was regarded as a terrorist organization 
primarily in the Western discourse. In Japan, the group was not taken seriously and 
was largely dismissed as a bizarre religious cult with irrational beliefs and objectives 
(Koblentz, 2011). Aum’s portrayal as a terrorist organization in the Western media 
and discourse can in fact be seen as part of the growing post-cold war practice to 
focus primarily on the threat posed by non-state actors. 
Due to the fall of USSR and the steady decline in inter-state wars, both the academic 
and popular attention had shifted towards intrastate conflicts and violence involving 
non-state actors. With terrorist acts being the most visible and standout manifestation 
of all such conflicts, media (as the primary communicator of terrorist violence) 
conveniently focused on the act of non-state terrorism than its socio-political context. 
Over time, this undue attention became further pronounced until terrorism was seen as 
nothing more than a physical act of senseless brutality. 
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Thus, as the disproportionate attention given to the act of terrorism increased 
considerably during the 1990s, so did the distance between terrorism’s means and 
ends. The objectives and even the rationality of the actors, as a result, became 
increasingly irrelevant. Subsequently, sub-state violence of any kind that shared a 
physical resemblance with acts that were typically understood to be terroristic 
(broadly non-state acts of violence that generated fear) was quickly labeled terrorism 
without any forethought or consideration. Moreover, due to the increasingly 
disapproving attitude towards all forms of sub-state violence in general and terrorism 
in particular, the more moral revulsion an act generated, the more terroristic it was 
deemed. This is what ultimately became a defining characteristic of new terrorism and 
in extension the extreme orthodox position.81 
Since, terrorism and terrorists were being judged solely in relation to a certain type of 
violent act, it is not at all surprising that the attack by Aum was instantly judged to be 
terroristic. The attack shared a very close resemblance with what was routinely being 
described as terrorism at the time. It had not only caused a number of seemingly 
random casualties but had also generated considerable amount of fear in its immediate 
aftermath. More importantly and decidedly however, it was the work of a non-state 
actor that had used dangerous biological weapons, which caused moral revulsion and 
universal condemnation. Aum, in other words, clearly met the criteria set up by the 
dominant extreme orthodox position. 
However, Aum did not simply just meet the criteria but in fact added an extra 
dimension to the emerging dominant understanding of terrorism. Through its act of 
total indiscrimination, Aum was able to extend visible and vocal support to the 
extreme orthodox claim that terrorism was now both qualitatively and quantitatively 
different. Even though its attack did not cause too many casualties, its use of 
biological weapons to jumpstart a worldwide apocalypse expressly demonstrated its 
willingness to do just that. Some of the extreme orthodox forebodings regarding the 
destructive and harmful power of contemporary and future terrorism were now 
evidently no longer hypothetical. In a sense therefore, the Aum attack not only 
                                                
81 For extreme orthodoxy, terrorism was simply a morally reprehensible and indefensible fear-
generating act of sub-state violence. 
	 231 
manifested but also magnified the attributes that were beginning to be associated with 
new terrorism.  
Thus, Aum’s desire to destroy the existing social order and its unusual choice of 
weapon to achieve that end, provided impetus and credibility to the extreme orthodox 
assertion that terrorism was now willing to break all thresholds and was no longer 
going to play by the rules. 
Its most significant impact however was in terms of the manner in which Aum’s 
apocalyptic and cultic beliefs lent unequivocal support to the idea that both the 
objectives and rationality of the terrorists were becoming increasingly redundant. 
Where this clearly provided the extreme orthodoxy with additional justification for 
finding terrorism morally repulsive and indefensible, there it allowed the apocalyptic 
logic to be extended to other contemporary terrorist groups. 
Such logic was particularly applicable to groups that had a religious dimension to 
their violence, since almost all religions including Christianity and Islam harbor some 
form of apocalyptic or messianic beliefs (See e.g. Rapoport, 1988; Cooper, 2005). As 
Lorne Dawson says ‘The refrains of apocalyptic rhetoric can be heard throughout 
history and the world though they are most pronounced in the three great religious 
traditions of the West: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam’ (2009: 11). In a sense 
therefore, the goals and objectives of all religiously inspired groups could 
alternatively be understood in apocalyptic and messianic terms, which among other 
things, allowed religious terrorist groups to be compared with the likes of Aum 
Shinrikyo and other millennial groups. Comparisons such as these ultimately shaped 
the understanding of new terrorism. 
As the apocalyptic character of religious groups was singled out and comparisons 
with other millennial groups were drawn, the political and other objectives of the 
groups became distinctly irrelevant. A group’s stated grievances or grudges thereof 
were either outrightly ignored or were simply shunned and cast aside as illogical or 
dishonest. Subsequently, even groups that were previously thought to be nationalist or 
separatist and only secondarily religious were now duly reassessed. 
Moreover, since religion tends to transcend borders, ethnicities, and nationalities, the 
apocalyptic threat it presented was believed to be widespread, endemic, and 
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transnational. This widely pervasive transnational character was supposedly 
facilitated by a system of decentralized networks that was held together by the unitary 
and monolithic appeal of the religion. This allowed religious terrorism to not only 
maintain indigenous cells all across the globe but also inspire lonewolf actors that 
adhered to similar religious ideals. Even local and regional groups that were distantly 
religious were now seen as part of the monolithic transnational religious movement. 
Their respective individual objectives in the process were either trivialized or 
dismissed altogether. Instead, they were all believed to be first and foremost united in 
their faith, sharing a similar apocalyptic view of the world. 
Understanding of religiously inspired terrorism in an apocalyptic sense clearly 
conflated means and ends. Just like apocalyptic and messianic cults, terrorists did not 
have a message to communicate to a wider audience. Their beliefs, objectives, and 
grievances were similarly fictional and unintelligible. Violence no longer had any 
thresholds, as the entire society was the enemy. The choice of weapon was not 
conventional or conservative but unusual and appalling. Targets were not selected for 
their symbolic or representative value but because they did not adhere to the group’s 
strict ideology. Death and destruction was no longer a calculated tool that was 
employed sporadically and selectively but was instead an objective in itself. There 
were no standard rules of the game, there were no freedom fighters, guerillas, or 
insurgents that employed terrorist tactics, there were just terrorists. 
Such conflation of means and ends not only drew a clear line between an old and a 
new understanding of terrorism but also between the classic and extreme orthodox 
positions. With extreme orthodox claims that classic orthodoxy was only applicable to 
the past, there was understandably an open confrontation between the two. And just as 
the former became the dominant position, the classic orthodoxy launched a strong 
counteroffensive, vehemently opposing its most basic assertions. 
The strongest opposition was concerning the rationality and political nature of 
terrorism. This is because, despite all definitional problems, the classic orthodoxy has 
always treated terrorism as a rational and political activity. Without these two base 
ingredients, many leading classic orthodox adherents (such as Wilkinson, Crenshaw, 
Jenkins, Merari, Silke, and Schmid) expressed serious concerns over the future 
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direction of terrorism studies. For if terrorism was an irrational and a purposeless 
activity then how could it be studied in an analytical or a scientific manner? 
Given that the extreme orthodox position justified its standpoint by pointing to Aum 
Shinrikyo and its 1995 Tokyo Subway attack as proof of terrorism’s irrationality and 
desire for total annihilation, adherents of classic orthodoxy were highly skeptical of it. 
Since Aum was an archetypal apocalyptic group, irrational and without any 
discernable political objectives, classic orthodoxy was highly critical of any 
comparisons drawn with nationalist, separatists and other traditional terrorist groups. 
As Claridge notes ‘the argument that the Aum attack is some kind of watershed is 
groundless. No serious organization would want to be compared with Aum’ (1999: 
143). 
Questions therefore were raised as to whether Aum should even be regarded as a 
terrorist actor and if it was right to treat it as a benchmark for the so-called religiously 
inspired new terrorism. The claim that there was a global monolithic religious threat 
(emanating from Islamic fundamentalism) that shared a similar apocalyptic view of 
the world was particularly scrutinized. Other than pointing out the political grievances 
of all such religious groups, critics also noted that the presence or emergence of such 
groups was not a novelty. It was argued that groups with religious dimension to their 
violence have existed throughout history. What was different or new however was the 
attention that was given to the religious element. As Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and 
Nicholas Rengger pithily observe ‘it is not really that religion has suddenly been 
resurgent, but rather that Western scholars, policy makers, and journalists have begun 
to take more note of it’ (2006: 544). 
This undue attention given to religion was clearly in large part due to its inherent 
apocalyptic character that permitted comparisons with the likes of Aum, thereby 
amplifying the threat posed by religion in general. Additionally, as we know, media 
has always given disproportionate attention to the act of terrorism than its context. 
With terrorism now described as an irrational activity that intended to destroy the 
existing social order with WMDs, the subsequent media attention of terrorism not 
only became more disproportionate and visibly pronounced but due to strong 
academic patronage was also deemed justified. 
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Following the September 11 attacks, this disproportionate attention given to the act of 
terrorism along with the extreme orthodox support of it escalated sharply. The moral 
attitude towards terrorism as a result also began to change drastically. Although 
classic orthodoxy too had routinely condemned terrorism, it was nevertheless always 
somewhat flexible over the question of its justification. The extreme orthodoxy on the 
other hand not only condemned terrorism unequivocally but also ruled its justification 
out of hand. In fact, anything short of total and unequivocal condemnation and 
rejection of terrorism was met with contempt and opprobrium, so much so that any 
form of moral justification for terrorism was often equated with encouraging it (See 
e.g. Dershowitz, 2002; Jones and Smith, 2010). Thus, the classic orthodoxy, with its 
justificatory space and moral neutrality, was simply no longer considered relevant. 
With terrorism believed to have been radically transformed, the extreme orthodox 
position was judged to be the only position that fully grasped and understood the 
challenges this new threat posed. 
Deemed outdated and outmoded, the credibility of classic orthodoxy as an academic 
inquiry into the problem of terrorism was now seriously threatened. Struggling for 
survival and relevance, the classic orthodoxy launched a strong counteroffensive 
against the notion of new terrorism and the extreme orthodox position. 
This strong backlash was considered necessary for not only the continued relevance of 
classic orthodoxy, but also due to the detrimental effect that the extreme orthodoxy 
was having on both the study and general understanding of terrorism. Its effect 
became apparent when its forebodings and predictions failed to materialize and after 
many of its suggestions and recommendations backfired. For instance, despite its 
repeated warnings regarding future use of WMDs, no group even came close 
employing such weapons. The strategic and logistical barriers to obtaining and 
utilizing WMDs, as the classic orthodoxy had insisted, were proving to be 
considerable obstacles. Similarly, its depiction of Islamic terrorism as a monolithic 
threat turned out to be largely misplaced as fragmentation and infighting between 
different Muslim sects and ethnicities in the aftermath of Afghanistan and Iraq 
invasions and the Arab Spring became widely prevalent. 
Most noticeably perhaps, the extreme orthodox assertion that terrorism no longer had 
any logical political ambitions and was irrational and apocalyptic, not only turned out 
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to be grossly inaccurate but also an unsustainable oversimplification. As over time the 
political and rational logic of terrorism became glaringly obvious and was very hard 
to ignore or refute (See e.g. Pape, 2003; Hoffman, 2003; Fierke, 2009). Even groups 
like Al Qaeda that was seen as an apocalyptic terrorist group by extreme orthodoxy 
had visible political objectives. Although these objectives were largely ignored in the 
immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, however, as the US war on 
terrorism floundered and as Al Qaeda continued to attract and inspire new recruits 
despite being pursued by a super power for over a decade, its political and rational 
dimension could hardly be disregarded. 
Thus, as these new political realties surfaced, the façade of the extreme orthodox 
position was gradually exposed and as a result its dominance slowly began to wane. It 
is important to note however that this fall from grace is only in reference to its loss of 
stature as the dominant position in the terrorism scholarship. Beyond academia, 
however, it continued to enjoy wide support in both media and political circles. 
Media and the extreme orthodox position have always enjoyed a mutually beneficial 
relationship since both essentially focus on the act of terrorism than its wider socio-
political context. Driven primarily by profits, media, as we know focuses mainly on 
the dramatic, sensational, and newsworthy aspects of terrorism. Conveniently for 
media, the extreme orthodox position with its forebodings and warnings about WMDs 
and mass annihilation, presented a very dramatic and chilling account of terrorism 
that had an immense commercial value. The extreme orthodox position provided an 
academic warrant to media’s disproportionate representation of the act and its 
exaggerated portrayal of the terrorist threat. Thus even when the extreme orthodoxy 
became highly questionable in the academic discourse and lost its dominant status, it 
continued to enjoy overwhelming support of media. 
Similarly, on the other hand, government and policy analysts are also drawn towards 
the extreme orthodox position. The reasons for such attraction are diverse and 
complex and certainly beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, it will suffice to 
say here that government representatives and policy makers are fairly wary of 
unfavorable outcomes that can result in public backlash or political fallout. Borrowing 
from the logic of prospect theory, policy makers generally tend to be loss averse, as 
they are greatly concerned about ‘a decline in their reputation or credibility’ (Levy, 
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1992: 285). A fear of loss can therefore not only prompt them to take great risks but 
can also make them pay excessive and unnecessary attention to potential losses. 
Moreover, the greater the alarm or some perceived fear of loss, the greater will be the 
attention directed towards it. Since a threat of WMDs and mass destruction represents 
irreversible loss and unimaginable damage, the importance given to extreme 
orthodoxy is certainly understandable. 
Thus, media’s relentless quest for dramatic and sensational news and government’s 
propensity to lean towards the alarmist end of the spectrum ensured continued 
survival of the extreme orthodox position. Since terrorism is essentially an open 
scholarly communication system with information flowing from mainly government 
and media sources, the support of both media and government made the extreme 
orthodox position standout despite facing strong resistance from within the field. In 
other words, even though the position was no longer dominant and many of its 
fundamental assertions had either been quashed or proven to be wrong, it still did not 
diminish altogether. 
This sustained importance understandably caused considerable friction in the 
academic discourse. Although opposition to the extreme orthodox position was 
certainly not new, it became more visible and pronounced after the position lost its 
dominant status because of the emerging political realities that unveiled its failings. 
However despite its obvious inadequacies, it still managed to secure crucial support 
from media and government sources and for that reason continued to play an 
important role in the discourse. It was this continued importance and unconditional 
media and government patronage that reinvigorated the academic resolve to challenge 
and oppose the extreme orthodox position more determinately and forcefully than 
ever before. 
 
The Critical Position 
The classic orthodox position, which had been under tremendous pressure following 
the September 11 attacks, started to reemerge just as the war on terrorism began to 
flounder and the failure and façade of the extreme orthodox position became blatantly 
apparent. Among other things, it continued to oppose and challenge the fundamental 
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assertions of the extreme orthodox position. However, the continued existence and 
importance accorded to extreme orthodoxy despite the damage it had already rendered 
to the study of terrorism made some academics highly skeptical of classic orthodoxy’s 
commitment to challenge it effectively. Moreover, since extreme orthodoxy emerged 
from within the mainstream terrorism scholarship, many simply failed to distinguish 
between the two orthodoxies. Distrustful and mindful of the entire scholarship as a 
result, the disgruntled scholars set up a parallel research agenda with claims to 
emancipate the study of terrorism. 
Inspired by the Frankfurt School, this new research agenda identified itself as critical 
studies on terrorism and formally emerged with the launch of the journal Critical 
Studies on Terrorism in 2008. Disappointed and frustrated with what it saw as 
demonization and compartmentalization of terrorism as an evil and immoral form of 
violence, it started with a strong and forceful critique of the orthodox terrorism 
scholarship. Using Michel Foucault’s notion of power-knowledge interplay it argued 
that knowledge especially in the context of terrorism is subservient to power and 
government elites (Burke, 2008). Through various post-modern and critical 
approaches, it tried to explain the dominance and continued government support for 
the extreme orthodox position. 
The critical position strongly objected to the categorical rejection of terrorism on 
moral grounds. By comparing terrorism to other forms of violence, it argued that 
terrorism, in terms of its intensity and violence was far less destructive and dangerous. 
It firmly opposed the view that terrorism is an abhorrent or evil form of violence and 
that terrorists should be treated differently and denied basic human rights. It 
advocated moral neutrality and argued that terrorism was no more condemnable than 
other forms of violence and if other forms of violence were justified, then so was 
terrorism (See e.g. Held, 2004; Dexter, 2012). The critical position in particular 
dismissed the notion of new terrorism and rejected the extreme orthodox claim that 
there was a distinct and qualitatively different form of religiously inspired terrorism 
that was apocalyptic and nihilistic in its drive and ambition (See e.g. Stohl, 2008; 
Spencer, 2011). 
It becomes somewhat obvious that the rise of critical studies was essentially a reaction 
to the dominant extreme orthodox position. Its assertion that the threat of terrorism 
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was blown out of proportion coupled with its robust challenge to the notion of 
religiously inspired terrorism was clearly a response to the new terrorism thesis. 
Similarly, its unwavering advocacy of moral neutrality was a visible rejection of 
extreme orthodoxy’s outright condemnation and denunciation of all terrorist violence. 
Interestingly however, where one the one hand such contentions demonstrate critical 
position’s strict opposition to extreme orthodoxy, there on the other hand they reveal 
that the criticism offered was not very different from the one provided by classic 
orthodoxy. In fact, its contentions go on to show that there is little, if at all any, 
difference between critical and classic orthodox conception of terrorism. Both give a 
justificatory space to terrorism, are mindful of observing moral neutrality, warn 
against isolating the act of terrorism from its wider socio-political context, and 
forcefully reject the notion of new terrorism and all that it entails. Such overlap is 
somewhat unexpected, given that the critical position claims to denounce the entire 
orthodox terrorism scholarship. 
As discussed already, part of the reason why critical scholarship repeatedly failed to 
acknowledge this overlap was due to the fact that the extreme orthodox position 
emerged from within the mainstream terrorism discourse, which made it difficult to 
isolate it entirely. Furthermore, the extreme orthodox position was clearly the more 
visible and vocal of the two positions that not only dominated the discourse for over a 
decade but also continued to enjoy wide media and government support even after 
many of its fundamental assertions had been quashed by the classic orthodox position. 
Nevertheless, despite this overlap and a shared understanding of terrorism, there was 
one important factor that stood out prominently in the critical research agenda. This 
factor was regarding the identity of the terrorist actor. The critical position argued that 
the terrorist activity should be independent of the actor and strongly criticized the 
orthodox terrorism scholarship for being deeply non-state centric. In fact it posited 
that non-state centricity was the most hypocritical and deceptive feature of 
mainstream terrorism discourse. This profound opposition to non-state centricity in 
due course became the most outstanding and recognizable feature of critical 
scholarship. 
Critical position’s preoccupation with the terrorist identity can in part be explained by 
its theoretical predisposition. As the position took its inspiration from post-modern 
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and critical approaches in social sciences, knowledge-power interplay was at the heart 
of its thesis. It was essentially centered on the core assumption that knowledge is not 
neutral and all to often serves power so as to conceal ‘its political function within 
claims to objectivity and expertise’ (Burke, 2008: 37). In other words, the critical 
position saw non-state centricity in terrorism scholarship as a condition that had 
deliberately been imposed by the state or powerful elites to further their own interests. 
This, it argued was due to the pejorative and derogative undertone of the term 
terrorism that states utilized as a delegitimizing tool to condemn and criticize their 
opponents.  
For the critical scholarship therefore, the identity of the actor and an understanding of 
existing power dynamics was a crucial and a necessary first step to solving the 
problem of terrorism. For it believed that only through exposing the concealed power 
dynamics could the nature of terrorism be truly liberated- nature that was otherwise 
independent of the actor. This idea that the nature of terrorism is independent of the 
actor, though elemental to critical conception of terrorism, is in itself not new. The 
roots of this line of thinking can be found in earlier works especially in the field of 
philosophy. 
Philosophers generally agree that irrespective of how terrorism is defined, the identity 
of the actor will be irrelevant to the nature and character of the activity. As Primoratz 
explains, ‘If some acts of state agents are basically similar to and exhibit the same 
morally relevant traits as acts of non-state agencies commonly termed terrorist, that 
will clearly determine our moral understanding and evaluation of both’ (2004: 114). 
Distinguishing state violence from terrorism proper (or even state terrorism from non-
state terrorism) when the basic nature and character of violence is the same violates 
the fundamental philosophical principle of consistency, which requires that we judge 
similar acts similarly for ‘one cannot perform virtually identical acts and judge them 
differently unless they differ in morally relevant aspects’ (Holmes, 1989: 196-197). 
The principle of consistency has made philosophers deeply skeptical of the provision 
of supreme emergency and the doctrine of double effect that not only grant state 
violence some form of immunity but supposedly also distinguish it from terrorism 
(See e.g. Coady, 1985; Rodin, 2004; McPherson, 2007). This, they believe, creates a 
double standard, which is both morally and analytically unsustainable. As Valls 
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argues ‘From a philosophical point of view, this double standard cannot be 
sustained… consistency requires that we apply the same standards to both kinds of 
political violence, state and non-state’ (2000: 66). 
Borrowing from the field of philosophy, the critical position made an active and 
robust case for actor neutrality and accordingly dismissed all approaches and 
definitions that categorically excluded states and tied the nature of terrorism to non-
state actors. Richard Jackson, for instance believes that ‘the actor-based definition of 
terrorism which excludes states from employing terrorism is not only intellectually 
untenable, it is absurd’ (2008: 383). Kaplan similarly argues that it is important to 
have a definition of terrorism that allows ‘flexibility regarding agency’ (2009: 187). 
While actor neutrality is the most outstanding feature of the critical position, it is by 
no means exclusive to it. As discussed already, the classic orthodox position has also 
routinely advocated actor neutrality. From Wilkinson’s contention that the tendency 
to apply the term ‘terrorism exclusively to substate groups is blatantly dishonest and 
self-serving’ (2000: 1) to Crenshaw’s assertion that ‘the identity of the actor does not 
matter to the specification of the method’ (2011: 4), the classic orthodox position has 
espoused actor neutrality since the inception of the field of terrorism studies. English 
has pithily observed this predicament, he argues that ‘many non-CST scholars would 
agree that states as well as non-state groups practice terrorism and that state terrorism 
should be studied’ (2009: 378). In light of such assertions, critical position’s dismissal 
of the entire orthodox scholarship as non-state centric appears fairly unwarranted. 
Such critical objections though certainly harsh are nevertheless justified insofar as the 
research agenda of classic orthodox position is concerned. As despite its claims of 
actor neutrality, the orthodox scholarship as a whole has largely failed to study state 
terrorism in any rigorous sense and focuses almost entirely on non-state terrorism. 
Critical scholars argue that merely suggesting that terrorism is independent of the 
actor does not constitute an active research agenda, nor does it alter the fact that 
orthodox scholarship is almost entirely non-state centric. Ruth Blakeley, for instance, 
criticizes the orthodox assertion that many leading scholars including Wilkinson have 
repeatedly acknowledged state terrorism and points out that ‘Occasional 
acknowledgements on Wilkinson’s part do not constitute a research agenda’ (2008: 
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154). The critical position therefore finds the orthodox claims to actor neutrality both 
toothless and deceptive. 
In spite of classic orthodoxy’s otherwise assertions, non-state centricity and state 
neglect has indeed been a regular feature of terrorism studies since its infancy. This 
latent capacity of the discourse to focus primarily on non-state terrorism became more 
deeply entrenched and pronounced over time. Finally, with the rise of the extreme 
orthodox position, which rejected the actor neutrality of classic orthodoxy and 
promoted a strict actor centric approach, non-state centricity in many ways became a 
defining characteristic of the orthodox scholarship. 
The problem was additionally compounded by classic orthodoxy’s failure to address 
the issue adequately. Even though it had robustly challenged and resisted extreme 
orthodoxy’s most outstanding characteristics, it did not (or simply could not) 
challenge its actor centric advocacy. Clearly this was primarily due to its own neglect 
that had permitted non-state centricity to thrive and flourish in the first place. 
Nevertheless, as a result of its failure, mainstream terrorism scholarship became 
profoundly non-state centric, which subsequently made its claims to actor neutrality 
appear superfluous and insincere. 
Critical scholarship’s grievances regarding state neglect and non-state centricity of 
mainstream terrorism studies are therefore well founded. However, while such 
grievances may partially be justified, it is important to remember that orthodox 
discourse’s non-state centricity is to a large extent not entirely by design (as is 
generally presumed by the critical position). As discussed earlier, there are a range of 
external factors that encourage non-state centricity and prevent scholars from doing 
little more than occasionally acknowledging state terrorism. 
In fact, given the wide range of problems (not to mention the dominance of the actor 
centric extreme orthodox position), classic orthodoxy’s continuous insistence on 
observing actor neutrality is at least partially commendable. This by no means is to 
excuse it entirely, as it often focuses on non-state terrorism simply because it is the 
convenient option, but to understand the underlying variables that additionally force it 
to be non-state centric despite its pronounced objections. As many of these variables 
(such as state-funded research, disproportionate media attention of non-state terrorism 
etc.) continue to influence and direct the non-state centric research agenda of the 
	242 
terrorism scholarship. Thus, even though non-state centricity is neither admirable nor 
particularly desirable, it is at least understandable. It is precisely this understanding 
that is categorically missing from the deeply skeptical critical scholarship. 
The critical position certainly offers some very interesting insights into the problem of 
terrorism. Among other things, it has played an important role in deconstructing 
certain myths and taboos that were often associated with terrorism, especially after the 
rise of the extreme orthodox position (See e.g. Stohl, 2008; Zulaika and Douglas, 
2008; Sluka, 2008). Additionally, it has also shed light on how the pejorative 
undertone of the term is frequently used as a political tool to delegitimize opponents 
(See e.g. Herring, 2008; Sorenson, 2009; Bartolucci, 2010). Most importantly, it has 
not been afraid to show how states, including Western liberal democracies actively 
utilize and benefit from the tool of terrorism (See e.g. Burke, 2008; Jackson, 2012). 
However, where its post-modern and critical predisposition offered original and fresh 
insight into the problem of terrorism, there it also prompted a complete and total 
rejection of the entire orthodox scholarship. With its focus on knowledge-power 
interplay, the critical position was more concerned about showing how the existing 
knowledge on terrorism serves the interests of states and powerful elites. Though 
many of its contentions are indeed justified (as demonstrated by the continued 
importance and relevance of the extreme orthodox position), its strict adherence to 
post-modern and critical ideals prevented it from realizing that there was more to 
terrorism scholarship than just state bias and power subservience. Moreover, as it 
blamed knowledge-power partiality for state neglect, it failed to also acknowledge the 
multitude of problems academics face while studying state terrorism (ironically many 
of such problems later prevented it from studying state terrorism as well). 
The rise of the critical studies was a direct response to the dominance of the extreme 
orthodox position and although commendable at the time, its inability to see past it 
has been regrettable. Led by its uncompromising theoretical standpoint, the critical 
position painted the entire terrorism scholarship with a broad brush, refusing to 
acknowledge any provision or exception. Ultimately the entire discourse was cast in 
the same light as the extreme orthodox position. This myopic viewpoint prevented it 
from ever realizing the existence of the classic orthodox position, with which it shared 
many of its key assertions. 
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With criticism of terrorism scholarship at its heart and a normative claim to 
emancipate the study of terrorism, critical studies put forth a very confusing and 
complicated research agenda. For most observers, the critical scholarship primarily 
offered nothing more than an active critique of terrorism scholarship that had very 
little to do with terrorism itself (See e.g. Weinberg and Eubank, 2008; Jones and 
Smith; 2010). Not to discredit some important work that has been done in the field, 
but there is certainly some truth to this claim. Due to its theoretical assertion that no 
knowledge is neutral, coupled with its failure to see past the extreme orthodox 
position, the critical position to a large extent has indeed been consumed by its 
unequivocal and outright condemnation of the entire terrorism scholarship. Owing to 
its strong and persistent distrust of mainstream terrorism scholarship, the impact of 
critical position has largely been restricted to its strict adherents. As opposed to the 
other two positions therefore, the critical position due to its fairly limited appeal was 
never the dominant position in the discourse. 
By choosing to ignore the common ground it shared with classic orthodoxy and 
reclining instead to a position of deep discontent and antipathy, the critical position in 
spite all its potential advantages, failed to achieve any noticeable impact. Most 
orthodox terrorism scholars were understandably unconvinced of its uncompromising 
criticism and therefore did not take it seriously. Moreover, its preference to stay 
outside mainstream terrorism scholarship further contributed to it being sidelined. 
This ultimately reduced the critical approach to a mere accusatory and denunciatory 
position that was increasingly isolated and ignored. 
It is important to point out in the end that although the critical position formally came 
to limelight after the launch of the journal CST in 2008, the position itself is not new. 
Despite its claims of an independent and separate research agenda, shades of it are 
visible in the orthodox terrorism literature as well. This is because scholars of 
different theoretical dispositions, including critical thought have long contributed to 
mainstream terrorism scholarship. Many orthodox scholars, for instance, have long 
been self-reflective and critical of the existing research practices in terrorism 
scholarship (See e.g. Crenshaw, 1992; Schmid, 1998; Silke, 2001). Similarly, many 
other scholars have noted the problem of knowledge-power interplay and how the 
pejorative undertone of the term terrorism is employed for relative political advantage 
(See e.g. Wardlaw, 1989; Teichman, 1989; Herman and O’Sullivan, 1990). And as 
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pointed out earlier, many orthodox scholars also routinely grant justificatory space to 
terrorism and have visibly been critical of state neglect. 
The critical approach is therefore neither new nor unique, nor does it stand in 
complete opposition to orthodox scholarship as it proudly claims. Thus although with 
the launch of the CST journal, it sought to isolate itself from mainstream terrorism 
scholarship as a distinct, unique, and oppositional position, however the only thing 
unique about the self-styled post-2008 critical position is its complete and total 
rejection of the orthodox scholarship. 
 
Discussion 
It is clear from our analysis that all three academic positions come with a host of 
problems. This is of course not to say that all three are equally problematic. The 
extreme orthodox position with its strict moral opposition undermines the 
longstanding conceptual and theoretical edifice of terrorism. It is therefore detrimental 
to the study of terrorism and clearly also the most problematic of the three positions. 
In comparison, the critical position neither undermines nor challenges any of the 
fundamental assumptions regarding terrorism. Nevertheless, its total and complete 
disregard for mainstream terrorism scholarship has prevented it from not only being 
an effective position but from also realizing the common ground it shares with the 
classic orthodox position. Its uncompromising oppositional standpoint and a failure to 
have any significant impact continue to cause friction in the discourse. 
Lastly, the classic orthodox position is quite visibly the least problematic of the three 
positions. Even though it has its due share of problems (state neglect and non-state 
centricity being the most standout), yet it is the only position that has persistently 
defended what is most fundamental to terrorism, even when it faced a strong and 
formidable onslaught by the extreme orthodox position. It is also the only position 
that does not take an extreme moral viewpoint. Admittedly, due to a shared 
conception of the problem of terrorism, it does somewhat tend to lean towards the 
critical end of the spectrum. However, where the critical position tends to be 
overcritical of state terrorism and over defensive of non-state terrorism, the classic 
orthodox position (conceptually speaking) is able to keep some form of moral 
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neutrality, at least in comparison with the two extreme positions. Out of the three 
positions therefore, the classic orthodox is clearly the most pragmatic and outward 
looking position. 
It was pointed out at the beginning of the chapter that the three positions are not 
entirely exclusive, as there tends to be significant overlap between all of them. It is 
important to point out now that this overlap is essentially between the two extremes 
and the classic orthodox position and not between the two extremes themselves. This 
is because the difference between the two extremes is so vast and their denouncement 
of each other is so pronounced that there can be no common ground between them. 
Regardless of the dominance of any position, academics adhering to opposite 
extremes will never be swayed otherwise. The only trespassing permitted therefore is 
between one of the two extremes and the classic orthodoxy. This is because where the 
extreme positions tend to fairly rigid in their outlook and disposition, the classic 
orthodox tends to be somewhat flexible and accommodating. 
Nevertheless, despite any overlap and trespassing, the three positions are in their own 
unique way fairly distinct (especially the two extremes) and can therefore be easily 
discerned in light of the analysis provided in this chapter. However, even if these 
positions exist and can easily be discerned, are they in any way useful? More 
importantly, can these positions help us better understand the problem of terrorism? 
These questions may seem elementary but they are also important and necessary. 
Indeed, most academics will first question the merit and utility of this academic 
categorization. 
As mentioned at the start of the chapter, a failure to understand terrorism owes as 
much (if not more) to the competing, conflicting, and contradictory academic 
positions as to the complex nature of terrorism. In fact, the widespread assertion that 
terrorism is a deeply contested term is essentially an indictment of constant academic 
failings and not of terrorism itself. Therefore, in order to understand terrorism and to 
make it less contested, it is imperative that we first try and make sense of the 
academic scholarship that claims to study it. Given the profoundly confusing state of 
terrorism scholarship, this classification is not only necessary but also long overdue. 
Although it must be pointed out here that while the three positions outlined in this 
chapter are a first, attempt to structure and discipline the study of terrorism is 
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certainly not (See e.g. Hermon and O’Sulivan, 1989; Schmid, 1998). The most recent 
of such attempts has been made by Lisa Stampnitzky. 
Stampnitzky pithily observes that ‘neither the problem of terrorism nor the field of 
terrorism expertise has been fully disciplined’ (2013: 7). She takes note of the fact 
that that during the 1970s a discourse that was previously ‘organized around 
insurgency’ shifted to ‘one organized around the concept of terrorism’ (p. 49-50). 
This new framework of terrorism, she argued would recast ‘incidents as the acts of 
pathological, irrational actors, precluding its application to the actions of states or 
legitimate actors’ (p. 9). In Stampnitzky’s opinion therefore, the discourse since its 
inception viewed terrorism as inherently immoral and pathological. In her own words, 
‘Discourse about the inherent immorality of terrorism has centrally shaped the 
possibilities for the creation of both knowledge about terrorism and terrorism experts 
themselves’ (p. 8). 
While Stampnitzky’s efforts are certainly commendable, she falls for the same trap as 
critical scholars. Her portrayal of terrorism expertise does not account for the classic 
orthodox position, which does not view terrorism as immoral and pathological. Like 
critical scholars, she fails to see past the more visible and pronounced extreme 
orthodox position. Although she identifies a ‘core group’ or ‘terrorism mafia’ that was 
‘at the centre of the emerging terrorism studies world, who took on the project of 
making the field a legitimate area of study’ (p. 42) and ‘were most invested in 
maintaining a professional/academic direction to the field’ (p. 47), her categorical 
denouncement of the entire terrorism expertise makes such assertions appear 
completely out of place. 
Thus, even though her work is important intellectual contribution, it clearly has its 
limitations. Such limitations however are not just characteristic of her work but of all 
similar attempts to understand terrorism scholarship, as they all categorically fail to 
distinguish between the classic and the extreme orthodox positions. It is precisely this 
failure that has prompted this study. 
Terrorism scholarship has faced intense academic scrutiny ever since the war on 
terrorism floundered and the façade of the extreme orthodox position was exposed. 
Although such criticism is mostly undiscerning, it is primarily intended for the 
extreme orthodox position. Schwartz et al. for instance are critical of terrorism 
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scholars in general because they ‘adopt an antagonistic and condescending view of 
terrorists- one that precludes a full perceptive understanding of their goals’ (2009: 
539). Their criticism is clearly intended for scholars that adhere to the extreme 
orthodox position, however their failure to acknowledge any distinction in the 
scholarship, erroneously prompts them to criticize it in its entirety. Thus, in the 
absence of formal categorization, all such criticisms and attacks are like stray arrows 
that are aimed blindly at the entire terrorism discourse. 
As opposed to such impetuous and blanket criticisms and assertions, the model 
outlined in this chapter is therefore clearly a more accurate representation of terrorism 
scholarship. By isolating the extreme orthodox from the classic orthodox position, it 
contextualizes and standardizes much of the criticism that erroneously engulfs the 
entire terrorism expertise. It is important to also remember that terrorism is first and 
foremost an essentially contested term. Any attempt to understand it would therefore 
be futile if the approaches utilized to study terrorism are muddled and obscure to 
begin with. Only through such realization can we make terrorism less contested and 






The contest over the precise meaning of terrorism is unlikely to subside in the years to 
come. While this may be true, it should at least be possible to get rid of some of the 
longstanding redundancies that have needlessly complicated the problem of terrorism. 
Over the course of this thesis, several notable redundancies have been identified that 
continue to exist despite being visibly unnecessary. For example, it is a fairly 
common practice to simultaneously use all the categories of civilian, non-combatant, 
and innocent or in varying combinations to describe the victim of terrorism when the 
non-combatant category alone sufficiently incorporates the other two. Similarly, it is 
exceedingly common to use the terms random and indiscriminate together. Such a 
practice is needlessly excessive as the term indiscriminate adequately incorporates 
randomness. Whether terrorism is ultimately indiscriminate or targets non-combatants 
is beside the point here. A discourse that is already laden with complex jargons and 
terminologies could certainly do without such redundancies. I will now to move on to 
the central question of whether terrorism can be defined, the answer to which 
expectedly is not a straightforward one. 
It has become evident through our discussion that terrorism is essentially a deeply 
contested term and while an understanding of different academic positions can offer 
significant clarity, it cannot and will not provide a solution to the definition of 
terrorism. Defining a highly politicized and an inherently pejorative term was always 
going to be a difficult and grueling undertaking. Over the years therefore, serious 
commentators in the field have attempted to disassociate the nature of terrorism from 
its highly politicized and pejorative undertone. Their efforts have produced countless 
models and definitions, which despite being diverse and inconsistent allude to certain 
common themes and features that have been remarkably consistent. It is these 
recurring themes that have been subjected to a rigorous examination in this thesis. 
This thesis has identified three major themes in the discourse: terror, victim, and 
actor. And while the conclusions drawn in relation to each of these themes are not 
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particularly distinct, their analysis nevertheless was able to offer several fresh and 
original insights into the problem of terrorism. 
The first chapter grappled with the problem of terror and whether or not terrorism 
generates fear. Although its conclusion that an act or threat of terrorism (since it 
disrupts social life) will always generate fear is not very different from similar 
assertions in the wider terrorism discourse, the manner in which this conclusion was 
arrived at however, offered visible original insights. Among other things, it was able 
to provide an answer to one of the most widely debated questions of whether terrorist 
generation of fear is necessarily deliberate. 
The debate over deliberate generation of fear is often forestalled due to moral 
considerations on the one hand and practical considerations on the other. At the moral 
end it is believed that the deliberate factor makes terrorism immoral, whereas on the 
practical side it is argued that without the deliberate factor terrorism cannot be 
distinguished from other forms of violence. Through carefully discerning the 
philosophical roots of terrorism, the chapter was able to show how a Hobbesian 
conception of society can explain deliberate generation of fear while its Lockean 
counterpart can account for it as an unintended by-product. In other words, the model 
provided satisfies both the moral and the practical side of the ongoing argument. This 
is certainly an important contribution given that the question of deliberate generation 
of fear has frustrated many academics over the years. 
The second chapter analyzed in detail the academic debate over the victim of 
terrorism. Although it too arrived at a somewhat conventional conclusion (that 
terrorism as of necessity targets or threatens non-combatants), yet in the process of 
doing so, it provided several notable insights into some complex problems (the moral 
problem in particular) that are typically associated with the category of victim. It put 
forth a moral continuum that challenges the conventional wisdom that there are only 
two types of moral attitudes towards terrorism- one that grants it a justificatory space 
and the other that condemns it unequivocally. Instead it proposes that in between the 
two opposing viewpoints, there are passive approaches that can lean towards either 
side of the moral spectrum. The proposed continuum therefore is a more accurate 
representation of moral attitudes towards terrorism than the prevailing black and 
white assertions. 
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As the chapter further explored a number of important intervening variables 
(deliberate and indiscriminate in particular), it was able to uncover some longstanding 
inconsistencies in the discourse that mostly go unnoticed. It demonstrated how 
scholars on both ends of the moral continuum often identify the exact same set of 
variables and yet curiously enough arrive at completely opposite moral conclusions. 
This observation (as will become clear at the end of this conclusion) exposes the 
moral façade of terrorism as it proves that academics clearly don’t know what makes 
terrorism immoral. 
The most outstanding contribution of the chapter however has been its treatment of 
the problem of innocence, responsibility and justification of terrorist violence. 
Responsibility and innocence have traditionally been treated as incompatible. This 
incompatibility has been utilized on both sides of the moral continuum to make a case 
for or against terrorism. Adherents of the amoral position argue that victims of 
terrorism are innocent because they bear no visible responsibility for some real or 
perceived wrongdoing. Whereas on the other hand, strict followers of the moral 
position utilize the logic of collective responsibility to show that the victims of 
terrorism can be held responsible for a wrongdoing and are therefore not innocent in 
the strict sense of the term.82 This has resulted in an impasse with both sides failing to 
understand that the relationship between responsibility and innocence is not one-
dimensional. To resolve this dilemma, the chapter put forth the concept of imposed 
responsibility, which explains how it is possible to be responsible for a wrongdoing 
while still being innocent. By showing how a responsibility can involuntarily be 
imposed, it not only attests to the rationality of terrorism but also leaves room for 
voluntary responsibility and subsequent justification of terrorist violence. 
The third and the fourth chapter meticulously engaged with the final theme regarding 
the identity of the terrorist actor. The problem of terrorist identity has clearly received 
more attention than any other issue or theme in this thesis. Part of the reason for such 
preferential treatment was to make up for state neglect and non-state centricity, which 
is characteristic of terrorism discourse. More importantly however, the identity of the 
                                                
82 Targeting innocents that bear no responsibility for a wrongdoing not only strips terrorism of its 
justification but also borders irrationality, which explains why the moral position has been extremely 
wary of it. 
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actor is a serious contentious point primarily because it threatens any attempt to 
separate the nature of terrorism from its highly politicized and pejorative undertone. 
Indeed if terrorism is associated with a certain class of actors in the society its nature 
will subsequently be corrupted, unless of course identity is part of the very nature of 
terrorism, which precisely is the underlying contention of the prominent actor centric 
approach. 
The actor centric approach ties the activity of terrorism to non-state actors and argues 
that the two are inseparable. Although strict adherence to the actor centric approach is 
not particularly widespread, the common inference of the term terrorism coupled with 
a discourse that is inherently non-state centric, extends considerable passive support 
to it. To understand why the actor centric approach commands such active and passive 
support, it was important to examine all the factors that encourage state neglect and 
non-state centricity. 
Thus over the course of the analysis, several important factors were carefully and 
methodically discussed, which conclusively rejected the actor centric approach and 
confirmed the assertion that the nature of terrorism is indeed independent of the actor. 
The most notable factor to emerge out of this discussion was the theatrical attribute of 
terrorism. Although it is one of the most frequently cited qualities of terrorism, there 
surprisingly has never been a concerted academic attempt to understand it in its 
entirety. Most academics simply take the theatrical attribute at face value and that 
essentially has been the problem all along. Treating the theatrical attribute as self-
explanatory misleadingly suggests that it is only applicable to non-state actors. 
Understood in terms of terrorism’s inherent propensity to influence an audience 
through a threat or act of dramatic violence, the theatrical attribute raises a number of 
utilitarian objections that typically bar states from practicing terrorism. 
It is generally believed that the advantage terrorism offers through its theatrical 
attribute is limited and short-term and can only benefit relatively weak or powerless 
actors in the society that have no other violent options available to them. Since states 
by virtue of their advantageous power position in the society have a range of violent 
alternatives at their disposal, therefore they would not risk a political backlash (due to 
the pejorative nature of the term) for some low yielding short-term benefits that 
terrorism offers. The merits of this prevailing logic, however, were subsequently 
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quashed and it was shown that not only do states stand to benefit from terrorism but 
also their potential benefits from it outweigh those of non-state actors. 
Since terrorism primarily offers only limited and short-term success (as painstakingly 
shown in the chapter), a state may therefore utilize it for its immediate or interim 
objectives while ultimately relying on other forms of violence to achieve its long-term 
objectives. In comparison, most non-state actors simply cannot pick and choose a 
form of violence that corresponds to their needs. Constrained by their capabilities, 
they may have no other option but to resort to terrorism even when it is clearly not the 
best option. In other words, as opposed to states, non-state actors cannot always 
utilize terrorism optimally. This observation not only turns the conventional utilitarian 
logic on its head but also challenges the moral comparisons drawn between state and 
non-state terrorism. For where terrorism could be a last or only resort for non-state 
actors, there it is simply a choice among other options for state actors.83 
If terrorism is a rational goal-driven activity, as is generally believed, then its utility 
could hold the key to both its definition and understanding. The theatrical attribute, as 
we have seen, epitomizes the benefits terrorism offers. Its importance to terrorism’s 
conceptual and theoretical edifice cannot therefore be trivialized. This thesis, for that 
reason, has attempted to provide one of the most detailed and comprehensive accounts 
of the theatrical attribute, in the hope that it will not only address current failings but 
also considerably further our overall understanding of the terrorism problem. 
While the first four chapters engaged with themes that are frequently discussed in 
terrorism scholarship, the last two dealt with issues that are either neglected or simply 
ignored. Chapter five ambitiously sets out to conceptualize terrorism as a tactic, 
strategy, and ideology. By strongly contesting the ideological view of terrorism, it 
rejects the idea that terrorism has an independent freestanding existence. Instead it 
argues that terrorism can only exist in an auxiliary sense whereby it can be taken up 
either as a tactic or a strategy in other forms of violence. This classification, it has 
been argued, can potentially resolve our longstanding confusion over labelling an 
actor terrorist. As a choice between tactical and strategic use of terrorism can help 
determine whether an actor can be labelled terrorist properly. Additionally, this 
                                                
83 This is considering that both actors want to achieve their goals through violent means. 
	 253 
classification also provides an answer to the question of when and if fear is generated 
deliberately. 
Although the model presented in the chapter is somewhat rudimentary and arguably 
controversial, it is nevertheless an important first step in the right direction to address 
some key issues that are normally deemed irresolvable. The pejorative undertone of 
the term terrorism discourages scholars from conceptualizing or engaging with issues 
that are deemed overly politicized and divisive. This model, however, stands in 
opposition to all such claims. It shows that it is possible to engage with complex 
politicized issues (such as labelling an actor terrorist) in an objective and 
dispassionate manner. 
The last chapter of the thesis methodically engages with the discourse on terrorism. 
Since terrorism is first and foremost a deeply contested term, such an undertaking was 
a necessary concluding task. For in order to make terrorism less contested, it is vitally 
important to make sense of the academic discipline that claims to study it. Given the 
chaotic state of terrorism scholarship and the half-hearted attempts to address this 
problem thus far, the chapter offers a timely and crucial contribution. By reflecting on 
the brief history of terrorism scholarship and the reasons that led to its emergence, it 
not only exposes the unstable and very questionable roots of the field but also shows 
how problems compounded over time. 
The discourse on terrorism formally emerged primarily in response to the increasingly 
disproportionate attention terrorism was receiving from media than any real or 
perceptible change on ground. As the media actively distanced the act of terrorism 
from its wider socio-political context, it encouraged two opposing moral positions. 
Those who were swayed by the disproportionate attention the act of terrorism 
received, were subsequently consumed by the horrors of the act and adopted therefore 
a strong moral opposition to terrorism. Whereas others that saw beyond the physical 
act were able to acknowledge the wider context of terrorism and observe some form 
of moral neutrality. The seeds for discord and division were thus sown just when the 
field of terrorism studies was still in its infancy. These conflicting moral positions 
failed to either give or permit a clear direction or path to the field of terrorism studies. 
Unable to gain any suitable direction at the time of its inception, the field instead 
fragmented and fractured along these deeply entrenched moral lines. 
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In the beginning there were essentially two moral positions in the terrorism 
scholarship: those who strictly opposed terrorism (extreme orthodox) and others that 
observed some form of moral neutrality (classic orthodox). Over time however, as the 
moral opposition to terrorism intensified and gained ground, a strand of moral 
neutrality became exceedingly defensive and ultimately isolated itself from 
mainstream terrorism scholarship, judging the latter to have been corrupted by strict 
and uncompromising moral opposition to terrorism. This reactionary position, 
identifying itself as the critical position, lashed out at orthodox terrorism scholarship 
and denounced it altogether. In doing so however, it failed to acknowledge not only 
its own roots but also the longstanding classic orthodox position with which it shared 
much common ground.84 Its inability to see past the extreme orthodox position and 
acknowledge common ground with the classic orthodox position still continues to 
encourage division and conflict in the discourse, which regrettably reinforces and 
inflates the assertion that terrorism is a deeply contested term. 
Over the course of our analysis it has become evident that all aspects of terrorism, in 
one way or another, are influenced by the moral factor. This is because the prevailing 
understanding of terrorism by and large has been determined not by some independent 
line of inquiry but instead by a strong interplay between different moral positions 
outlined in this thesis. It is therefore understandable why many academics believe that 
terrorism is essentially a moral problem. 
There is indeed no denying that the interplay between terrorism and morality has been 
a major stumbling block that has up until now prevented scholars from understanding 
and defining terrorism. While this is true, it is important to understand that the 
problem essentially is not with morality and nature of terrorism per se, but instead 
with academics being locked down to their respective moral standpoints. This is not to 
say that the nature of terrorism does not raise moral concerns, but more so to point out 
that it is not responsible for our failure to understand or define terrorism as is 
generally assumed. 
To maintain that the morally problematic nature of terrorism is responsible for the 
existing conceptual and theoretical stalemate, there should at least first be an 
                                                
84 This is not to say that the critical position did not take any inspiration from the Frankfurt School, but 
more so to point out the basic understanding of terrorism it shared with orthodox scholarship. 
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agreement on what makes terrorism morally reprehensible. However, as this thesis 
has shown, there is no academic consensus on what makes terrorism morally 
problematic. For some scholars it is simply because terrorism generates fear, while for 
others it is because it targets civilians or non-combatants. For others still, terrorism is 
immoral because it is carried out by non-state actors that have no legitimate or legal 
authority to use violence. Lack of agreement on what makes terrorism morally 
problematic clearly demonstrates that there is no standout characteristic inherent to 
terrorism’s nature that makes it distinctly immoral. On the contrary, it confirms our 
assertion that academics have different moral standpoints that prompt them to 
associate one or the other attribute of terrorism to immorality. 
It is important to also understand that subjective moral judgments on terrorism are not 
in any way unique to it, as we normally maintain different moral positions regarding 
almost all aspects of social life. Our failure to understand or define terrorism should 
therefore not be pinned down on terrorism’s inherent immorality, but our own 
subjective moral standpoints and an inability to see past them and understand the true 
nature of terrorism. 
This true nature of terrorism has evaded scholars ever since a formal inquiry into the 
problem was launched. Treated sometimes as a method or tactic and at other times as 
a distinct form of violence, the nature of terrorism remains elusive, while a failure to 
understand it is conveniently blamed on the moral problem. Contrary to this, it will be 
argued here that the main obstacle to understanding the nature of terrorism is not its 
inherent morality or immorality but instead our treatment of it as a distinct form of 
violence and the confusion over whether or not it is a method. 
Treating terrorism as a method or as a distinct form of violence has created some 
fundamental misunderstandings and misconceptions over the years that continue to 
elude and confuse us. This is because in reality terrorism neither fully functions as a 
method nor entirely qualifies as a distinct form of violence. When seen as a method, 
terrorism will inadvertently be confused with ordinary violent methods and practices 
(such as assassination or kidnapping) that are otherwise clearly not terroristic. On the 
other hand, seeing it as a form of violence contradicts academic claims that terrorism 
can be used as a tactic or strategy in other forms of violence. 
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I will therefore conclude that terrorism is neither a method nor a form of violence. It 
is not a method because not only does it require several intervening variables but also 
because the specification of the method is ultimately irrelevant to the all-important 
effect terrorism inflicts. It cannot also be a form of violence, because unlike other 
forms of violence terrorism does not have a freestanding or tangible existence.85 
Instead, it has been argued in this thesis that terrorism can perhaps best be described 
in an auxiliary sense, whereby it can be used as a tactic or strategy in other forms of 
violence. In a sense therefore, terrorism can perhaps best be described as an affix that 
gives certain characteristics to a form of violence or movement it is attached to. 
While it is true that terrorism plays a supplementary role in other forms of violence, 
the idea of terrorism being auxiliary can also misleadingly suggest that it is a method 
or a form of violence. This is not to say that terrorism does not exist in an auxiliary 
sense but only to point out that the suggestion could and has easily been misconstrued 
to mean something that terrorism is clearly not. This is because when understood to 
be auxiliary, terrorism sits somewhat uncomfortably between a method and a form of 
violence. And since there is no standard criterion to account for such positioning, it is 
easily confused with both. In fact, it is due to being awkwardly placed as such that 
terrorism is sometimes regarded as a method and at other times as a form of violence. 
Much work therefore needs to be done to conceptualize terrorism in an auxiliary 
sense, as all our existing categories and classifications fail to adequately account for 
it.86 
However, despite being seriously under-theorized, the auxiliary sense clearly best 
captures the essence of terrorism. It is able to show that as opposed to being a method 
or a form of violence, terrorism only plays a facilitatory or supplementary role. It 
therefore not only accounts for the intangible nature of terrorism but also effectively 
outlines its rationale and purpose, whereby terrorism mainly or only exists to provide 
some distinct benefits that can be utilized in any form of violence. Thus, if terrorism 
only stands to provide a facilitatory or supplementary role, then the key to 
understanding its true nature clearly lies in its utility and function. 
                                                
85 This is not to say that other forms of violence have a completely freestanding existence as they too 
depend on several intervening variables. However, unlike terrorism, they do not have an auxiliary 
existence whereby they depend on other forms of violence to survive or transpire. 
86 This in part explains why terrorism throughout this thesis has been referred to and at times even 
treated as a form of violence in this thesis. 
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The utility of terrorism, as we know, is encapsulated in the theatrical attribute of 
terrorism. By means of which, terrorism offers the unique advantage of recognition 
and attention with minimum cost and effort. This is achieved through psychologically 
influencing an audience with a credible threat of harm. The advantage, however, can 
only be realized if terrorism targets (or threatens to target) the right people that can 
serve as message generators for its target audience. Moreover, for recognition and 
attention or simply effective publicity, it is extremely important that terrorism grabs 
the attention of media, its primary and in many ways sole communicative platform. 
For this it not only needs to target the right people but also ensure that its threat is 
credible and newsworthy. 
Given that terrorism has an auxiliary existence, whereby it can only play a 
supplementary or facilitatory role, the advantages terrorism offers are in many ways 
representative of its true nature and can and should therefore be utilized to not only 
understand but also define terrorism. This of course does not mean that terrorism 
should simply be defined in terms of publicity or attention and recognition. Instead, 
what is important is the manner in which these benefits are generated, that not only 
explains why they are cost-effective but also how they are unique to terrorism. Since 
these benefits are essentially generated through psychologically influencing an 
audience with some credible threat of harm, terrorism should therefore be defined and 
understood accordingly. 
As the advantage terrorism offers can only be realized if it targets the right people that 
not only serve as message generators but are also newsworthy, it may at first glance 
appear difficult to identify individuals in each society that can serve this specific 
purpose. However, given that every society can broadly be divided into two 
categories, combatants and non-combatants, and only an attack or its threat directed 
towards the latter (due to reasons discussed in chapter 2) will send a message to a 
target audience and generate headlines, it is possible to identify the victims of 
terrorism as non-combatants. Moreover, as opposed to combatants, non-combatants 
are not engaged in active combat and so any harm or threat directed towards them will 
affect the social life and psychology of the individuals and whether intended or not, 
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will also subsequently generate fear (as outlined in chapter 1).87 It is important to also 
note that the advantage of terrorism ultimately materializes through the 
disproportionate attention provided by media, which further inflates and fosters the 
element of fear, making it indispensible to terrorism. 
In addition to the benefits terrorism offers it is important not to forget its two 
elementary characteristics, political and rational. While a definition of terrorism must 
specify the political factor, there is no need to categorically refer to its rationality. 
Terrorism being political and purposive should in itself suggest that terrorism is a 
rational activity. Thus in light of our analysis, it is proposed here that terrorism should 
be defined as a fear generating political activity that psychologically influences an 
audience by means of targeting or threatening to target non-combatants with a 
credible threat of harm. 
It is worth mentioning again that terrorism is essentially an auxiliary tool that is 
utilized in different forms of violence. Critics of this model will point to isolated or 
independent acts of terrorism and argue that terrorism can have an independent 
existence. However, it is important to remember that terrorism is first and foremost 
political and even seemingly isolated acts of terrorism are connected to some wider 
social and political movements, and even if they are not, they may still represent some 
wider political sentiments that may inspire similar events in future or at least present a 
threat as such, and in case of terrorism, a credible threat is often more important than 
the act itself. Terrorism, in other words, can never occur in a vacuum. 
Seen in an auxiliary sense, terrorism then is a process, not a method or a distinct form 
of violence. The nature of terrorism, as reflected in its definition, is remarkably 
consistent over time and is therefore neither revolutionary nor evolutionary, which 
                                                
87 Combatants are not representatives of the broader society and an attack directed towards them will 
not resonate with a target audience. An attack on combatants fails to psychologically influence a 
broader audience and is viewed in a military context, it does not for that reason have the same dramatic 




should once and for all put an end to the debate that it is old, new, or even protean.88 
Terrorism is not a moral problem as it is made out to be. The problem is with our 
failure to acknowledge its true nature that defies our standard categories and 
classifications. As long as terrorism is regarded as a method or a distinct form of 
violence, its true nature will continue to elude and confuse us. 
 
 
                                                
88 Academics that suggest otherwise are often swayed by technological developments or the novelty of 
methods employed. However, specification of a method as we know is irrelevant and has no effect on 
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